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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the last decades, paid domestic work – which in its broad definition includes both 
housework and care work – has received increased attention in Europe, both at the academic 
and the policy level. The reasons for the increased attention paid to this often ‘invisible’ 
segment of the labour market are not only linked to the overall increase of the domestic sector 
in most European countries and globally, but also to the problems raised by this type of work, 
which, for a variety of reasons, seems to be different from any other employment relationship.  
On the one hand, the economic and societal changes that have occurred in the last few 
decades – the growing inequalities in the new global economy, but also among developed 
countries; societal, economic and demographic changes, such as the transformations in family 
models, the increased female participation in the labour market and the ageing of the 
population; and the general erosion of welfare states, among others – are often pointed as the 
main factors that have contributed to the increased externalisation of domestic activities. This, 
coupled with the tension generated by the persistent gendered division of labour, has 
generated a rich debate on the consequences of the externalisation of domestic services and 
also on its implications in terms of gender, class and race. 
On the other hand, as highlighted by scholars, paid domestic work is different from other 
employment relationships, because it is performed in the private sphere, because it is based on 
a gendered and very private form of power relationships, because it is linked to the concept of 
dirtiness and because it involves both physical and emotional labour (Anderson, 2000; Lutz, 
2008, 2010; Triandafyllidou and Marchetti, 2015). Additionally, some scholars have stressed 
that domestic work tends to raise questions of inequality – among couples, between the 
employer and the domestic worker and between wealthier and poorer regions of the world –, 
because it recalls the concept of servitude (Rollins, 1985; Cox, 2006) and because it can 
hardly be separated from the unpaid work traditionally performed by women. This partly 
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explains the fact that the attempts made by European governments for professionalising 
domestic work have generally failed. Even when domestic work is remunerated and even if 
today it is a recognised sector of the labour market in all European countries, it is generally 
characterised by the persistence of a low reputation, low value and poor working conditions.  
Despite this widespread low recognition of the importance of domestic services, significant 
differences exist between European countries, which have stimulated the academic interest. 
Scholarship on domestic work has emphasised both continuities with the past and emerging 
trends at European level, albeit with cross-country differences. While the massive 
concentration of women in domestic services and the persistence of poor working conditions 
in the sector represent the main continuities compared to the past1, the main changes have 
occurred in the workforce composition. If the ‘profile’ of domestic workers seems to be more 
differentiated in terms of education and age (more and more highly educated migrants, from 
different backgrounds and of different ages), the most striking change of contemporary paid 
domestic work is its ethnicisation. According to the literature, in many European countries 
housework and care work are more and more performed by international migrants, so that the 
phenomenon of ‘migrant domestic work’ has been pointed as a new global theme (Parreñas, 
2001; Lutz, 2008, 2010; Sarti, 2008; Yeates, 2009; Anderson and Shutes, 2014; Williams, 
2014). 
Although migrant domestic work is generally considered an emerging European phenomenon, 
the ethnicisation of domestic services across Europe is uneven, so that it has been defined as a 
‘converging variation’ (Williams, 2012). The substantial difference between European 
countries in the proportion of the migrant labour force in the domestic sector – which, 
according to the EU-LFS 2015, varies from little more than 1% in some Eastern European 
countries to 65% in Cyprus and 50% in Italy, for instance – represents one of the most 
puzzling features of contemporary domestic work, and leads to at least two meaningful sorts 
of questions. First, in the light of these differences, can we really speak of a convergence 
among European countries with respect to the ethnicisation of the domestic labour force? Are 
countries with lower shares of migrant domestic workers simply at an earlier stage of a 
change that will eventually occur everywhere, at least in Europe? Or, is the different 
concentration of migrants a structural feature specific to each country? Second, which are the 
factors that determine these variations? Do these factors – if any can be identified – contribute 
                                                        
1 As discussed in Chapter 1, a clear separation between continuities and discontinuities can be inaccurate, as 
certain features that appear to be new might have been visible at certain times in history. The feminisation of the 
domestic sector, for instance, can be considered a continuity of a trend that only started in the nineteenth century. 
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to a convergence towards a homogeneous domestic sector, or to a further diversification as to 
how paid domestic sector is not only regulated, but also conceived? 
To answer these questions, different perspectives can be adopted, that focus on micro, meso 
and/or macro approaches. In the literature on domestic work, micro perspectives can be useful 
for understanding the role of individual choices of both client/families (the choice to 
externalise or not domestic tasks, family strategies about child rearing and care for dependent 
people, professional choices and life trajectories) and domestic workers themselves 
(individual preferences and professional strategies, life course events, migration trajectories 
when relevant, and so on). Similarly, examples of meso analyses in the field of domestic work 
proved to bring about important contributions, as they acknowledge the role of social 
networks and of the community at large2 in generating outcomes in the domestic sector.  
Without neglecting the importance of networks and agency in the making of individual 
choices and preferences of both domestic workers and the families that employ them, this 
research focuses on macro-structural elements that are thought to have an impact on the main 
features of paid domestic work, so as to contribute to explaining some of the cross-country 
differences in Europe.  
The macro factors that are taken into consideration throughout this study are the care, gender 
and migration regimes, as defined by Lutz (2008, 2010). The broad concept of ‘regimes’ 
refers not only to the institutional context and state policies, but also “to cultures and practices, 
legacies, to major forms of social relations of power and inequality inherent in that domain” 
(Williams, 2014, p. 17). The reasons that make the above three regimes relevant for a study 
on migrant domestic work are multiple.  
First, care regimes – which broadly speaking include the set of regulations that each state puts 
in place to deal with care responsibilities – can be useful to explain the reasons behind the 
externalisation of domestic and care activities and the way the provision and allocation of care 
is regulated at national level (Bettio and Plantenga, 2004; Bettio et al., 2006; Simonazzi, 
2009; Saraceno and Keck, 2010; among others). For instance, the availability of quality and 
affordable services for the care of children or elderly people, the availability of financial 
incentives for the care of family members, the duration and compensation level of maternity, 
paternity and parental leaves are just a few examples of care policies that can influence the 
                                                        
2 Networks are intended here as including all types of ties: family, friends, neighbours and the community at 
large. To use Granovetter’s distinction, they include both strong and weak ties, as both types of ties can be 
crucial in determining for instance the level of externalisation of domestic work by families (the use of networks 
as part of domestic and care strategies of families) and the workforce composition in the domestic sector (the use 
of networks as instruments for entering or leaving the domestic sector) (Granovetter, 1973). 
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way families build their own ‘care packages’ and thus the size and characteristics of the 
domestic sector.  
Second, gender regimes – which for the purpose of this study are conceptualised as the 
combination of gender equality outcomes and the set of cultural and social norms that define 
the division of domestic and reproductive labour (the ‘gender contract’) – can provide insights 
on the gendered implications of specific institutional arrangements, as well as on the decisions 
to externalise domestic services (Anttonen and Spila, 1996; Daly, 2002; Pfau-Effinger, 2000; 
Gerhard et al., 2005; Lewis et al., 2008; Pfau-Effinger and Rostgaard, 2011, among others). 
For instance, while gender equality in a broad sense is generally associated with a more equal 
gendered division of labour, not all countries with high female participation rates and 
relatively high gender equality in the workplace experience the same level of externalisation 
of domestic activities, nor the same labour standards to domestic workers. The choice to 
outsource domestic services and the reputation of domestic work are also determined by the 
gendered social norms that operate in each country.  
Third, migration regimes – which include migration policies and regulations on the entry and 
stay of non-nationals and which are influenced by concepts of cultural desirability – can have 
an effect on the international mobility of domestic workers (Parreñas, 2001; Koffman et al., 
2005; Williams and Gavanas, 2008; Finotelli and Sciortino, 2009; among others)3. While the 
increased demand for domestic workers have pushed some governments to put in place 
specific arrangements for the entry and stay of migrant domestic workers, other factors, which 
can be included in the overall migration regime that operates in each country, have proved to 
encourage the arrival of migrant domestic workers and thus the ethnicisation of the domestic 
sector. Among these factors are, for instance, the pre-existence of a large informal economy 
and the existence of policy instruments such as regularisation programmes (add ref).  
While the three regimes have been often studied individually and more rarely in combination, 
Helma Lutz observes that, for a deeper understanding of European migrant domestic work, 
these three regimes should be taken into account simultaneously (Lutz, 2008). Starting from 
the observation that, in Europe, domestic work is more and more delegated to migrant women, 
Lutz affirms that: 
 
On the theoretical level, three different ‘regimes’ are at the heart of the phenomenon 
of ‘migrant domestic work’ in Europe. Firstly, gender regimes in which household and 
care work organisation can be seen as the expression of a specifically gendered 
                                                        
3 A detailed review of the existing studies on these three factors is provided in Chapter 2. 
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cultural script. Secondly, care regimes as part of the welfare regime, concerning a 
(multitude) of state regulations according to which the responsibility for the well-
being of national citizens is distributed between the state, the family and the market. 
Thirdly, migration regimes, which for various reasons either promote or discourage 
the employment of migrant domestic workers. 
(Lutz, 2008, p. 2; italics in the text) 
 
Lutz’s theory, as complex as it is, has not been empirically tested so far. Most literature on 
domestic work, but also on care, gender and migration regimes, tends to remain confined to 
the theoretical level and/or to be carried out only through qualitative methods. This is 
understandable, because of the very nature of concepts that are difficult to measure, and 
because of the richness of insights that are provided through qualitative methods of 
investigation. However, such methods also present some important risks. From a general 
point of view, qualitative evidence can be perceived as insufficient for building a sound 
theory. This is also due to the fact that generalisation is difficult, even more so when cross-
country comparison is involved (i.e. at European level). From an epistemological point of 
view, a theory remains confined to the philosophical realm, rather than being ‘scientific’, 
unless empirically validated (or falsified)4. This in turn can prevent the theory from being 
used as a framework for future research or for directions at policy level. 
The overall objectives of this research are the following: 
 To investigate whether and to what extent the three regimes have an impact on the 
main features of paid domestic work, and in the degree of ethnicisation in particular.  
 To investigate whether typologies can be a useful tool to explain the cross-national 
variation in the concentration of migrants in the domestic sector.  
The research that is reported in this dissertation aims to empirically test the theory of the three 
regimes for the first time. The empirical test of this theory is carried out through a quantitative 
comparative analysis among European member states, which is developed in three phases.  
The first phase is a descriptive analysis of the main features of contemporary paid domestic 
work in Europe, with a focus on the concentration of migrants in the domestic sector. The 
analysis, mainly based on the EU-Labour Forces Survey data 2015, focuses on three thematic 
areas: 1) the magnitude of the domestic sector; 2) the workforce composition; 3) the working 
                                                        
4 According to Popper, a theory can never be ‘verified’ empirically, as empirical observations can always 
contradict a theory. Thus, it is impossible to affirm that a theory is verified once and for all. On the contrary, in 
order to be ‘scientific’, a theory needs to be formulated so that empirical observation can falsify it. The result is 
that after testing a theory, instead of saying that the theory has been ‘verified’, we can only say that the theory 
has not been falsified by the empirical test (Popper, 1995; quoted in Meraviglia, 2004, p. 50). 
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conditions in the domestic sector. The magnitude of the domestic sector is analysed with a 
focus on both the increase of the domestic sector in recent years and a cross-country 
comparison of the current size of the domestic sector in Europe. The analysis of the workforce 
composition focuses on the feminisation and the ethnicisation of the domestic sector, through 
a comparative analysis of the concentration of women and of migrants in the domestic sector 
in all European countries for which data is available. A last set of descriptive analyses 
includes some aspects that can be used to define the working conditions of domestic workers: 
the income level, the job stability (proportion of temporary vs. permanent contracts) and the 
work on unusual working schedules (Saturdays, Sundays, evenings and nights). Although the 
main focus of this research is the degree of ethnicisation of domestic work, the objective of 
this first set of analyses is to confirm the trends that have been highlighted by scholarship 
with respect to the main features of the domestic sector and to highlight similarities and 
differences between European countries. Additionally, this first comparative analysis is 
helpful to empirically confirm that among the characteristics that are taken into account the 
most striking differences lie in the concentration of migrants in domestic activities. 
The second part is the construction of three typologies, one for each regime under study, in 
order to identify countries that behave similarly with respect to the care, gender and migration 
regimes. In order to empirically analyse the three regimes and develop a typology of countries, 
a composite index based on a variety of indicators is built for each regime. The choice of the 
indicators selected for the typology of each regime is made based on the literature and the 
availability of reliable and harmonised data at the European level.  
Specifically, for the typology of care regimes, the majority of the indicators are selected from 
the Multilinks database – and cross-checked with other international databases, such as the 
MISSOC database and the OECD Health Statistic database 2017 – and derived from the 
report Developing personal and household services in the EU: a focus on housework 
activities, so to cover both services and incentives for the care of children and elderly people, 
as well as incentives for the externalisation of domestic activities. The selected indicators are 
analysed through a Principal Component Analysis (PCA), which allows for the construction 
of two composite indexes that correspond to the ‘de-familialisation’ and the ‘generosity’ of 
care regimes. Finally, a cluster analysis is carried out to identify the clusters of European 
countries that behave more similarly with respect to the two indexes. 
The analysis of the European gender regimes is carried out so to keep separate the two 
dimensions that are used for defining the gender regime, namely the gender equality outcomes 
and the ‘gender contract’. For the first dimension, which corresponds to gender equality, an 
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existing composite index (the Gender Equality Index 2015, elaborated by the European 
Commission) is used. For the second dimension, which corresponds to the ‘gender contract’, a 
series of indicators are selected from two European databases (the ad hoc module on ‘family 
work and well-being’ of the European Social Survey 2004 and the Special Eurobarometer 
428/2014 on gender equality) and a Principal Component Analysis is carried out to construct 
the gender contract index. Finally, the typology of gender regimes is derived through a cluster 
analysis carried out on the two indexes. 
For the construction of the typology of migration regimes, the indicators are selected so to 
cover elements of both integration and immigration policies, as per the traditional distinction 
made in the literature, as well as specific factors that may influence the ethnicisation of the 
domestic sector. The Migrant Integration Policy Index 2015 is used to cover the integration 
policy system, plus some elements of the immigration system. Additionally, three separate 
indicators are selected, so to cover specific dimensions of the migration regimes that can be 
relevant for the analysis of the domestic sector: the number of residence permits issued for 
employment reasons, the number of migrants from new accession countries and the size of the 
shadow economy. Finally, a cluster analysis is carried out to build the typology and identify 
the groups of countries that share the most similar migration regimes. 
The third part is the empirical test of the theory of three regimes on migrant domestic work. 
The three typologies that result from the second step of the analysis are used to measure the 
impact of the three regimes on the concentration of migrants in the domestic sector. In this 
third step of the analysis – and in order to answer to the main research questions – the 
typologies of the three regimes are combined with the EU-LFS data 2015. This allows to 
investigate whether the three regimes have an effect on the actual outcomes of individuals in 
the labour market (in the domestic sector) and to measure the intensity of this effect.  
The specific objectives of the last set of analyses, which include the comparison of a series of 
multinomial logistic regression models and the final analysis of the effects of the three 
regimes on the ethnicisation of the domestic sector, are the following: 
 To investigate whether the three regimes – the care, the gender and the migration 
regimes – have an effect on the proportion of migrant domestic workers, compared to 
native domestic workers and on the proportion of migrant domestic workers, 
compared to migrants working in another sector. 
 To investigate whether the three regimes have a stronger explanatory power when they 
are taken into consideration simultaneously. 
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 To investigate whether the three regimes are a better tool, compared to countries, to 
explain the main features of paid domestic work and in particular the degree of 
ethnicisation of the sector  
 To analyse the specific effects of the three regimes on migrant domestic work. 
 
 
The dissertation is organised in six chapters.  
Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 present the theoretical framework and the review of the literature in 
this field. Chapter 1 provides a review of the literature on paid domestic work. It includes a 
brief historical overview of domestic work and highlights the main changes that have 
occurred over time, as well as the continuities. The chapter also provides an overview of the 
main features of contemporary paid domestic work and a discussion on the problems raised 
by domestic work in terms of gender equality and discrimination based on racial and class 
stereotypes. The last part of the chapter provides a definition of contemporary paid domestic 
work in Europe. 
Chapter 2 presents the literature on care regimes, on gender regimes and on migration regimes. 
Since the analysis of the tree regimes in this study is conducted through the use of typologies, 
an introduction on the use of typologies in literature is provided at the beginning of the 
chapter. Also, for each regime a particular attention is paid to the different typologies that 
have been developed over time. The literature review of the three regimes is introduced by a 
brief review of the literature on welfare regimes. This is due to the fact that the most 
influential typologies of care (and partly on gender) regimes have been developed based on 
the literature on welfare.  
Chapter 3 presents the methodology and the data used in this research. The first part of the 
chapter provides a brief description of the methodology used in this research and of the main 
types of statistical analyses carried out, as well as a discussion on the advantages and 
disadvantages of secondary analysis of existing data. The following section is a detailed 
description of the different databases and sources that have been used for the analyses and 
includes a discussion on the main limitations of the available data. A particular attention is 
paid to the problems linked to the statistical definition of the domestic sector and the 
statistical definition of the migrant population, as well as the issues linked to the informal 
economy. The last part of the chapter addresses some additional problems encountered during 
the course of the research, which include problems linked to international comparisons and 
problems linked to specific statistical analyses. 
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The following chapters presents the analyses that have been conducted in the framework of 
this study, as well as the main results.  
Chapter 4 presents a descriptive analysis of contemporary paid domestic work in Europe, 
based on the EU-Labour Forces Survey data. The analysis is divided into three thematic areas: 
1) the magnitude of the domestic sector; 2) the workforce composition; 3) the working 
conditions in the domestic sector. The first part includes a section on the increase of the 
domestic sector in recent years and a section on the current size of the domestic sector in each 
European country included in the analysis. The second part focuses on the feminisation and 
the ethnicisation of the domestic sector. The last part analyses some aspects that can be used 
to define the working conditions of domestic workers: the income level, the job stability 
(proportion of temporary vs. permanent contracts) and the work on unusual working 
schedules (Saturdays, Sundays, evenings and nights). 
Chapter 5 presents the analyses that I have conducted on the three regimes under study. In 
particular, the chapter provides a description of the main steps that have conducted to the 
creation of three typologies: selection of indicators, construction of new synthetic indicators, 
where relevant, and development of typologies – one for each regime.  
Chapter 6 presents the last set of analyses conducted in the framework of this research. The 
first part of the chapter provides the specific hypotheses, based on the objectives of the 
research. The second part presents some descriptive bivariate analyses, similar to those 
presented in Chapter 4, where the information on the main features of the domestic sector is 
aggregated at the level of the typologies. The third part of the chapter presents description of 
the analyses that have been carried out, the comparison between the different models and the 
interpretation of the results. In the last part of the chapter I interpret the results in the light of 
the hypotheses presented at the beginning of the chapter. 
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Chapter 1  
Understanding contemporary domestic work: challenges, 
continuities and discontinuities 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is divided into three main parts and presents the state of the art of the literature 
on domestic services, the main challenges and problems linked to this type of work, as well as 
a definition of paid domestic work.  
The first part starts with a brief historical contextualisation of domestic work, which 
highlights the main transformations occurred over time in the domestic sector, including 
changes in the definition of domestic services and in the way domestic work has been 
organised and regulated at different times in history. This part includes a separate section on 
the ‘resurgence’ of paid domestic work in recent years, where the main continuities and 
discontinuities compared to older forms of domestic work are highlighted. 
The second part provides an overview of the main characteristics of contemporary paid 
domestic work in Europe and is organised in three main thematic sections: a first section 
dealing with the feminisation of domestic services, a second section dealing with the 
ethnicisation of domestic work and a third section dealing with the persistence of poor 
working conditions and low reputation of domestic work. This last section also tackles some 
of the main problematic issues linked to domestic work.  
The last part of the chapter provides the definition of paid domestic work that will be adopted 
throughout the study, based on the transformations of domestic work occurred over time, on 
the main features of contemporary domestic work and on the definition of domestic workers 
provided by the International Labour Organisation (ILO). 
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1.1 From old to contemporary domestic work 
 
She could not, then, call me by my name, instead of saying all the time, “My 
girl,” this, “My girl,” that, in that tone of wounding domination which 
discourages the best wills and straightway puts such a distance, so much 
hatred, between our mistresses and us? Do I call her “little mother”? […] 
Oh! The cheek that they have, and the fuss that they make about nothing! And 
when I think that it is all done just to humiliate you, to astonish you! 
(Octave Mirbeau, The Diary of a Chambermaid, 1900) 
 
My Hilda seemed a treasure. She could cook, she could read and write, she 
kept herself and the rooms clean and looked like a pink and flaxen doll. I could 
treat her as an equal without finding that this led to her stealing my clothes 
and doing no work. 
(Freda Utley, Lost Illusion, 1948) 
 
The European literature of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries abounds with descriptions 
of the life and work of the many domestic servants who were populating the houses of the 
aristocracy. This is not surprising given that the number of domestic workers had known a 
steady increase over the eighteenth century and an unprecedented pick in the nineteenth 
century (Sarti, 2008). Despite the ‘invisibility’ of this job, which was and still is carried out 
behind the doors of the household, literary works testify to the important role that servants 
have played in mirroring, but also shaping, the customs of societies at different times in 
history, as well as contributing to the definition of the cultural and class identity of the 
wealthy (Rollins, 1985).  
Far from being a phenomenon linked to the past, domestic work still exists and is increasing 
in all developed countries (Cox, 2006; Lutz, 2010; ILO, 2013). Although the types of 
employment relationships, the statuses, but also the work itself, have known great 
transformations over time and the domestic servants described above no longer exist, it is not 
unusual that the word domestic still recalls similar images today. As it will be discussed in 
later sections, this could be explained by the fact that important continuities exist between 
older and new forms of domestic work, not least in the way this work is still considered a 
dirty and degrading job. As historians point out, studying contemporary domestic work is a 
difficult task, not only because it represents an often-hidden segment of society, but also 
because changes are intertwined with the reproduction of certain dynamics (Sarti, 2006).  
The next section provides a brief overview of the history of domestic services, which includes 
the description of the gradual transformations in the way domestic work was organised and 
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conceived, as well as the changes in the work itself and in the role of domestic workers at 
different times. The objective is to identify the transformations intervened over time, but also 
to highlight the continuities from ancient to newer forms of domestic work. This will 
contribute to a better understanding of contemporary forms of paid domestic work, in the light 
of the European comparative analysis that will be presented in Chapter 4. 
 
1.1.1 Historical overview 
 
Paid domestic work, broadly intended as the set of domestic services performed by someone 
other than a family member5, is neither a novelty, nor a social phenomenon doomed to 
become extinct. As historical evidence shows, domestic work was already carried out by 
individuals external to the family in times as ancient as the Roman Empire and even before 
(Rollins, 1985). For a long time, domestic labour was typically performed by slaves, whose 
presence was abundant in virtually all ancient times. Although not all slaves were assigned 
domestic chores, there is evidence that domestic activities represented one of the two types of 
work considered more suitable for women slaves, the second being prostitution (Rollins, 
1985). The fact that domestic work was initially carried out by slaves is important, as it 
probably represents the origin of the link between domestic labour and slavery, which still 
permeates the perception of this work today.  
Before the nineteenth century and up to the Industrial Revolution in the second part of the 
1800s, domestic servants were mainly working at the dependency of the aristocracy, which 
often employed a large number of personnel, in a complex hierarchy of assignments and 
statuses. Hence, the often-romanticised idea of the wealthy surrounded by a crowd of servants, 
ranging from butlers, cooks, housekeepers, maids, valets to other manual workers, performing 
tasks such as cleaning, cooking, gardening, repairing, watching over the security of the house 
and even providing counselling to the masters. The employment of a large number of servants 
in aristocratic households was based on a well-structured hierarchy of statuses among 
domestic workers, with those at closer contact with the members of the family generally 
enjoying better working conditions and higher prestige6. Therefore, if the distance between 
                                                        
5 The definition of domestic work is not unambiguous and has significantly changed over time. The definition of 
contemporary paid domestic work adopted in this study is provided in section 1.3.  
6 Typically, butlers, housekeepers and cooks were enjoying the highest status among servants, while cleaners, 
chambermaids and personnel carrying out manual housework were at the bottom of the hierarchy. The 
distinction among the servants often implied that the chores performed by men were more valued than chores 
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the master and the servant was certainly common to all domestic workers, some scholars have 
argued that not all forms of domestic labour were considered as degrading, as some of them 
allowed servants to be in contact with the highest ranks of society (Sarti, 2006). 
However, despite the hierarchical differences among servants, the idea of the domestic worker 
was closely associated with the idea of a low class, low-skilled worker, often single and living 
inside the premises of the house for which he/she was working. The same recognition of 
domestic labour as a ‘real job’ could not be taken for granted, insofar the actual wages were 
often replaced by in-kind gifts, food, accommodation, or simply by protection (Rollins, 1985). 
The master-servant relationship was one the main features of European pre-industrial 
societies, where the power of the master/mistress over his/her servants was similar to the 
power of the king over his subjects or that of the pater familias over the members of the 
family (Sarti, 2006). The paternalistic relationship between masters and servants – typical of 
the relationship between master and slaves – was characterised by total subordination and 
fidelity on the side of the servant, in exchange for protection by the master (J. S. Miller, 1869; 
Rollins, 1985).  
The low status of the work and the enormous differences between the employer and the 
worker in terms of class, education, social and economic status were hardly questioned and 
employing a more or less important number of domestic workers was a matter of social 
prestige (Rollins, 1985; Sarti, 2006, 2008). The fact that these workers were hardly 
considered as real employees and that the work they were performing within the household 
was considered as a sort of unconditional help rather than a real work was a clear sign of the 
blurred separation between the condition of domestic workers and slaves. 
The industrialisation period in Western Europe marked a significant change in the way 
domestic work was organised and conceived, as well as in the servant’s profile. In terms of 
the number of domestic workers, the second half of the nineteenth century is the period that 
registered the highest number of domestic servants employed in private households (Rollins, 
1985; Cox, 2006; Sarti, 2006). However, apart from the numerical increase, important 
changes had occurred in societies, which determined a shift in the features of the domestic 
service sector.  
A first important change brought about by the industrialisation process was the decline of 
agriculture and the simultaneous urbanisation, which pushed a large number of young people 
to urban centres in the search for employment. This resulted in a change in the servant’s 
                                                                                                                                                                             
assigned to women. The discussion over the difference between female and male types of domestic labour is 
discussed later in this section.  
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profile. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the great majority of domestic workers 
were young women coming from the countryside, working as live-in domestic workers in 
urban families. If up to the eighteenth century the domestic service sector was populated by 
both men and women in an approximately equal share, during the nineteenth century women 
started to dramatically outnumber men. While industrialisation had generated new 
employment opportunities for low-skilled workers, it was generally men who had left the 
domestic service sector towards new opportunities. Women, on the contrary, remained for a 
long time confined to domestic services, for various reasons. First, due to common social 
values attached to the concept of respectability, domestic work was considered more suitable 
for women, compared to factory work. The fact of living within a family, especially for young 
women coming from the countryside, was considered a source of protection. Second, it 
allowed saving money on food and accommodation, while at the same time providing 
domestic training for life after marriage (Rollins, 1985). Additionally, given that women were 
generally less trained and had fewer opportunities for education, the exit from the domestic 
service sector was slower, compared to that of men. 
The second important social transformation brought about by the industrialisation process was 
the emergence of a large urban middle class. While up to the middle of the nineteenth century 
the aristocracy was the main – if not the only – employer of domestic servants, now larger 
social strata could afford to employ domestic servants (Cox, 2006; Rollins, 1985). However, 
due to the costs of maintaining domestic personnel, new middle-class families could only 
employ a limited number of workers – often only one. A dramatic reduction in the number of 
servants per family was nonetheless registered among the aristocracy. The French Revolution, 
with its egalitarian ideals, had already fostered a fight against the privileges of the aristocracy 
and the employment of servants for the sake of showing their status, which in turn had 
affected the employment of domestic personnel (Sarti, 2006).  
The reduction in the number of servants per household translated into a transformation of the 
servant’s profile. On the one hand, it led to the extinction of certain jobs, within the range of 
domestic services. Profiles such as the driver, the butler, the lackey and the footman, which 
were typically profiles of male domestics, gradually disappeared and domestic work was 
generally re-centred around housework and cleaning activities, which were considered as 
more suitable for women7. On the other hand, the work itself and the duties associated with it 
experienced a series of transformations. While a large hierarchized structure of servants 
                                                        
7 The feminisation of domestic work, together with the discussion about the gender division of domestic labour, 
are discussed in section 1.2.2.  
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implied a strong specialisation of tasks among servants, each of them performing only a part 
of the domestic chores, the decrease in the number of servants employed per families implied 
a reunification of tasks on the same worker, who was now expected to provide for the full 
range of domestic services for the family.  
The greater demands placed on each servant had consequences both on the severe physical 
and mental strains endured by servants, and on the relationship between masters and servants. 
Although generally wages were higher compared to the past, domestic workers started to find 
hard to meet the expectations of the new bourgeoisie. At the same time, given that the new 
employers were new to their role of masters and could not count on the unquestioned 
privileges of the aristocratic class, they strove to distinguish themselves from the servants by 
drawing a rigid class separation between the two. This inevitably led to a growing tension 
between servants and masters, which is mirrored by the proliferation of literary works devoted 
to the proper management of domestic personnel and resulted in a great turnover rate of 
domestic workers (Rollins, 1985). 
This increased tension, together with social and economic transformations, led to the decrease 
in the number of domestic workers at the beginning of the twentieth century. Changes in 
social and family values, the availability of new job opportunities seen as suitable also for 
women – such as the emergence of white-collar jobs –, the decreasing size of middle-class 
families and technological progress facilitating household maintenance, all contributed to the 
decline of both the supply and the demand for domestic labour (Rollins, 1985). Additionally, 
higher educational attainments and changes in values and attitudes pushed many domestic 
workers to move towards other occupational opportunities, considered less degrading and 
demanding. 
The trend towards the decline of domestic service – especially live-in but also live-out jobs – 
continued and was even reinforced in the second half of the century. During World War II, 
the absence of male soldiers had made necessary for many women to engage in larger sectors 
of the economy and after 1945 many former domestic workers did not re-enter the sector 
(Sarti, 2008). This trend was visible in all Western European countries, and even more in 
countries that provided the strongest welfare support to families, such as Northern European 
countries. At this point in history, it seemed that domestic service was deemed to come to an 
end in all modern societies (Sarti 2005; 2008). 
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1.1.2 The resurgence of paid domestic work 
 
After the drop at the beginning of the twentieth century and after the War World II, the 
domestic sector started to increase again at the end of the century and has grown even more 
significantly in the last two decades (Cox, 2006; Sarti, 2008; ILO, 2013). The emblematic 
figure of the ‘domestic servant’ in the form of butlers, maids, cooks and valets serving the 
very rich was gradually replaced by a considerable number of nannies, cleaners, au pairs, 
caregivers and other domestic helpers, who make it possible for the middle and upper classes 
all around the world to live more comfortably (Cox, 2006).  
Although historical trends seemed to point to the total extinction of the figure of the domestic 
servant, paid domestic work constitutes today a non-negligible segment of the labour market 
in many European countries. Some trends that were already visible at the end of the 
nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth century are confirmed by recent 
developments of paid domestic work. The increased feminisation of the work and the gradual 
disappearance of live-in forms of work in favour of live-out domestic work are the two main 
continuities from previous centuries. However, even in this respect, some exceptions seem to 
contradict these trends, as a few European countries – such as Italy and Spain – have recently 
experienced a relative resurgence of both male domestic work and a return to live-in forms of 
jobs in the domestic sector8. Additionally, the low reputation and the poor and sometimes 
degrading working conditions that were already associated with this hard manual labour in the 
past seem to persist, despite the attempts that have been carried out in some European 
countries to professionalise and improve the status of the job. 
The main novelty in what can be considered modern domestic work pertains to the profile of 
the domestic workers. First of all, many European countries have experienced an increase in 
the proportion of international migrants working in the domestic and care sector and the 
employment of female migrants in the domestic services is receiving a growing public 
attention. In some countries, the phenomenon has assumed enormous proportions and the 
domestic sector can be considered the main occupation of migrant women (Cox, 2006; Lutz, 
2008). Although migration was already a feature linked to the domestic service sector in the 
previous century, the new migrant domestic workers are different in many respects. In the 
nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth century the migration of domestic 
workers was for the majority internal to each country and was linked to the mobility of young 
                                                        
8 The reasons for these seemingly contradicting trends in Europe is dealt with in section 1.2.2 on feminisation 
and in section 1.2.3 on the ethnicisation of domestic work.  
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people from the countryside to urban centres. On the contrary, the end of the twentieth 
century saw a dramatic increase in international migrants moving from poorer to richer parts 
of the world to work as domestic workers (Sarti, 2008). 
However, despite the increased mobility from poorer to wealthier countries, the new migrant 
domestic workers are not necessarily poor themselves. Recent studies have highlighted that 
not only migrant domestic workers often belong to middle or higher classes in their country of 
origin, but also that they possess on average higher education, compared to domestic workers 
in the past (Lutz, 2008, 2010; Sarti, 2008). This inevitably leads to a redefinition of the 
relationship between the families and the workers in terms of class, social and cultural 
distance. 
Another change regarding the profile of new domestic workers is that, contrary to the 
nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, the age and the marital status of 
domestic workers are more differentiated. As discussed in the previous section, during the 
industrialisation period in Western Europe the vast majority of domestic workers were young 
and single women coming from the countryside, who were working as live-in domestics 
awaiting marriage. Today, not only domestic workers are on average older than their previous 
colleagues, but contrary to the past many of them are married and/or with children (Sarti, 
2008). The phenomenon of transnational motherhood9, although not unknown to the past, 
perfectly fits the situation of the ‘new’ domestic workers. Although the literature on global 
care chains10 has been widely criticised for overemphasising the numerical importance of 
transnational mothers, and for neglecting the presence of more differentiated profiles among 
domestic workers, it nevertheless offers an important contribution to the study of new forms 
of domestic work.     
If the above-mentioned transformations are of great importance for understanding the 
development of domestic work, one of the main changes pertains to the redefinition of the 
tasks assigned to domestic workers. Among these changes, it is the gradual inclusion within 
general domestic services of activities linked to the care of dependent people that has known 
the greatest development. If it is true that also in the past there were domestics in charge of 
the care of children and that some servants also cared for the elderly (Sarti, 2008), it is from 
the end of the twentieth century that the care of people has become a crucial dimension of 
paid domestic activities.  
                                                        
9 For literature on transnational motherhood, refer to Ehrenreich and Hoschild, 2003; Kraler et al., 2013; 
Parreñas, 2001, 2005, 2008. 
10 For literature on global care chains, refer to Ehrenreich and Hoschild, 2003; Yeates, 2009. 
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The reasons that brought about this important redefinition of domestic tasks are discussed in 
the next section. What is important to mention here is that after a re-centring of domestic 
activities on housework-related services in the nineteenth century, there has been a new 
expansion of the activities that fall under the category of domestic work. The profile of the 
‘caregiver’ has known an unprecedented expansion, so that care activities are today just as 
important as housework activities within the broad domestic service sector11. This probably 
represents the most important discontinuity compared to the past. 
 
1.2 The main characteristics of contemporary paid domestic work 
 
This section presents an overview of the main characteristics of contemporary paid domestic 
work. The section is introduced by a first part, discussing some of the reasons that have 
generated the ‘resurgence’ of domestic services in Europe. This part is followed by the 
overview of the main features of paid domestic work, grouped around the following thematic 
areas: the feminisation of paid domestic work, the ethnicisation of paid domestic work and 
the working conditions in the domestic sector. This last part also includes a discussion of the 
main problematic issues that have been emphasised by the literature on domestic work and 
that make this type of work unique. 
 
1.2.1 The increase in the size of the domestic sector 
 
As mentioned in section 1.1.2, after an overall decline of domestic services in the twentieth 
century, up to a point that paid domestic work seemed destined to disappear (Sarti, 2008), the 
end of the century saw a sort of resurgence of domestic work, albeit with differences across 
countries. According to the ILO, conservative estimates suggest that today the number of 
domestic workers worldwide be around a total of 52,6 million, while other estimates count as 
much as 100 million domestic workers (ILO, 2013). Because it is often performed in the 
undeclared economy, estimates on the magnitude of the phenomenon vary depending on the 
source and depending on the classification used for data collection.  
The main regions interested by the growth are Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia and 
Middle East countries, where domestic work represents the highest share of total wage 
employment. However, even if at a lower rate, the last 20 years have seen an increase in 
                                                        
11 The detailed definition of the activities that fall under the range of domestic activities is provided in section 1.3.  
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domestic work also in Western countries. France, Spain, Italy and the United States have the 
highest prevalence of domestic workers in absolute terms12 (ILO, 2013). As national statistics 
show, at European level it is especially the care sector that has assumed a significant role in 
recent times and has become the centre of the attention of the public debate.  
 
The structural factors determining the increase of the domestic sector 
The reasons for the general increase of the domestic sector have been investigated at various 
levels. At structural level, scholars have identified a series of reasons that have contributed to 
the increase of both the supply and the demand for domestic services.  
From the point of view of the supply, the increase is often associated with the growing 
inequalities in the new global economy (Cox, 2006; Parreñas, 2001). The development of a 
global economy and the spread of neo-liberal principles have caused an exacerbation of social 
inequalities, both at global scale and within healthier regions. In less developed countries, the 
worsening of economic and living conditions have generated a growing supply of the 
workforce to richer countries. Some countries, such as the Philippines and Sri Lanka, 
officially promote the emigration of massive numbers of female citizens, who are encouraged 
to work as domestics all around the world (Cox, 2006). Poverty in developing countries can 
also represent a pushing factor for migration. A number of domestic workers flee from their 
countries of origins for reasons linked to extreme poverty, armed conflict and/or violence 
(Anderson, 2000).  
At the same time, the increased wealth in the global North has led to an increase of the 
demand for domestic workers, as more and more families can afford to buy external help. 
This further attracts migrants from the global South, even when governments are not directly 
favouring their emigration. The result is that domestic work has become a global theme 
traversing Europe (Ambrosini, 2015; Kofman et al., 2000, Lutz, 2008). 
However, social inequalities are growing within developed countries as well. Better living 
standards have enabled some parts of the society – especially the middle class – to afford to 
pay domestic help, but this has not resulted in better salaries and living conditions for those 
who provide domestic services. The inequality between those who serve and those who are 
served is far from being resolved. The phenomenon of the ‘global cities’, as it has been 
theorised by Saskia Sassen (2002), perfectly applies to the situation of new domestic workers. 
If global cities generate more and more services, skilled jobs and consequently higher salaries 
                                                        
12 Spain counts 747000 domestic workers, the US 667000 workers, France 590000 workers, and Italy 419000 
workers. 
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and wealth, the other side of the coin is that more and more invisible helpers are needed to fill 
the gaps that this increased standard of living requires. Global cities produce a strong demand 
for low-wage workers and for services in particular. At the same time, the presence of a cheap 
and flexible labour force makes it possible even for middle and lower classes to afford to buy 
external help (Sassen, 2002; Lutz, 2010)13. Domestic work is no longer a luxury for the few, 
but one of many commodities available to potentially anyone.  
The second main structural dimension that has been identified as contributing to the growth of 
the domestic sector has to do with societal, economic and demographic changes in developed 
countries. In particular, the increased participation of women in the labour market, together 
with the ageing of the population and the general erosion of the welfare state that occurred in 
developed countries, are pointed as important drivers for the expansion of the demand for 
domestic workers.  
If we focus on Europe, the growth of the employment rates of women is a phenomenon that in 
the Scandinavian countries had already started in the 1950s and 1960s (Leira, 2002) and that 
later expanded throughout the continent. This ‘emancipatory’ movement of women from the 
private to the public sphere has been accompanied by a (partial) reshaping of the traditional 
family model, which shifted from the widespread male breadwinner model, to an ‘adult earner’ 
model, where both men and women are working (Lutz & Palenga-Mollenbeck, 2010). This 
has created a ‘need’ for domestic workers, because women are no longer fully available to 
perform housework tasks, and because the availability of a double salary makes it possible for 
families to outsource these services. The decreased availability of grandparents and of the 
extended family to provide occasional help, due to the participation of grandmothers in the 
labour market, as well as the modernisation of family models towards nuclear families 
(Gerhard et al., 2005; Esping-Andersen, 2009), also play a role in making the outsourcing of 
domestic services more and more popular.  
The decline of fertility rates, combined with the ageing of the population, represents another 
change that is crucial for the increased demand for domestic help. Increasing numbers of old 
and very old people already determined a growing demand for caring services in many 
European countries. The trend towards policies that promote cash allowances, instead of 
residential care services for the elderly, the fact that in some European countries long-term 
                                                        
13 According to Saskia Sassen, the fact that these workers are cheap and flexible goes against the ‘historical nexus’. The 
increase of high-wage professionals and consequently of the demand for domestic services should suggest that 
domestic workers be paid higher salaries. Also, the strengthening of the sector should lead to the emerging of a strong 
“class”, with a consequent empowering effect. Instead, the invisible nature of domestic service creates a dynamic that 
goes against the prediction and leaves workers unempowered.  
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care is still predominantly family oriented, combined with the transformations in family 
structures (increased geographical distance, the decline of the enlarged family, etc.) are all 
factors that contribute to the expansion of the care sector (Bettio and Plantenga, 2004).  
Finally – and linked to the above-mentioned changes – is the general erosion of welfare states 
in Europe and the important cuts in the provision of services, especially for the care of 
children and the elderly, albeit with significant national differences (Degavre and Nyssens, 
2012). The increased participation of women in the paid economy has not been adequately 
accompanied by an increase in services, especially for the care of children, the elderly and 
people with disabilities. In many European countries, taken apart the Northern countries, 
which have a more solid history of public provision of care, public affordable childcare for 
children under the age of 3 and public residential homes for the elderly are unavailable and/or 
unaffordable for the majority of the families, who have to opt for private solutions available in 
the market. Private services are more and more promoted as the only option, but when they 
are too expensive families have to find individual solutions. This often means buying these 
services directly in the market, often from (irregular) migrants, who offer the cheapest 
available prices at the best flexible conditions (Simonazzi, 2009).  
 
Other reasons explaining the increase of the domestic sector 
Although all these factors have played a crucial role in determining the increase of the 
demand for domestic workers, they are not the only explanations of the phenomenon. First of 
all, even if employment rates of women have increased everywhere in Europe and in other 
developed countries, it is not the first time that women work outside their homes. Women 
were already present in the formal paid economy in the past, and sometimes worked very long 
hours (Gerhard et al., 2005). Second, if it is true that the increased employment rates of 
women have been accompanied by an increase in domestic outsourcing, because a new ‘need’ 
has resulted from less available time at home, not all women who have entered the labour 
market (even in full-time jobs) have hired external help (Goñalons-Pons, 2015). In the light of 
these facts, scholarship on domestic work has investigated other factors that might have 
contributed to the increase in the number of waged domestic workers.  
Some scholars have argued that it has to do with the profile of new working women. While in 
the past female employment was only common within the working class, now it is middle-
class women who have entered the labour market (Lutz, 2008; Cox, 2006). This has somehow 
changed the perspective and the behaviour with regards to paid and unpaid housework. When 
middle-class women enter what Rosie Cox calls ‘career structured jobs’, they are exposed to 
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the traditional employment culture, which in turn is influenced by the traditional breadwinner 
model. This means that women have to adapt to males’ standards and have to sacrifice some 
of their home duties, if they want to be treated equally and compete with men in the labour 
market. Therefore, changing expectations in the labour market may affect the patterns of 
domestic work and push women to outsource it (Cox, 2006).  
According to feminist scholars, the key reason for the increased outsourcing of domestic 
activities is that all the above-mentioned changes (increase in female employment rates, 
demographic changes, the restructuring of traditional family models and so on) have not been 
accompanied by a transformation in the gender division of labour and this has created a 
tension (Lewis, 1992; Giele, 2006; Gerhard et al., 2005). The alleged ‘liberation’ of women, 
who are more and more participating on an equal basis in the labour market, is not reflected in 
the division of household tasks, which remains the domain of women.  
To sum up, if the presence of women in the labour market has been welcomed as a strong sign 
of empowerment and of – at least formal – gender equality, two main issues have not been 
solved so far. The first is that women had to adapt their careers to male standards (such as 
long working hours, unbroken careers, etc.), instead of being offered different solutions or 
instead of creating their own way of ‘having a career’. This means that a woman who chooses 
a career may have to sacrifice her family (Giele, 2006; Gerhard et al., 2005). The second is 
that the traditional division of labour, which assigns domestic tasks to women, has not been 
questioned. Domestic chores are still overwhelmingly performed by women – no matter if 
they work part-time or full-time – and the amount of time allocated to housework and care for 
family members has not been redistributed among the sexes (Cox, 2006). The private sphere 
is still considered a female responsibility, and women are still expected to find a solution for 
replacing ‘their’ domestic work, if they choose to have a career.  
Some qualitative research (Cox, 2006; Anderson, 2000; Rollins, 1985) have found that the 
division of household tasks between men and women represents a crucial matter of conflict 
for couples and that hiring domestic help is the easiest way to avoid such conflict. According 
to these studies, instead of pushing forward the claims for gender equality also within the 
household by fully involving men in the equal sharing of the tasks, women have chosen to 
avoid the conflict and rather outsource what is socially perceived to be their work (Anderson, 
 32 
2000; Cox, 2006). The result is that household and care tasks have simply been redistributed 
among women14.  
Thus, the transformative potential of the increased gender equality in the labour market 
remains limited (Goñalons-Pons, 2015) and it rather reinforces unbalanced gender relations. 
First, it reinforces inequality between the sexes, because women can only choose between 
doing the ‘double shift’ and outsourcing their tasks. Second, it reinforces the inequalities 
between affluent middle-class women, who can somehow pursue better gender equality in 
their careers, and domestic workers, whose gender inequality is maintained and intensified 
even in their employment place. Gender equality for some women acts at the expenses of 
gender equality for domestic workers (Sarti and Scrinzi, 2010). 
 
1.2.2 The feminisation of paid domestic work 
 
Before talking about the feminisation of the domestic sector, an important distinction has to 
be made between paid and unpaid domestic labour. Although male domestic workers existed 
and still exist today – albeit in very low numbers – domestic activities have a long history of 
being associated with women. From a sociological point of view, the origins of the traditional 
view of domestic chores as female activities can be traced back to two fundamental 
dichotomies.  
The first one is the ‘private/public divide’, which has a strong gendered connotation, as it 
assigns the private domain to women and the public domain to men (Anderson, 2000). While 
the economic and public function pertains to men, domestic activities belong to the private 
sphere and are considered the responsibility of women. According to feminist scholars, this 
dichotomy, which still permeates our societies, can be challenged only as long as women 
maintain their private role. This means that women can move into the public sphere, but 
without losing their private responsibilities. Hence, domestic activities, be them unpaid or 
under the form of a regular employment contract, remain among women (Cox, 2006; Lutz, 
2010; Gerhard et al., 2005).  
The second dichotomy, which was first stressed by Marxist feminist scholars, makes a 
distinction between productive and reproductive labour. Based on this distinction, productive 
labour is any type of work that brings an economic surplus to the nation and corresponds to 
                                                        
14 As Barbara Ehrenreich and Arlie Hochschild have argued with regards to childcare, “the presence of immigrant 
nannies does not enable affluent women to enter the workforce; it enables affluent men to continue avoiding the 
second shift” (Ehrenreich & Hochschild, 2002). 
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work that generates goods and services that have a monetary value. On the contrary, 
reproductive work is intended as the physical, mental and emotional labour that individuals do 
for themselves and for the care of others, but which does not bring a monetary value. 
Domestic activities, such as cooking, cleaning, caring for children, and so on, fall under the 
category of reproductive labour. This distinction, which had been taken as given by most 
economic analysis, started to be questioned by feminists at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, as it did not take into consideration the social and economic value of the reproductive 
work15 (Anderson, 2000; Lutz, 2010).  
While unpaid domestic services have been universally associated with the female domain, it 
was not always the case as to paid domestic work. Historians observed that before the 
nineteenth century nearly as many men as women were populating the paid domestic sector 
(Rollins, 1985; Sarti, 2005; 2008; Cox, 2006). It was only starting from the nineteenth century 
that the sector became more and more feminised. Today, according to institutional data from 
the ILO (2013), the great majority of domestic workers in the world are women. According to 
some authors, the very ‘resurgence’ of paid domestic work would be the result of the almost 
entire feminisation of the work (Lutz, 2007).  
However, although for a long time and at different times in history male domestics were 
common, a few considerations are worthy to be mentioned. First, as Judith Rollins argues, 
even in ancient times, when domestic labour was performed by male slaves it was always to 
replace the responsibilities of women (Rollins, 1985). In other words, the need to possess a 
slave to be used for domestic labour depended on whether or not this labour could be 
performed by women. Therefore, domestic work as a female responsibility seems to belong to 
very old times. 
Second, historical evidence shows that differences existed between male and female 
domestics in many respects. As mentioned in section 1.1.1, before the nineteenth century, 
domestic workers were mainly employed in aristocratic families, in a hierarchy of different 
statuses and privileges. Within this hierarchy, the positions that enjoyed a closer contact with 
the members of the family and thus better working conditions and higher prestige were held 
by male domestics16. On the contrary, apart from a very few female positions that held a 
                                                        
15 The claims for compensating reproductive labour saw its biggest expression in the “Wages for Housework 
Campaign”, during the 1970s. Feminists’ claims started from the assumption that reproductive labour is key for the 
reproduction of the nation, as it provides the units (men) necessary for productive labour. Therefore, reproductive 
labour should be recognised as labour producing an economic value and should be compensated accordingly. 
16 Among the highest positions in the hierarchical structure of the domestic personnel in aristocratic families were 
the butler, the house steward, the man-cook, the baker, the valet, the gardener and all the confidential advisors and 
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special status – such as the housekeeper – women domestics were assigned manual tasks 
linked to cleaning and housework activities, which were already seen as more suitable for 
women. Another sign that testifies for a gendered difference within domestic servants was the 
introduction in the eighteenth century, in England and in France, of special taxes on male 
domestics. Contrary to their female counterparts, male domestics were considered ‘luxury 
items’ (Sarti, 2006; Cox, 2006) and therefore officially recognised as more valuable. This can 
be interpreted as a clear sign of the different value attributed to the work of men and women, 
the latter representing a lower form of labour that does not need formal recognition.  
Third, historical evidence shows that the feminisation of paid domestic work was the 
consequence of a few trends: i) the emergence of new working opportunities available for 
men, who were thus able to escape domestic service, ii) the disappearance of typically male 
positions and their displacement outside the home17, and iii) the re-centring of domestic work 
on housework and cleaning activities. In this sense, domestic work was re-feminised the 
moment it became linked to the activities that are traditionally seen as female activities 
(cleaning, ironing, cooking, washing, and so on). 
These changes led not only to a numerical increase of female domestic workers, but to the 
“feminisation of the very notion of the servant” and to the de-valorisation of the job (Sarti, 
2006, p. 20). In fact, because the work started to become more and more similar to housework 
– and thus it started to coincide with the unpaid work that is seen as the ‘natural’ competence 
of women – it was also not considered as a real job. 
According to scholars, the gradual ‘naturalisation’ of domestic work, combined with the 
debate on productive vs. reproductive labour, which was gaining pace in economic theories, 
contributed to a general devaluation of domestic work (Sarti, 2006). It is only during the 
twentieth century, with the emphasis on the distinction between market and non-market 
activities, that paid domestic work started to be considered productive work. However, as it is 
discussed in section 1.2.4, its inclusion within market activities did not necessarily translate 
into a real professionalisation of domestic work. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
personal attendants of the master (Rollins, 1985). If it is true that also low-status male servants existed, the 
comparison with women’s position show that the highest positions were indisputably those of men. 
17 While some domestic functions (such as butlers, valets, grooms) became obsolete, other jobs gradually moved 
outside the home. For instance, jobs like the gardener, the driver and the secretary moved away from the domestic 
sector and became professionalised occupations. 
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1.2.3 The ethnicisation of paid domestic work 
 
In the last decades, many European countries have experienced an increase in the proportion 
of migrants working in the domestic sector and the employment of female migrants as 
cleaners and/or carers for children and the elderly has received a growing public attention. 
According to the ILO (2013), an almost universal feature of domestic work today is that it is a 
heavily female-dominated sector and that it is predominantly carried out by migrants and 
other disadvantaged groups.  
Although it is not always stressed by the literature, domestic work already had a strong 
migration dimension in the past (Cox, 2006; Sarti, 2008). However, while previous migrant 
domestic workers were mainly internal migrants, moving from rural to urban areas within the 
same country, in globalised societies domestic work is more and more performed by 
international migrants. Before the twentieth century, international migration of domestic 
workers was only linked to colonialism, and the few international migrant domestic servants 
were moving from richer to poorer countries18. Conversely, today the migration of domestic 
workers has assumed an international and inter-continental character, following a pattern that 
is mainly directed from poorer to richer areas of the world (Sarti, 2008). The new geography 
of mobility of domestic workers to Europe follows a pattern from East to West and from 
South to North and it seems to be determined, at least partly, by the growing inequalities 
between these regions of the world (Lutz, 2008; Sarti, 2008). In the EU, the arrival in recent 
years of many domestic workers from Eastern Europe also determined a change in the type of 
migration, which has partially shifted from settlement to temporary migration (Morokvasic, 
2004; Lutz, 2008). 
As already mentioned in section 1.1.2, recent studies have highlighted a few important 
changes concerning the characteristics of the new migrant domestic workers. In the nineteenth 
century, domestic work was mainly performed by young women without dependants, as it 
was considered to be a type of employment especially suitable for girls before they got 
married and founded their own family. Today, on the contrary, it is more and more performed 
by migrant women of all ages, often with dependants, and these women are generally more 
educated than their predecessors (Sarti, 2008; Lutz, 2010). These women emigrate as 
domestic workers, often leaving behind their families and their caring responsibilities. A 
                                                        
18 Although part of the servants of colonialist families were recruited in loco and were mainly employed in the most 
manual types of work, it was not uncommon that families brought with them some of the domestic personnel 
recruited in the country of origin. These workers were usually the highest among the hierarchy of domestic servants: 
housekeepers, maids, teachers, etc.  
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flourishing literature has recently developed around the phenomenon of global care chains19, 
which was first theorised by Hochschild to identify the movement of care workers from 
poorer to richer countries. Hochschild defines the ‘care drain’ as “the importation of care and 
love from poor countries to rich ones” (2002, p. 17): women from poorer countries move to 
care for other people’s children, the elderly and disabled in rich countries, delegating their 
own caring responsibilities to other women, be them women from the family or paid workers. 
It is a phenomenon similar and parallel to the brain drain, but it is somehow more insidious 
and difficult to quantify, because of the hidden nature of domestic and care work. 
The reasons for the growing concentration of migrants in the domestic sector have been 
investigated at various levels. The principal argumentation is based on a combination of push 
and pull factors. The increased supply of labour on one side of the world, mainly due to 
economic reasons but also to more affordable transports and ease in communication 
technology, meets the growing demand for domestic labour in the richer parts of the world, 
including Europe (Lutz, 2008). As discussed in section 1.2.1, the growing demand for 
domestic labour is in turn determined by the combination of multiple factors: the increased 
female participation rates in the labour market, the degree of welfare support to families, 
demographic changes, changes in family models, as well as transformations in values and 
attitudes of women.  
Among the various reasons that make migrant labour force particularly suitable for this 
specific sector, two seem to play a key role. On the one hand, the persistence of low wages 
and poor working conditions (unfriendly working hours, unsafe environments, hard physical 
work, among other issues), coupled with the low reputation associated with domestic chores, 
make domestic work unattractive to local women. On the other hand, migrant domestic 
workers often represent a cheaper and more flexible option, compared to locals, and tend to 
accept lower wages (and sometimes off-the-books work) and worse labour conditions, which 
makes them more attractive to employers. 
This is due to a series of reasons, which are directly linked to the migration process. First, 
wages in Western European countries are usually higher than those in the countries of origin 
of migrant domestic workers. This means that even a poorly remunerated job can represent an 
important source of income for migrants and for their families in the country of origin. 
Second, migrants, especially in the first stages of their migration project, cannot count on 
social protection in the host country and therefore are more vulnerable than locals in the 
                                                        
19 For literature on global care chains, refer to Parreñas, 2001, Hochschild, 2002; Kofman, 2013; Lutz & Pallenga-
Möllenbeck, 2012; Williams, 2012; Yeates, 2009, 2012. 
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labour market. This means that, at least at the beginning, they are willing to accept low-wage 
jobs as a first way of survival. In economic terms, they have lower reservation wages, 
compared to locals20 (Sciortino, 2004). Third, because they are often without dependants – at 
least in the host country –, migrant domestic workers are usually more prepared to accept jobs 
that require unsocial working hours and harsh conditions, including live-in jobs (Anderson, 
2011). 
The case of live-in jobs is emblematic, as in many European countries live-in jobs are almost 
universally occupied by migrants. Although the trend towards a shift from live-in to live-out 
types of domestic work is common to all developed countries, in some European countries 
live-in employment is regaining momentum, mainly due to the increased demand for care 
workers. This is particularly true in some Mediterranean countries, such as Italy and Spain 
(Ambrosini, 2012, 2015). 
As scholarship has pointed out, the employment of migrants in live-in jobs is advantageous 
both from the point of view of employers and of migrants themselves (Ambrosini, 2015). 
From the point of view of employers, migrants are particularly suitable, because in the 
majority of the cases they do not have to attend their own families and can potentially be 
available 24 hours per day. Even if a growing number of female migrants do have family 
dependants (children, parents, disabled relatives), their dependants often live in the countries 
of origin, either because of restrictive measures that make family reunification difficult, or 
because of migration strategies21. In addition to the geographical distance from their families, 
newly arrived migrants often lack a network of social relations in the countries of destination, 
which makes them particularly suitable for live-in jobs22.  
From the point of view of migrants, live-in domestic work can also be advantageous. First of 
all, it solves all at once the problems related to employment and accommodation, thus 
allowing repaying more quickly the costs of the migration process. At the same time, it can be 
                                                        
20 In labour economics, the reservation wage is defined as the minimum wage rate at which a worker would 
consider accepting a certain job. A lower wage rate would therefore be rejected by the worker. The reservation 
wage of an individual typically evolves over time, depending on different factors. For instance, the birth of a 
child, the age of the individual, new qualifications or education tend to increase the reservation wage, as the 
worker will need a higher wage rate to consider being in employment. Also, the type of job (pleasant or 
unpleasant), personal preferences or specific events of the life course can have an influence on the reservation 
wage. For instance, a worker could be willing to accept a poorly paid job if the job is seen as an opportunity of a 
new professional career, or if the job is seen as temporary, before better opportunities might arise. 
21 Due to the great differences in the costs for living between countries of destination and countries of origin, the 
choice to leave their families behind can be voluntary, because the economic benefits of migration are greater if 
dependants remain in the country of origin. 
22 The isolation experienced by many domestic migrants, due to their migration status and to the work in private 
homes, makes them particularly vulnerable to long hours and other exploitative practices. 
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particularly sought-after by female migrants, as it represents a sort of shelter from the external 
world: it provides physical protection from an unknown environment, but it also provides 
social and legal protection. This can be particularly useful for undocumented migrants, who 
might find domestic work in private households more secure, as it decreases the risk of being 
tracked by the authorities. Therefore, relatively low earnings and unfriendly working hours 
can be part of the migration strategy of domestic workers, because the economic function of 
the job is entirely directed to the country of origin and because they do not have the 
reproductive burden of their families in the receiving countries. Additionally, contrary to local 
women, for migrant women the fact of working in the domestic sector is usually seen as a 
temporary situation, be that because the professional situation might evolve once settled, or 
because the migration project itself is seen as temporary (Anderson, 2011).  
A last, but not less important, factor that can explain the concentration of migrants in the 
domestic sector is linked to discrimination issues. Racism and stereotypes around migrants 
are just as strong drivers as gender stereotypes with regards to the choice of domestic workers 
(Anderson, 2002). Racial stereotypes play an important role in the choice of domestic workers, 
because they can be used by employers to justify class differences. 
As qualitative research has highlighted, many employers find it easier to deal with foreign 
domestic workers compared to native ones, as it justifies their position of superiority in the 
employment relationship (Anderson, 2002; Rollins, 1985; Kordasiewicz, 2015; Kofman, 
2004). Since employers tend to feel a sense of guilt at the idea of being served by someone 
who is perceived to be equal in terms of class or education23, they use ethnic reasons or 
simply nationality as a way to build the distance with their employees. The idea that the 
domestic worker belongs to another ethnic group or another nationality creates the necessary 
distance that legitimises the very act of employing her/him 24 . The greater the perceived 
distance between the employer and the employee, the stronger the legitimisation 
(Kordasiewicz, 2015). 
Additionally, some studies have pointed out that in countries where the presence of migrants 
in the domestic sector is very strong, employers build a hierarchy of more or less wanted 
nationalities and/or ethnic groups (Ambrosini, 2013). This phenomenon, sometimes referred 
to as ‘statistical discrimination’, functions as a process of categorisation of domestic workers 
based on some qualities (or faults), which are attributed to certain ethnic groups or 
                                                        
23 Literature on domestic work showed that the class and educational distance between middle and lower-class 
employers and migrant domestic workers have come to decrease in recent years. 
24 In migration studies, it is common to refer to the concept of ‘otherness’, meaning the construction of a 
separation between autochthones and foreigners as a way to justify discriminatory behaviours. 
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nationalities. Based on these categorisations, some foreigners are considered as more or less 
suitable for certain types of domestic work25 (Ambrosini, 2012).  
 
1.2.4 Low reputation and poor working conditions 
 
Today, paid domestic work in Europe is considered a low-skilled job and it is characterised by 
poor working conditions and low reputation, with no exception. This represents the strongest 
continuity with the past.  
As discussed in section 1.1.1, in the eighteenth century certain domestic functions were not 
considered as degrading, but on the contrary enjoyed quite a social prestige. However, the 
relatively good reputation of the work was only applicable to certain positions, namely those 
that required high responsibilities and that were not purely linked to manual work. Starting 
from the nineteenth century, these positions either disappeared or became more 
professionalised and paid domestic work came to be strongly associated with work of low-
skill and low value. This coincided with the feminisation of domestic work, so that the low 
status of the job is often associated with the ‘natural’ inclination of women to perform these 
tasks. Additionally, because it is traditionally performed for free by the female members of 
the family, it is considered to have no value26 (Cox, 2006; Lutz, 2010). 
Although contemporary paid domestic work is officially recognised as part of the labour 
market in all developed countries and despite the recent attempts to professionalise the 
sector27, domestic workers are among those suffering the worst conditions among all waged 
                                                        
25 For instance, women from less developed countries are generally assumed to be more suitable for cleaning 
and housework, compared to care work (Cox, 2006). However, as qualitative studies have shown, 
discriminations can be even more specific. In certain contexts, for example, African women are thought to be 
lazy and slow in housework tasks, while they are welcome as child-carers, as they are thought to be more 
maternal. Similarly, Filipino women can be sought-after (hence better paid), as they have a reputation of being 
submissive and hard workers (Parreñas, 2001; Rollins, 1985) and so on. 
26 The low-skilled nature of domestic chores is contradicted by the fact that employers do require specific skills. 
Usually these requirements are not only limited to objective competencies (ironing, cooking, speed at executing 
tasks, etc.), but they include what are commonly defined as “soft skills”: the ability to manage time, to prioritise, 
to perform multiple tasks at once, but also listening and showing empathy to the needs of the employers, among 
others. Although a renewed attention has been paid to the importance of soft skills, the belief that domestic work 
is unskilled is so deeply anchored that all attempts to professionalise the sector have failed so far (Anderson, 
2000). A growing gap exists between professionalised work – jobs that require skills and that are more likely to 
be performed also by men, such as nurses, teachers, gardeners, etc. – and non-professionalised work – jobs that 
have the lowest possible status and that continue to be performed only by women. 
27 Among the efforts made in recent years to professionalise paid domestic work and to improve the working 
conditions of domestic workers, the most significant at international level is the work of the International Labour 
Organisation. The ILO Convention 189 and the Recommendation 201 on “Decent Work for Domestic Workers”, 
adopted in 2011, are the most powerful instruments adopted at international level for the protection of domestic 
workers and the improvements of their working conditions. 
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workers. The hours are long, the pay is low and the benefits associated with it generally poor, 
the work requires strong physical and emotional efforts and the commuting for live-out 
workers can be exhausting. It is a work that can be monotonous and both live-in and live-out 
domestic workers can experience situations of profound isolation. Moreover, domestic work 
is attached low status and low reputation and in the vast majority of cases it is considered 
degrading. As Bridget Anderson states, “paid domestic work looks in many ways like just 
another undesirable job” (2002, p. 104). 
As it has been recognised by scholarship, the reasons for the persistence of poor working 
conditions are partly linked to the peculiarity of the job. Domestic work is different from any 
other employment relationship, mainly because i) it is based on power relationships that recall 
those between masters and slaves; ii) it is performed in the private sphere; iii) it involves 
emotional labour; and iv) it is linked to the idea of dirtiness. (Rollins, 1985; Lutz, 2008, 2010; 
Anderson, 2002, 2006; Triandafyllidou & Marchetti, 2015). 
First, the power relation between employer and domestic worker is particularly insidious, as it 
is embedded in classes, races, nationalities and genders and it recalls the concept of servitude 
(Anderson, 2000; Cox, 2006; Parreñas, 2001). Although the relationship employer/worker is 
by definition an asymmetrical relationship, the distinctive feature of domestic work is that the 
very nature of the work implies a logic of servility and justifies a strong demarcation between 
superiority and inferiority. No matter how good the relationship employer/worker is, there 
will always be someone who serves and someone who is to be served. This can make the 
worker vulnerable to exploitation. Additionally, contrary to other power relationships, 
domestic work creates hierarchies and asymmetries among women: some women hold power 
and exercise it over other women. This has a strong impact on the reproduction of gender 
stereotypes and the intersection between gender, class and race issues. 
According to Rollins, the two extreme ways through which the exercise of power can be 
manifested are either an openly exploitative behaviour, or a ‘maternalistic’ attitude (Rollins, 
1985). Both behaviours reinforce class separation, but maternalism can be particularly 
dangerous, because it is hidden and because it creates a strong psychological dependence of 
the worker. The relation of dependence is especially strong for undocumented migrants, who 
fear to lose their job if they show insubordinate behaviour. Like paternalism, maternalism is 
based on an exchange: it provides protection in exchange for work and obedience (Rollins, 
1985). 
Second, domestic work is always performed in the private and intimate space of the ‘home’, 
which is a very special place of employment, and this has consequences at various levels 
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(Lutz, 2011; Triandafyllidou & Marchetti, 2015). On the one hand, the private sphere is 
socially and politically constructed as antithetical to the public and what happens within the 
private sphere cannot be considered as real work. Domestic workers find themselves in a 
space between the public and the private: they facilitate the movement of middle-class women 
into the public sphere, but they assume the private responsibilities of these women (Anderson, 
2000).  
On the other hand, the sharing of the intimate space between the employer and the employee 
can generate a series of issues. For one thing, it makes the work invisible and workers 
vulnerable to physical, sexual and psychological violence. The fact that labour inspections are 
not allowed in private homes makes particularly difficult to monitor working conditions and 
punish abuses. Furthermore, the relationship itself can generate ambiguity. The relationship 
employer/worker usually fluctuates between extreme closeness and extreme distance: 
domestic workers may either be treated as ‘one of the family’, and hence expected to show 
feelings of gratitude, or treated as inferiors, hence excessively controlled or even brutally 
abused28 (Rollins, 1985; Anderson, 2000). In general, the fact that the work is performed in 
the private sphere prevents domestic workers from the full exercise of their rights29. 
Third, domestic work does not simply require physical labour, but it involves an emotional 
dimension. As far as domestic work is concerned, physical labour and emotional labour 
cannot be disentangled (Andersen, 2002; Lutz, 2008; Triandafyllidou & Marchetti, 2015; 
Zdravomyslova, 2010). This raises important questions about the commodification of 
domestic work and of care work in particular30. While employers are in a better position for 
handling the emotional bond that goes together with domestic work, this can reveal 
particularly problematic for the workers. Emotional ties tend to be recognised or denied, 
depending on the employer’s interest: they are reinforced when the worker is expected to love 
and care as one of the family, while they are denied when the worker is no longer wanted.  
A last feature that contributes to the low status and low reputation of the job is its close 
association with the concept of dirtiness. It has to do with the low status traditionally 
                                                        
28 Qualitative researches show that employers typically treat workers as ‘one of the family’ when it comes to 
hours and flexibility (e.g. working extra hours, being ‘on call’ 24h per day, performing tasks which are not part 
of the job description, and so on), but as employees when it comes to workers entitlements (e.g. claims for extra 
holidays or permits, unjustified dismissals of the worker, and so on) (Rollins, 1985; Parreñas, 2001; Anderson, 
2002). 
29 For instance, domestic workers are among the least represented in trade unions and associations, which 
reduces their protection and collective bargaining power.  
30 The recognition of the emotional dimension typical of domestic work has stimulated a debate over the 
appropriateness of externalising this type of work. In other words, can emotional labour be bought? Can money 
buy love? Despite the increase in the demand for care workers, the commodification of care work is still 
questioned by many. 
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attributed to people who deal with dirt as a profession31. Although dealing with his/her own 
dirt is considered to be normal, being paid for dealing with other people’s dirt is automatically 
associated with a lower status. The status of the worker becomes inseparable from the status 
of the work (Cox, 2006). This partly explains why attempts to professionalise the sector and 
promote the dignity of domestic work have often failed: low wages, low reputation and low 
status of domestic workers continue to go hand in hand.  
In the light of the transformations occurred over time in the way paid domestic work is 
regulated and organised, as well as the main features of the contemporary European domestic 
sector, the next section provides a definition of paid domestic work today. This definition will 
be adopted throughout the research.  
 
1.3 The definition of contemporary paid domestic work  
 
The definition of domestic work is controversial, and this is reflected both in the various 
categorisations and employment statuses attributed to domestic workers at national level and 
in the way domestic sector is coded in international and national statistics. Additionally, as 
historians who have analysed the development of domestic services has repeatedly 
emphasised, the definition of paid domestic work has changed over time.  
The complexity of the definition of domestic work is not only theoretical, but it also derives 
from practical issues. The invisibility of the work, due to its private nature, makes it difficult 
to monitor. Also, due to the variety of tasks that can be performed by domestic workers, a 
common definition has not been agreed upon so far. 
In its broad definition, and taking into consideration the transformations in domestic work 
occurred over time, modern paid domestic work includes both housework – cleaning, ironing, 
cooking, polishing, shopping, and all activities whose aim is to take care of the house – and 
care work – all tasks related to the care of children, the elderly and/or the disabled32. However, 
even this simple definition can be problematic, as often the two dimensions overlap. The fact 
that performing care work often requires that the worker do some housework-related task 
(cooking for children and the elderly, washing body dirt, tidying, etc.), or that housework is 
                                                        
31 Stephen Castles has used the concept of the “3-D jobs” (Dirty, Demanding and Dangerous) to describe the 
work of foreign women in the domestic and care sector.  
32 One of the main novelties of contemporary domestic work, compared to older forms of domestic services, is the 
overwhelming increase of a ‘care dimension’ within domestic tasks. In Europe, as in other developed regions, care 
work represents an important segment of the domestic sector. Details about the changes in the proportion of care 
work, compared to the past, are provided in section 1.1.2.  
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ultimately intended to make the life of the family members more comfortable (hence, to take 
care of them), makes the separation blur.  
To overcome the problem of listing the specific tasks performed by domestic workers, which 
vary from country to country and may also vary over time, the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) provides a general definition of domestic workers as all workers who 
work for private households. In particular, the Domestic Workers Convention (N. 189) 
adopted in 2011, which constitutes the international reference framework for all statistical 
definitions of domestic workers, defines domestic work as follows: 
 
a) the term “domestic work” means work performed in or for a household or 
households; 
b) the term “domestic worker” means any person engaged in domestic work within an 
employment relationship; 
c) a person who performs domestic work only occasionally or sporadically and not 
on an occupational basis is not a domestic worker. 
 
The definition of the ILO is interesting, because instead of providing a list of activities, it 
focuses on the nature of the work. In particular, point a) of the definition emphasises the 
private nature of domestic work and thus excludes all workers who provide domestic services 
for institutions (kindergartens, hospitals, nursing homes, orphanages, retirement homes, and 
so on). Also, according to the Convention, domestic work may involve a variety of tasks, such 
as “cooking, cleaning the house, washing and ironing the laundry, general housework, looking 
after children, the elderly or persons with disabilities, as well as maintaining the garden, 
guarding the house premises, and driving the family car” (ILO, 2011). 
According to point b) of the definition, domestic work includes domestic workers on a part-
time basis, domestic workers who are engaged with multiple employers, national and non-
national domestic workers, and live-in and live-out domestic workers. It is important to notice 
that the employer can be either a member of the household for which the work is performed, 
or an agency/enterprise that employs domestic workers and make them available for a private 
household. This definition excludes self-employed domestic workers. 
According to point c) of the definition, only who performs domestic work on an occupational 
basis can be considered a domestic worker. This means that a clear distinction has to be made 
between domestic work and home work, the latter being the work carried out by an individual 
in his/her own home, rather than in the home of the employer. 
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Based on the transformations of domestic work over time, on the main characteristics of 
contemporary domestic work and on the definition provided by the ILO, the definition of paid 
domestic work adopted in this study is the following: 
- Tasks/activities: it includes both housework and care activities33.  
- Nature of employment: it includes only work performed in or for a private household 
or households34.  
- Type of employment: it includes only the work performed on an occupational basis 
and therefore excludes the domestic work performed in his/her own home. 
- Qualifications: it includes only low-skilled work (work for which no qualifications are 
required)35. 
These features set the theoretical definition of domestic work adopted for the purpose of this 
study. However, as it is presented in Chapter 3 on methodology, various problems arise when 
the theoretical definition is translated into a statistical definition. 
 
  
                                                        
33 This is based on the recent developments of paid domestic work and on the increase of the demand and supply of 
care domestic workers (see section 1.1.2). The advantage of the inclusion of both housework and care work is that it 
solves the problem of the overlap between the two dimensions. 
34 This is based on the definition of the ILO Convention N. 189 (2011).  
35 This allows drawing a distinction between domestic workers and more professionalised positions. This distinction 
is useful especially for the classification of care workers. For instance, care workers working for private households 
will be considered domestic workers only when no official qualification is required to perform the job. On the 
contrary, when care workers (typically those paid by public authorities) need a formal training to perform care tasks, 
they will not be included in the domestic sector.  
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Chapter 2  
 
Care, gender and migration regimes and the use of typologies in 
literature 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter presents the main contributions of the literature on care, gender and migration 
regimes. Since the analyses of the three regimes under study ultimately result in the 
construction of typologies, an introduction on the use of typologies in the literature is 
presented as a separate section. This introduction can be useful, as it provides an overview of 
the main philosophical and empirical argumentation in favour (or against) the creation of 
typologies. Another section that precedes the debate on the three regimes under study is a 
brief review of the literature on welfare regimes.  
The reason for presenting a separate section on welfare regimes is based on three 
considerations. First, care regimes are part of welfare regimes, as they include welfare 
policies and regulations that define the division of caring responsibilities among the state, the 
family and the market. Thus, a general review of welfare regimes seems necessary for a 
thorough review of care regimes. Second, the tradition of welfare studies provides one of the 
richest contributions in terms of creation of typologies and thus it also represents a useful 
methodological tool. Third, as it emerges from the review of the literature on care and gender 
regimes, many existing classifications have been inspired, at least partly, on welfare studies.  
Sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 present the review of the literature on the care, the gender and the 
migration regimes. For each regime, the most influential theorisations and classifications 
developed in the literature are reviewed. The specific examination of the three regimes and 
the overview of the most influential classifications developed by scholarship is meant to lay 
the ground for the analysis of the three regimes, which is presented in Chapter 5. In each 
section only some of the most influential typologies that have been created and that have a 
direct impact on the study of paid domestic work are reviewed. Also, for a matter of relevance, 
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I only mention the most prominent theories, namely those that have generated the widest 
debate and the largest aftermath for both political economy and sociology36. 
 
2.1 Typologies in the literature 
 
2.1.1 The use of typologies in the literature: advantages and disadvantages 
 
Before examining the typologies that are most relevant to the study of paid domestic work, it 
seems necessary to introduce the use of typologies in the literature and how the formulation of 
ideal types has been either encouraged or criticised. Economists, political economists and 
sociologists, among others, have always been interested in analysing similarities and 
differences in national institutions and the deriving systems. One way to explore such 
differences, as well as common trends, has been to classify countries according to typologies. 
In academic research, typologies have been used for different purposes: in order to simplify 
the reality, in order to facilitate the comparison between different realities or objects and to 
highlight common features and differences, but also in order to build new theories to explain 
social phenomena.  
The main theoretical and methodological questions about the creation of typologies concern, 
on the one hand, the scientific validity of typologies and, on the other hand, the usefulness 
and the explanatory power of ideal types. 
Concerning the scientific validity of typologies, the debate can be traced back to the 
philosophical question over what type of knowledge can or cannot be considered as ‘science’. 
Although classifications and typologies as a ‘natural’ instrument for understanding the reality 
have always been used and accepted, their use as a tool to produce science has been either 
encouraged or strongly criticised at different times in history. The main resistance to the use 
of classifications in scientific research draws from the division between natural and social 
sciences and their status as sciences and focuses on the ‘scientific fallacy’ of classifications 
and typologies (Marradi, 1990, p. 150).  
                                                        
36 Due to the richness of the scientific literature that has developed around the three regimes, it is impossible to 
account for all the contributions in the field. For the purpose of this study, only a reduced selection of authors is 
mentioned. The choice, which is by no means exhaustive, is based on the relevance of the classifications to the analysis 
of domestic work (namely, classifications that use indicators that are somehow relevant for analysing the outsourcing 
of domestic activities) and the magnitude of the debate that they have generated (namely, the most known 
classifications that have inspired the literature).    
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According to positivists, given the difference in the object of study between natural and social 
sciences, different methods have to be adopted, the former being objective, while the second 
being necessarily subjective (or empathic) (Meraviglia, 2004). While natural sciences use 
scientific methods from which they derive exact laws, social sciences aim to understand social 
phenomena through general theories and classifications. Similarly, logical empiricists in the 
nineteenth century maintained that for social sciences to be recognised the same scientific 
status as natural sciences, methods of classification should be abandoned in favour of exact 
measurement, the latter being superior to the former (Marradi, 1990). 
Typologies, instead, have been defended on different grounds by many scholars. One of the 
most prominent defender of typologies is Weber, who recognises the elaboration of ideal 
types as a proper method for scientific research (Weber, 1958, quoted in Meraviglia, 2004). In 
opposition to positivists, Weber believes that the object of study in social sciences does not 
preclude from objectivity and that this objectivity can be achieved through a rigorous method. 
The construction of ideal types is one of the crucial parts of the method elaborated by Weber. 
According to him, ideal types are abstract constructions, or models, to which the reality can 
be compared. Ideal types are constructed by emphasising some traits that are present in reality, 
but which are not necessarily present at the same time or with the same intensity. They can be 
considered as extreme concepts that never correspond to the reality. The usefulness of 
typologies lies in the fact that the reality can be measured and compared to ideal types and 
that it can thus reveal its constitutive elements. Since ideal types do not correspond by any 
means to real types, typologies are instruments of analysis that can be useful to social 
scientists in order to understand the conceptual categories that he/she is using. In this, 
typologies guarantee the objectivity of the analysis (Weber, 1958, quoted in Meraviglia, 
2004). An important part of the Weberian definition of ideal types is that they should not be 
used as an end in itself, but rather to clarify social phenomena. 
Concerning the usefulness and explanatory power of typologies, a constant scepticism derives 
from the fact that real phenomena can rarely be unambiguously assigned to ideal types. If 
certain real types bring much resemblance to a given ideal-type, this is not the case for all 
social phenomena. The proof is that, the typologies being equal, a certain real object might be 
assigned to different ideal types, depending on the measurement or simply on individual 
judgement. However, as Weber already stressed in his work, this does not constitute a 
problem, as ideal types are by definition abstract conceptualisations, which never exactly 
correspond to the reality. It is exactly in the distance between real and ideal types that lays the 
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explanatory power of typologies: the power to compare social phenomena, the power to 
measure the intensity of a certain phenomenon, and so on (Meraviglia, 2004). 
The emphasis on the usefulness of typologies for comparative purposes has been largely 
emphasised by literature. According to Watkins, comparing real types to pure types – which 
obviously implies knowledge of both types – enables the emergence of deviations from the 
ideal and therefore the measurement of reality (Watkins, 1969, quoted in Arts and Gelissen, 
2002). Using the words of Arts and Gelissen, through the comparison between real and ideal 
types ‘the deviations of the “impure” real types are contrasted with the “purity” of the ideal-
type’ (Arts and Gelissen, 2002, p.139). Therefore, typologies can be used as conceptual tools 
for empirical validation. 
Additionally, according to some scholars, typologies are not only useful for comparative 
purposes, but they may be useful tools for building new theories. As Boucher and Gest affirm, 
“aside from [their] empirical contributions, robust typologies allow scholars to analyse and 
deepen existing theory” (2014, p. 3). In this sense, they can be useful to introduce innovative 
theories and new ways of investigations. 
Another controversial issue highlighted by scholars concerns the use that should be made of 
typologies. As mentioned above, according to Weber ideal types should not be used as an end 
in itself, but only to clarify social phenomena. Similarly, other scholars have asserted that 
ideal types have a value if and only if they are not a goal in themselves, but they are oriented 
towards other goals, which should be real phenomena. According to Klant, ideal types are of 
no value if they are not created with the explicit intent of using them for explaining the reality 
(Klant, 1984). 
From a methodological point of view, different types of classifications/typologies37 exist, 
depending on the goal they pursue and depending on the methodology used for their 
construction. One of the clearest distinctions between different types of classifications is the 
one elaborated by Marradi. According to him, classifications can be carried out through two 
main families of operations38. What he calls ‘intensional classification’ refers to the process of 
conceptual elaboration of typologies. Based on theory, a concept at a certain level of 
generality can be subdivided into further concepts or groups. On the contrary, the ‘extensional 
classification’ refers to the process of grouping objects or events, based on their properties or 
                                                        
37 For matters of simplicity, I use the terms ‘classification’ and ‘typology’ almost interchangeably. Although no clear 
semantic definition exists and despite the close similarity between the two terms, classifications generally refer to the 
process of classifying, while typologies to the result of this process. For a more detailed discussion over the correct 
terminology to be used, refer to Marradi, 1990. 
38 Marradi identifies a third type of classifications, not mentioned here, which refers to the process of assigning 
objects or events to existing classes. This type of classification usually results in taxonomies (Marradi, 1990). 
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their perceived similarity. In simple words, while intensional classifications start from the 
theoretical level and are then confirmed by the observation of the reality, extensional 
classifications build typologies starting from the characteristics of the object. The main 
criterion applied for extensional classifications is to maximise the homogeneity among groups 
and the heterogeneity between groups (Marradi, 1990). 
Although the typologies presented in the following sections correspond to either of the two 
types of classifications, the construction of the typologies in this study (presented in Chapter 
5) falls under the extensional type of classifications.  
 
2.1.2 The welfare regime 
 
In Europe and in other developed countries, the attempt to classify countries for comparative 
reasons has become of crucial importance in the last decades and even more today. Much of 
the debate, be that in economic, political or social terms, focuses on whether global trends 
such as globalisation, liberalisation and technological advancement are meant to bring about 
convergence among countries or whether national differences will persist.  
A typical approach, which represents one angle from which to explore differences and 
similarities between developed societies, has been to explain the economic behaviour of 
nation states by looking at how institutions (mainly the state and the market) interact and 
generate different institutional combinations that influence the economy and society at large. 
To investigate and explain economic behaviour, political economists and economists have 
used different approaches, by giving prominence to one or more aspects that might determine 
economic and institutional stability and that might meet the social and economic challenges 
brought about by the modernisation of societies. Thus, various typologies exist, which focus 
either on the labour market regulations, on the role of the state, on welfare regulations, and so 
on39.  
In this section I concentrate on the elaboration of typologies of welfare regimes. As 
mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, the justification for a separate section specific to 
welfare regimes derives from three factors. First, care regimes – which are one of the focuses 
                                                        
39 One of the most influential contributions to explain institutional variations was developed by Peter Hall and 
David Soskice, who proposed the ‘varieties of capitalism’ (VofC) approach. Based on two main indicators – 
coordination and complementarities – they developed a classification that distinguishes between two ideal-types: 
liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated market economies (CMEs) (Hall and Soskice, 2001). In 
liberal market economies, the relationship between firms and other actors is determined by market relations, 
while in coordinated market economies it is mainly based on non-market relationships.  
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of this research – are part of welfare regimes, whose prior description seems therefore 
necessary. Second, welfare literature provides one of the richest examples of classifications. 
Third, many classifications of countries in terms of care and gender regimes are carried out 
based on existing typologies of welfare. 
 
2.1.2.1 The Welfare state typologies 
 
Some of the most successful and well-known typologies developed in sociological and 
economic studies are those addressing the differences among welfare states in developed 
countries. Although the creation of welfare states in Europe is usually traced back to the end 
of the 19th century, it took several generations before it was recognised and labelled as such. 
The need to classify welfare states started to become pressing in the post-war period, when 
the restructuring of developed societies urged the reorganisation of welfare institutions and 
the definition of social rights (Flora and Heidenheimer, 1976)40.  
The definition of welfare state itself is not without contradictions. Generally speaking, welfare 
is considered the instrument through which the state guarantees a certain degree of economic 
and social well-being to its citizens41. As defined by Põder and Kerem (2011, p. 56), “welfare 
regimes refer to institutional arrangements between the market, the state and the family, in 
which the state has a central role in protecting individuals against market risks”. In the 
traditional economic distinction between the state, the market and the family, welfare 
constitutes the state intervention where market and families fail to guarantee the survival and 
a decent standard of living to individuals (Esping-Andersen, 1990).  
While welfare states can be more or less interventionist in the degree of support they provide, 
their existence always implies a certain degree of recognition of social rights, in addition to 
civil rights. Various differences exist in the way social rights have been adopted and 
translated into welfare policies. Such differences, and the evolution of national welfare states, 
                                                        
40 The welfare state originated in Germany with the policies implemented by the German Chancellor Otto von 
Bismark, who introduced a programme of social protection (old age pensions, accident insurance and medical 
care), so to win the support of the working class. In the United Kingdom, welfare state emerged at the beginning 
of the 20th century, when the first liberal welfare reforms were introduced, and became a proper model with the 
Beveridge Report in 1942 (Flora and Heidenheimer, 1976). Today, Bismark and Beveridge have come to 
identify two distinct models of welfare.  
41 Some definitions of welfare consider that a real welfare exists only when the majority of state activities are 
oriented towards the wellbeing of households and individuals, or when its support addresses the whole 
population. So, strictly speaking and based on these definitions, no real welfare state was present before the 
1970s, the time when governments in western democratic countries started to acknowledge the existence of 
social rights and adapt their structure to accommodate social policies (Esping-Andersen, 1990). 
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have generated a long tradition of comparative social policy literature and still constitute a 
rich subject of studies today.  
 
2.1.2.2 The three worlds of welfare capitalism 
 
Among different classifications of welfare states developed in the last decades, the one 
proposed by Esping-Andersen (1980-1990) is the one that has received the greatest attention 
and that has shaped the following literature. In his seminal work on welfare states – The Three 
Worlds of Welfare Capitalism – Esping-Andersen proposes a three-group typology of welfare 
regimes42, based on the different relationship between the state, the market and the family that 
can be identified in modern capitalist democracies.  
While previous attempts to classify welfare systems were based on the total level of social 
expenditure, Esping-Andersen starts from the observation that not all social expenditures 
count equally and they do not necessarily reflect social solidarity. According to him, welfare 
regimes can be classified based on the combination of two indicators: the degree of de-
commodification and the degree of social stratification in a given country. The concept of 
‘commodification’, which is a feature shared by all capitalist societies, is based on the idea 
that in capitalist societies workers are seen as commodities, whose well-being depends on the 
market. In countries where the level of commodification is high, the survival of individuals 
and their standard of living depend on their attachment to the market and their performance in 
the market. On the contrary, in countries with a high degree of de-commodification, 
individuals’ well-being does not entirely depend on the market, but it is guaranteed as a social 
right. Individuals are de-commodified when they have the choice not to work and they are 
still able to conduct a decent life. If a certain degree of de-commodification is part of every 
welfare system, the way it is pursued and the extent to which de-commodification is achieved 
varies greatly from country to country.  
The second indicator that Esping-Andersen considers in his analysis of welfare regimes is 
social stratification, understood as the way certain social policies determine the kind of 
stratification in place in a given country and which kind of solidarity they pursue. The type of 
social stratification will be different, depending on the set of social policies promoted by the 
                                                        
42 In the preface of the book The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Esping-Andersen makes a distinction 
between the term welfare state and the term welfare regime. While the first one is narrowly associated with 
social aid policies, the latter includes all the features that characterise the relationship between the state and the 
economy. Since the aim of the author is not to analyse social programmes, but to reconceptualise welfare 
systems in terms of political economy, he systematically adopts the terms “welfare capitalism” or “welfare 
regimes”. Without neglecting the existence of semantic nuances, in my overview of welfare I will use the terms 
“welfare regimes”, “welfare systems” and “welfare states” interchangeably. 
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state and in particular depending on which among social assistance, social insurance and 
universalistic policy system predominates43.  
Based on the degree of de-commodification and the degree of social stratification resulting 
from social policies, Esping-Andersen recognises three distinct types of welfare capitalism. 
‘Liberal welfare states’ are characterised by low levels of de-commodification. In these 
countries, social assistance schemes prevail over other types of state support and the market is 
seen as the only instrument that can ‘free’ people. These systems determine a high level of 
stratification, low de-commodification and strong polarisation between poor stigmatised 
individuals and the rest of the population. The United States, Britain, Canada and Australia 
are identified as the core of the liberal welfare state model. 
In ‘corporatist-conservative welfare states’, the focus on the market is weaker and social 
rights are commonly accepted. The state assumes the role of substitute to the market in 
guaranteeing well-being to its citizens, but the state intervenes only when the family or the 
market fail44. In line with the corporatist tradition, entitlements to social rights depend on 
contributions and therefore on employment, and tend to reinforce classes and privileges. 
Although the enforcement of social rights is not questioned, in corporatist-conservative 
countries the level of de-commodification is not very high, as the level of provision depends 
on hierarchies and statuses. Austria, Germany, France and Italy are the countries that better 
represent this typology. 
Finally, ‘social-democratic welfare states’ are based on solidarity and equality. The insurance 
system is universalistic and social protection is provided as a universal right, without any link 
to the market. In social-democratic countries, the level of de-commodification is high, as 
individuals are not dependent on the market for their well-being. They can choose whether or 
not to work and they receive social benefits even if they are outside the market. Insurance 
                                                        
43 For instance, while both social assistance schemes and social insurance schemes are intended to provide a 
certain level of support to citizens, they are somehow going in the opposite direction in terms of de-
commodification. Social assistance, as it addresses only the weakest segments of the population – those who are 
not able to participate in the market – paradoxically creates a stronger dependence of people from the market. In 
countries where social assistance is the dominant model, a strong polarisation between the very poor and all 
other individuals emerges: the social stigma associated with social assistance forces people to rely on the market, 
which becomes then the only instrument for achieving a decent standard of living. While social insurance 
generally covers larger social strata, it is not however an instrument of de-commodification and can sometimes 
exacerbate the dependency of workers on the market. Since social insurance is typically linked to employment, it 
maintains statuses and privileges, based on the position of the individuals in the labour market. Through social 
insurance schemes the state typically guarantees the fidelity of public servants through specific privileges. 
44 Since conservative countries are highly influenced by the Catholic church, the family ideology is particularly 
strong. Because families are seen as the natural providers of care and mothers as dependant from their male 
counterpart, women are not supported in their decision to enter the labour market, spouses are not covered by 
individual social insurance and services for children are lacking. 
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benefits are universally provided, independently of social contributions linked to 
employment45. If in the corporatist-conservative welfare type the state intervenes only where 
family and the market fail, in social-democratic countries the state intervenes in advance, so 
to guarantee a certain degree of well-being to all. Scandinavian countries are those identified 
as the core countries representing this model.  
An interesting feature of this welfare type is that, although de-commodification is highly 
reached for, the market is nevertheless a crucial element of the system. Even if citizens are 
entitled to choosing between working or not, the participation in the labour market is highly 
encouraged, as work is considered a universal right. Since full employment – also of women – 
is the ultimate goal and it is considered as a state responsibility, it follows that childcare and 
elderly care services and all other services aimed at facilitating the combination of work and 
family responsibilities are highly developed. 
 
2.1.2.3 New ways to look at welfare states 
 
Much of the literature on welfare of the last two decades has taken the three ideal types of 
Esping-Andersen as the basis for the comparison of welfare regimes and for the classification 
of welfare states. While I will not linger over a theoretical or methodological evaluation of the 
typology developed by Esping-Andersen, I will nevertheless mention the main criticisms 
raised at his classification, in that they enabled the construction of new ways to look at 
welfare regimes and to make international comparisons46. The main criticisms raised against 
Esping-Andersen classification can be summarised in the following: i) the systematic 
inclusion of Mediterranean countries in the conservative welfare regime and the lack of a 
specific Southern group; ii) the definition of liberal and conservative countries; iii) the lack of 
a gender perspective in the overall architecture of the classification.  
                                                        
45 Although these welfare states are far the most egalitarian, the universalistic nature of benefits makes them 
very costly for governments, which are often unable to provide high levels of compensations. If welfare states 
fail to guarantee a real choice between inside or outside the market, because benefits are too low, the risk is a 
polarisation between the very poor and the middle-class. According to Esping-Andersen, the Scandinavian 
countries, which represent the core of this typology, managed to provide benefits that are high enough to cover 
the middle-class and so avoid a social polarisation between the rich and the poor. 
46 For the purpose of this research, I will not enter into the debate on whether or not Esping-Andersen typology 
of welfare regimes is still valid today, whether it was ever useful on empirical grounds, or whether it possesses 
any explanatory power or any theoretical legitimation (for further details about the theoretical and empirical 
value of his work, see Arts and Gelissen, 2002). I will rather use Esping-Andersen typologies, as well as other 
typologies resulting from criticisms to his work, in order to provide an overview of the various comparative 
perspectives in welfare studies. 
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For the review of the main welfare typologies deriving from Esping-Andersen classification, I 
refer to the reviews of Arts and Gelissen (2002) and of Bambra (2007), from which I selected 
the typologies that are most significant for the purpose of this study. The typologies are 
divided into the type of criticism from which they derive. Each table presented in the section 
– one for each type of criticism – shows a chronological list of the selected typologies and 
includes the name of the author, the measure/indicator on which the model is constructed and 
the typologies, including the countries that according to each model better fit into each cluster. 
 
Distinctiveness of Southern countries 
In his original classification, Esping-Andersen included Italy in the conservative group, while 
other Mediterranean countries were not taken into account. While he acknowledged the 
similarity among Mediterranean countries, all characterised by a strong Catholic influence 
and strong family ideology, Esping-Andersen considered these countries as a sub-group of the 
conservative type. 
As presented in Table 1, many scholars underlined the lack of the distinctiveness of Southern 
countries and remodelled the original classification, so to form a specific cluster of Southern 
countries. 
What is interesting to notice is that, despite the use of different indicators, all authors identify 
three ideal types of welfare state, which are similar to those developed by Esping-Andersen. 
The main innovation is the recognition of a fourth ideal-type, represented by Mediterranean 
countries. However, as it is often the case when typologies are constructed by means of 
different indicators, some differences exist in the attribution of certain countries to each ideal-
type. While Scandinavian countries, as well as Greece, Portugal and Spain on the one side and 
Austria and Germany on the other side seem to constantly represent the core of each group 
(Northern, Southern and Continental, respectively), there are countries that belong to different 
clusters depending on the type of measurement. For instance, while all authors include France 
in the conservative/Bismarckian group, in Leibfried’s analysis France is part of the group of 
Southern countries, which corresponds in his classification to a rudimentary model of social 
protection. Similarly, while Italy shares in all classifications the same characteristics of other 
Southern countries, Navarro and Shi assign it to the Christian Democrat cluster.  
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Table 1: Welfare state typologies - distinctiveness of the Southern group 
Author Indicators Welfare regimes 
Esping-
Andersen 
(1990) 
- De-
commodification 
- Social 
stratification 
Liberal: 
Australia 
Canada 
Ireland 
New Zealand 
UK 
USA 
Conservative: 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Japan 
Italy 
Social-
democratic: 
Austria 
Belgium 
Netherlands 
Denmark 
Norway 
Sweden 
 
Leibfried 
(1992) 
- Poverty policy 
- Rights 
- Basic income 
- Social insurance 
Anglo-Saxon: 
Australia 
New Zealand 
UK 
USA 
Bismarck: 
Austria 
Germany 
Scandinavian: 
Denmark 
Finland 
Norway 
Sweden 
Latin Rim: 
France 
Greece 
Italy 
Portugal 
Spain 
Ferrera (1996) - Eligibility rules 
and coverage 
- Financing and 
organisation of 
social protection 
Anglo-Saxon: 
Ireland 
UK 
Bismarck: 
Austria 
Belgium 
France 
Germany 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Switzerland 
Scandinavian: 
Denmark 
Finland 
Norway 
Sweden 
Southern: 
Greece 
Italy 
Portugal 
Spain 
Bonoli (1997) - Social 
expenditure 
- Social 
expenditure via 
contributions 
British: 
Ireand 
UK 
Continental: 
Belgium 
France 
Germany 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Nordic: 
Denmark 
Finland 
Norway 
Sweden 
Southern: 
Greece 
Italy 
Portugal 
Spain 
Switzerland 
Navarro and 
Shi (2001) 
- Political tradition Liberal-Anglo 
Saxon: 
Canada 
Ireland 
UK 
USA 
Christian 
Democrat: 
Belgium 
Netherlands 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
Switzerland 
Social 
Democratic: 
Denmark 
Finland 
Norway 
Sweden 
Austria 
Ex-fascist: 
Spain 
Greece 
Portugal 
 
 
Redefinition of the liberal and/or conservative types 
While for some authors the principal omission in Esping-Andersen’s classification was a 
distinct Southern group, other authors focused on the possible internal differences of the 
liberal and/or the conservative types. Table 2 shows a selection of alternative typologies that 
highlight this issue. 
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Table 2: Welfare state typologies - redefinition of the liberal and conservative types 
Author Indicators Welfare regimes 
Esping-
Andersen 
(1990) 
- De-
commodification 
- Social 
stratification 
Liberal: 
Australia 
Canada 
Ireland 
New 
Zealand 
UK 
USA 
Conservative: 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Japan 
Italy 
Social-
democratic: 
Austria 
Belgium 
Netherlands 
Denmark 
Norway 
Sweden 
  
Castles 
and 
Mitchell 
(1993) 
- Welfare 
expenditure 
- Benefit 
equality 
Liberal: 
Ireland 
Japan 
Switzerland 
USA 
Conservative: 
Germany 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Non-right 
hegemony: 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Norway 
Sweden 
Radical: 
Australia 
New Zealand 
UK 
 
Kangas 
(1994) 
- De-
commodification 
Liberal: 
Canada 
USA 
Conservative: 
Austria 
Germany 
Italy 
Japan 
Netherlands 
Social-
democratic: 
Denmark 
Finland 
Norway 
Sweden 
Radical: 
Australia 
Ireland 
New Zealand 
UK 
 
Korpi 
and 
Palme 
(1998) 
- Social 
expenditure (% 
GDP) 
- Institutional 
features 
Basic 
security: 
Canada 
Denmark 
Ireland 
Netherlands 
New 
Zealand 
Switzerland 
UK 
USA 
Corporatist: 
Belgium 
France 
Austria 
Germany 
Italy 
Japan 
Encompassing: 
Finland 
Norway 
Sweden 
Targeted: 
Australia 
 
Pitruzello 
(1999) 
- De-
commodification 
Liberal: 
Canada 
Ireland 
UK 
USA 
Conservative: 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Switzerland 
Social 
Democratic: 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Norway 
Sweden 
Conservative-
Bismarckian: 
Austria 
Finland 
France 
Italy 
Japan 
Radical: 
Australia 
New Zealand 
Bambra 
(2005) 
- Healthcare 
services 
- De-
commodification 
Liberal: 
Australia 
Japan 
USA 
Conservative: 
Austria 
Belgium 
Canada 
Denmark 
France 
Italy 
Social 
Democratic: 
Finland 
Norway 
Sweden 
Conservative 
subgroup: 
Germany 
Switzerland 
Netherlands 
Liberal 
subgroup: 
Ireland 
UK 
New Zealand 
 
Again, although the three ideal types identified by Esping-Andersen remain at the core of all 
classifications, by considering different indicators (social protection and distribution, the 
degree of poverty and inequality, public health and health inequalities and so on), new 
clusters of countries emerge. Without entering the debate over the classification of 
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Antipodean countries (Australia, New Zealand) and of the USA, what is interesting to notice 
is that several authors have not only added one or more clusters, but they have also rearranged 
the configuration of the existing ideal types, according to the set of indicators upon which 
their typology rests. 
 
Adding a gender perspective 
A last set of critiques raised to Esping-Andersen’s typology is the lack of a gender perspective. 
As highlighted by Orloff (1996), the vast corpus of literature that takes into consideration 
gender as a framework of analysis of welfare states has developed around two different but 
complementary schools of thoughts. First, the welfare state can be seen as contributing to the 
reproduction of gender hierarchies. This way of analysing welfare regimes emphasises the 
way the state, through multiple mechanisms, reinforces and maintains traditional gender roles. 
In this case, the way the state promotes the access to social rights and to power resources can 
be used as indicators for a gender-sensitive analysis (O’Connor, 1993). Second, since the 
welfare is ultimately meant to address citizens’ well-being, it is also meant to have a positive 
impact on social inequality, including gender inequality. This way of analysing gender 
regimes focuses on the gender-differentiated outcomes in terms of poverty reduction and 
reduction of inequalities.       
Additionally, according to feminist scholars, the fact that care work was not included in the 
traditional typology as a distinct area of social policy led to a gender-blind model of welfare. 
Feminist scholars have identified in Esping-Andersen’s typology at least three problematic 
issues: i) the lack of a gender perspective in the very concept of de-commodification, ii) the 
lack of a systematic analysis of the gendered division of unpaid labour (especially care and 
domestic work) and in particular of the welfare provided by families, and iii) the lack of 
recognition of gender as a means of social stratification (Bambra, 2007).  
Although gender analyses of welfare states are numerous and have brought about a crucial 
contribution to welfare studies, many authors point at a lack of comparative studies in this 
field47 (O’Connor, 1993; Orloff, 1996). If many authors have identified new and sophisticated 
indicators that take into account the gender dimension of welfare states, they have often 
focused on one single system or on two-country comparisons. Therefore, despite the rich 
contributions on the relationship between gender and welfare, very few examples of multi-
country classifications exist with this respect. 
                                                        
47 Among the most influential feminist contributions to welfare studies are Diane Sainsbury, Julia S. O’Connor, 
Ann Orloff, Jane Lewis, Birte Siim, Mary Ruggie. 
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Table 3 reports some examples of alternative typologies developed once gender is included in 
the analysis48. 
 
Table 3: Welfare state typologies - adding a gender perspective 
Author Indicators Welfare regimes 
Esping-
Andersen 
(1990) 
- De-
commodification 
- Social 
stratification 
Liberal: 
Australia 
Canada 
Ireland 
New Zealand 
UK 
USA 
Conservative: 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Japan 
Italy 
Social-
democratic: 
Austria 
Belgium 
Netherlands 
Denmark 
Norway 
Sweden 
 
Sainsbury 
(1993) 
Type of welfare 
claims (social 
assistance, social 
insurance, or 
universal 
entitlements) 
Liberal: 
USA 
Conservative: 
Netherlands 
Social 
democratic: 
Sweden 
Mixed type: 
UK 
Gustafsson 
(1994) 
Childcare policies Market 
provision: 
USA 
Support 
mother 
caregiving: 
Netherlands 
Public services: 
Sweden 
 
Wennemo 
(1994) 
Employment 
benefits and family 
allowances 
Continental 
Europe 
(wage system, 
benefits to 
men) 
English 
speaking and 
Scandinavian 
countries 
(public family 
allowances) 
  
Siaroff (1994) - Family welfare 
orientation 
- Female work 
desirability 
- Family benefits 
paid to women 
Protestant 
Liberal: 
Australia 
Canada 
New Zealand 
UK 
USA 
Advanced 
Christian-
democratic: 
Austria 
Belgium 
France 
West Germany 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Protestant 
Social-
democratic: 
Denmark 
Finland 
Norway 
Sweden 
Late female 
mobilisation: 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
Portugal 
Spain 
Switzerland 
 
As shown in Table 3, the ideal types identified by Sainsbury and Gustafsson reproduce more 
or less the same groups as Esping-Andersen’s, but they introduce indicators/measures that 
take into account the gendered outcomes of care policies and family benefits, as well as the 
type of benefits (between universalistic benefits and benefits based on social assistance and/or 
social insurance). Similarly, Wennemo makes a distinction between welfare states that 
allocate benefits based on employment in the labour market and welfare systems based on 
                                                        
48 More examples of the alternative ways to look at welfare in a gender perspective will be presented in the 
sections on care regimes (2.2) and on gender regimes (2.3). 
 
 59 
public family allowances, and distinguishes between two main groups: continental European 
countries, on the one hand, and English-speaking and Scandinavian countries, on the other 
hand.  
A different approach is offered by Siaroff, according to whom the lack of a gendered 
perspective can be overcome by looking at the relationship between welfare states and the 
religious tradition. The alternative presented by the author is constructed by differentiating 
between the Protestant and the Catholic tradition. The resulting typology identifies a cluster of 
countries – the late female mobilisation group – characterised by poor welfare provision and 
the persistence of the family ideology, typical of the Catholic tradition. 
 
Adding new countries to the picture: the post-communist type 
I conclude the section on the review of the main welfare regimes with an extremely recent 
debate, related to the introduction in the welfare regimes typologies of the new European 
member states. Post-communist countries and generally Eastern European countries have 
been generally omitted from comparative policy studies, mainly because the features 
associated with the transition period they were facing made them difficult to classify. When 
scholars tried to fit them into existing typologies, the conclusion was often that the ‘European 
model’ was absent from the social policy asset in these countries (Ferge, 2001), because of 
the financial problems they were facing and their dependency on foreign capital, among other 
features. Another issue encountered when dealing with post-communist countries was that 
these countries were not homogeneous enough as to justify the introduction of a distinct 
cluster (Fenger, 2005). Despite the controversies in literature, some authors have attempted to 
fill this gap in recent years.  
Table 4 shows the comparison between Esping-Andersen typology and the typology proposed 
by Põder and Kerem, showing one possible alternative when Baltic countries are added in the 
picture. Their conclusion seems to point to a certain level of convergence between continental 
and Mediterranean countries, but also to the persistence of a clear separation between Nordic 
countries and all other countries. Additionally, according to their analysis, a clear group of 
countries emerges – that of post-communist countries – characterised by quite high levels of 
commodification (with the exception of Poland and Slovakia) and low levels of social 
protection. Therefore, a post-communist group is emerging, which combines features of the 
liberal type and of the Mediterranean group.  
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Table 4: Welfare state typologies - adding new countries: the post-communist group 
Author Indicators Welfare regimes 
Esping-
Andersen 
(1990) 
- De-
commodification 
- Social 
stratification 
Liberal: 
Australia 
Canada 
Ireland 
New Zealand 
UK 
USA 
Conservative: 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Japan 
Italy 
Social-
democratic: 
Austria 
Belgium 
Netherlands 
Denmark 
Norway 
Sweden 
  
Põder and 
Kerem 
(2011) 
-
Commodification 
- Social 
protection 
Mediterraneans: 
Italy 
Czech Republic 
Hungary 
Spain 
Greece 
Continentals: 
Germany 
France 
Austria 
Belgium 
Anglo-
Americans: 
USA 
Ireland 
UK 
Portugal 
Nordics: 
Denmark 
Finland 
Norway 
Sweden 
Post-
communists: 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Estonia 
Poland 
Slovakia 
 
 
Three main conclusions can be drawn from this schematic overview of selected typologies. 
First, although some authors have added further types to the original typology, mainly by 
focusing on one or another area of social policy, the three core typologies of Esping-Andersen 
seem to remain at the basis of all classifications. In other words, even by changing the 
perspective and the angle through which looking at welfare states, there seems to be a robust 
distinctiveness in Europe, where liberal, conservative and social-democratic models can be 
identified. This also suggests that no clear sign of convergence is visible at European level, 
and that on the contrary the differences identified two decades ago are still topical.  
The second consideration that is worth mentioning is that in all typologies of welfare states 
some countries emerge as the closest possible variations of ideal types, while other countries 
are included into one or another ideal-type, depending on the classification. This means that 
countries such as Sweden (for the social-democratic), Germany (for the conservative), the UK 
(for the liberal) hold a majority of coherent features that make them the prototype of the core 
groups. On the contrary, other countries can be more difficult to fit into a certain group, 
because they possess features that belong to different clusters. The result is that, by nature of 
their mix type of welfare policies, some countries seem to be particularly problematic in each 
classification49.  
                                                        
49 This is the case, for instance, of the Netherlands and Switzerland, which are pointed at as outliers in Esping-
Andersen typology, because of their hybrid characteristics in welfare provision. 
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A last consideration has to do with the type of measurement adopted for the construction of 
welfare models. If all the presented typologies suggest that the clusters vary according to the 
kind of indicator used for the analysis, they also show that a comprehensive classification of 
welfare states, which takes into consideration all possible aspects related to social policy and 
welfare provision, is a complicated task. This could suggest that rather than strive for a 
typology that provides a comprehensive picture of welfare regimes, an alternative solution 
could be to acknowledge the multitude of elements that determine the welfare regime and 
focus on one or the other element (political tradition, health policies, policies aimed at 
combating poverty or social stratification, care provisions, labour policies, family policies, 
social protection, education policies, and so on) depending on the social phenomenon that is 
to be studied. 
 
2.2 The care regime 
 
 
The concept of care regime started to be used systematically in the 1990s and is widely used 
today as a framework of analysis of welfare states. Although different definitions might give 
prominence to one or the other aspect and to micro or macro levels of analysis (Degavre and 
Nyssens, 2012), care regimes are usually thought as including the set of regulations, policies 
and general arrangements that each nation state puts in place to deal with care responsibilities. 
Since they include welfare policies that affect directly or indirectly family well-being and the 
support to families with respect to caring responsibilities, they are part of the welfare regime 
and they are often used as a category of analysis of welfare states (Daly and Lewis, 2000; 
Degavre and Nyssens, 2012). According to Kofman and Raghurma, “care regimes are 
conceptualised as the institutional and special arrangements (locations) for the provision and 
allocation of care” (2005, p. 4). In an earlier study, Knjin and Kremer (1997, p. 328) define 
care regimes as the “caring dimension of the welfare state”, where the care-giving and the 
care-receiving are the focus of the analysis of welfare systems. 
To use the traditional distinction employed by economists, care regimes focus on the 
repartition of caring responsibilities among the state, the market and the family – or, 
additionally, the third sector (Lewis, 2002, Degavre and Nyssens, 2012; Pavolini and Ranci, 
2008). The concept of care regimes helps understand how the responsibilities for domestic 
and caring activities are shared among different actors through national implicit or explicit 
regulations. Although the state is generally assumed to take in charge at least a certain level of 
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individual well-being and therefore a certain degree of care responsibilities (Degavre and 
Nyssens, 2012), in Europe the way care is produced and allocated differs from country to 
country, so that at national level various care strategies can be identified. These strategies 
define how and to what extent the state secures the individual’s right to receive care and the 
right to benefit from time for care50, in different combinations. Additionally, they also define 
how actors other than the state or the family are involved in the process.  
Structural changes in societies and the introduction of new regulations in the field of care 
have engendered changes in the way care is perceived and the way care is provided in the 
private and in the public sphere. This has an obvious impact on the organisation and the 
characteristics of the domestic sector, as it determines not only the degree of externalisation 
of care and domestic activities, but also the different combination of formal and informal care 
adopted by families.  
Although many policies and regulations might affect care regimes in a way or another, 
examples of care measures include incentives for housework activities (voucher systems, tax 
deductions and other types of cost reduction), incentives for childcare (availability of 
childcare facilities, child allowances, tax deduction for children-related costs, maternal, 
paternity and parental leaves, etc.), incentives for the care of the elderly (availability of 
residential services, cash-for-care schemes, pension and minimum contributory schemes, etc.) 
and any other instrument aimed at providing support to families and its members with respect 
to domestic and care activities. 
 
2.2.1 Who is responsible for providing care? 
 
In order to understand recent changes in the domestic sector, it is crucial to ascertain who is 
responsible for the family well-being and for care (with a special focus on children, elderly 
people and other dependant people) among the state, the market or the family itself. On the 
one hand, the level and the extent of support provided by the state to families in their 
traditional caring role have a direct impact on the functioning of modern societies, in that they 
favour – or on the contrary they reduce – the capacity of citizens to reconcile family and work 
lives. This in turn generates tangible outcomes in the labour market and therefore on 
economies. On the other hand, recent changes – at the family level, in the labour market and 
                                                        
50 Care policies can define the right of an individual to receive care when needed, but also the right of an 
individual to dispose of free time to allocate for the care of others (for instance, maternity and parental leaves 
and time off from work belong to the latter). 
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in societies at large – have made urgent in all countries the restructuring of care systems and 
the introduction of policies addressing specifically the repartition of caring responsibilities. 
Although the state has always assumed a certain degree of support for caring needs, domestic 
and care activities have been traditionally performed by family members, usually women, in a 
completely voluntary and unpaid way (Daly & Lewis, 2000; Bettio and Plantenga, 2004; Lutz 
2011; Pfau-Effinger, 2013). For a long time, the family was recognised as the only, or at least 
the main, provider of care for both children and dependent people, at least until serious health 
situations demanded the intervention of health professionals. The family was also considered 
responsible for domestic activities, unless the family was wealthy enough to externalise them. 
This was the situation at the end of the nineteenth century and up to the second half of the 
twentieth century in virtually all European countries. The fact that the care of dependent 
individuals was considered the natural role of the family, and of female family members in 
particular, can be ascribed to the traditional division of labour between men and women and 
to the more or less explicit ‘male breadwinner model’51 (Lewis, 1992; Davis, 1984; Daly and 
Lewis, 2000; Letablier, 2009).  
In the male breadwinner model, which had a strong influence on the construction of welfare 
states, the economic function of supporting the family with income was linked to the 
employment of men, while women were in charge of the care of family members and 
financially in charge of men. Men were entitled to social rights, in that part of the labour 
market, and all social risks taken in charge by the welfare state were linked to their 
employment relationship. On the contrary, women were not entitled to social rights insofar 
(often) not actively participating in the paid labour market, and their rights were ‘derived’ 
from those of their male counterparts (Letablier, 2009; Frericks et al., 2013). Women were 
able to engage in paid work, but only as long as it did not interfere with family care 
responsibilities. As soon as one family member had to renounce to paid work for taking care 
of other family members, women were more or less explicitly expected to assume the care 
responsibilities, because they were financially covered by the male income and the social 
rights linked to male employment.  
 
                                                        
51 From an historical point of view, the male breadwinner model became an ideological reference model only in 
the post-war period, when the return to the labour market of male soldiers translated into the promotion of the 
role of women as housekeepers. However, as stressed by feminist scholars, the gendered division of labour that 
assigns to men the public/market role was already present in more ancient times. For instance, according to 
Lewis, the male breadwinner model was already strong for middles class women at the end of the nineteenth 
century, despite the fact that women from the working classes were engaged in paid labour (Lewis, 1992).  
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2.2.1.1 The reorganisation of care in modern welfare states 
 
In pre-industrial societies, the family was the main provider of welfare and the biological 
differences linked to breast-feeding and childbearing were translated into social differences. 
In post-industrial societies, and following the changes in the labour market, caregiving arose 
as one crucial problem that made it necessary a redefinition of responsibilities (Daly and 
Lewis, 2000; Giele, 2006). Although the welfare state had more or less engaged in some sort 
of support to families also with respect to children and elderly members in the past, it is a 
series of emerging trends in post-industrial societies that required a full redefinition of care 
provision. Scholars have identified some structural economic and societal changes that 
brought about this new phenomenon.  
 
Increased female participation in the labour market 
First of all, despite the fact that women were already engaging in paid work in previous times 
to different degrees, depending on the geographical area and depending on the prevalent 
economic model (rural, industrial, and so on), female participation rates in the labour market 
started to dramatically increase only in the second half of the twentieth century. In some 
countries, such as the Scandinavian countries, women started to massively enter the labour 
market already in the 1950s and 1960s and by the end of the 1970s women’s participation 
rates were already similar to those of men (Leira, 2002). The rest of Europe joined the trend 
only in the 1990s and to different degrees (OECD, 2016).  
Although significant differences still exist in Europe, with some countries where female 
participation rates remain far below the European average and far below the participation of 
men, women have massively entered the labour market, and for various reasons.  
On the one hand, the increase of precariousness in the labour market, the growing 
unemployment rates and the general erosion of income stability of households have required a 
second income, so to contribute to the overall economic well-being of the family. The 
increase of lone-parent families has also contributed to the participation of women in paid 
employment, as lone mothers could no longer count on the male income. Some studies 
showed that mothers’ income is the main instrument for protecting children from poverty 
(Saraceno, 2011). So, if at the end of the nineteenth century it was mainly working-class 
women who had to engage in paid work for economic reasons, in post-industrial societies 
wider segments of the population started to have the economic need for a double income.  
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On the other hand, the increased recognition of women’s rights in engaging in the labour 
market on equal terms as men, together with the improvements achieved in many European 
countries in terms of gender equality at work, also had an impact on the massive entering of 
women in the labour market (Lutz, 2011; OECD, 2016). The exceptional increase in 
educational attainments by women in the nineteenth century (due to their severe under-
schooling in previous times as compared to men) is another factor that explains the increase 
of female participation rates in the labour market. This means that not only financial 
constraints, but also changes in women’s expectations have contributed and still contribute to 
the phenomenon.  
The fact that the European Union and the majority of its member states set the increase in 
female participation rates as one of the main objectives of their programmes (European 
Commission, 2014) is the most visible sign of the recognition of the importance of women’s 
work, be that for economic reasons or for gender equality matters. However, the persistent 
idea that a female family member should provide care when needed is in direct conflict with 
the targets set at the European level in the Lisbon agenda, where the increase of the female 
labour force participation is one of the principal objectives (Bettio and Plantenga, 2004; 
Anderson, 2012)52. As Helma Lutz (2011) argues, women’s full integration in the labour 
market, as it is encouraged by the European Union, cannot be pursued without taking into 
account the issue of care work, which is not accounted for in the public debate and which 
remains a problem to be solved at the individual level. Additionally, while gender equality 
and anti-discrimination issues have long been introduced in the European Union principles, 
the reconciliation of family and professional life has received less attention so far53.  
The fact that more and more women engage in paid labour also means that women are no 
longer fully available for the provision of care to family members and for household tasks and 
that new solutions have to be found to cover the gap left by women. In the male breadwinner 
model, the solution for working women was either to count on the availability of the extended 
family or other relatives and neighbours to provide some help in care and domestic activities, 
                                                        
52 According to the Lisbon European Council 2000, one of the targets for the year 2010 was to increase the 
female employment rate to more than 60% in Europe 
53 During the 1970s and 1980s, the European Commission took different measures aimed at advancing gender 
equality and the equal treatment of men and women in work. While the European Economic Community (EEC) 
already set in 1957 the principle of “equal pay for equal work”, starting from the 1970s the EC introduced a 
series of Directives, not only extending the principle of equal pay for work of equal value, but setting standards 
regarding equality between men and women in working conditions, access to training, access to social security 
systems and fight against different types of discrimination. The Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 explicitly 
introduced specific advantages for the “underrepresented sex and introduced the concept of gender 
mainstreaming. Starting from the 1990s, the employment of women started to be considered a crucial aspect of 
employment policies (Gerhard et al., 2005). 
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or to exit the labour market whenever the care burden was too hard to carry. This was 
typically the case in topic moments of the life course, such as the birth of a child or when a 
member of the family required long-term care (Bettio et al., 2006). Today, often the help of 
the extended family, when available, is not enough to cover care needs (Bettio et al., 2006) 
and families have to be supported at least partly by external help (the state, the market or the 
third sector).  
 
Demographical changes 
The second main change that occurred in recent years and that is requiring a reorganisation in 
terms of care arrangements derives from demographic changes. The fall in fertility rates, that 
in many European countries are below the replacement rate and the consequent ageing of the 
population translate in an accrued burden of care towards the old and very old population, and 
in an increased financial contribution on the side of families and the state (Anderson, 2012). 
This trend is stronger in Mediterranean countries, where estimates of the WHO show that the 
number of dependent people aged over 60 will constantly increase until 2040 (Bettio et al, 
2006)54. According to the “Population ageing in Europe” report of the European Commission 
(2014), predictions indicate that Europe overall will experience an intensive population 
ageing until 2060, accompanied by the shrinking of the population in working age. These 
estimates foresee that in Europe the proportion of people aged 65 or more will increase from 
17.4% to 25.6% in 2030, and that altogether the population of elderly people will almost 
double from 87.5 million in 2010 to 152.6 million in 2060. Also, the proportion of the very 
old (aged 80 or over) will rise from 5% to 12% by 2060. Although a longer life expectancy 
also means healthier lives, the massive increase of the population over 65 and especially over 
80 years old will necessarily bring about an important care burden on younger generations. 
This, coupled with the increase in the retirement age and the engagement of women in the 
labour market, implies that additional solutions will have to be found to provide long-term 
care inside or outside the home. 
 
Changes in family models 
In addition to these two main factors, other structural changes occurred in the last decades that 
contributed to the redefinition of family models and thus of the solutions offered to families to 
                                                        
54 As an illustrative example of the trend, Bettio et al. report the estimates of the World Health Organisation for 
Italy, which show that the number of dependent people over 60 will go from a base value of 100 in 2000 to a 
value of 142 in 2040, before decreasing only in 2050 (Bettio et al., 2006). 
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cope with caring responsibilities. The current transformations in family models can be 
summarised in the trends towards pluralisation, deinstitutionalisation and polarisation 
(Gerhard, 2005)55. The passage from the extended family to the nuclear family (polarisation), 
the deterioration of the importance of traditional ties and institutions (deinstitutionalisation) 
and the increasing differentiation of family forms (pluralisation), all played a role in 
stimulating the adoption of different solutions to meet care needs.  
While the traditional standard family was characterised by internal cohesion and strong 
geographical connections and relationships of interdependence with the extended family, 
today new family types, as well as the increased mobility of families, necessitate the adoption 
of a multiplicity of solutions. Lone parents, families living far from the extended family, 
working grandmothers, both parents working long hours are just some of the most common 
examples of the constraints faced by families in their care needs. In the light of this increased 
burden, families can no longer provide the totality of care required by dependent family 
members, which in turn calls for a redefinition of responsibilities. 
 
The ‘culture’ of care 
Finally, although care regimes are influenced by demographic changes, women’s participation 
rates and other societal structural changes, they also depend on ideals and culture about the 
role of the family and about care, which differ greatly from country to country. If social 
policies are important in defining care regimes and in stimulating families’ behaviour, social 
practices are equally important and cannot be underestimated (Gerhard et al., 2005). The care 
culture can in turn contribute to shaping labour market patterns, fertility rates and other 
developments (Bettio and Plantenga, 2004). This means that care regimes are at the same time 
the result and the driver of social and economic changes56.  
 
 
                                                        
55 The erosion of the traditional family and the deterioration of the family ideal as the foundation of society has 
been widely criticised. First, the focus on the family as the primary unit of society is associated with the 
deterioration of values, which is often considered as dangerous for society and for the state as a whole. Second, 
the pluralisation of family types cannot be considered as a new historical phenomenon, as it was part of many 
phases of social changes in history. Third, the same widespread idea of the passage from the extended family to 
the nuclear family is thought to be nothing more than a myth in many contexts (Laslett, 1972, quoted in Gerhard, 
2005). However, for the purpose of this study, what is important to notice is that starting from the 1970s there 
are indeed signs of convergence of European family styles, which include an increased diversity and 
differentiation of family models (Gerhard et al., 2005). 
56 This aspect will be tackled in section 2.3 on gender regimes. 
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2.2.2 Convergence or divergence? 
 
In the last two decades, all European welfare states have introduced reforms aimed at 
redefining the structure of the division of care and meet care needs of families, while at the 
same time trying to limit the growing costs of care. Although some common patterns have 
emerged in Europe in the way welfare states are addressing the care problem (Simonazzi, 
2009), each country has put in place a combination of policies and of formal and informal 
arrangements that vary from country to country. These combinations are the result of a 
complex set of factors that include social, political and economic reasons, but also historical 
and cultural elements.  
Concerning the signs of convergence among European countries with respect to care 
provision, scholars have emphasised the overall trend towards the growing marketization of 
care, coupled with the increased individualisation of service supply (Degavre and Nyssens, 
2012; Pavolini and Ranci, 2008). This trend has the direct result of increasing the 
diversification of care providers and the competition among them. At the same time, the 
emphasis of care policies on the empowerment of the user (‘free choice’ of the customer) 
contributes to changing the logic of care provision, when the user is more and more 
encouraged to act as a client, or a ‘customer’ (Pavolini and Ranci, 2008; Anderson, 2012).  
Within this general convergent trend towards the marketization and individualisation of care 
provision, and in line with the above-mentioned changes, scholars have identified three main 
trends that characterise recent reforms of care systems in Europe. These trends are ascribable 
to the general attempt to reduce entitlements, while at the same time reducing costs related to 
care (see, among others, Degavre and Nyssens, 2012; Simonazzi, 2009; Anderson 2012).  
 
From residential services to home services 
First of all, there is a shift from residential/external care services (care for children, residential 
homes for seniors and disabled people, etc.) to home services. This trend is more visible in 
countries with a stronger tradition of residential care provision, such as the Scandinavian 
countries and France (Simonazzi, 2009). The rationale behind this trend is linked to both 
economic reasons and motivations associated with individual choices and well-being. 
Concerning economic reasons, the shift towards home-based services significantly reduces 
the public funding, while increasing the burden on families and individuals. Concerning 
individual choices, home provision is more and more publicly encouraged based on the idea 
that home care better meets individual needs for both children and elderly people.  
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Regarding children, the argument draws from the lack of consensus over the question of who 
should care for children. Although mothers are more and more encouraged to work, in many 
EU countries there is still no agreement on whether children should be cared for in external 
non-family settings or within family boundaries (Saraceno, 2011). In many countries, mothers’ 
participation in the labour market is still seen as detrimental for children’s well-being, and 
caring solutions within the family settings are regarded as more appropriate for the emotional 
development of the very young. Concerning elderly people and other dependent people, the 
justification for the increase of home provision is based on the assumption that the natural 
preference of the individual is to be cared for at home, rather than in external facilities 
(Anderson, 2012). This rationale is especially popular in countries with strong familialistic 
traditions, such as Mediterranean countries, characterised by a strong aversion towards the 
institutionalisation of the elderly, but also in the Anglo-Saxon model, where the discourse of 
the ‘free choice’ has acquired importance in the last decades (Pfau-Effinger, 2013). In both 
cases, the general opinion is that home care is more suitable to individual preferences, even 
when care is not provided directly by a family member.  
The trend towards the provision of home care has different results. In countries characterised 
by a weak care provision from the side of the state, such as Mediterranean countries, there has 
been a massive increase of home care provided by private carers (services bought directly in 
the market), especially by migrants. In the countries with a stronger tradition of residential 
care provision, such as the Scandinavian countries, France and Belgium, the change has 
affected the reorganisation of the entire chain of care and has required different measures 
(reallocation of investments between hospitals, nursing homes and the community, 
redefinition of responsibilities among actors, closer coordination of home care services, 
monitoring of job quality and services, and so on) (Simonazzi, 2009).   
 
From public to private provision of care 
The second trend identified by scholars is the shift from public to private provision of care, 
mainly in the form of the contracting out of services by local authorities in charge of care 
provision. This trend is more visible in the UK, where the public provision of care is more 
and more guaranteed only to the weakest segments of the population and the full privatisation 
of care has been favoured, in line with government choices. However, also in the 
Mediterranean countries the subcontracting of care provision by municipalities to profit and 
non-profit organisations is becoming more and more popular (Simonazzi, 2009). In Northern 
European countries, this feature is less visible, as the state still controls the majority of both 
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in-kind and home services. Scholars have highlighted that the increased privatisation of care 
and the deriving competition among private providers could potentially bring about risks, 
especially in terms of the quality of care and the quality of jobs in the domestic sector 
(Simonazzi, 2009).   
 
From in-kind services to monetary transfers 
The third trend that has been observed in Europe in the last two decades is the shift from in-
kind services to monetary transfers. This has generated an increase in the direct purchasing of 
care services by families, either directly in the market, or via public or private intermediate 
actors (Degavre and Nyssens, 2012). The main reason explaining the proliferation of reforms 
introducing cash allowances and reducing in-kind services is linked to financial issues and is 
mainly due to the fact that cash transfers are less costly than in-kind services for governments.  
Cash allowances vary across countries as for the level of financing, the way they are allocated 
and the way they are monitored. Mediterranean countries tend to rely almost entirely on cash 
transfers, rather than on public in-kind services, but the allowances are relatively low and are 
generally not bound to state control. The result is that families often use these allowances to 
buy services directly in the market, usually finding the cheapest available options in the 
services provided by migrant carers. On the contrary, countries like Germany and Austria, 
although they do heavily rely on cash benefits, also exert a stronger control on the way cash 
allowances are used. The result is that in these countries the care markets, as well as the 
quality of care and the quality of care jobs, tend to be more regulated, compared to 
Mediterranean countries (Simonazzi, 2009). Another result is that while in Mediterranean 
countries families are more and more encouraged to act as employers in the labour market, in 
countries where tied allowances are prominent the care process is mediated by intermediate 
actors, be that public or commercial. However, no matter the type and the degree of 
generosity of monetary transfers, they all result in the increase of the role of the market in 
care provision, compared to the past, and the introduction of a multiplicity of actors involved 
in the process of care provision. 
 
Despite these emerging trends, which seem to suggest a certain level of convergence in 
Europe, the organisation of care provision, as well as the combination of care strategies, 
varies greatly across Europe. This is partly due to the differences in the way welfare regimes 
developed, as well as in social, economic and political factors that influence policy 
orientations and preferences on the side of families and individuals (Anderson, 2012).  
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The great difference that exists at national level with respect to the way care needs are 
conceived and covered by public and private funding suggests not only that European 
countries follow a different logic in the way they support families and allocate care, but that 
there is no common agreement over the best care model towards which national strategies 
should converge. Prominence is given to either type or target beneficiary of care, depending 
on financial and political constraints, but also depending on generally accepted understanding 
of what is considered good care. Therefore, there are reasons to believe that a uniformity of 
care regimes is unlikely to be reached, at least in the near future. 
 
2.2.3 Classifying care regimes 
 
Many attempts have been made by scholars to classify European countries and create 
typologies based on their care regime. However, the complexity of the task makes the 
exercise particularly arduous, for various reasons. 
First, even if care and domestic tasks tend to be more and more externalised, as families 
cannot bear alone their full burden, at least a part of care is still performed by families in all 
European countries, and it is likely to remain so (Saraceno, 2011). The complex combination 
of formal, informal, public and private solutions adopted by families to meet care needs 
makes the classification of care regimes particularly complex.  
Additionally, the variety of tasks that can be performed under the common label of ‘care’ can 
be performed by different kinds of workers and the separation between health, social and 
domestic services can be a source of ambiguity. For instance, activities linked to elderly care 
can include medical care (medical treatments, drug administering, etc.), general health care 
(hygiene and personal cleaning activities, etc.), emotional care (keeping company, listening, 
etc.) and helping out with domestic and housework activities (cleaning, cooking, grocery 
shopping, and so on)57.  
Second, the lack of reliable and harmonised data at the European level is another issue that 
makes cross-national comparisons difficult. As mentioned above, various activities, which are 
not necessarily classified as care activities, can coexist and a clear definition of care to be 
applied to different countries can be difficult58. This means that, depending on the way care is 
acknowledged and provided within each welfare state, care and domestic workers may be 
classified as belonging to different sectors of the labour market, ranging from more 
                                                        
57 See methodological chapter for the problems linked to the definition of domestic and care work.  
58 See previous footnote. 
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professionalised medical or semi-medical occupations to unskilled workers. Also, the public 
budget allocated to the provision of care may be included in different budget lines, depending 
on the type of care and depending on the country. For instance, public expenditure for long-
term care (LTC) for elderly people can be partly covered by the public health system, by the 
social assistance, or by the budget deriving from contributions and pension systems.  
If the issue of the lack of reliable data is common to international comparisons in virtually all 
fields, there are a series of problems which are typical of care regimes. The first issue is that 
contrary to other types of classifications, care regimes cannot simply be classified in terms of 
generosity of welfare. Although generosity of provisions is certainly important in defining 
care systems, there are other aspects that need to be taken into consideration. For instance, the 
type of provision, such as in-kind services vs. financial benefits, is of crucial importance for 
an international comparison of care regimes59.  
Another issue that complicates the picture is that policies towards care are not addressing all 
types of care coherently and in the same way. Thus, childcare, elderly care and domestic 
services can be treated separately and can be offered different types of incentives and services, 
which are not necessarily coherent one with another. Research in this field has shown that in 
the majority of European countries the prominence is given to one or the other dimension 
between childcare, elderly care and domestic activities, and that some countries can have 
significantly different approaches in addressing one or the other dimension, depending on 
political interests, but also on cultural ideals and historical reasons (Saraceno and Keck, 2010; 
Saraceno, 2011; Pfau-Effinger 2013; Lutz, 2011). 
Another problem that is typical of care regimes is that, contrary to other social fields, there is 
no clear definition and no agreement on what is the best model of care and which should be 
the ideal type towards which societies should tend. On the contrary, care policies can pursue 
different objectives and have different intentions. This means that while in some countries the 
more or less explicit objective – dictated by traditional values and/or economic reasons – is to 
keep the family as the principal care provider, other countries tend to see the state as the main 
actor responsible for providing care services to citizens. In the two cases the policies put in 
place will differ: in the first case, they will push care towards a familialisation of care, while 
in the second case policies will ultimately aim to de-familialise care. 
                                                        
59 Significant cross-national differences exist with respect to this aspect. For instance, there are countries such as 
Sweden and Belgium, where the care provision has traditionally been oriented towards the provision of services, 
rather than cash allowances, while other states have historically opted for an economic support to families, 
offering limited in-kind services. The main classifications based on this distinction are dealt with in the next 
section. 
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2.2.4 How can care regimes be classified? 
 
Due to the complexity of welfare policies addressing care, care regimes have been analysed 
and classified based on different criteria. The resulting classifications do not always coincide 
and the same European countries have been grouped differently, depending on the parameters 
included in the analysis and on the type of measurement used for the classification. In this 
section I present some selected classifications, which exemplify the main approaches that 
have been used to classify care regimes and the different outcomes derived from this exercise. 
The main typologies of care regimes developed by scholarship have combined one or more of 
the following distinctions: i) familialisation vs. de-familialisation; ii) childcare vs. elderly 
care; iii) formal vs. informal provision of care. 
 
2.2.4.1 Familialisation vs. defamilialisation 
 
One of the main problems when trying to classify care regimes is that different policies can 
produce different outcomes along the spectrum that goes from familialisation to de-
familialisation. While certain policies directly translate into a high degree of de-
familialisation (which corresponds to the externalisation of care responsibilities from families 
to the state, the market or the community), other policies directly or indirectly push towards a 
familialisation – or a re-familialisation60 – of caring responsibilities within the family.  
The way policies are implemented at national level, as well as their intended outcome in terms 
of de-familialisation, derive from multiple factors. If economic reasons might play a role in 
the degree of familialisation of care policies – as a voluntarily pursued logic of de-
familialisation is more costly for the state –, historical, cultural and ideological arguments 
also contribute to the way care is financed and allocated by the welfare state (Pfau-Effinger, 
2012, 2013; Frericks et al., 2013).  
Countries with strong familialistic traditions, such as Mediterranean countries, generally tend 
to promote more familialistic packages of care arrangements, as the family is considered the 
principal provider of care. Conversely, countries where historically and socially it is more 
accepted to externalise care and domestic activities, such as Nordic countries and France, tend 
                                                        
60 The expression ‘re-familialisation’ is used to describe the shift occurred in some countries from de-
familialising to more familialising policies. An example is Finland, where the provision of childcare services for 
children aged 0-3 has recently been coupled with a system of direct cash transfers for those parents who opt for 
caring for children at home (Leira, 2002).  
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to show higher levels of de-familialisation also in the way care regimes are conceived. 
However, policies directed towards the familialisation of care responsibilities do coexist with 
de-familialisation measures in virtually every European care regime (Leitner, 2003). 
Additionally, if it is true that Scandinavian countries have a longer history of de-
familialisation, a pure de-familialistic model is not only unlikely to exist, but it is also hardly 
sought for (Saraceno, 2011). 
One problem in attempting to classify policies based on this dichotomy is that not all policies 
are uncontroversially pointing towards one or the other direction along the familialisation/de-
familialisation spectrum. If certain incentives can clearly be measured through this scale61, 
other policy measures are more difficult to classify.  
For instance, while long and generously compensated maternity leaves are commonly 
recognised as familialistic incentives, as they promote the care of children within family 
settings (Saraceno, 2011), paternity and parental leaves can hardly be considered as 
encouraging the familialisation of care. The reason behind this difference is that the main risk 
associated with long maternity leaves in terms of familialisation is that they tend to result in 
obstacles for women in entering or reintegrating the labour market (the so-called ‘child 
penalty’), especially when quality and affordable childcare services are unavailable. On the 
contrary, paternity and parental leaves, since they actually contribute to the sharing of 
responsibilities among couples, are known to have opposite outcomes in terms of the 
reintegration of women in the labour market after the birth of a child. Some research has 
found that when parental leaves are more equally shared between men and women, mothers 
tend to show a stronger attachment to the labour market and a dual-earner/dual-carer model 
tends to be promoted62 (Saraceno, 2011; Leira, 1998).  
                                                        
61 Policies that are uncontroversially pushing towards a familialisation of care responsibilities include maternity 
leaves and all types of monetary transfers for both childcare and elderly care. Policies that are uncontroversially 
pushing towards a de-familialisation of care responsibilities include incentives for the externalisation of 
housework activities and the availability of public in-kind services for both childcare and elderly care (childcare 
facilities, residential and nursing homes, etc.). See also Leitner (2003) and Bettio and Plantenga (2004). 
62 It should be noticed that the professional behaviour of women is not only influenced by care policies such as 
maternity and parental leaves, cash allowances etc., but it depends on other factors. Some scholars have analysed 
the relationship between women’s attachment to the labour market and the educational level, and found that the 
higher the educational level, the higher the probability that the mother will re-integrate the workplace, even in 
the presence of long maternity leaves (Bettio and Plantenga, 2004; Saraceno, 2011). The same is valid for cash 
allowances formally given to mothers to stay home to care for children. Also in this case, social class differences 
might be strengthened, as it is more likely that low class mothers would opt for staying at home in exchange for 
the allowance (Saraceno, 2011). 
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Usually, a distinction is made between parental leaves where men have the option to take time 
off to care for children, and specific ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ quotas for fathers63 . The latter is 
commonly considered to be the best possible incentive to promote equality among couples 
and in the labour market, as it reformulates the work-family issue as a concern of both parents. 
In this sense, compulsory quotas for fathers can be seen as a potentially radical approach to 
combat gender stereotypes (Leira, 2002).  
Another example showing the complexity of a clear demarcation between what is familialistic 
or not is the use of monetary transfers. If it is true that cash allowances are generally intended 
to reallocate care responsibilities to families (contrary to in-kind services), and in this sense 
they promote a familialisation of care work, it is not uncommon that such monetary transfers 
are used by families to directly purchase services in the market. In this sense, cash benefits 
can simultaneously promote familisalisation (families are responsible for all the choices 
related to care) and de-familialisation (families shift from care providers to care managers64) 
(Saraceno & Keck, 2008).  
Table 5 reports two examples of typologies of care regimes that classify care regimes using 
the concept of familialisation/de-familialisation.  
Saraceno and Keck (2010) use a complex set of indicators to cover four dimensions of care65: 
financial support for children; childcare services; financial support for elderly people; and 
services for elderly people. Based on the selected indicators, they differentiate between 
‘unsupported familialism’, ‘supported familialism’ and ‘de-familialisation’, with the 
possibility of a hybrid form between the last two groups. In the unsupported familialism, 
financial support for family care is underdeveloped and there are neither public alternatives, 
nor financial support for care within the family. In the supported familialism, policies support 
families in their care responsibilities, usually through financial transfers (cash-for-care 
benefits, but also tax deductions and paid leaves). The final aim of these policies is to support 
family members, and women in particular, to maintain their caring role within the family. The 
                                                        
63 The potential of take-it-or-leave quotas for fathers is best exemplified when we look at the actual use of 
parental leaves made by fathers in different European countries. In countries such as Italy, Portugal and 
Germany, where the parental leave for fathers is available but not compulsory, fathers tend not to use the leave, 
leaving it entirely to mothers. On the contrary, in countries with the take-it-or-loose-it system (which is where a 
part of the leave can be used only by fathers), such as some of the Nordic countries, the instrument proved to be 
effective and fathers are more and more using parental leaves (Leira, 2002).  
64 This phenomenon is very common in Mediterranean countries, where the low level of state provision has 
engendered an informal market of caregivers, where families act as employers. For more information about the 
‘managing role’ of families refer to Ambrosini (2013). 
65 The indicators used by Saraceno and Keck include, but are not limited to: child allowances, tax deductions for 
children, legal obligations towards children, duration and compensation of maternity and parental leaves, 
services for children, minimum contributory pensions, legal obligations towards the elderly, residential services 
for elderly, cash-for-care allowances. 
 76 
de-familialisation is based on the individualisation of social rights (such as the right to receive 
care, minimum social provisions, etc.), which is meant to reduce family responsibilities for 
care 
The authors observe that usually the higher the degree of familialism, the higher its gender 
specificity, with women considered as the natural providers of care. One of the main findings 
of their analysis is that due to the complexity of care packages it is impossible to identify 
robust clusters of countries. Each country behaves differently with respect to financial 
provision and service provision, and also with respect to childcare and care for the elderly. 
Therefore, countries may show similar approaches, but only when one or the other dimension 
is considered separately. The only exception is represented by Nordic countries, which show 
high levels of de-familialisation on all dimensions. At the extreme end of the spectrum, there 
is a group of countries with high levels of familialism in almost all dimensions, which 
includes Italy, Poland, Spain, Greece and Bulgaria.  
 
Table 5: Care regimes typologies - Familialisation vs. De-familialisation 
Author Indicators Care regimes 
Saraceno and 
Keck (2010) 
- Financial 
support for 
children 
- Childcare 
services 
- Financial 
support for 
elderly  
- Services for 
elderly 
Unsupported 
familialism: 
Poland 
Portugal 
Cyprus 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Spain 
Ireland 
Slovakia 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Austria 
Supported 
familialism: 
Estonia 
Czech Republic 
Hungary 
Finland 
Bulgaria 
Germany 
Greece 
De-
familialisation: 
Denmark 
Sweden 
Norway 
France 
Hybrid (de-
familialisation 
with limited 
support): 
Belgium 
Leitner (2003) - Time rights 
- Cash transfers 
- Social rights 
 
Explicit 
familialism 
Optional 
familialism 
Implicit 
familialism 
De-familialism 
 
In her theoretical study on how care responsibilities can be distributed among actors, Leitner 
identifies four ideal types of care regimes, depending on the level and the type of familialism 
that characterise welfare institutions. The identification of the ideal types is based on three 
main indicators that represent the institutional structures that can be used to strengthen 
familialism: time rights (which usually include maternity, paternity and parental leaves, as 
well as leaves to care for dependent people), cash transfers (such as tax reductions, cash for 
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care benefits, etc.) and social rights attached to caregiving (such as pensions, social security 
schemes, pensions for wives, etc.). Based on different combinations of these familialising 
structures, four ideal types emerge: i) explicit familialism, where the caring role of families is 
strengthened and no alternatives are provided in terms of care provision; ii) optional 
familialism, where both familialistic policies and services are provided; iii) implicit 
familialism, where neither the caring function of the family nor the de-familialisation are 
directly supported; and iv) de-familialism, where there are strong de-familialising structures, 
in the form of service provision provided either by the state, the market or the voluntary 
sector.  
Two considerations that emerge from this classification are important to mention. First, care 
structures and policies have a gendered dimension. Since de-familialising structures are meant 
to relieve families from the burden of care and promote women’s employment, they might 
discourage the breadwinner model. Therefore, they can have a de-gendering effect and 
promote gender equality in the labour market. On the contrary, familialising structures 
implicitly and explicitly reinforce traditional gender roles. Because they strengthen the caring 
function of the family, and because women are in most cases those in charge of providing 
care within the family, they contribute to the reproduction of the gendered division of care 
labour. In this sense, they have a gendering effect. Only when familialistic policies include 
incentives for the sharing of responsibilities between men and women (i.e. use-it-or-lose-it 
parental leaves for fathers), they can also have a de-gendering effect. Second, each welfare 
system shows its own ‘profile’ of familialism and each system can evolve over time from one 
to another type66.  
 
2.2.4.2 Childcare vs. elderly care 
 
In the great majority of classifications of care regimes, a distinction is made between 
childcare and care for the elderly, while housework incentives are usually not taken into 
consideration. The reason behind the choice to maintain the two dimensions separate is that 
wide differences exist in the way the provision of childcare and elderly care are covered and 
supported by the state. Some countries might be more generous in supporting the care for 
children compared to elderly care, while other countries might have an opposite behaviour. 
The most cited examples of this ‘inconsistency’ are the UK and the Netherlands, where care 
                                                        
66 Leitner (2003) shows the case of Belgium, which after a first period of de-familialism turned into a gendered 
form of optional familialism, with the potential of becoming a de-gendered form of familialism in the future. 
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policies for children are underdeveloped, while both services and generosity for elderly care 
are among the highest in Europe (Bettio and Plantenga, 2004). Also, some countries might 
promote familialistic policies with respect to childcare and de-familialialisation policies for 
the care of senior people. For instance, while childcare is everywhere supported through a 
certain degree of familialism – at least concerning time incentives (maternity and parental 
leaves) – and considered to be primarily a family responsibility, the responsibility for elderly 
care is more taken in charge by the state, either through public services or through monetary 
incentives (Bettio and Plantenga, 2004).  
Table 6 reports some selected examples of classifications of care regimes, where a clear 
distinction between care strategies for children and for elderly people emerges.  
 
Table 6: Care regimes typologies - Childcare vs. elderly care 
Author Indicators Care regimes 
Bettio 
and 
Plantenga 
(2004) 
- care 
strategies for 
children 
- care 
strategies for 
the elderly 
Group 1: 
Italy 
Greece 
Spain 
Portugal 
Ireland 
Group 2: 
UK 
Netherlands 
Group 3: 
Austria 
Germany 
Group 4: 
Belgium 
France 
Group 5: 
Denmark 
Finland 
Sweden 
Saraceno 
and Keck 
(2010) 
- Financial 
support for 
elderly  
- Services for 
elderly 
Unsupported 
familialism: 
Estonia 
Italy 
Spain 
Hungary 
Poland 
Lithuania 
Bulgaria 
Supported 
familialism: 
Slovenia 
Greece 
Latvia 
Czech 
Republic 
Portugal 
 
De-
familialisation: 
Denmark 
Netherlands 
Sweden 
Belgium 
France 
Austria 
Luxembourg 
Ireland 
Hybrid: 
Finland 
Germany 
UK 
 
Saraceno 
(2011) 
- effective  
childcare 
coverage 
(early 
childcare gap) 
Group 1: 
Poland 
Ireland 
Italy 
Cyprus 
Portugal 
Spain 
(Netherlands) 
Group 2: 
Former 
communist 
block 
Group 3: 
Denmark 
Belgium 
Sweden 
France 
Norway 
  
Frericks et 
al. (2013) 
- cash benefits 
for family 
caregiving 
Informal 
family care 
regime: 
All other 
countries 
Semi-
formal 
family care 
regime: 
Germany 
Netherlands 
Formal family 
care regime: 
Denmark 
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Based on the elaboration of six indexes for both childcare and elderly care67, Bettio and 
Plantenga (2004) identify 5 clusters of countries, depending on the care strategies towards 
childcare and elderly care. Each of the 5 clusters are characterised by a different combination 
of care strategies. As mentioned above, the UK and the Netherlands (group 2) are the 
countries that show the widest difference in the approach over the provision of care for 
children and the elderly. In both countries, the provision of care for children is low – in the 
Netherlands because the family is considered the natural provider of care, and in the UK 
because childcare services are largely privatised. Concerning the care of dependent people in 
both countries the state is thought to be the main provider. The other groups have more 
homogeneous care policies, albeit characterised by great differences in the degree of public 
provision (medium levels in Austria and Germany and higher levels in France, Belgium and 
Nordic countries).  
While the above-mentioned classification includes both childcare and elderly care and 
highlights the differences in the public provision for the two dimensions, the other typologies 
reported in Table 6 are examples of classifications that focus on either of the two dimensions. 
In two separate studies, Saraceno develops classifications based on either childcare or elderly 
care. Frericks et al. (2013) analyse the public provision for senior citizens. They offer an 
innovative type of classification (of ‘family care regimes’) in that they take into consideration 
recent policies aimed to financially support family members who provide care68.  
 
2.2.4.3 Formal vs. informal care 
 
Some scholars have analysed care regimes with a focus on the separation between formal and 
informal provision of care. When talking about care work, the distinction between formal and 
informal can refer to two different definitions. 
According to the first definition, the informal care indicates all activities linked to the unpaid 
care and domestic work performed by family members. It is the work traditionally performed 
by female family members, and includes domestic activities, care for children and care for 
                                                        
67 Based on available indicators, the authors elaborate six indexes to measure the level of provision for children 
and for the elderly: index of leave facilities, index of financial provisions, public services for children, index of 
public pension schemes, residential care and community care. 
68 Their study starts from the observation that although family care (care towards the elderly performed by a 
family member) has traditionally been considered a voluntary activity, rather than real work, recent policies in 
various European countries are increasingly recognising this activity as a real job. This is the result of the 
recognition of social rights both to senior citizens (right to receive care) and to family members to provide care. 
Therefore, in some countries family care is now treated as a “normal” employment relationship, where the state 
acts as the employer and the family member as a paid care worker. 
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older members of the family and other dependent individuals. It can be a job performed by 
either relatives external to the nuclear family or by close friends or neighbours, with the 
common feature that it is an activity performed on a voluntary basis. According to this 
definition, the formal provision of care indicates all paid working activities performed by 
either publicly or privately funded workers.  
The second definition focuses on the distinction between the formal provision of care, 
intended as the care provided in one or another form by the state, and the informal provision 
of care, intended as the lack of such public provision and the consequent proliferation of 
informal care arrangements. In this sense, a formal care market indicates a professionalised 
market put in place by state policies, while informal care can indicate both the unpaid work 
performed by family members, or the development of an informal market of – often irregular 
– carers (Simonazzi, 2009). The fact that in recent years some European countries have 
introduced instruments to partly professionalise the unpaid work of family members, adds up 
to complicate the picture.  
Table 7 reports two examples of classifications of care regimes that focus on the distinction 
between formal and informal provision of care. 
 
Table 7: Care regimes typologies - Formal vs. informal provision of care 
Author Indicators Care regimes 
Bettio and Plantenga 
(2004) 
Index of informal care 
intensity (time budget 
data) 
Heavy informal care 
users: 
Greece  
Italy  
Spain  
Ireland 
UK 
Netherlands 
Weak informal care 
users: 
Finland  
Denmark 
France  
Portugal 
Simonazzi (2009) Level of in-kind provision 
vs. cash benefits 
Formal provision 
(in-kind provision and 
tied benefits): 
UK 
Sweden 
France 
Informal provision 
(untied benefits): 
Germany 
Austria 
Italy 
 
Starting from the first definition of formal and informal care, as the separation between 
unpaid and paid work, Bettio and Plantenga (2004) identify different groups of countries, 
depending on the way each country implicitly or explicitly tends to promote one or the other 
type of care. Based on their ‘index of informal care intensity’, the authors distinguish between 
heavy and weak informal care users. According to their findings, Greece, Italy, Spain and 
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Ireland belong to the group of heavy informal care users, which confirms the traditional 
importance of family ties in these countries. Surprisingly, also the UK and the Netherlands 
belong to the group of heavy informal care users. On the other side of the spectrum, there are 
countries like Finland and Denmark. France and Portugal also belong to this group, which is 
more unexpected (Bettio and Plantenga, 2004). 
Based on the second definition of formal and informal care, Simonazzi (2009) operates a 
distinction – only regarding elderly care – between policies characterised by a high level of 
in-kind and service provisions and policies where unconditional cash allowances prevail. 
According to this author, these two types of policies engender opposite outcomes in terms of 
the formality of the care market. The bestowal of in-kind services and tied financial benefits69 
tend to favour the development of a formal care market. In this case, the state plays an 
important role in the provision of care and also in the regulation of the care market (it defines, 
for example, the working conditions of care workers, the eligibility conditions of beneficiaries, 
etc.). On the contrary, the granting of untied (or unconditional) cash benefits, for which there 
is no control by the state over the use of the allowance, encourages the development of an 
informal market, be that unpaid work or remunerated work directly purchased in the market. 
Therefore, based on the type of support provided by the state and the way care is financed, the 
author recognises two main groups of countries. The first group includes countries that rely 
mainly on in-kind provision, either through the provision of services (residential homes, 
home-based care) or through tied cash allowances, over which the states maintain a certain 
degree of control. These countries include the UK and Sweden, as far as services are 
concerned, and France, with respect to conditional cash allowances. As mentioned above, the 
policies adopted in these countries tend to promote a formal market for care. The second 
group includes countries that rely mainly on untied cash allowances, either in the form of care 
insurance schemes, as it is the case in Germany and Austria, or in the form of unconditional 
cash benefits, as in Italy. These countries are characterised by a large informal care sector. 
This classification is intended to show that the way the financing for care is operated 
influences both care regimes and the structure of the care market (Simonazzi, 2009). 
Another way of employing the dichotomy between formal and informal care provision is to 
distinguish between two ideal types of care regimes: the informal care model and the service-
led model (Anderson, 2012). The first model is characterised by a limited governmental 
responsibility. The state has a regulatory function, rather than an active role in providing care, 
                                                        
69 Tied benefits are care allowances granted under certain conditions, where usually beneficiaries have to prove 
that they have used them to buy care. 
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and care responsibilities are entirely on families. The second model is characterised by the 
extensive provision of care services by the state, thus reducing the responsibilities left to 
families. As Anderson underlines (2012), both models are currently raising issues: while in 
the first one families are encountering more and more difficulties in supplying care to the 
increasing number of dependent people, in the second model the high costs related to the 
provision of services is generating a strain in the financial capacities of the state. 
 
2.2.4.4 Dual vs. triangular employment relationship 
 
A further way to classify care regimes is to analyse the way care and domestic work are 
externalised. The way care regimes are conceived and care financed and allocated generate 
different outcomes in the degree of marketization of care. Although the marketization of 
services is more visible in countries where the state provision is weaker, the trend towards the 
marketization of care services is visible in every care regime, be that a service-oriented 
system or a system that more heavily relies on informal arrangements70. In countries where 
untied cash allowances are the prominent instrument of care provision, families are 
encouraged to employ informal carers directly in the market. In countries characterised by a 
strong provision of services or in countries where cash allowances are subject to a strict 
control by local authorities, care services are more and more outsourced by the government to 
both profit and non-profit external actors.  
Depending on the care strategies implemented by each welfare state, the care employment 
model is different, both in terms of the type of employment relationship to which domestic 
workers and carers are subject, and in terms of job quality and conditions in the domestic 
sector. An example of classification based on the type of employment model of service 
provision is the distinction between a ‘direct employment model’ and an ‘employment in 
service provider organisations’, as identified by Farvaque (2013). The first employment 
model is based on a dual relationship and is characterised by the direct recruitment of 
domestic and care workers by private individuals or households. The second employment 
model is based on a triangular relationship, in which the family is not the direct employer, but 
there is the intermediation of a third party. In the latter case, workers are employed by an 
organisation, which can be public or private. According to this classification, the direct 
employment model is typical of Southern countries, but it is more and more used in other 
                                                        
70 Camargo and Rea (2013) talk about a shift from a social policy to a labour market policy. 
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countries, such as Germany and Austria. The second employment model dominates in 
Northern countries, Belgium and partly in France (Farvaque, 2013). The detailed 
classification is provided in Table 8. 
 
Table 8: Care regimes typologies - Employment models of care provision 
Author Indicators Care regimes 
Farvaque 
(2013) 
- Care activities 
(NACE 88) 
- Housework 
activities (NACE 
97) 
Direct 
employment: 
Cyprus 
Spain  
Portugal 
Italy 
Greece 
(Germany) 
(Austria) 
Employment in 
service 
providers: 
Denmark  
Finland 
UK 
Ireland 
Belgium 
Mixed model 
(both): 
France 
Luxembourg 
Mixed model 
(neither): 
Eastern countries 
 
An alternative way of classifying countries based on the employment model, which also takes 
into consideration the distinction between public and private service providers, would be to 
distinguish between three main models: 1) a direct employment model; 2) a triangular 
employment model, where either the market or the third sector act as an intermediary (private 
service provision); 3) a triangular relationship, where the state acts as the intermediary (public 
service provision). 
The first model is typical of Mediterranean countries. The lack of public care services, the 
low level of care allowances and the untied nature of cash allowances engender the creation 
of a direct form of employment relationship, where families become employers and care 
workers are employed directly by families, without any form of intermediation. In this model, 
families search for the most flexible and cheapest available option directly in the market, and 
their expectations are often matched in the employment of a migrant workforce. The risk of 
this model is linked to the deregulation of the employment relationship, the increase of 
irregular types of contracts and the weakening of working conditions of domestic and care 
workers. 
In the second model, typical of countries that rely more heavily on tied cash allowances, but 
also countries where the state outsources services directly, the employment relationship is 
characterised by a triangular relationship, where an intermediary – that can be both a profit or 
non-profit actor – mediates between the workers and the clients (families). The UK could be a 
country belonging to this group. Also in this case, some risks can arise, as the proliferation of 
competing actors has proved to decrease both the quality of services and the quality of jobs.  
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In the third model, typical of countries where care regimes are more service-oriented or where 
the use of cash allowances is strictly controlled by the state, the employment relationship is 
triangular, as in the second model, but directly mediated by the state. In this model, public 
agencies or local authorities mediate between the workers and the clients (families). Since 
there is a more or less direct employment relationship between the state and the workers, 
domestic and care workers become public employees. This model seems to engender fewer 
risks, both in terms of quality of services and in terms of working conditions of care workers. 
France and Belgium could be examples of countries belonging to this group. 
However, it is interesting to notice that the French and Belgian voucher systems include 
features of both the second and the third model. On the one hand, the state intervenes directly, 
especially through the allocation of consistent public funding and through a strict control over 
the quality of services and the quality of jobs. On the other hand, the intermediate actors are 
not public agencies but private actors.  
 
2.3 The gender regime 
 
The importance of introducing the gender regime as a framework for the analysis of paid 
domestic work derives from the fact that different gender regimes are likely to produce 
different outcomes in the way paid domestic work is regulated and conceived. On the one 
hand, whether welfare promotes or not gender equality has an impact on both the degree of 
externalisation of domestic activities and the characteristics of the domestic sector. On the 
other hand, collective representations and cultural attitudes and values about gender equality 
and about the sharing of responsibilities between men and women may influence the degree 
of externalisation of domestic and care tasks and the way both unpaid and paid domestic work 
are conceived71.  
 
2.3.1 What is the gender regime? 
 
The introduction of the gender regime as a conceptual framework came as a response to the 
shortcomings of the literature on welfare states. As mentioned in section 2.1.2, the typology 
                                                        
71 For this last point, I refer to the concept of ‘social representations’, as they have been defined by Moscovici 
(1961, quoted in Moscovici and Duveen, 2001). Drawing from Durkheim’s separation between ‘individual’ and 
‘collective’ representations, Moscovici builds a theory that combines sociological and psychological elements. In 
his idea of social representations are included the set of values, ideas, beliefs and practices that are shared among 
the members of a certain group and that orient them in the social world.  
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of welfare states elaborated by Esping-Andersen’s has been criticised by feminist scholars, 
because of a lack of a gender perspective (see, among others, Lewis, 1992; Sainsbury, 1994; 
Williams, 1995). Since one of Esping-Andersen’s main assumptions was that labour coincides 
with paid employment, all unpaid care work and the relationship between the state and family 
in reconciling work and family life was absent (Lutz, 2008; Pfau-Effinger, 2000). According 
to these scholars, welfare regimes also depend on – and can be classified accordingly – the 
importance attributed to care, that is, whether the care for children and dependent people is 
considered a public or a private responsibility, the way care is acknowledged, whether care is 
accounted for in social security schemes, and so on. 
From a gender perspective, whether care and domestic activities are considered a public or a 
private responsibility has also an impact on the gender division of labour within families, as 
female family members, without remuneration, have traditionally performed care and 
domestic work. Therefore, according to feminist scholarship, any analysis of welfare states 
should take into consideration the way policies acknowledge the traditional gender division of 
labour and the way they encourage, or on the contrary discourage, a more equal sharing of 
care responsibilities within couples.  
In this perspective, the allocation of care by the state should be oriented towards gender 
equality, in order to avoid reinforcing gender stereotypes and the gender division of labour 
(Gerhard et al., 2005). To give a typical example, maternity leaves, when they are not 
accompanied by a parallel – possibly obligatory – parental leave to be shared with fathers, 
tend to prevent women from re-entering the labour market and therefore reinforce the 
traditional ‘maternal’ role of women.  
Whereas there is no unique definition of gender regimes, for the purpose of this study I 
conceptualise them as the intersection of two main dimensions. Firstly, they include all 
policies that are directly or indirectly addressing gender equality, as well as their outcomes in 
terms of gender equality in all fields (economy, politics, work, health, power, education, and 
so on). Secondly, they address what feminist scholars have defined the ‘gender contract’, 
which includes traditional and cultural beliefs and understandings of gender roles and the 
‘natural’ or more suitable arrangements in terms of division of responsibilities. Defining 
gender regimes as the combination of these two dimensions means to introduce a more 
subjective and culturally determined element to what is usually employed as the reference 
point of any study addressing gender equality – which is the analysis of the attainments in 
terms of gender equality resulting from different policies. 
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While most of the literature has separated these two dimensions, it seems fundamental to 
combine gender equality outcomes with the overall gender culture for different reasons. First 
of all, they do not necessarily coincide, as better performances in terms of gender equality in 
the labour market or in any other social sphere may not be accompanied by an equal sharing 
of care and domestic responsibilities between men and women, or in a change of gender 
stereotypes linked to domestic and care work. Additionally, taking into consideration the 
gender contract and the gender social norms that operate within societies is key to understand 
the choices of families with respect to care and domestic activities and therefore to understand 
the different combinations of paid and unpaid domestic work adopted by households. Thus, if 
the implementation of gender sensitive policies in all fields and of policies addressing 
specifically gender stereotypes is crucial in encouraging a better sharing of domestic 
responsibilities, the actual behaviour of men and women can and is influenced by the social 
norms and the traditional culture of gender. 
Thus, while gender equality in its broader form is part of the gender system in any given 
country, the literature agrees on the fact that gender regimes include something more difficult 
to capture, but even so of crucial importance for explaining labour market, family and social 
behaviours of men and women. For instance, recent research on female employment rates 
showed that women do not base their decision to work outside the home solely on the 
availability of childcare services or financial allowances and tax deductions that allow them to 
reduce the costs for childcare. On the contrary, attitudes of women towards paid work are also 
influenced by social norms and cultural elements (Gerhard et al., 2005; Duncan and Pfau-
Effinger, 2000). This means that the labour market behaviour of women cannot be fully 
explained by welfare support, and that social practices are equally important in their decisions 
(Gerhard et al., 2005).  
 
2.3.2 The importance of the gender contract 
 
Whereas the gender contract has been theorised so to include various elements, such as 
changes in women’s roles, new mechanisms to reconcile work and family life, the search for 
gender equality and gender expectations, among others, the very nature of the concept makes 
it hard to measure. Also, while some attempts have been made to classify countries through 
the lens of the gender contract and to identify transformative changes occurred over time, the 
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main limitation is that the majority of the studies have remained more descriptive than 
analytic (Giele, 2006). 
From a purely theoretical point of view, the literature usually refers to the gender contract to 
emphasise the informal gender arrangements between men and women, which determine how 
they act in society, within their families and in the relationship with each other. The gender 
contract includes the gendered division of both paid labour and family and work 
responsibilities, but also the common and accepted understanding of gender roles and what is 
considered to be the ‘right’ and ‘natural’ place for women and men.  
Social norms concerning gender roles often operate routinely, whether they are recognised or 
not. For example, they can define what is considered to be ‘good care’ for either children or 
dependent people, what is acceptable or unacceptable for family well-being, and also whom 
and to what extent, among the state, the market and family, is responsible for family well-
being.  
The concept of gender contract draws from the concept of the social contract between the 
sexes (Fouquet, 1999, quoted in Letablier, 2009), which looks at the employment activity of 
women and at the different forms of entitlement to social rights, be that rights acquired 
through the direct participation in the labour market, or derived from the professional activity 
of the spouse. In this sense, the gender contract can be used as a tool for investigating how the 
social division of labour attributes certain rights and certain roles to men and women in a 
gender-differentiated way. 
Scholarship identifies a traditional gender contract – common to all pre-industrial and 
industrial societies – which is based on the social differentiation between men and women and 
their responsibilities with respect to the caring function within the family (female role) and 
with respect to the economic function of family well-being (male role). The traditional gender 
contract, which was the dominant model of all western industrial societies, assigns women 
domestic tasks such as cleaning and caring for dependants and implies that women are 
recognised as ‘experts’ in the sphere of everyday life (Zdravomyslava, 2010), hence their 
numerical predominance also in paid domestic work. 
Using the words of Lutz (2011), the traditional gender contract can be defined as ‘an implicit 
contract between genders whereby the public […] and the private […] spheres are specifically 
differentiated by gender. Within this division, professional employment enjoys high social 
esteem, whereas the work of caring for the family is regarded as trivial. Thus the gender-
specific differentiation also constitutes a hierarchical distinction’. Also, in the traditional 
gender contract, the unequal and gender differentiated roles of men and women within the 
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family is institutionally supported and encouraged by the state and by society at large 
(Zdravomyslava, 2010).  
The gender division of productive and reproductive work was denounced by feminists in the 
early 1970s, where the campaign for the ‘wages for housework’ was launched.  The demand 
for payment for domestic work, which inflamed a long debate and was widely criticised, did 
not aim to obtain an actual wage for reproductive labour. Instead, it was both a criticism of 
the patriarchal society and a quest for reshaping the way capitalist societies encourage this 
implicit contract between sexes72.  
According to the literature, a general convergence can be identified in the way family models 
and the social recognition of productive and reproductive work are identified in all Western 
post-industrial societies. A main change intervened in the last decades, namely the transition 
from the traditional gender contract to a more egalitarian implicit contract between the sexes, 
which corresponds to the transition from the traditional ‘male breadwinner model’ to the new 
adult-earner or dual-earner model (Lewis, 2001).  
While the expression ‘male breadwinner model’ was introduced to identify the gendered 
repartition of paid and unpaid labour, where the male family member is responsible for the 
economic well-being of the family, the dual-breadwinner model represents a redefined, more 
egalitarian and more individualistic family model towards which all modern societies tend 
(Leira, 2002). In the male breadwinner family, which was the dominant model in the post-war 
period, the husband had the unquestioned role of participating in the paid labour market and 
he was the only responsible for the economic subsistence and the well-being of the family73. 
On the contrary, the participation of the wife in the paid labour market was not necessary, as 
her primary role was to take care of the family in the private sphere. Even when women – 
especially working-class women – were forced by circumstances to be active in the labour 
market, their economic function was thought as secondary, compared to that of men. In 
specific moments of the life course, for instance after the birth of a child, or when the 
domestic and care burden was to increase, it was the wage of the female member of the family 
– usually the lowest – that was sacrificed.  
                                                        
72 As Lutz points out, paradoxically none of the early feminists demanding wages for housework would have 
imagined that this metaphorical demand would have translated in the 21st century in a real phenomenon: that of 
the actual de-commodification of domestic labour (Lutz, 2011). 
73 In her overview of the change from the male breadwinner model to the adult-worker model, Lewis (2001) 
observes that although a pure breadwinner model never existed, there have been historical periods where the 
breadwinner model more closely described the social reality compared to that in other periods. One example is 
the decades between the post-war and the last quarter of the twentieth century. 
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From a common and unquestioned traditional gender contract, a more differentiated and 
egalitarian vision of gender roles started to develop in certain contexts, be that encouraged by 
institutions, by society or by individuals. This resulted in the development of the adult/dual-
breadwinner model, where both adult family members share the same economic function 
within and outside the family (Lewis, 2004; Lutz and Palenga-Mollenbeck, 2010). Indeed, in 
this new model, both spouses’ wages are equally important for the economic well-being of the 
family and a more egalitarian sharing of domestic and care responsibilities within couples 
would be the consequence of this change.  
The reasons for the shift from one to another model cannot be traced exclusively to macro-
structural changes in society; other relevant factors are the increased educational attainments 
of women and the change in family values. 
While social scientists all seem to agree on the more or less visible transition from the male 
breadwinner to the adult-breadwinner model, the change has not assumed the same proportion 
in all contexts. Actually, some countries have reached a virtually egalitarian model, where 
men and women equally share professional and private responsibilities74; in other countries, 
however, the traditional gender contract seems to resist societal changes and the ‘family 
ideology’ seems to persist unquestioned75. Instead of a simple transformation of the male 
breadwinner model into an egalitarian system, as it was foreseen by Davis (1984)76, post-
industrial societies show an increased within-role complexity (Giele, 2006). 
 
2.3.3 Existing classifications of gender regimes 
 
The development of typologies of gender regimes has drawn the attention of many scholars 
along the years, since the mid-twentieth century. While the term ‘gender regime’ is only 
                                                        
74 Although in some countries (such as Scandinavian countries) social norms, institutional norms and family 
values seem to point towards a virtually egalitarian society, the idea that a completely egalitarian family model 
exists in Europe is widely criticised. Studies that employ time-budget surveys to analyse the repartition of 
professional and family responsibilities between men and women show that a great difference still exist between 
the time allocated by men and women to domestic tasks. Researches have observed that if the time allocated by 
men to family tasks has increased, not only it has not reached the same amount of time spent by women in 
domestic chores, but the fathers’ involvement in domestic activities has increased only in certain types of 
activities, namely those linked to the care of children (Saraceno, 2011).  
75 The concept of the family ideology is linked to the male breadwinner model, in that it is based on the social 
division of labour, where men and women have differentiated roles and women are ‘in charge’ of men. For a 
detailed explanation, refer to the classification of M. T. Letablier, later in the text. 
76 According to the functionalist theory of K. Davis (1984), the breadwinner system was about to be replaced by 
an egalitarian system, as this model was not ‘functional’, because of its unequal foundations. The unequal 
foundations of the breadwinner model were bringing about its own destruction, as this system could not solve the 
problem of the reconciliation between female’s work and childrearing.  
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explicitly employed by some of these classifications, all the typologies presented in this 
section take into consideration either the system of gender equality, or the idea of the gender 
contract. Although each scholar has focused on one or another aspect defining gender roles, 
they all somehow tackle the problem of the gender division of labour and of work and family 
responsibilities. In this view, they all address one or more specific aspects that define gender 
regimes. 
A well-known classification of welfare regimes that takes into account the gender contract is 
the one proposed by Jane Lewis (1992), who classifies countries based on their strong, 
modified or weak male breadwinner model. According to Lewis, all welfare states developed 
upon a male-breadwinner family model that was subsequently modified to different degrees in 
different countries. Examples of ‘strong male breadwinner’ countries are Ireland and Britain, 
with high rates of female part-time and very weak state support in conciliating work and 
family life. These countries are characterised by a lack of childcare services, poor maternity 
rights and a strong inequality between sexes with regards to social security. Public and private 
responsibilities are clearly separated, and care responsibilities belong to the private realm.  
According to Lewis, the best example of the ‘modified male breadwinner’ model is France, 
where female full-time is more widespread and the state provides better support. In France, 
women benefit from the social security system, whether they are part of families with children 
or without. While the patriarchal system of the strong breadwinner model is embedded not 
only in the family but also in the institutions, in the modified family model it belongs to the 
private sphere, but not in collective institutions. In the public sphere, women can enjoy their 
rights as mothers and as workers.  
An example of a ‘weak male breadwinner’ model is Sweden, the only one that intentionally 
decided to move towards a dual breadwinner system. In this model, women are encouraged to 
participate in paid employment and the conciliation is facilitated by the provision of childcare 
services (Lewis, 1992). 
In her interesting analysis of the way national policies on childcare influence the changing of 
the traditional gender contract, Leira (2002) focuses on the Northern European countries and 
shows how three different types of childcare policies are linked to different gender contracts77. 
Her analysis is based on the acknowledgment of a common trend in Nordic countries, pushing 
at the same time towards a de-familialisation of childcare and a re-familialisation of childcare. 
                                                        
77 Her analysis of different models of gender contract is particularly interesting, because the author shows how 
countries that are commonly considered as offering similar care/welfare packages, do have important differences 
both in terms of the types of policies that are implemented institutionally, and in terms of the resulting family 
models. 
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The author takes into consideration three types of childcare policies – childcare services, paid 
leaves and cash benefits – which are linked to three different gender contracts. State-
sponsored childcare services, when they are based on a universalistic and social right, 
facilitate the dual-earner model. Cash benefits encourage the gender-differentiated family 
model, as they encourage mothers to stay home to take care of children instead of entering the 
labour market 78 . Parental leaves, especially in the form of fathers’ quotas, target the 
transformation of the gender division of labour and can be powerful instruments for the 
redefinition of the gender contract.  
Based on these indicators, Leira identifies four models within the Northern countries79. In 
Denmark, the focus of governmental policies is on women’s employment. The country offers 
the shortest paid leave but largely provides childcare facilities for children aged 0 to 3 years 
old. This system is based on the recognition of the right of mothers to work full-time. Little 
attention is paid on the sharing of responsibilities of care between men and women. 
Conversely, in Finland policies promote a re-familialisation of childcare, through a relatively 
long parental leave and a system of cash benefits, through which families can choose between 
public childcare services and parenting at home. Little attention is paid to the involvement of 
fathers in care activities.  
In Sweden, the system of childcare policies promotes the sharing of responsibilities between 
mothers and fathers, together with the promotion of full-time work for both parents. State-
sponsored childcare services are well developed and are intended to cover the needs of two 
full-time workers80. A special attention is paid to encourage fathers to take their reserved 
leaves quotas. Finally, in Norway the state promotes a mixed model for the reconciliation of 
work and family life. A long parental leave, which foresees a father’s quota, promotes the 
sharing of childcare responsibilities. At the same time, a cash benefit has been introduced, to 
offer the opportunity to prolong parental care at home. The provision of childcare services is 
mainly used on a part-time basis and mothers tend to concentrate in part-time jobs. 
According to Marie Thérèse Letablier (2009), in every European country the welfare state 
was initially based on the ‘family ideology’, according to which family is the fundamental 
                                                        
78 The author refers to the cash benefits that were introduced in Norway and in Finland, intended to families that 
choose not to use state-sponsored childcare facilities. The objective of these benefits is to provide an alternative 
to families and support them when they choose to provide care for their children at home. 
79 Technically, Leira does not elaborate a typology in the strictest sense of the word (typologies of countries 
cannot correspond to one single country, as the result is a description of the country instead of a generalisation). 
Her work is more intended to show that although Nordic countries are usually treated as a homogeneous block, 
they do in fact have significant differences. 
80 Although childcare provision is intended to cover the full-time employment of both parents, in Sweden a 
large proportion of mothers opt for part-time jobs (Leira, 2002). 
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social unit within which feminine and masculine roles are differentiated. Along the decades, 
welfare states started to differentiate, and some of them began to recognise the right of 
women to choose whether to work in the waged market or to rear their children at home. The 
result was, for instance, that the French welfare state became more supportive to women’s 
efforts to conciliate family and work; countries like Germany and the Netherlands kept a 
fundamentally maternal ideology in their welfare; while Northern European countries got rid 
of the maternal ideology, based on the idea that women’s participation in the labour market is 
the main instrument for achieving gender equality (Letablier, 2009). Based on these criteria, 
Letablier developed a classification of gender regimes that recognises five ideal types.  
Birgit Pfau-Effiger (2012) stresses the importance of culture and social change as a theoretical 
approach to understand gender arrangements. Not only the social behaviour of individuals is 
strongly influenced by cultural values and ideals about the ‘right’ division of labour between 
the sexes, but also welfare state's policies are influenced by predominant ideals. Then, 
countries can potentially experience internal contradictions: policies might be more traditional 
than individual orientations about gender models and so they might constitute an obstacle for 
women; or, on the contrary, policies might be more innovative compared to the ideals of the 
majority of the population.  
Pfau-Effinger (2002, 2005) classifies countries according to the cultural ideals about the 
gender division of labour (‘gender culture’) and to the cultural constructions in social 
institutions (‘gender order’), and she recognises five different gender cultural models in 
Europe. The family economic model is the family model of agrarian and crafting families, 
where the whole family contributes to the subsistence and care is not seen as a specific task to 
be allocated to one family member. The male breadwinner/female home carer model is the 
family model in which the female member of the family is responsible for care. The male 
breadwinner/female part-time carer model is based on the idea that the family has to share at 
least part of the care responsibilities with other institutions, such as the market, the state or 
non-profit organisations. The dual breadwinner/external carer model is based on the idea that 
care should be mainly provided by external actors, such as the state, the market, or the non-
profit sector. Finally, the dual breadwinner/dual carer model is based on the assumption that 
men and women should equally share care responsibilities within the family and that part of 
these responsibilities should be shared with external actors, such as the state, the market, or 
the non-profit sector (Pfau-Effinger, 2005).  
Table 9 provides a summary of the selected classifications of gender regimes that were 
presented in this section. 
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Table 9: Gender regimes typologies 
Author Indicators Gender regimes 
Parsons 
(1955), 
Myrdal & 
Klein (1956), 
Liljeström 
(1978) 
- Family 
models 
Specialisation 
of roles: 
Industrial 
societies 
Women as 
second 
provider: 
1950-60s 
Shared roles 
model: 
Post-
industrial 
societies 
  
Lewis (1992) - female 
participatio
n rates, 
social 
security 
rights, 
childcare 
provision 
Strong male 
breadwinner 
model: 
UK 
Ireland 
Modified 
male 
breadwinner 
model: 
France 
Weak male 
breadwinner 
model: 
Sweden 
  
Leira (2002) - childcare 
services 
- paid leaves 
- cash 
benefits 
childcare 
Women’s 
employment 
model: 
Denmark 
Care at 
home model: 
Finland 
Share of care 
model: 
Sweden 
Mixed 
model: 
Norway 
 
Letablier 
(2009) 
- family 
ideology 
Maternalist 
regime: 
Germany 
Belgium 
Netherlands 
France 
Austria 
Social-
democratic 
regime: 
Northern 
countries 
Family-ties 
regime: 
Mediterrane
an countries 
Neo-liberal 
regime: 
UK 
Ireland 
Residual 
regime: 
New EU 
members 
states 
Pfau-Effinger 
(2005) 
- gender 
culture 
- gender 
order 
Family 
economic: 
Post-war 
period (FI) 
Male 
breadwinner
/female 
home carer: 
Post-war 
period (UK, 
NL, NO, DE) 
Male 
breadwinner
/female 
part-time 
carer: 
NL 
UK 
DE 
Dual 
breadwinner
/external 
carer: 
FR 
DK 
SE 
FI 
Dual 
breadwinne
r/dual 
carer: 
NL 
NO 
 
Although these are only some of the various typologies that have been developed in relation 
to gender regimes, they all stress the importance of the gender perspective in explaining 
cross-country variations in family models, welfare policies and care arrangements. Although 
each of them focuses on specific aspects of gender arrangements, all the presented typologies 
share the basic assumption that to fully understand the choices of households with respect to 
domestic and care arrangements it is necessary to take into consideration not only national 
policies, but also gender values and cultural and social norms. Therefore, a theoretical 
framework that takes into consideration gender regimes may help understand both the degree 
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of externalisation of domestic and care activities to the market, and the way the domestic 
sector is conceived and regulated by the state. 
 
2.4 The migration regime 
 
The importance of introducing migration regimes in a study of paid domestic work derives 
from the increased presence of international regular and irregular migrants in the domestic 
sector in many European countries (UNHCR, 2011; ILO, 2013). In some countries – namely, 
Mediterranean countries – the employment of female migrants in the domestic services and 
care services for children and the elderly has assumed enormous proportions, so that in these 
countries the domestic sector can be considered the main occupation of migrant women (Lutz, 
2008)81.  
As discussed in section 1.2.3, the main changes compared to older forms of mobility of 
domestic workers concern both the new geography of migration of domestic workers to 
Europe (which follow a pattern from East to West and from South to North82) and the new 
‘profile’ of domestic workers (international migrants, instead of internal migrants, more and 
more educated and coming from urban areas and from a middle-class background) (Lutz, 
2008; Morokvasic, 2004, Sarti, 2008). 
Scholars have identified some factors that have contributed to the concentration of migrants in 
the domestic sector. The principal argumentation is based on the rationale of a global push-
and-pull model, where the enormous increase of supply of labour on one side of the world 
(due to economic reasons) meets the growing demand for domestic labour in the richer parts 
of the world, including Europe (Lutz, 2008). This contributes to increase the international and 
inter-continental mobility of domestic workers.  
The growing demand for domestic labour is in turn determined by the combination of societal 
changes, such as the increased female participation rates in the labour market and 
                                                        
81 For literature on migrant domestic workers in the European countries where the proportion of migrants 
outnumbers that of locals in the domestic sector, refer to Parrenas for the US, 2008; Lutz-Palenga-Mollenbeck, 
2010 for Germany, Leon, 2010 for Spain, Gendera, 2011 for Austria, Anderson, 2006 for the UK; Ambrosini 
2011, Catanzaro and Colombo, 2009, Sciortino, 2011 for Italy. 
82 The national diversity in the countries of origin of domestic workers in the different European countries is 
quite significant. However, without going into detail, it is visible a prevalence of Eastern European domestic 
workers in the new migration countries (Mediterranean countries), while in old migration countries, mainly due 
to historical reasons, female migrants from Africa and South America constitute the majority of the migrant 
workforce in the domestic sector. Moreover, because of international agreements, as well as specific public 
policies encouraging the emigration of domestic workers, migrants from countries such as The Philippines and 
Sri Lanka represent a large segment of the domestic sector in many European countries.  
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demographic transformations, and the persistence of poor wages and working conditions in 
the sector. On the one hand, the accrued participation of local women in the labour market 
means that local women are no longer available to perform all domestic and care tasks within 
their families for love (Anderson, 2011), as it was expected in the past. As it was discussed in 
section 2.2.1, the increased feminisation of the labour market and the ageing of the population, 
among other factors, combined with the lack of good quality and affordable public services 
available to families to meet care needs, encourage families to externalise domestic activities. 
On the other hand, the persistence of low wages and poor working conditions (unfriendly 
working hours, unsafe environments, hard physical work, among other issues), coupled with 
the low reputation associated to domestic chores, make domestic and care work unattractive 
to local women.  
But what are the reasons that make migrants more suitable for domestic work? 
Contrary to locals, migrant women are seen as more suitable for performing paid domestic 
work, because they offer domestic and care services at the most competitive prices and thus 
they represent the cheapest available option for households83. In economic terms, they have 
lower reservation wages, compared to locals, and at least in the first stages of their migration 
strategy they tend to accept any type of job, including those that are very poorly 
remunerated84 (Sciortino, 2004). In fact, since the migration project always involves high 
costs for migrants and since at least at the beginning migrants cannot count on social 
protection in the host country, newly arrived migrants tend to accept low-wage jobs as a first 
way of survival. Additionally, as wages in the receiving countries are typically higher than 
those in their country of origin, even a poorly paid job can represent an important resource for 
migrants in terms of remittances. 
Moreover, migrant domestic workers represent a more flexible workforce, compared to locals. 
Because they are often younger and without dependants, they are usually more prepared to 
work unsocial working hours and endure harsh conditions (Anderson, 2011). However, even 
migrants with dependants might find advantages in the domestic work. As literature on global 
                                                        
83 Sciortino (2004) employs an economic concept to describe the difference between domestic services and 
other jobs. According to this theory, domestic and personal services are subject to the ‘Baumol cost disease’. The 
provision of services oscillates between the risk of a sudden reduction of supply (when wages in the domestic 
sector are too low) and the risk of a sharp reduction of demand (when demanded wages are too high). In many 
European countries, the solution to the Baumol cost disease is solved through the employment of migrant 
domestic workers, who foster the demand by accepting low wages. 
84 See footnote 20, p. 34. 
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care chains 85  has long highlighted, contrary to the past, more and more women with 
dependants (children and other dependent relatives) emigrate to work as domestic workers in 
wealthier regions of the world. For these women, domestic work, especially in the form of 
live-in work, can represent a way to save money for food and accommodation, while allowing 
them to send remittances to their families in the country of origin (Ambrosini, 2015)86 . 
Therefore, in the case of migrant women with dependants, relatively low earnings and 
unfriendly working hours can be part of their migration strategy, because the economic 
function of the job is entirely directed to the country of origin and because they do not have 
the reproductive burden of their families in the receiving countries. Additionally, contrary to 
local women, for migrant women the fact of working in the domestic sector is usually seen as 
a temporary situation, be that because the professional situation might evolve once settled, or 
because the migration project itself is seen as temporary (Anderson, 2011).  
However, the above-mentioned factors cannot explain alone the concentration of migrants in 
the domestic sector, nor the significant differences that exist in Europe with this respect. First 
of all, the growing inequalities among regions of the world and the economic reasons that 
might encourage people in poorer regions to emigrate (push-pull argument) can neither 
explain the concentration of migrants in this specific sector, nor the choice of the destination 
country and the consequent cross-country variations in terms of migrant workforce. Also, as 
literature teaches, migration processes are engendered by a multiplicity of factors, which 
cannot be associated only to the economic rationale.  
Some scholars suggested that the proportion of migrant care and domestic workers is not only 
determined by the increase of the demand and by the state withdrawal in terms of public 
services, but it is also voluntarily induced by policies (Sciortino, 2004; Anderson, 2011). In 
other words, the increase of migrant domestic workers in many European countries cannot be 
simply explained by the fact that local women are not prepared to carry out paid domestic 
work in the labour market because of low wages, or that there is a lack of appropriate public 
services. Instead, the increase of flows of domestic workers is “both demand-induced and 
policy-constructed” (Sciortino, 2004).  
                                                        
85 For literature on global care chains, refer, among others, to Parreñas, 2001, Ehrenreich & Hochschild, 2002; 
Kofman, 2013; Lutz & Pallenga-Möllenbeck, 2012; Williams, 2012; Yeates, 2009, 2012. 
86 Literature on “global care chains” has pointed at the fact that more and more migrant women migrate alone 
from poorer to wealthier regions of the world to work as domestic workers. In the case of migrant women with 
dependants, usually they emigrate alone, leaving their children and dependants at the care of family, relatives or 
other paid workers in the country of origin. The family reunification – often partial – does intervene only at a 
later stage of the migration process and only when the migration project turns from temporary to a more stable 
project.  
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First of all, low wages and unfriendly working hours – which indeed attract less and less local 
women – are supported by policies. Even in countries that have adopted public measures to 
regulate the domestic sector, such as the voucher system in France and Belgium, the domestic 
sector is still characterised by poorer wages and working conditions, compared to national 
standard and compared to other low-skilled jobs (Gerard et al., 2013). The regulation of 
certain aspects of the work (regularisation of contracts, controls over the tasks to be 
performed, improved benefits) coexists with lower wages, compared to national wages, and a 
lower quality of jobs87.  
Second, migrant domestic workers represent the cheapest alternative to the lack of public 
provision, but usually only in the first phases of their migration project – namely, before their 
situation evolves towards the settlement or before they are entitled to welfare benefits and 
other social rights. To meet the demand for affordable domestic work, public policies tend to 
directly or indirectly promote a constant inflow of (often irregular) migrants to provide 
domestic and care services (Sciortino, 2004). In this sense, migration policies, combined with 
welfare and labour policies, are of paramount importance as they can encourage the arrival of 
domestic workers and set the conditions of work in the domestic sector.  
Therefore, the analysis of migration regimes and of the migration policies regulating the entry 
and work of migrant domestic workers can be useful to understand the concentration of 
migrants in the domestic sector and the working conditions in the sector, as well as cross-
European differences.  
 
2.4.1 Migration regimes and domestic work 
 
The concentration of migrants in the domestic sector in all European countries is influenced 
by migration regimes, both in the form of direct policies aiming at encouraging or controlling 
the entrance of domestic workers, and in the form of more general immigration policies, 
determining the entry, stay and work permits of foreigners. Although migration regimes 
                                                        
87 The Belgian voucher system is symptomatic of the contradiction between a professionalised and regularised 
domestic sector and the creation of a lower work status in the labour market. As stated in the annual report of 
IDEA Consult on the Belgian voucher system, while certain aspects of the work are closely regulated by the 
state (the type of tasks allowed, the contractual situation, the regulation of working hours), the quality of the job 
remains lower, compared to other occupations. In particular, although the voucher system is covered by 
collective bargaining and therefore the wages cannot be lower than the minimum national wage, the collective 
agreement foresees lower benefits for domestic workers (holidays, travel expenses, etc.). Some researchers have 
argued that the voucher system was successful in regulating the sector and reducing irregular work, but it has 
failed in improving the working conditions of domestic workers and in actually professionalising the work 
(Gerard et al., 2013).  
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include all aspects linked to the entry and stay, as well as the regulation of the work permit of 
all foreigners, they have an impact on the domestic sector, as they can directly promote the 
employment of migrant domestic workers in different ways (Lutz, 2008).  
National immigration policies usually reflect the different perceptions over the benefits vs. the 
disadvantages of including migrants in the national labour market (UNHCR, 2011). 
Concerning domestic workers, from the nineteenth century until some decades ago, many 
European countries had put in place migration policies aiming at controlling the arrival of 
domestic workers in their national territory (Sarti, 2008). Today, in the majority of European 
countries, there is a visible mismatch between immigration policies, which insist on 
demanding high-skilled and high-earning migrants, and the reality of the labour market, 
which demands low-skilled, cheap and flexible domestic and care workers88 (Anderson, 2011). 
Only a few countries, such as Italy, Spain and to a lesser extent Germany, have recognised the 
enormous demand for migrant domestic workers and have enacted migration policies and 
provisions specifically addressing domestic workers (Kofman, 2005; Sarti, 2008), albeit with 
national differences in the type of measures that have been adopted. Although measures 
specifically addressing the need of migrant domestic workers do not seem to be sufficient to 
meet the increasing demand, they are nevertheless important because they show that certain 
governments have acknowledged the increase of the demand and the importance of migrant 
domestic workers in the receiving labour market. However, even in this case, these measures 
are generally limited to ex-post regularisations or specific (but limited) quotas for the entry of 
domestic workers, rather than permanent instruments that recognise domestic work as a type 
of work that warrants a specific visa and work permit (Sarti, 2008). In general, in Europe 
there is a lack of acknowledgment of the need of migrants in the domestic sector (UNHCR, 
2011) and existing measures are insufficient and fragmented. 
Concerning the entrance of migrant domestic workers into the territory, Bettio et al. (2006) 
identify three factors that, coupled with the general permeability of borders, determine the 
size of inflows: i) the size of the underground economy; ii) the use of regularisation 
programmes; and iii) the demand for care work. 
                                                        
88 All definitions of domestic work agree on the low-skilled nature of the job. However, there is an increased 
awareness of the fact that this type of work requires other skills and competences (‘soft skills’) which are crucial 
for the employer and which include management of personal relationships, empathetic skills, knowledge of how 
to identify emergencies and how to physically take care of frail people, etc. (Anderson, 2011). Also, the fact that 
migrant domestic workers are included in the lower-skilled segments of the labour market does not necessarily 
mean that they have no education. On the contrary, more and more migrant domestic workers are medium to 
highly educated and the paradoxical situation of a domestic worker who has better education than her employer 
is not an exception in Europe (Sarti, 2008). 
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The pre-existence of a large informal economy has long been recognised as a factor 
encouraging the inflow of migrants (Ambrosini, 2015; UNHCR, 2011; Finotelli and Sciortino, 
2009; Bettio et al., 2006). Contrary to common beliefs, a large informal labour market attracts 
migrants, rather than being the consequence of the arrival of important inflows of migrants 
(Bettio et al., 2006). When jobs are available in the informal labour market, migrants may 
find it easy to enter the territory and earn money even without a residence or a work permit. 
Moreover, the entrance of irregular migrants through clandestine routes constitutes the 
smaller segment of the irregular migrant presence in any country (Ambrosini, 2010). The vast 
majority of migrants enter the territory legally, usually through temporary permits or tourist 
VISA, and then overstay their permit and become irregular. In this case, the presence of a 
large and easily accessible underground economy allows migrants to remain on the territory, 
while waiting for regularisation opportunities.   
The use of more or less frequent regularisation programmes as a policy instrument for the 
management of unauthorised migration also attracts large inflows of irregular migrants89 
(Ambrosini, 2010; Bettio et al., 2006). Exceptional regularisation programmes have been 
frequently used in Southern European countries in the last two decades, in the absence of 
other immigration policies and mechanisms. In these countries, regularisations have involved 
a very large number of migrants working in the informal economy and this has created 
expectations for both irregular migrants already present in the territory and for potential 
migrants (Bettio et al., 2006). The fact that two of the Italian regularisation programmes 
launched in recent years were specifically directed to domestic workers is a clear sign of the 
recognition of the importance of migrants for domestic work. 
Concerning the demand for care workers, the high demand for domestic and care workers – 
which has already been discussed in previous sections – both retains migrants and fuels new 
waves of migration. The unprecedented concentration of migrants in households and the 
segmentation of the domestic sector by gender are symptomatic of the role played by female 
migrants that emigrate to work in the domestic sector (Bettio et al., 2006; Anthias and 
Lazaridis, 2000; Lutz, 2008, 2010).  
 
                                                        
89 A distinction can be made between regularisation programmes, which are exceptional measures, usually 
limited in time and addressed to specific groups of migrants, and regularisation mechanisms, which are 
permanent measures, meant to regulate the status of certain groups of migrants (such as refugees, family 
members, etc.) (MPI, 2011; Ambrosini, 2010). 
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2.4.2 Migration regimes in Europe: current trends 
 
This section provides an overview of the current European situation with regards to migration 
policies, with a focus on the existing classifications of migration regimes. As it emerges from 
this overview, migration regimes, as they are usually analysed, do not refer specifically to 
domestic workers and none of the typologies developed so far have taken into account the 
increased demand for domestic workers in many European countries. However, existing 
analyses of migration regimes are useful to understand both the historical legacies that 
influence the way immigration is perceived and regulated in different countries, and recent 
trends in Europe with respect to immigration and integration issues. This in turn is key to 
contextualise the emerging demand of migrant domestic workers and to investigate how this 
increased demand is fitted into existing migration regimes. 
Overall, European migration regimes are influenced by the recent history of migration in 
Europe and by the affirmation of the rhetoric of the ‘control of the borders’, promoted by the 
European Union (Huysmans, 2000; Bosworth, 2008; Infantino, 2013). In the last decades, and 
more and more since the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the EU has made 
efforts to harmonise policies on migration and to develop a common European legal 
migration framework, mainly through the adoption of directives on border control, legal 
migration, irregular migration, visa and the Common European Asylum System (European 
Parliament, 2015). However, immigration policies – especially those related to the integration 
of migrants in the host societies – still remain a competence of member states.  
Although the common distinction between integration and immigration policies is still visible 
and it is adopted in most policy frameworks, both the European Union and national states 
seem to be concerned about creating a nexus between immigration, integration and citizenship 
(Carrera, 2006). In the majority of European countries, recent developments in the legal and 
policy framework suggest a trend towards a general restriction with respect to the entrance of 
migrants (immigration framework) and the introduction of binding integration programmes 
(integration/citizenship framework).   
 
Restriction of immigration regimes 
With respect to the immigration legal and policy framework, a state can be more or less 
favourable to the entrance and stay of migrants for different reasons, that vary from economic 
and demographic interests, historical and colonial links to emigration countries, the control of 
their borders, or humanitarian considerations (Bourhis et al., 2010). Regarding trends in 
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immigration policies, scholarship has observed that in the last three decades the European 
Union has repeatedly tried to discourage immigration and to restrict both entry and stay of 
migrants (Sciortino, 2004).  
Although the inflow of migrants into the European Union is far from being dramatic, starting 
from the closure of labour migration in the 1970s and more and more in the 1990s, there has 
been a growing concern about the entrance of foreigners into the European territory. This has 
generated a shift from a focus on integration policies to a focus on entrance and control 
policies, which are currently given prominence both at European level (through the 
implementation of directives and soft regulations) and at national level (under the pressure of 
the EU). Also, due to the mediatisation of the debate about the threat of irregular migration, 
migration has generally turned into a ‘security issue’ (Huysmans, 2000; Infantino, 2013) and 
European migration policies tend to focus on restrictive measures, external control and 
exclusion policies (Finotelli and Sciortino, 2009).  
Countries at the border of the European Union – namely at the Northern coastlines of the 
Mediterranean and countries in Eastern border areas – are being particularly under pressure, 
because they are expected to adapt their national migration systems to the European 
restrictive policies and to ‘protect’ the European borders from unwanted and irregular 
migration. However, because the inflows of unwanted migration are still significant, 
Mediterranean countries are commonly designed as the 'weak underbelly’ of the European 
control system and their migration system is regarded as weak and ineffective90 (Finotelli and 
Sciortino, 2009). 
Despite the general emphasis on border control and the repression of irregular migration, the 
large extent of inflows of unwanted migrants constitutes a phenomenon that is more and more 
regarded as endangering national and European sovereignty (Ambrosini, 2010; Anderson, 
2008). The increased concern over border control is in itself the result of the decline of the 
power of nation states under the forces of globalisation, which conversely emphasises free 
trade and free movement of people (Bosworth, 2008). The tension between the generalised 
restrictive dictate and the increase of unwanted migration is currently at the centre of the 
political debate and has become increasingly mediatised in all European countries. Although 
                                                        
90 This is due to a multiplicity of factors. Southern countries, which have been for long time countries of 
emigration, were traditionally open to receive foreigners because of their economic dependence on tourism, and 
also because the arrival of migrants was mainly transitional (Bettio et al., 2006). When these countries 
progressively turned into immigration countries during the 1980s (Baldwin-Edwards and Arango, 1999) and 
started to depend more and more on foreign workforce in their labour markets, governments found themselves 
unprepared to receive large amounts of migrants. Following the demands of northern and continental Europe to 
reinforce the borders, they all had to intensify migration controls, but with limited results (Bettio et al., 2006) 
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different types of irregularity exist91 and although each EU member state defines and treats 
irregularity differently (Ambrosini, 2010), the fight against irregular migration is crucial to all 
European migration regimes. Because irregular migrants are those who enter in conflict with 
the rules defined by the state, the political-normative action of migration regimes is 
fundamental in creating categories of migrants, in a hierarchy that ranks migrants from the 
most to the least desirable92. 
Although differences exist at country level in the way measures are implemented, the criteria 
according to which migrants are accorded entry, stay and work permits, as well as social and 
civil rights, unanimously encourage the migration of high-skilled / high-earning migrants, 
while discouraging the entry of low-skilled workers. This is due to the fact that high-skilled 
migrants are more accepted, both economically and politically. From an economic point of 
view, high-skilled / high-earning migrants are advantageous for the receiving country, as they 
contribute to the economic growth of the nation. From the political point of view, high-skilled 
migrants are better accepted by the local population because, in contrast with the negative 
perception of low-skilled migrants, they integrate faster in the receiving community and they 
do not compete with the local low-skilled workforce in the labour market and in the access to 
public welfare benefits (Boeri at al., 2012). Also, seasonal workers are welcome in many 
countries, because of the temporary nature of their migration project93 and because of the high 
demand for low-skilled seasonal work in many countries.  
                                                        
91 A definition of irregular migrants is far from being uncontroversial. As it has been emphasised by Ambrosini, 
there are at least four types of irregular status under which migrants can fall: irregular entry, irregular stay permit, 
irregular work permit and irregular work status. The irregular situation of migrants can involve one or more of 
these types and can evolve over time (Ambrosini, 2010). Also, migration policies can concentrate on one or the 
other type of irregularity – typically, entry and stay permits (with an emphasis on security policies) – while 
tolerating other forms of irregularity – typically, work permits and work status. This means that the fight against 
irregular migration do not necessarily implies the repression of all types of irregular status. 
92 Crucial to the definition of migration policies is the notion of the cultural desirability and the definition of 
whom – among all potential migrants – are ‘wanted’ and/or ‘accepted’ in the national territory. Therefore, 
migration regimes also include the regulation of whom will be granted entry, stay and work permits, as well as 
social, civic and political rights and access to naturalisation (Lutz, 2008). Modern migration regimes are based 
on the idea of ‘managed migration’ (Kofman and al., 2005) and tend to classify migrants according to 
desirability criteria. This in turn foments the polarisation between ‘good migrants’, who are welcome and even 
necessary (usually to the economy of the country) and ‘bad migrants’, who are associated with illegality and 
criminality (Finotelli and Sciortino, 2009). Additionally, although the fight against unwanted migration seems to 
pervade all migration regimes, there are also hierarchical categories among irregular migrants, with some 
migrants being regarded as more irregular than others. As Ambrosini observes, EU nationals – even when 
irregular on one or the other aspect – are considered less irregular, thus less dangerous, compared to new 
accession nationals, to OECD countries nationals and to third-countries nationals, in a hierarchical continuum. 
At the same time, another type of hierarchy operates with respect to the ‘utility’ of migrants – namely to fill 
labour market shortages – and according to gender (Lutz, 2008; Ambrosini, 2010). 
93 A popular and often mediatised discourse denounces migrants as abusers of European welfare. More and 
more popular xenophobic discourses foment the idea that migrants are not attracted to better opportunities in the 
European labour markets, but rather to the high protection provided by European welfare states. Therefore, 
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The generalised restrictive policies and exclusionist regulations that characterise European 
migration regimes have two important consequences.  
First, by restricting the criteria for regular migration, they paradoxically increase the number 
of irregular migrants, in that they increase the number of individuals that come into conflict 
with the rules of the normative apparatus. The increase in the proportion of irregular migrants 
generates the need of enforced measures to combat irregular migration. However, the 
repressive approach of migration policies cannot be pushed beyond a certain limit, as this 
would jeopardise the very basis of democracies (Ambrosini, 2010). The dilemma to which 
European democracies are currently confronted has to do with the willingness to refrain 
irregular migration and the moral imperative to respect human rights principles.  
Second, since these policies do not take into consideration the demand for low-skilled migrant 
workers in the labour market, they create a tension between political restrictionist intents and 
the economic interests (Finotelli and Sciortino, 2009). This can result in a further polarisation 
between wanted and unwanted migrants, an increase in the inflow of irregular migrants, as 
well as a mismatch between migration regulations and the actual practice. The mismatch 
between policies and practice is particularly visible in some countries, where low-skilled 
workers are needed to fill the labour shortages in certain sectors of the labour market, such as 
the construction sector and domestic services. Migrant workers who are employed in these 
sectors find themselves in an ambiguous situation, as they are politically and administratively 
refused, but economically accepted and even needed (Ambrosini, 2011). 
 
Introduction of integration programmes 
Concerning integration policy frameworks, there seems to be a clear trend towards the 
introduction of mandatory integration programmes for migrants in the host countries. 
Although not all European countries have already put in place a system of integration 
programmes, several countries are currently planning to introduce such systems and the 
mandatory character of these programmes is progressively becoming the norm in Europe 
(Carrera, 2006). Integration programmes usually include elements such as language classes 
and civic courses on the norms, history, values and traditions of the receiving country, and 
sometimes elements of professional orientation and training (Jacobs and Rea, 2007).  
Although the introduction of integration programmes is generally seen as a common trend 
that interests all European countries, some differences exist in the way these programmes are 
                                                                                                                                                                             
temporary migration is often regarded as more acceptable compared to settled migration, because seasonal 
migrants – due to the very temporary nature of their stay – are not entitled to welfare provisions.  
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conceived. First, the state can offer integration programmes without fees, as a public service 
aimed at helping migrants in their integration process, or can demand fees to migrants for 
courses attendance. Second, the target beneficiaries can vary, as programmes can be 
specifically directed to newly arrived migrants, to migrants living on social benefits, to the 
whole migrant population, or even to potential migrants in their countries of origin. Third, 
integration programmes can have different degrees of compulsoriness. While in some 
European countries, such as France and Belgium (Wallonia region) integration programmes 
are voluntary, in other countries (Austria, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and the 
Flemish part of Belgium) they are compulsory and their incompletion may engender various 
juridical and social sanctions. The sanctions for not participating in integration programmes 
can vary from the withdrawal of entitlements to social benefits or restriction to certain 
services, monetary fees, or consequences on residence permits and the expulsion from the 
country (Jacobs and Rea, 2006; Carrera, 2006). 
The introduction of integration programmes is based on the common assumption that 
migrants should have at least a general knowledge of the receiving society. What differs 
among European countries is the underlying philosophy of integration programmes and the 
reasons behind their use. The evolution in the requirements and the intents linked to such 
programmes over time opened the debate over the very nature of integration pursued by these 
instruments. Integration programmes were initially conceived as to offer migrants better 
chances of integration in the host country, such as language and other skills necessary to 
integrate the labour market. This is still the case in countries like Sweden and Finland. 
However, integration programmes can also be conceived as instruments to achieve other goals, 
such as assimilation and acculturation, as it is the case in the Netherlands and to some extent 
also in Denmark and Germany (Jacobs and Rea, 2006). Several scholars suggest that 
integration programmes are part of a general shift from multiculturalism to assimilation94, as 
well as a shift in the responsibilities for integration from the state to the individual migrants 
(Carrera, 2006).  
 
2.4.3 Typologies of migration regimes 
 
European countries differ quite significantly in their system of immigration and integration 
policies and in their outcomes. This is due to different historical factors, institutional and 
                                                        
94 A detailed explanation on the difference between multiculturalism and assimilation is provided in the 
following section Integration/citizenship typologies, p. 103.  
 105 
economic forces, as well as political and popular perception of migration (Boucher and Gest, 
2015). Many attempts have been made by scholars to classify migration regimes and identify 
how countries cluster together across different dimensions of migration regimes. As Boucher 
and Gest observe, contemporary classifications of migration regimes and the deriving 
typologies have developed by focusing on either of the following aspects: 1) integration 
regimes and 2) immigration regimes95.  
The first type of migration regimes (integration) covers the situation of the migrant population 
once settled in the receiving country. It includes elements such as access to the labour market, 
access to health services, access to education, political participation, participation in cultural 
and leisure activities, access to social benefits and services, participation in trade unions, and 
so on. The second type of migration regimes (immigration) covers the entry and admission 
criteria of migrants and includes visas, entry and work permits and the overall system of laws 
and regulations intended to manage the admission of migrants in the national territory. 
Classifications of both dimensions of the migration regime can be based on policy outputs 
(the policy apparatus, including laws, binding or non-binding decisions, implementation 
activities, etc.) or on policy outcomes (the result of policy implementation).  
According to Boucher and Gest, the main limitation of current typologies of migration 
regimes lies precisely on the lack of comprehensive classifications that would take into 
account both dimensions – integration and immigration/admission. As it will be discussed in 
the next section, scholars have treated the two aspects separately and the interaction between 
the selection of migrants (admission) and settlement policies (integration) is currently under-
explored.  
 
Immigration/admission typologies 
As shown in Table 10, most of the typologies that classify countries in terms of 
admission/entry policies are very much linked to the historical legacies of migration and tend 
to emphasise the nature and the type of migration flows in each country. A typical approach 
to classify immigration regimes is to distinguish between three main groups. The first group is 
that of ‘settler states’, characterised by the reception and settlement of extended inflows of 
international migration. This group includes old immigration countries, such as the US, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The second is the ‘guest workers’ group, which is 
                                                        
95 Throughout this study, I will use the term migration regime to indicate the overall system of migration 
policies in a given country. The migration regime, as defined in this study, includes both integration and 
immigration/admission policies. 
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typical of Northern and continental European countries that have received large inflows of 
international migration through the guest-worker programmes after the Second World War. 
This group includes old immigration countries, such as Germany, the UK, France and 
Belgium. The third group is that of former sending countries, which became immigration 
countries only starting from the 1980s. This cluster includes Mediterranean countries, such as 
Italy, Spain and Greece. Other similar typologies of countries in terms of their immigration 
regimes have been developed by scholars. Table 10 provides a selection of these 
classifications. 
 
Table 10: Migration/admission regimes typologies 
Author Indicators Migration regimes 
Hammar 
(1985) 
- Immigration 
control 
- Integration 
policies 
(qualitative) 
Guest workers or 
rotation system: 
Germany 
Switzerland 
Permanent 
immigration: 
UK 
Sweden 
Post-colonial 
immigration: 
UK 
France 
Netherlands 
 
Freeman 
(1995) 
- immigration in 
labour market 
- external 
pressures on 
immigration 
(qualitative) 
English-speaking 
settler societies: 
US 
Australia 
Canada 
Post-war 
immigration 
countries: 
France 
UK 
Germany 
Switzerland 
Netherlands 
Sweden 
Belgium 
Former 
emigration 
countries: 
Spain  
Portugal 
Italy 
Greece 
 
Cornelius 
and Tsuda 
(2004) 
- Immigration 
policies 
- Public support 
to immigration 
(qualitative) 
Classic countries 
of immigration: 
US 
Canada 
Australia 
Reluctant 
countries of 
immigration: 
France 
Germany 
Netherlands 
UK 
Recent countries 
of immigration: 
Italy  
Spain 
Japan 
Korea 
 
Joppke 
(2005) 
-Immigration 
selection 
(qualitative) 
Settler states: 
US 
Australia 
Post-colonial 
constellations: 
Northwest 
Europe 
Southwest 
Europe 
Diaspora 
constellations: 
Israel 
Germany 
 
Menz 
(2009) 
- Labour union / 
industry 
relations 
- Labour 
immigration 
selection 
(qualitative) 
Established 
countries of 
immigration: 
France 
Germany 
UK 
New countries of 
immigration: 
Ireland 
Italy 
Poland 
  
Devitt 
(2011) 
- Flows of 
immigrants  
- Type of work of 
Nordic regimes: 
Sweden 
Denmark 
Conservative / 
continental 
model: 
Southern / 
statist model: 
Italy 
Liberal model: 
UK 
Ireland 
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immigrants 
- Labour market 
design 
 
Finland Germany 
Australia 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
Greece 
Spain 
Portugal 
France 
* The selection of the typologies is based on the study conducted by A. Boucher and J. Gest (2015) 
 
What clearly emerges from all these typologies is that the type of immigration regimes and 
their outcomes in terms of immigration flows are influenced by historical factors (colonialist 
links, for instance), by the ‘age’ of their immigration (old vs. new countries of immigration) 
and by the type of immigration (settlement vs. temporary). The limitation of the majority of 
the typologies on immigration/admission regimes is that they are mainly based on a 
qualitative evaluation of policies and that they do not always specify the variables that have 
been taken into account (Boucher and Gest, 2015).  
To overcome this problem, scholars have recently tried to systematise the efforts of 
classifying countries in terms of the restrictiveness of migration policies and a few databases 
have been constructed to this purpose (de Haas et al., 2015). Due to the difficulty in defining 
restrictiveness of immigration regimes in absolute terms, the majority of the databases 
provide information about the changes in immigration policies over time. The works of 
Mayda and Patel (2004) and later of Ortega and Peri (2012) cover policies of labour migration, 
asylum, family reunification and border control in 14/15 OECD countries. The Immigration 
policy database (ImPol), developed by Mezger and Gonzales-Ferrer in 2013, measures 
immigration policy changes in five Western countries. Among the databases that track 
changes in immigration policies, the most recent and complete both in terms of policies 
covered and in terms of the number of countries covered is the Determinants of International 
Migration database (DEMIG Policy database), which includes migration policy changes over 
the period of 1945-2013 in 45 countries. Although these databases are very useful for 
understanding the evolution of immigration policies over time, they are nevertheless less 
powerful for comparing the degree of restrictiveness across countries (de Haas et al., 2015). 
Recently, some attempts have been made to create immigration policies databases that can be 
used for comparative purposes, in that they measure the degree of restrictiveness in absolute 
terms. The Immigration Policies in Comparison project (IMPIC) and the Immigration Policy 
and Law Analysis project (IMPALA) are among the most successful attempts in this respect. 
However, as many other databases on immigration policies, their main limitation is that they 
usually cover a limited number of countries and/or a limited set of policies (de Haas et al., 
2015), which make their use limited to broad international comparisons. 
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Integration/citizenship typologies 
Regarding integration regimes, various classifications have been developed, that take into 
account a variety of factors. The integration of migrants into host societies is achieved in very 
different ways, depending on historical, economic, demographic, political and cultural 
elements that influence the way minority groups are perceived and treated. It also depends on 
how the national community has been created and on which values it developed (Rodriguez-
Garcia, 2010). In broad terms, the debate over integration models has rotated for a long time 
around the distinction between multiculturalism and assimilation96.  
Although many types of multiculturalism have been identified97, the term multiculturalism (or 
pluralism) usually refers to policies that aim to preserve cultures and cultural identities of 
minority groups – usually migrants – within the society. In an ideal-type multicultural society, 
the state recognises equal status to all minority cultural and religious groups, with no one 
culture predominating over the others. A state based on multicultural policies tends to 
recognise legal status and legal protection to minority groups. The philosophical roots of 
multiculturalism are based on the assumption that although different nations’ subcultures 
might be different, they all share common values and that unity can be achieved through 
difference.  
On the contrary, assimilation (or cultural assimilation, or republicanism) aims to achieve 
integration of minority groups through the ‘absorption’ of these groups into the established 
dominant society. Since minority groups have to assimilate to national and cultural values, 
assimilation always implies a certain loss of the original characteristics of the group. 
Assimilation is based on the idea of a monocultural society, where rules and values of the 
established community are absorbed by minority groups, so that minority communities 
become virtually indistinguishable from the dominant one (Rodriguez-Garcia, 2010). In pure 
assimilation-based states, citizens are just treated as citizens, without differences. Integration 
regimes based on assimilation assumptions tend to legally forbid the recognition of minority 
groups as distinct communities, with their own religion, cultural identity and values.  
                                                        
96 For information on multiculturalism/assimilation and on the debate over a possible European convergence 
towards assimilation, refer, among others, to Carrera, 2006; Joppke, 2007; Koopmans et al., 2012; Michalowski, 
2009. 
97 Some authors distinguish between weak and strong multiculturalism (refer to the review of Rodriguez-Garcia, 
2010), while some scholars have come to identify up to eight or nine types of multiculturalism (refer to the 
review of Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010). 
 109 
As it is always the case for classifications that identify two ideal types as the two extremes of 
a continuum, no such pure multiculturalist or assimilationist country exist. However, some 
countries are often pointed at as those that better exemplify the two models. Looking at North 
America, the US is considered the country that most closely exemplifies assimilation, while 
Canada has been often treated as the ideal-type of a multicultural society. In the European 
context, France and the UK have been identified as the two societies that better reflect 
assimilationist and multicultural values, respectively, while the Netherlands and Germany are 
often considered as in between the two models (Mangan and Borooah, 2009). In reality, all 
countries combine multicultural and assimilationist tendencies, depending on the region and 
depending on the historical period98.  
A third model of integration – which some scholars consider as a sub-group of 
multiculturalism – is the segregationist (or exclusionist) model, based on the fragmentation of 
ethno-cultural communities. This model is characterised by a rigid immigration legislation, 
where rigid refers to the conditions that must be satisfied to access the territory (Carrera, 
2006). This model is typical of countries where the acquisition of citizenship is based on the 
jus sanguinis criterion99, as it is the case in Austria, Germany and Switzerland (Rodriguez-
Garcia, 2010). 
Another typology that takes into account pluralistic and assimilationist approaches is the one 
developed by Castles and Miller (2009), who identify four types of integration: i) countries 
that integrate members or former members of multi-ethnic empires; ii) countries that focus on 
ethnic dimensions, such as culture and language; iii) countries that adopt a republican model, 
based on a constitution or on laws; and iv) countries based on a multicultural model, which 
focuses on a pluralistic approach. 
As shown in Table 11, apart from the traditional typologies of integration regimes that 
distinguish between more or less multicultural/assimilationist models, various databases have 
been built in order to measure integration policies and outcomes. Among these instruments, 
Banting and Kymlicka proposed in 2011 the Multiculturalism Policy Index, which measures 
the type and strength of multicultural policies in 21 OECD countries. Similarly, the Migration 
Policy Group developed the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), which takes into 
                                                        
98 For instance, there is a current debate over the failure of the French assimilationist model, which would have 
pushed the country towards the recognition of multicultural values. To give another example, the Netherlands is 
seen as slowly turning from a multicultural to a neo-assimilationist society (see discussion in Rodriguez-Garcia, 
2010). 
99 Jus sanguinis is a principle based on which citizenship is not determined by the place of birth (jus soli), but 
by the citizenship of one or both parents. 
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account broad integration policies in all EU member states and in Australia, Norway, 
Switzerland, Canada and the US. Other indexes, such as the Citizenship Policy Indicator 
developed by Howard, focus on the acquisition and loss of citizenship in Europe, while 
Janoski uses outcome-based indicators on naturalisation rates to classify citizenship regimes. 
A last example of integration measure is the Civic Integration Index, developed by Goodman, 
which measures the requirements of European member states in terms of language and 
knowledge of the culture and the values of the receiving country. 
 
Table 11:  Integration/citizenship regimes typologies 
Author Indicators Integration regimes 
Castles 
and Miller 
(2009) 
(qualitative) Integration of 
members or 
former 
members of 
multiethnic 
empires 
Focus on ethnic 
dimensions 
(culture of 
language)  
Republican 
model based on 
constitution or 
laws 
Multicultural 
model, 
pluralistic 
approach 
Banting 
and 
Kymlicka 
(2011) 
Multicultural policies  Multiculturalism Policy Index: 
21 OECD countries 
 
Migration 
Policy 
Group 
(2006) 
Labour market 
mobility, family 
reunion, education, 
political participation, 
long-term residence, 
access to nationality, 
anti-discrimination 
Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX): 
EU member states + Australia, Norway, Switzerland, Canada and the US 
Howard 
(2009) 
Measurement of jus 
soli, residency 
requirements, dual 
citizenship 
allowances 
Citizenship Policy Indicator: 
15 EU states 
Goodman 
(2010) 
Naturalisation 
requirements of 
country knowledge, 
language and values 
agreement 
Civic Integration Index: 
15 EU states 
 
 
 
Chapter 3  
Data, methodology and challenges 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter deals with the methodology of the research and is divided in five main sections. 
The first section provides the description of the methodology used in this study and of the 
main types of statistical analyses carried out (presented in Chapter 4, 5 and 6). The second 
section discusses the advantages and disadvantages of secondary analysis of existing data. 
The third section is a detailed description of the different databases and sources that have 
been used for the analyses and of the available data. The fourth section discusses the main 
limitations of each database used for the analysis. A particular attention is paid to the 
problems linked to the statistical definition of the domestic sector and the statistical definition 
of the migrant population, as well as the issues linked to the informal economy. Finally, the 
fifth section addresses some additional problems encountered during the course of the 
research, which include problems linked to international comparisons and problems linked to 
specific statistical analyses. 
 
3.1 Methodology 
 
This research is a comparison between European countries, which is conducted with 
quantitative methods of investigation. Namely, it intends to empirically test the theory, 
elaborated by scholar Helma Lutz, according to whom ‘migrant domestic work’ is influenced 
by three different regimes, which operate simultaneously.  
Three main sets of analyses have been conducted, which are presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
Due to the complexity of the work, other types of analysis have been explored – and in some 
cases tentatively carried out – which are not presented in this dissertation. Section 3.1.1 
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presents the three main sets of analyses conducted in the framework of this research, while 
section 3.1.2 presents a brief description of the statistical tools that have been used. 
 
3.1.1 The three main analyses of this research 
 
First analysis: descriptive analysis of the domestic sector 
The first is a descriptive analysis of contemporary paid domestic work in all the European 
countries for which data is available. The objective is to confirm the main findings of the 
literature on domestic work and to highlight the main trends and cross-national differences. A 
particular focus is paid to the concentration of migrants in the domestic sector, as it represents 
the focus of this research. The data used for this analysis is the EU Labour Forces microdata, 
publicly available upon demand to Eurostat.  
Due to the characteristics of this database and its limitations – which are addressed in section 
3.4.1 – the descriptive analyses were limited to the following aspects: 1) the size of the 
domestic sector in all EU member states (1998-2015); 2) the feminisation of the domestic 
sector; 3) the ethnicisation of the domestic sector; 4) some aspects that can be used to define 
working conditions, namely: the income level; the prevalence of temporary work vs. 
permanent work; and unusual working hours (night, evening and weekend shifts) vs. normal 
hours100.  
The analyses presented in Chapter 4 are mostly carried out on the latest available EU-LFS 
data (2015), with the exception of the analysis of the presence of second generations of 
migrants in the domestic workforce, for which I have used the data of the EU-LFS ad hoc 
module 2014101. 
 
Second analysis: construction of typologies 
The second set of analyses is the construction of indicators and of three typologies, one for 
each regime that is taken into consideration in this study. These analyses are presented in 
Chapter 5. The choice to create new indexes, where relevant, and new typologies – one for 
each regime – is based on the fact that no synthetic (or composite) indicator exists, which 
                                                        
100 In this research, bivariate analyses, mainly in the form of graphics (bar charts) and tables, are presented in 
Chapter 4 and in the first part of Chapter 6. In Chapter 4, they are used to analyse the main features of paid 
domestic work in the European countries for which data is available, while in Chapter 6 they are used to analyse 
the same features aggregated at the level of the three typologies.  
101 The ad-hoc module 2014 of the EU-LFS is the only public data released by Eurostat that provides 
information about the country of birth of mothers and fathers. 
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could be used for the purpose of this study. Although some indicators exist that measures one 
or more aspects that define the three regimes, new indexes and new typologies were necessary 
because of the specific object of this study, namely, the domestic sector. In line with the 
literature that highlights the importance of using typologies (only) when they are intended to 
explain empirical social phenomena102, the three typologies created for the purpose of this 
research are not intended to have ‘validity’ per se, but rather to be used as empirical tools for 
the understanding of a social phenomenon. For this reason, each typology has been 
constructed so to best represent each regime for this specific study on domestic work. 
One of the main challenges of this analysis was the selection of the best possible indicators, in 
terms of reliability, comprehensiveness, harmonisation between different countries and 
relevance for the regime under study. Several indicators have been selected from different 
databases and different sources.  
For the analysis of care regimes, I have built two synthetic indexes: the De-familialisation 
index and the Generosity index. These two synthetic indexes were created based on indicators 
selected from different sources. Some of the indicators used for the de-familialisation index 
were selected from the Multilinks database103, while others were derived from an EU report 
on personal household services. The indicators used for the generosity index were selected 
from the Multilinks database and from the OECD Health Statistics 2017 database104. The 
construction of the two synthetic indexes was carried out by means of Principal Component 
Analyses105. Finally, the typology of care regimes was constructed by means of a cluster 
analysis106. 
                                                        
102 Here, I refer to the work of Weber (1958), but also to the following literature that has developed on the use 
of typologies. The discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of using typologies is presented in section 
2.1.1.  
103 The Multilinks project has been carried out by a consortium of nine partners, led by the Berlin Social 
Science Center (WZB). Data were collected for the years 2004 and 2009 in 30 European countries (EU-27 and 
Norway, Georgia and Russia). The database is public and is available upon registration at the following link: 
https://multilinks-database.wzb.eu/session/new . More information on the database is provided in section 3.3.2. 
104 The online database OECD Health Statistics, released on 30 June 2017, includes data on health systems 
across countries. The database is available online at this link: 
http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=HEALTH_STAT. More information on the database is provided 
in section 3.3.2. 
105 Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is a multivariate statistical procedure that allows finding the principal 
components of a multivariate data sample, based on the correlation between variables. In simple words, it 
reduces the number of highly correlated observed variables into a smaller number of principal components, 
which account for most of the variance of the observed variables. While the actual number of extracted 
components corresponds to the number of original variables, only the components that explain the majority of 
the variance are retained. The results of a PCA are usually discussed in terms of component scores (or factor 
scores) and loadings.  
106 Cluster Analysis is a multivariate statistical method used to classify a sample of observations, based on a set 
of variables, into a number of different groups, or clusters. The objective of the analysis is to identify clusters of 
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For the development of the typology of gender regimes, I have used two synthetic indexes, 
corresponding to the ‘gender equality’ dimension and to the ‘gender contract’ dimension. For 
the dimension of gender equality I used the Gender Equality Index 2015107, which is an 
existing synthetic index developed by the European Commission. For the dimension of the 
gender contract, I have built a synthetic index, based on indicators selected from different 
sources, and obtained by means of a Principal Component analysis. The two synthetic indexes 
were then used to build the typology of gender regimes, through a cluster analysis. 
The analysis of migration regimes was carried out so to measure two dimensions: the 
integration system and the admission/immigration system. For the integration system, one 
synthetic index was used, namely the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX)108. For the 
admission/immigration system, three indicators were selected from different sources. The 
indicator of the number of first residence permits issued for employment reasons was selected 
from the Residence permits statistics report of Eurostat109. The indicator of the number of 
migrants from new accession countries was selected from the 2016 Annual Report on intra-
EU Labour Mobility of the European Commission. The indicator of the estimates of the 
informal economy was selected from “Size and development of the shadow economy of 31 
European and 5 other OECD countries from 2003 to 2015: different developments” by 
Friedrich Schneider (2015). Finally, the typology of migration regimes was constructed by 
means of a cluster analysis. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
objects that are similar based on the selected variables. The term cluster analysis encompasses a number of 
different algorithms for grouping the objects based on their similarity/dissimilarity (Aldenderfer and Blashfield, 
1984). Although many clustering techniques can be performed, the types of cluster analysis that I have used for 
the construction of the typologies are hierarchical clustering, k-means and Partitioning Around Medoids (PAM). 
Hierarchical cluster analysis produces a tree-based representation, known as dendrogram, where the groups can 
be extracted by cutting the dendrogram at the desired similarity level. K-means and PAM cluster analyses are 
both part of the family of ‘partitioning clustering’, and use two different algorithms respectively to subdivide the 
data into a set of k groups, where the value of k is pre-specified. The main difference between these two methods 
is that while k-means chooses the mean of a cluster as its centre, PAM chooses data-points as centres of the 
clusters. 
107 The Gender Equality Index was elaborated by the Gender Equality Institute (GEI), following the “Roadmap 
for Equality between Women and Men 2006-2010”. It provides a measure of gender equality in all EU member 
states. A detailed description of the index is provided in section 3.3.3. 
108 The MIPEX is a database that provides a comparative instrument for the measurement of the integration of 
migrants in the receiving society. It is available online at this link: http://www.mipex.eu/key-findings . The 
detailed description of the database is provided in section 3.3.4. 
109 The detailed description of the sources used for the construction of the typology of migration regimes is 
provided in section 3.3.4. 
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Third analysis: measuring the impact of typologies 
The third set of analyses was conducted in order to measure the impact of the three typologies 
constructed for the three regimes on the presence of migrant domestic workers in the domestic 
sector. This part is presented in Chapter 6. 
The data used for these analyses includes both the EU-LFS 2015 microdata and the indexes 
and typologies of the three regimes. Although other explorative analyses have been carried 
out, only the results of the multinomial logistic regression models110 are presented in Chapter 
6. Section 3.5 addresses the problems encountered for this last part of analyses and section 
3.5.2.1 discusses the reasons why alternative statistical techniques (multilevel regression 
models and linear regressions on data aggregated at country level) could not be used. 
 
3.2 Secondary analyses of existing data 
 
All the analyses conducted in the framework of this research are secondary analyses of 
existing data. Secondary analysis can be defined as an analysis conducted on data produced 
by a third party. This data can be the result of institutional (but not only governmental) 
surveys, national or international research programmes, administrative records, or any other 
collection of numeric data (Danhier, 2016). The use of secondary analysis of existing data can 
have both advantages and disadvantages, which are worth mentioning because they influence 
both the work of the researcher and his/her results. 
The first and probably most obvious advantage of secondary data is the reduced cost, both in 
terms of money and time. Data collection is a very expensive operation, as it includes the 
definition of the population, the development of selection procedures to achieve 
representativeness, the creation of the tool (survey, questionnaire, etc.), the administration of 
the tool and the transformation of the collected data into a suitable form. All these steps 
require technical competences, resources and time. Because secondary data has been collected 
by someone other than the researcher, the costs for the researcher are smaller than the ones 
engendered by data collection. 
                                                        
110 Multinomial logistic regression models are part of regression analysis techniques. When the dependent 
variable is numerical the regression is called linear, while when the variable is categorical it is called logistic. 
Logistic regression models are used to estimate the probability of a binary response (‘0’ and ‘1’) based on one or 
more predictors. When we want to predict the membership to more than two categories, which is when the 
outcome variable has more than two categories, we use multinomial logistic regression. 
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The second advantage is that the data has presumably been collected by professionals, who 
have covered the expertise of the entire process of data collection. Competences can refer to 
techniques such as sampling design, weight constructions, and so on. Additionally, when data 
comes from official institutions, we can reasonably assume that a certain quality is provided 
(Danhier, 2016). Last, secondary data is certainly advantageous when conducting large-scale 
international comparisons, as data collection at international scale requires considerable 
resources and expertise. 
Although the advantages – especially the reduction of the costs – make the analysis of 
secondary data extremely useful and popular, there are also some disadvantages that are worth 
mentioning. The main disadvantage is linked to the fact that the data has not been produced to 
address your own research questions. On the contrary, the original purpose of the collection of 
data can have originated from very different interests. This can make the existing data 
inappropriate to the interests of the researcher. The result is that either the hypotheses and the 
theoretical framework of the research have to be modified – sometimes deeply – or that the 
results of the research can be partially missed (Cheng and Philips, 2014). 
A second disadvantage can be represented by the access to data. Some data can be restricted 
or unavailable, due to laws on the protection of the privacy, while other data can be accessible, 
but with time restrictions. Moreover, technical problems in the conversion of data can also 
reduce accessibility. 
Another disadvantage of using secondary data is that, although it considerably reduces time 
and financial costs, it nevertheless demands a large amount of time for the researcher to 
familiarise with the data. Ideally, and especially in the case of institutional and administrative 
data, some documents are provided in order to guide the researcher (codebooks, guides and so 
on). However, and depending on the complexity of the data, the familiarisation can be very 
time consuming, even only to read codebooks and explore the variables. In addition to the 
process of familiarisation, the data must then be structured and adapted to the specific 
research. This can imply a great work for merging datasets, recoding variables, compressing 
the information and so on. 
In addition to the above-mentioned disadvantages, each dataset can present a series of 
problems and limitations, which can make their use complex and limit the reliability of the 
results. Section 3.4 describes the main limitations of the databases that have been used for this 
research. 
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3.3 Description of the data 
3.3.1 The EU-Labour Forces Survey 
 
The European Union Labour Forces Survey (EU-LFS) is a large household sample survey 
conducted in the 28 EU member states, two candidate countries (Macedonia and Turkey) and 
three European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries (Iceland, Norway and Switzerland). 
The first year of data collection was 1983 and since then it has been conducted every year. As 
a general rule, the data are available for each country depending on their accession date to the 
EU.  
The data are collected at country level, where each national statistical institute is responsible 
for the selection of the sample, the questionnaire, the face-to-face interviews and the coding 
of the data, according to the rules established by Eurostat. The data is then transmitted to 
Eurostat, which is responsible for harmonising them at the European level. 
Anonymised EU-LFS microdata are made available by Eurostat, free of charge, for scientific 
purpose only. Although data is centralised by Eurostat, national statistical institutes remain 
the owners of their data. This means that there might be restrictions in the accessibility of 
certain information for specific countries. Moreover, since the LFS microdata contains 
information on individual units, they are confidential. 
The EU-LFS data provides quarterly results on labour market participation and are an 
important source of information about the situation of the labour market in Europe and at 
country level. It covers residents in private households and includes both people inside and 
outside the labour market. In addition to quarterly surveys, which cover the core themes of the 
survey, each year a set of additional variables are added, to cover specific topics on the labour 
market (ad hoc modules).  
The core variables of the survey cover demographic background, labour status, employment 
characteristics of the main job, time-related issues and underemployment, search for 
employment and modalities of search, education and training, previous work experience, 
employment situation one year before the survey and income111. The labour status is at the 
core of the EU-LFS. The main goal is to classify individuals in three categories: employed, 
unemployed and inactive.  
                                                        
111 The microdata released by Eurostat usually includes some 170 variables. However, the exact number 
of variables can vary depending on the year. 
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The definition of the employment situation and the labour status and occupation, as well as 
the classifications of country/areas and on educational attainments, are based on international 
classifications. Regarding the definition of the labour status, a number of variables are 
provided, based on different classifications. For the definition of the professional status, the 
International Standard Classification of Status in Employment (ISCE), elaborated by the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) is used. For the definition of economic activity, the 
Statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community (NACE) is 
provided. For the definition of the occupation, the International Standard Classification of 
Occupations (ISCO), developed by the ILO, is provided.  
Regarding the classifications of countries, they are coded based on the ISO 3166 
(International Organisation for Standardisation, alpha-2 format). The classification of regions 
is based on the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS). It is important to 
notice that the classification of countries based on the ISO 3166 is not provided for the 
variable ‘country of birth’, for which only the region (NUTS) is provided. 
Concerning the educational level attained and the field of education, the International 
Standard Classification of Education (ISCED), developed by the UNESCO, is provided. 
 
3.3.2 Data used for the typology of care regimes 
 
The Multilinks database 
The Multilinks database is the source from which the majority of the indicators on childcare 
and elderly care used in this research were selected. The database is the result of a EU-FP7 
project whose aim is to investigate how demographic change shapes intergenerational 
solidarity, well-being and social integration across different European countries112. The reason 
for choosing this database is that it is the only available dataset that provides harmonised data 
at European level on social policies directly linked to care regimes. While the majority of 
datasets collecting indicators on social policies only include fragmented information 
regarding care policies and focus more on other types of welfare policies, the Multilinks 
                                                        
112 The Multilinks project has been carried out by a consortium of nine partners, led by the Berlin Social 
Science Center (WZB). Data were collected for the years 2004 and 2009 in 30 European countries (EU-27 and 
Norway, Georgia and Russia). The database is public and is available upon registration at the following link: 
https://multilinks-database.wzb.eu/session/new  
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project specifically covers all public policies affecting and defining care responsibilities in an 
integrated approach113.  
Since the objective of the construction of the database is to provide a full mapping of how 
each nation state regulates care responsibilities and intergenerational obligations towards 
children and the elderly, it offers a rich and complete set of indicators that are easy to use for 
international comparison. The database offers more than 70 indicators that provide empirical 
measurements in four domains: 1) responsibilities to care for children; 2) responsibilities to 
provide financial support for children; 3) responsibilities to care for frail older people; 4) 
responsibilities to provide financial support for older people114.  
One of the main innovations of the database is that, contrary to other databases that focus on 
other dimensions (expenditure data, labour markets and other institutional dimensions), it has 
been conceptualised as to include a familialisation/de-familialisation approach, rather than a 
commodification/de-commodification approach115. Therefore, instead of focusing only on the 
level of national expenditure on care and on labour market indicators, it includes indicators 
that look at modes of provision, entitlements, benefit levels and coverage, so to enable a more 
specific measurement of the type of support provided by the state to families.  
Another innovation of the database is that it also includes Eastern European countries, which 
have been traditionally excluded from comparative welfare and policy studies and which are 
still marginal in current typologies116 (Saraceno and Keck, 2008). However, the Multilinks 
database is also subject to a series of limitations, which are addressed in section 3.4.2.  
 
 
                                                        
113 The information contained in the Multilinks database is in turn derived from a series of sources, including – 
but not limited to – the MISSOC database, national statistical sources, existing studies (especially regarding 
Eastern European countries) and national informants. For more information, refer to the Conceptual report, 
available here: https://multilinks-database.wzb.eu/info/documentation    
114 The full list of indicators included in the database is available in the Codebook, at this link: 
https://multilinks-database.wzb.eu . 
115 The familialisation-defamilialisation approach has been introduced by the literature on care regimes, while 
the commodification-decommodification approach has been conceptualised by Esping-Andersen and it is mainly 
used in welfare studies. For more details about the two approaches, refer to sections 2.1.2 and 2.2. 
116 Esping-Andersen’s welfare typologies, as well as the majority of the following typologies using welfare 
indicators, have been developed only with regard to Western European countries, plus other non European 
countries (namely, the United States, Australia, Canada and New Zealand). Post-Soviet countries, with their 
distinctive historical roots, have been excluded for long time from comparative policy studies, for various 
reasons. First, their welfare state was considered radically different from – and not comparable to – the 
‘European Model’. Second, even the possibility of introducing a ‘post-communist cluster’ including Eastern 
European countries was discouraged, due to the high level of variety among these countries (Põder and Kerem, 
2011).   
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Developing personal and household services in the EU: a focus on housework activities 
(report of the European Commission) 
The information on incentives addressing the externalisation of housework activities has been 
derived from this report, promoted by the European Commission. Information on housework 
incentives is highly fragmented and has been largely neglected by literature. Also, it usually 
focuses on national initiatives and there is a lack of harmonised comparable information at 
European level. Taking apart the intense debate over some national experiences where 
housework has become the main focus of policies – namely, the case of vouchers in Belgium 
and France – a complete overview of policies aiming at regulating housework services in each 
EU country is currently lacking. This report is an attempt to provide comparable cross-
country information.  
While the report acknowledges the interconnection between care and domestic activities and 
the difficulties arising when trying to separate domestic activities in two domains (care and 
housework)117, the objective of the study is to focus only on household services, so to cover 
the existing gap in literature on housework services. Therefore, this study specifically 
concentrates on the tools that have been implemented in the field of domestic activities, 
leaving aside the care services as such.  
The report provides an overview of the main policies that address housework, divided into 
four main domains that correspond to the objective pursued by governments: 1) reducing the 
price for households; 2) simplify the procedures (for hiring domestic workers); 3) regulating 
employment (in the domestic sector); and 4) fostering the emergence of a supply side. In the 
first domain, the main policies include the reduction of the VAT rate, the exemption from 
social contributions and tax reduction. In the second domain, the voucher system is the main 
tool analysed. In the third domain, there are indicators regarding the flexibilisation of work 
and cost reduction and specific regulations about housework. In the fourth domain there are 
indicators about the structure of the market and the quantity of formal suppliers.  
 
OECD Health Statistics 2017 database 
The OECD databases are among the most complete and reliable data used for international 
comparison. The online database OECD Health Statistics 2017, released on 30 June 2017, 
offers one of the most comprehensive sources of data on health systems across countries118. It 
includes data on five thematic areas: employment policies; health policies; social policies; 
                                                        
117 For information about the intersection of care and housework activities, refer to section 1.3. 
118 The database is available online at this link: http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=HEALTH_STAT 
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families and children; pension systems; and international migration policies. For my analysis 
of care regimes, only one indicator on elderly care has been selected from this database (the 
level of expenditure on long-term care). However, this database has been used both to 
complete the missing information on other indicators and to verify the reliability of other 
indicators, when necessary. 
 
Other sources 
In order to complete missing information on both care provision and housework incentives, I 
have referred to national institutional data, when available, as well as data from the following 
sources: OEDC, ILO, the European Commission and the Mutual Information System on 
Social Protection (MISSOC) database119. 
 
3.3.3 Data used for the typology of gender regimes 
 
The Gender Equality Index 2015 
The Gender Equality Index 2015 (GEI) is an index elaborated by the European 
Commission120, which provides a measure of gender equality in all EU member states. The 
GEI combines indicators of gender equality in different domains into a synthetic index, which 
provides a summary measure of gender equality overall. Although gender equality is a 
complex concept to measure, the idea is to provide comparable indicators that measure the 
overall situation and the level of achievement of each country with respect to certain policy 
areas. Due to the complexity and the multi-dimensionality of the concept of gender equality, 
as well as the different meaning that it can assume in different contexts, the GEI is based on a 
conceptual framework that draws from an analysis of the EU policy framework. It is based on 
a hierarchical structure that includes composite measures (and sub-measures) in six main 
domains: work, money, knowledge, time, power and health121.  
The domain ‘work’ includes indicators that measure the level of participation in the labour 
market, the level of gender segregation and the quality of work. The domain of ‘money 
                                                        
119 Available online at this link: http://www.missoc.org/INFORMATIONBASE/informationBase.jsp . 
120 The Gender Equality Index was elaborated by the Gender Equality Institute (GEI), following the “Roadmap 
for Equality between Women and Men 2006-2010”. The first GEI was launched in 2013. 
121 The GEI 2015 includes two satellite domains – violence against women and intersecting inequalities – which 
are not taken into consideration in the calculation of the overall GEI scores. The reason for the exclusion of these 
two domains is that, although they are related to gender equality, they represent an illustrative phenomenon and 
because they are related to women only (EIGE, 2013). In the construction of the indicators and the typology of 
gender regime, the overall scores of the GEI 2015, without the two satellite domains, will be used. 
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includes measuring financial resources and the overall economic situation. The domain of 
‘knowledge’ includes indicators measuring the educational attainment, the segregation and 
the lifelong learning. The domain of ‘time’ includes indicators measuring the time devoted to 
economic activities, the time devoted to care activities and the time devoted to social 
activities. The domain of ‘power’ includes indicators measuring the level of economic, social 
and political power122. And finally, the domain of ‘health’ includes indicators that measure 
the health situation, the health behaviour and access to health services123.  
The GEI offers comparable data on all EU-28 countries on indicators that measure outcomes 
in each domain. The reason for the choice of using outcome variables, instead of variables 
evaluating policies, results from the idea that from a gender point of view it is better to focus 
on what has been achieved, rather than what the capabilities are. 
Although different measures of gender equality exist at international level and based on 
reliable institutional data, the GEI was chosen for two main reasons. First, although valid and 
powerful measures exist at international level, they are often conceived for international 
comparisons at global level. This means that the indicators used have to reflect global 
differences, rather than differences between European countries. This often results in a loss of 
nuanced information, which is necessary when conducting comparisons at European level. 
The use of a measure with a reduced geographical range and focusing on European countries 
allows a more detailed intra-European analysis. Additionally, global measures often do not 
include data on all European countries – typically on new accession countries –, which can 
jeopardise the analysis. The second reason for the choice of the GEI 2015 is that not only it 
provides updated information on the most recent trends124, but also it covers domains that are 
pertinent for the purpose of this study (see earlier in the text).  
 
The European Social Survey  
Selected indicators of the European Social Survey (ESS) ad hoc module on ‘family, work and 
well-being’ (round 2 - 2004) were chosen to construct the ‘gender contract’ index (Chapter 5).  
The European Social Survey is an international survey, carried out every two years in all EU 
member states, starting from 2002. The ESS measures attitudes, opinions and behaviours of 
                                                        
122 The level of economic and political power is measured through the number of ministerial and parliamentary 
representation (political) and the number of membership in boards and banks (economic). 
123 The full set of indicators used for the construction of the Gender Equality Index 2015 is available here: 
http://eige.europa.eu/rdc/eige-publications/gender-equality-index-report . 
124 The GEI is updated every two years, both in the overall structure of the measure, which aims to stay up to 
date with structural societal and economic transformations, and in the data of each indicator. 
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citizens, with the overall aim to analyse changes in the social structure, in living conditions 
and in social attitudes in Europe, and to interpret them in the light of the social, moral and 
political evolution in Europe. The ESS questionnaire consists of two main parts: a core 
questionnaire, which is carried out every two years, and rotating questionnaires (ad hoc 
modules), which are carried out only at certain ESS rounds. The rotating questionnaires offer 
thematic modules that offer specific focuses on social issues.  
The ad hoc module on ‘family, work and well-being’ was carried out in two different rounds: 
Round2/year 2004 and Round5/year 2010. This thematic module focuses on the 
interconnection between work, family and well-being. The aim is to provide insights on the 
respondents’ satisfaction about their work-family issues, but also on the role of national 
welfare regimes in this process. The module combines more ‘objective’ indicators, which 
measure job quality, family structure and welfare services, with more ‘subjective’ indicators, 
measuring life satisfaction and attitudes, thus revealing values and preferences of citizens. 
This ad hoc module was introduced in order to evaluate the impact of changes of welfare 
systems (including the increase of atypical work and the up-skilling of work) and of family 
and household structures (including single-person households, dual-earner families, etc.) on 
the lives of individuals. The core questions of the module intend to answer important 
questions about the issues related to the conciliation of work and family lives and the impact 
of national policies and of new family models on personal life satisfaction. Due to the nature 
of the questionnaire, this module is particularly useful for analysing social cohesion in general, 
but also gender relations and the conflicts arising from work-family responsibilities. 
The list of indicators that have been selected for the construction of the gender contract index 
is detailed in section 5.2.3. 
 
The Special Eurobarometer on Gender Equality 
Selected indicators of the Special Eurobarometer 428/2014 on ‘gender equality’ were chosen 
to construct the ‘gender contract’ index (Chapter 5).  
The Eurobarometer is a European survey, established in 1974, whose aim is to measure public 
opinion on in-depth thematic issues. The general aim is to investigate motivations, 
perceptions and reactions of European citizens towards a given subject, which is considered to 
be a sensitive issue at a given time. 
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A number of Eurobarometer surveys focusing on gender equality were launched previous to 
the 2014 version125. The Special Eurobarometer survey on gender equality (428/2014) aims to 
measure perceptions of gender inequalities in all member states. The core issues tackled in the 
survey include the widespread of inequalities between men and women, whether the situation 
has improved in the last years, the fields where men and women experience discrimination 
and are subject to stereotypes, and which are the most common stereotypes at country level.  
Additionally, it investigates attitudes towards gender equality in the workplace and at home, 
including the role of women and men within the household. The survey was carried out in 28 
EU member states in November-December 2014 and gathered 27801 respondents from 
different socio-demographic groups126. 
 
3.3.4 Data used for the typology of migration regimes 
 
The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) 
The Migrant Integration Policy Index 2015 (MIPEX) is the most comprehensive tool for 
comparing integration regimes in Europe, both because it covers a large number of countries, 
including all European countries, and because it includes an extended spectrum of policy 
domains. 
The first edition of the MIPEX, derived from the collaboration of different universities, think 
tanks and institutional bodies in Europe, was developed in 2004 with data on 15 EU member 
states. The fourth edition of 2015 includes data on 38 countries, including all EU member 
states, Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, 
Turkey and the USA.  
The MIPEX database employs 167 policy indicators that provide a comparative instrument 
for the measurement of the integration of migrants in the receiving society127. It is based on 
the idea that although the actual integration of migrants in host societies derives from a 
variety of factors that go beyond the policy framework, state policies can nevertheless 
contribute to eliminating obstacles for the integration of migrant communities and individuals. 
                                                        
125 Although the first thematic Eurobarometer on gender equality was conducted in 2009, other Special 
Eurobarometer surveys investigating gender issues, equal opportunities and the relationship between men and 
women were launched as early as 1975. For more information about the previous versions of the Eurobarometer, 
refer to the following link: http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm . 
126 The full questionnaire of the Special Eurobarometer on gender equality is available online at this link: 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/documents/eurobarometer_report_2015_en.pdf . 
127 The full list of indicators of the MIPEX is available online at this link: http://www.mipex.eu/key-findings . 
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It measures policies that promote integration in the society, both in civic and in social terms, 
and it includes eight main policy areas, which are in turn divided into sub-domains. The 
covered policy areas and dimensions are the following:  
 labour market mobility: access to the labour market, access to general support, 
targeted support and workers’ rights; 
 education: access, targeting needs, new opportunities and intercultural education; 
 political participation: electoral rights, political liberties, consultative bodies and 
implementation policies; 
 access to nationality: eligibility, conditions, security of status and dual nationality; 
 family reunion: eligibility, conditions, security of status and rights associated; 
 health: entitlements, access policies, responsive services and mechanisms of change; 
 permanent residence: eligibility, conditions, security of status and rights associated; 
 anti-discrimination: definitions, fields of application, enforcement mechanisms and 
equality policies. 
As discussed in section 2.5.3, the principal limitation of existing indexes aimed to measure 
migration regimes is that they focus either on policy output or on outcomes, and that they 
analyse either integration or immigration policy frameworks. The MIPEX is part of those 
quantitative tools that measure output policy (vs. outcomes) and integration (vs. 
immigration/admission). However, due to the wide spectrum of policy areas, the MIPEX 
seems to be particularly suitable for the construction of robust typologies of migration 
regimes, as in addition to policies that specifically measure integration it also covers policies 
that can be partly used for the measurement of immigration/admission regimes. In particular, 
the domains of access to nationality, family reunion and permanent residence, as well as the 
subdomain that measures the access to the labour market, also cover policies on entry, stay 
and work permits and can provide information about immigration systems.  
 
Size and development of the shadow economy of 31 European and 5 other OECD countries 
from 2003 to 2015: different developments – Friedrich Schneider, 2011 
This source was selected among the different available sources, as it provides the most recent 
and the most reliable data on the informal economy for all EU member states. According to 
scholarship, the concept of shadow economy is complex, because “it comprises all currently 
unregistered economic activities that would contribute the officially calculated gross national 
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product if the activities were recorded”128 (Schneider and Williams, 2016). The measurement 
of the informal economy is challenging because it requires estimating an economic activity 
that is typically hidden from all official sources. The measurement of the shadow economy 
can be carried out through the use of surveys, or through the use of statistical techniques, that 
estimate the shadow economy as an ‘unobserved’ variable. The main issue regarding the use 
of surveys for the measurement of the informal economy is that people always tend to hide 
the use of informal channels, which leads to the underestimation of the size of the 
underground economy. The problem linked to the use of statistical techniques is that they are 
complex and may differ in their assumptions, as well as their results (Schneider and Williams, 
2016).  
The calculation of the estimate of the informal economy used by Schneider is based on the 
combination of the ‘multiple indicator multiple cause’ (MIMIC) procedure and the ‘currency 
demand method’, which is used in order to calibrate the relative value of the MIMIC 
estimates129.  
The main advantages of the employment of the data from this study are that it covers all EU 
member states, thus providing easily comparable harmonised data, and that it employs 
advanced statistical techniques, thus overcoming the issue associated with the reliability of 
responses in surveys on the informal economy. 
 
Eurostat Statistics Explained 
The indicators on the number of residence permits issued by reason and on intra-European 
migration have been calculated based on Eurostat data available online. The website of 
Eurostat Statistics Explained130 provides public data harmonised at European level, as well as 
statistical findings in different fields. It includes full datasets of public data, as well as reports 
and publications on different topics. 
The indicator on the residence permits was calculated, based on the article Residence permits 
statistics, elaborated by Eurostat. The article presents statistical findings, based on national 
administrative sources, which are then harmonised by Eurostat. 
                                                        
128 The shadow economy, as defined by literature, excludes all illegal activities that could be classified under 
the umbrella of crimes (such as burglary, robbery, drug dealing, etc.), as well as the informal work performed 
within the household (Schneider and Williams, 2016). 
129 Since the MIMIC method only provides relative estimates of the size of the informal economy, some other 
method is needed to calculate the absolute estimates. For details about the estimation procedure, refer to 
Schneider and Williams, 2013. 
130 Link http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Main_Page/fr   
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The indicator on the provenance of intra-European migrants was calculated, based on the data 
presented in the Eurostat report 2016 Annual Report on intra-EU Labour Mobility (Fries-
Tersch et al., 2017, European Commission). The disaggregated data on the country of origin 
of migrants, which was used for the indicator, derives from the EU-Labour Forces Survey. 
 
 
3.4 Main limitations of the available data 
 
3.4.1 The EU-LFS 
3.4.1.1 Statistical definition of the domestic sector 
 
One of the main problems when studying paid domestic work is the definition of which 
activities are to be included and what has to be excluded. The issue becomes even more 
complicated when using quantitative methods of investigation, as the statistical definition of 
the domestic sector is subject to problems of measurement and classification. 
From a theoretical point of view, the domestic sector can be defined so to include both care 
and domestic work. Although a clear definition of domestic workers is far from being 
unambiguous, this research adopts the definition provided in section 1.3, which is partly based 
on the Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189) of the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO)131. 
From a statistical point of view, the lack of a clear definition of paid domestic work is 
reflected in the way domestic and care activities are classified by national and international 
classifications. First of all, the unclear boundary between care activities and housework 
activities generates issues of classifications, as the same worker can be attributed to one or 
another statistical category, depending on the way the work performed is perceived (if the 
care or the housework dimension is seen as dominating). Second, the definition of the 
domestic sector is also determined by the objectives followed by public policies, which can be 
different depending on the country. In Europe, for instance, each member state can give 
priority to public policies addressing either housework activities, childcare, or elderly care. 
Since domestic services cover a wide range of activities, the issue of which services are 
                                                        
131 According to the Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189) of the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO), which represents the main authoritative sources at international level, domestic workers are defined as i) 
workers that perform a work in or for a household or households, ii) workers with an employment relationship, 
and ii) workers performing a work on occupational basis. 
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included in the scope of each category is a matter of debate and it also depends on different 
national approaches (Farvaque, 2013). 
Concerning the statistical definition of domestic work, some attempts have been made 
recently as to provide internationally valid tools of measurement. However, since each 
government adopts a unique definition of domestic and care services, which is also reflected 
in their measurement instruments, there is not a unique international category that includes 
unambiguously all domestic and care tasks and the harmonisation of data at international level 
is still problematic132. This means that even at national level there is no official definition of 
the domestic sector and that any attempt to measure and/or to analyse domestic work is 
subject to a certain degree of discretion. This problem makes international comparisons 
especially complicated.  
In the report Domestic Workers across the World (2013), the ILO provides some guidelines 
for measuring the domestic sector with the different available instruments. Each of them 
present advantages and shortcomings.  
One way of classifying domestic workers is to use the ‘status-in-employment approach’. This 
approach, which is more common outside Europe, is based on the International Classification 
by Status in Employment (ICSE-93). This classification distinguishes between domestic 
workers and other employees. The main problem of this approach is that the separation 
between domestic workers and other employees is not very common in Europe and generates 
very different findings when compared to other approaches.  
Another way of identifying domestic work is the ‘household-roaster approach’, which can be 
applied when the national labour forces survey (LFS) questionnaire captures the relationship 
of each household member with each other133. This means that the questionnaire would report 
the presence of any live-in domestic personnel. The obvious limitation of this approach is that 
it systematically excludes live-out domestic workers, which constitute the majority of 
domestic workers today.  
A third way of classifying domestic workers is through the ‘industry-based approach’. This 
approach – which is quite widespread, as it overcomes many of the issues related to the other 
approaches – is based on the International Standard Industrial Classification of all Economic 
                                                        
132 Talking about the difficulties in measuring and analysing the domestic sector at both national and 
international level, some scholars have concluded that the measurement issue is not likely to be solved in 
the short run, and that the sector can be considered a ‘statistical non-reality’ (Devetter and al., 2015).  
133 According to the System of National Accounts (SNA-2008), the household is defined as a “group of 
persons who share the living accommodation, who pool some, or all, of their income and wealth and who 
consume certain types of goods and services collectively, mainly housing and food”. This includes 
domestic personnel in the definition of households. 
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Activities (ISIC, revision 3.1)134. The advantage is offered by the fact that this classification 
includes a category of ‘activities of private households as employers of domestic staff’. 
Therefore, the great advantage is that it groups together all workers that are in an employment 
relationship with a private household, which represents the majority of domestic workers. 
Also, since it is based on the employment relationship and not on the fact of living within the 
household, it also includes activities that are performed outside the home. The main 
shortcoming of this approach is that it excludes all domestic workers that have an 
employment relationship with an external (public or private) party. This represents a severe 
limitation, as the recent trends in the domestic sector point at the increase of the marketisation 
of domestic services and the contracting-out of services to external agencies. In some 
European countries, the triangularisation of the employment relationship in the domestic 
sector has become extremely common135.  
A last approach that can be used for a statistical definition of the domestic sector is the ‘task-
based approach’, based on the International Standard Classification on Occupations (ISCO-88 
and ISCO-08). This approach is the one adopted in this study. The main advantages and 
limitations will be discussed in the next section. 
 
ISCO 08 classification 
The International Standard Classification on Occupations 2008 (ISCO-08) is a system of 
classification of occupations used in international surveys. It is the result of a major revision 
of the International Standard Classification on Occupations 1988 (ISCO-88) and it is the 
classification elaborated by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in 2007 and then 
adopted in 2008. The aim of this classification is to provide statisticians a common 
framework to code internationally comparable data on occupations. While it does not replace 
national statistical classifications, the translation of national codes into ISCO-08 codes makes 
international comparisons easier. 
                                                        
134 The same approach is used by the Statistical classification of economic activities in the European 
Community (NACE). According to this classification, NACE category 97 includes all workers directly 
employed by households. One way of overcoming the issue of the exclusion of all domestic workers 
employed by third parties has been to couple category 97 with category 88, which includes employment 
in service provider organisations in social work activities. However, this category can include also 
professional fields and activities that are not part of the domestic sector (Farvaque, 2013). 
135 In countries like Belgium and France, where the voucher system includes the great majority of 
domestic workers (only cleaners for Belgium and both care and domestic workers for France), the use of 
the industry-based approach could be particularly problematic. However, also in other European 
countries, the use of both public and private intermediate is growing fast and makes this approach 
problematic. For more details about the different employment models in the domestic sector, refer to 
section 2.2.4.4.  
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The revision of the previous classification (ISCO-88) aimed to reflect the significant changes 
occurred both in technology and in the organisation of work in the previous 20 years (ILO, 
2010). Following the revision, there has been a total restructuring of the classification, with 
the merging and splitting of groups and sub-groups, and the introduction of new groups of 
occupations. Although the theoretical framework remains unchanged from the ISCO-88 
(same definition of skills, jobs and occupations), significant differences exist between the two 
classifications in the treatment of specific occupational groups. The differences are meant to 
overcome the specific issues related to the ISCO-88 and to update the classification after 20-
year time. 
The overall structure of the classification is a hierarchical division into Major groups (1 digit), 
Sub-major groups (2 digits), Minor groups (3 digits) and Unit groups (4 digits). Among the 
main changes that have been introduced after the revision, there are two changes that are of 
particular importance for the definition of domestic workers: 
- “Occupations concerned with the provision of health services have been expanded, in 
order to provide sufficient detail to allow ISCO-08 to be used as the basis for the 
international reporting of data on the health workforce” (ILO, 2013, p. 8). This means 
that new subgroups, differentiating between more or less skilled workforce and more 
specific about the actual tasks performed, have been introduced. This makes the 
definition of care workers more precise and harmonised at European level. 
- “The coverage and visibility of occupations that are significant in informal 
employment have been improved, leading to an associated increase in the number of 
sub-major groups in the ISCO-08 Major Group 9: Elementary Occupations” (ILO, 
2013, p. 8). This means that occupations in the domestic sector, which are known to 
represent a high share of the informal market, are more likely to be captured by the 
new classification. 
The main challenge for the definition of domestic workers in this research is due to the fact 
that the EU-LFS microdata provides the ISCO code only at 3-digit level, which leads to 
problems of over or underestimation. 
 
Definition of care workers 
Care workers are included in Major Group 5 (‘Services and sales workers’) in both ISCO-88 
and ISCO-08. This group has undergone important revisions from ISCO-88 to ISCO-08. 
These changes include both modifications in the content description of occupations for each 
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Minor group (3-digit level) and the inclusion of new Minor groups and Unit groups. Table 12 
presents the comparison between ISCO-88 and ISCO-08 for Major Group 5. 
 
Table 12: Sub-major and minor groups in Major Group 5 - ISCO-88 and ISCO-08 
ISCO-88 code ISCO-88 title ISCO-08 code ISCO-08 title 
5 Services workers and 
shop and market 
sales workers 
5 Services and sales 
workers 
51 Personal and 
protective services 
workers 
51 Personal services 
workers 
511 Travel attendants and 
related workers 
511 Travel attendants, 
conductors and 
guides 
512 Housekeeping and 
restaurant services 
workers 
512 Cooks 
513 Personal care and 
related workers 
513 Waiters and 
bartenders 
514 Other personal 
services workers 
514 Hairdressers, 
beauticias and related 
workers 
515 Astrologers, fortune-
tellers and related 
workers 
515 Building and 
housekeeping 
supervisors 
516 Protective services 
workers 
516 Other personal 
services workers 
52 Models, salespersons 
and demonstrators 
52 Sales workers 
521 Fashion and other 
models 
521 Street and market 
salespersons 
522 Shop salespersons 
and demonstrators 
522 Shop salespersons 
523 Stall and market 
salespersons 
523 Cashiers and ticket 
clerks 
  524 Other sales workers 
  53 Personal care 
workers 
  531 Child care workers 
and teachers’ aids 
  532 Personal care 
workers in health 
services 
  54 Protective services 
workers 
  541 Protective services 
workers 
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Regarding the care for elderly people and other dependent individuals, new sub-groups have 
been introduced in ISCO-08, in order to reflect the changes in this type of occupation. While 
personal care workers were previously included either in professionalised health occupations 
(Sub-major group 22), or in Major Group 9 (Elementary occupations), depending on the skills 
associated to the type of work performed, a specific Sub-major group has been introduced for 
‘Personal care workers’ (code 53). This Sub-major group includes code 531 (child-care 
workers and teachers’ aids) and code 532 (personal care workers in health services).   
 
Table 13: Sub-major group 53 (Personal care workers) of ISCO-08 code 
53 Personal Care Workers 
 531 Child care workers and teachers’ aids 
  5311 Child care workers 
  5312 Teachers’ aids 
 532 Personal care workers in health services 
  5321 Health care assistants 
  5322 Home-based personal care workers 
  5329 Personal care workers in health services not elsewhere 
classified 
 
The Sub-major group 531 includes the Unit groups 5311 for childcare workers and 5312 for 
teachers’ aids. Unfortunately, it is only when ISCO-08 code is provided at 4-digit level that it 
is possible to distinguish between the two occupations. This means that including code 531 in 
the definition of domestic workers leads to an overestimation of childcare workers, while not 
including it leads to an underestimation. However, given that code 531 is the only available 
code for childcare workers, which constitutes a fundamental category of the definition of 
domestic workers136, in this research code 531 has been included to define childcare workers. 
This is also based on the assumption that the majority of workers included in this type of 
occupation is more likely to be childcare workers, as the occupation of teachers’ aid is not 
widespread. 
The Sub-major group 532 includes the Unit groups 5321 for health care assistants, 5322 for 
home-based personal care workers, and 5329 for personal care workers in health services not 
elsewhere classified. Since the code 5329 is likely to include low-skilled non-qualified care 
                                                        
136 In the definition of paid domestic work used in this study, there are three main categories of occupations that 
are included: housework services (cleaning and house related tasks), childcare services (excluding professional 
childminders and Professional teaching activities) and care for elderly people and other dependant persons 
(excluding professional health services). For a detailed definition, refer to section 1.3.  
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workers137, it can be concluded that it is part of the definition of the domestic sector. Since all 
three 4-digit subgroups are part of the definition of care workers, the code 531 is not 
problematic and can be included in the overall statistical definition of domestic workers, 
without issues of over or underestimation. 
Therefore, the codes that have been used in this research to define care workers are the 
following: 
- ISCO-88: code 513 (personal care and related workers)  
- ISCO-08: code 531 (child-care workers and teachers’ aids) and 532 (Personal care 
workers in health services)  
The obvious great limitation when conducting analyses over time is the lack of a code in 
ISCO-88 that could capture childcare. 
 
Definition of house-related workers 
Domestic workers whose tasks are related to the maintenance of the house (cleaning, ironing, 
preparing meals, polishing, laundering, washing, and so on) are included in Major Group 9 
(Elementary occupations). Despite the changes in Major Group 9 from ISCO-88 to ISCO-08, 
in both classifications cleaners are quite easy to identify: code 913 in ISCO-88 and code 911 
in ISCO-08. However, both classifications present some drawbacks, as both codes include 
workers other than domestic workers, leading to problems of over-estimation. In code 913 of 
ISCO-88 are included both domestic and related helpers and launderers, the latter being 
excluded from any definition of domestic work. In code 911 of ISCO-08 are included not only 
domestic cleaners but also hotel and office cleaners. 
The codes that have been used in this research to define house-related workers are the 
following: 
- ISCO-88: code 913 (domestic and related helpers and launderers)  
- ISCO-08: code 911 (domestic cleaners, hotel and office cleaners)  
 
Domestic workers from ISCO-88 to ISCO-08 
While the passage from ISCO-88 to ISCO-08 brought about significant ameliorations and a 
higher degree of sophistication in the occupational definitions, it also implied difficulties in 
terms of harmonisation and in terms of longitudinal comparisons. This means that 
                                                        
137 Care workers working in health care but not included in other classifications, such as professional health 
professionals (code 22), are likely to be those health care workers who do not possess the qualifications to be 
included in more professionalised sectors. Therefore, they can be included in the domestic sector, as defined in 
this study. 
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longitudinal comparison (before and after the adoption of ISCO-08) on the size of the 
domestic sector are not completely reliable. Moreover, each classification has its own degree 
of approximation, with 3-digit codes including also other types of occupations. 
Table 14 summarises the codes that have been included in the statistical definition of the 
domestic sector in this research. 
 
Table 14: Definition of domestic work (3-digit level) 
ISCO-88 ISCO-08 
  531 childcare  Risk: overestimation 
(includes teachers’ 
aids) 
513 personal care Risk: general 
description 
532 personal care 
workers 
/ 
913 cleaners Risk: overestimation 
(includes 
launderers) 
911 cleaners Risk: overestimation 
(includes hotel and 
office cleaners) 
 
Although both definitions (as per ISCO-88 and ISCO-08) imply a certain degree of over-
estimation, these codes seem to be the ‘best’ possible definition of the domestic sector in the 
available data.  
 
3.4.1.2 The informal labour market  
 
One of the main problems when analysing the labour market with existing institutional data is 
that data cannot grasp the informal segments of the labour market. Due to the very high level 
of undeclared work in the domestic sector (see section 4.2.3), analysing the scope of domestic 
work becomes particularly challenging.  
Similar to other multi-country datasets that focus on labour market participation, the EU-LFS 
data does not provide information allowing for the analysis of informality. The only available 
information about the type of contract is the variable that allows users to distinguish between 
permanent and temporary contract. However, since there is no ‘no contract’ response 
proposed to the respondents, it is impossible to recognise undeclared workers.  
Although the EU-LFS does not exclude informal workers a priori, we can reasonably assume 
that the vast majority of undeclared workers would not be willing to disclose their irregular 
employment status and thus to participate in the survey. This is especially true for irregular 
migrants, whose presence in the domestic sector in some European countries is largely 
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documented, who might fear to be reported to the authorities. Therefore, if it is true that 
considering the domestic workers included in the EU-LFS as only regular workers does not 
correspond to the reality (as the survey is in principle open to any individual, irrespectively of 
his/her labour status), it is also true that we could expect the majority of irregular workers not 
to be grasped by LFS data. This represents a considerable obstacle and can lead to serious 
problems of underestimation of the domestic workforce, as well as important distortions in the 
comparison between countries 138 . Unfortunately, this is an unavoidable problem that is 
common to all institutional data. 
 
3.4.1.3 Statistical definition of the migrant population 
 
The migrant population can be identified with the EU-LFS data through one main variable, 
which is the country of birth. The definition of migrants using (only) this variable can lead to 
three main problems.  
First, the variable providing information on the country of birth only allows identifying first-
generation migrants, that is individuals born in a country other than the country of residence. 
Therefore, based on LFS data, second (and third) generations cannot be distinguished from 
the local population. This might represent a strong limitation, especially for research that 
investigates issues of discrimination on ethnic grounds139. This limitation is one of the main 
reasons for the choice, in this research, to concentrate only on first-generation migrants. 
However, in section 4.3.2.2, I show how the ethnicisation of the domestic sector would 
increase and how this would modify the comparison between EU member states, by adding 
second generations to first arrival migrants. For this part, I had to rely on the data of the ad 
hoc module 2014, which is the only one, among the files provided by Eurostat, which 
provides the information on the country of birth of mothers and fathers.  
The second problem of the variable on the country of birth is that it is only provided in a 
disaggregated form at the level of ‘areas’ (and not at country level). This obviously results in 
a loss of information, especially when the origin of migrants constitutes the focus of the 
research. In the case of this research, for instance, it was only possible to differentiate 
                                                        
138 In section 4.2.3, I show how the proportion of the domestic sector as a share of the total employment would 
change if we were to add the informal economy in the domestic sector. The result is that: 1) the domestic sector 
would become a significantly larger share of the total employment in all EU countries included in the analysis; 
2) the comparison between EU countries would be completely different. 
139 Usually, discrimination on ethnic grounds is not based on the country of birth but rather on ethnic origins. 
Therefore, not only newly arrived migrants, but also second and third generations might be the object of 
prejudices and discrimination. 
 136 
between third-country nationals (aggregated in large areas: South America, North America, 
Middles East, etc.) and EU nationals (aggregated in areas, such as old European countries, 
countries of new accession 2004, countries of new accession 2007, and so on). Therefore, a 
detailed comparison aiming to differentiate migrants depending on their specific country of 
birth cannot be conducted using the EU-LFS data. 
The last problem for the identification of the migrant population derives from specific  
restrictions at country level, based on which the variable ‘country of birth’ is not provided for 
public use. Restrictions can involve one or more countries at a time, but can also change over 
time. This means that the variable ‘country of birth’ might be available for a given country 
only for some specific years, leading to obstacles for both cross-country comparisons and 
comparisons over time. This was probably the most significant problem encountered for this 
research, because it limited the number of countries included in the analysis. The countries for 
which the information on the country of birth was not available are Germany and Romania. 
 
3.4.1.4 Comparability of data and national restrictions 
 
Although the EU-LFS represents the largest harmonised survey on the labour market at 
European level, issues of comparability arise for different reasons. First, as mentioned in 
section 3.3.1, the availability of the survey for each country depends on their year of 
accession into the European Union. This means that a European comparison including the 28 
current member states is possible only starting from the last accession in 2013 and that 
longitudinal analyses are possible only with old accession countries. 
Another serious problem that affects comparisons – especially comparisons over time – is that 
the EU-LFS has undergone various changes in recent years. The changes concern both the 
questionnaires and the classifications used in the survey. Concerning the changes in the 
questionnaires, the problem is due to the fact that national statistical institutes are responsible 
for the questionnaires and they can modify, for instance, elements such as the questions, the 
sample design, the weighting method, and so on.  
Concerning the changes in the classifications used in the survey, it is a problem common to 
all international classifications. Indeed, all classifications are subject to regular revisions and 
transformations, in order to adapt them to social and economic changes, which can generate 
breaks and inconsistencies in longitudinal analyses. In particular, the main classifications used 
to define the labour status and occupations (ISCO and NACE), which are the core themes of 
the survey, have undergone great transformations. As mentioned in section 3.4.1.1, the 
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transition from the ISCO-88 to the ISCO-08 has been particularly problematic for the analysis 
of the increase of the domestic sector over time.   
A last important problem regards the restrictions that countries can impose on certain 
information. The main restrictions that caused difficulties in this specific research are two. As 
mentioned above, the first concerns the unavailability for Germany and Romania of the 
variable ‘country of birth’, which prevents from identifying the migrant population in the two 
countries. The second is the unavailability for some countries of the ISCO code at 3-digits, 
which prevents from identifying the domestic workers in these countries. The countries for 
which the ISCO code is only provided at 1 or 2-digit are Bulgaria, Slovenia, Malta and Poland. 
This obviously reduced the number of countries that could be included in the final analysis 
(see Chapter 6).   
 
3.4.2 Databases used for the typologies 
 
The limitations of the databases that have been used for the construction of the three 
typologies can be summarised in two main issues: 
1) the missing information, especially regarding Eastern European countries, which 
affects the comparison among European countries. When possible, the missing 
information was completed with the information available from national official 
sources. When it was not possible (that is, when no reliable source was found), some 
countries had to be excluded from the analysis. The result is that the three typologies 
do not include all 28 EU member states.  
2) The difficulty of harmonising data on national policies. Since policies are embedded 
and reflect each country’s economic, social, political and cultural setting, they cannot 
be evaluated on the same basis140. Therefore, it is crucial that policies are harmonised 
and weighted for the comparison to be reliable. The issue of harmonisation was 
particularly challenging for the selection of the indicators to be used for the 
construction of the typologies. While in certain cases missing information could be 
filled in through the use of different sources, this was only possible for some of the 
indicators. For the indicators that needed to be weighted I could only rely on pre-
                                                        
140 To give an example, the amount of the cash allowances allocated by governments for elderly care can be 
proportional to the income level of the recipient, or provided at a fixed amount. In the latter case the fixed 
amount can vary between countries and can be calculated based on different considerations. 
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harmonised information with the result that some countries were excluded from the 
analysis.  
The specific limitations linked to each dataset used in this research are presented below. 
 
Multilinks database 
As any database, the Multilinks is also subject to a series of limitations.  
First, while it offers a wide range of policy indicators, which are all pertinent to cover the 
dimension of childcare and elderly care, it does not include other indicators, which are 
commonly part of any study of welfare. These include for example health policies, 
unemployment benefits, income levels, etc. However, in line with the theoretical intent of the 
database, a choice had to be made on the indicators to be included, in order not to extend the 
inquiry too far from the core.  
Second, due to the fragmented information available in this field of study, the information on 
some crucial indicators (such as the availability of cash-for-care allowances and the level of 
compensation of such benefits) is not available for all European countries. This makes 
comparisons challenging, as choices about the missing values inevitably engender some loss 
of information. The number of missing information is particularly large and problematic for 
Eastern European countries, Malta and Cyprus, and for the following indicators: child-rearing 
allowance, cash-for-care allowances, minimum and maximum care allowances per month.  
The third limitation, which is linked to the complexity of care packages, is that the indicators 
cannot acknowledge on a number of issues, which are important for the understanding of care 
regimes. For instance, it cannot account for cross-country differences on attitudes and values 
about ‘care’, such as the definition of the family, the social pressure linked to the ideal of care 
for both children and elderly people, the social definition of care, and so on141. Also, although 
the authors of the database acknowledge the importance of the familialisation/de-
familialisation approach, there is no uncontroversial way to classify policies in this 
perspective and the database cannot entirely account for this difference. This is inevitable, 
because outcomes in terms of familialisation/de-familialisation cannot be entirely predicted 
by the type of policy and because many measures of care provision are known to potentially 
generate either familialistic or de-familialistic outcomes (Saraceno and Keck, 2008). The 
result is that the use of the indicators in this perspective implies a certain degree of 
                                                        
141 In this research, I try to overcome this issue by combining the indicators of the care regime with the 
indicators of the gender regime, which acknowledges – at least from a gender perspective – part of these 
social/cultural differences. For details about the intersection of care and gender regimes, refer to section 2.3.  
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subjectivity142. Finally, the Multilinks database cannot account on outcomes in terms of the 
degree of marketization of care, nor on the type of employment relationship that they 
engender (direct vs. triangular employment relationship)143.  
A last general limitation of the database is that it does not include indicators on incentives for 
housework services (through tax deduction, public financial contribution, and so on, as it is 
the case in some European countries). For this reason, indicators on housework incentives 
were derived from other sources. 
 
Developing personal and household services in the EU: a focus on housework activities 
(Farvaque, 2013, report commissioned by the European Commission) 
The main limitation of this source is that it does not include all European countries. Another 
limitation, which makes cross-national comparisons difficult, is that some of the measures 
used in the report are neither numerical, nor categorical, but rather narrative. This means that 
variables have to be derived from descriptive accounts of policies, with the subsequent risk of 
loss of information and/or issues of interpretation. This is particularly challenging for 
measures of specific work regulations for domestic workers, the degree of flexibilisation of 
work and the structure of the market. 
 
OECD Health Statistics 2017 database 
One of the main disadvantages of this database is that, although it provides highly reliable 
data covering virtually all OECD countries plus other countries, not all indicators are 
available for all countries. Regarding Europe, some Eastern European countries and Portugal 
are among those presenting the highest numbers of missing values, which makes the use of 
these indicators problematic for a European cross-national comparison. 
 
 
                                                        
142 This issue will be discussed in section ¿??, where I explain how I have classified policies based on a 
femilialisation/de-familialisation approach. 
143 Some welfare provisions can directly or indirectly favour the development of care provisions bought in the 
market. Such policies are of difficult interpretation if we want to investigate the role of the state and of families, 
without taking into account the results of such policies on the labour market. The policies that are generally 
thought to promote the development of private providers are all types of unconditional monetary transfers, which 
are cash benefits not bound to a control from the side of the state and that can thus be used to directly buy 
services in the private market. However, also tied cash allowances, as well as other types of incentives, can 
sometimes generate an increased marketization of services. Moreover, as mentioned in section 2.2.4.4, even 
governments that more consistently provide public services in the form of residential facilities, are recently sub-
contracting those services to third parties – both profit or non profit – thus favouring the marketization of care 
services. This can in turn contribute to the creation of a secondary informal market (a quasi-market) of care 
givers (add ref. Degravre and al??). 
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The European Social Survey 
The main limitation of the ESS ad hoc modules is that not all modules are available for all EU 
member states. In the case of the ad hoc module on ‘family, work and well-being’, a few 
missing countries in each Round do not allow for a comparison of all European countries. The 
missing countries of Round2/2004 are Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Romania, while the missing countries of Round5/2010 are Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg and Romania. Therefore, although a more recent version of the same ad hoc 
module exists (Round5/year 2010), the Round 2 of year 2002 was chosen, as it includes all 
EU member states also included in this analysis144. 
 
3.5 Additional methodological limitations 
 
Apart from the limitations linked to the available databases used in this study and of analyses 
of secondary data in general, there are other methodological issues specifically linked to this 
research. I mention the two main problems encountered during the research. 
 
3.5.1 International comparisons 
 
Although international comparisons are very powerful and useful tools in academic research, 
they are subject to a series of problems, which can be summarised in the following: 
- the lack of data for all countries. For instance, concerning comparisons between 
European countries, rich and complete data are often available for the old European 
countries, while there is a constant lack of information on new European countries.  
- Harmonising the data, while accounting for national differences. These can include 
structural differences, such as economic and social regulations, regulations of the 
labour market, etc., or differences in values and cultural beliefs. These differences can 
be reflected in the way statistics are collected and framed at national level. For this 
reason, harmonisation of data is key for the realisation of international comparisons. 
                                                        
144 Italy, Latvia and Luxembourg were not included in the ad-hoc module Round 5/2010. Since these countries, 
especially Italy and Luxembourg, represent core countries in many of the typologies created in relation to 
welfare systems and gender regimes, it was important to include them in the analysis. Therefore, the two rotating 
modules (Round 2 and Round 5) were compared in order to check whether important differences in the attitudes 
of European citizens were visible. Since all responses were consistent from 2004 to 2010, the older version 
(2004) of the module, which includes all EU countries, was used. 
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However, despite the efforts in harmonising data at European level, we can reasonably 
assume that a more or less important risk of bias affects all European comparisons. 
    
3.5.2 Statistical analyses with a limited number of countries 
 
In addition to the problems that researchers might encounter when carrying out international 
comparisons, comparing countries with quantitative methods can be problematic, because the 
limited number of countries reduces the spectrum of statistical tools that can be employed by 
the researcher. In statistics, the minimum sample size that is considered as acceptable for 
obtaining unbiased and reliable results in most statistical analyses is a subject of debate and 
depends on the technique of analysis used. While different statistical techniques vary 
significantly as per the number of the minimum sample size required, most statistical manuals 
and academic articles stress the importance of having ‘large’ samples. Basically, for statistical 
theory and tools, the larger the sample, the more reliable the results. While most institutional 
secondary data do offer large samples in terms of individual units, working with countries or 
with data aggregated at country level can bring about problems of sample sizes.  
The main ‘technical’ problems that I have encountered during the course of this research are 
linked to the problem of sample size. In particular, there are two types of statistical analyses 
that could not be performed, because of the limited number of the EU countries included in 
the analysis: the multilevel analysis and the validation of the indicators using Structural 
Equation Modelling (SEM).  
 
3.5.2.1 Multilevel regression models  
 
The concept at the basis of multilevel analysis is that individuals are influenced by – and 
interact with – the context (or the social groups) to which they belong. A popular way of 
quantifying the extent to which differences in outcomes are due to differences specific to 
groups is to conduct multilevel analysis. This type of analysis allows the researcher to create a 
hierarchy of units (level 1 corresponding to individuals and level 2, 3, … corresponding to 
groups) and to analyse the interaction between the variables that define the individual level 
and the variables that define the group level. Multilevel regression models – which are a 
multilevel extension of multiple regressions – require the sample size at both the individual 
and the group level to be sufficiently large. 
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As Maas and Hox (2005) point out, this usually poses a problem for the level 2, which is the 
number of groups. Having the sufficient number of groups can be difficult to achieve, for two 
main reasons. First, while adding individuals can be relatively simple, adding new groups can 
be considerably costly (think, for instance, what it means in terms of costs to add new 
countries to a survey). Second – and this is especially problematic for comparisons of 
countries – the number of the groups can be limited because no other groups exist. For 
instance, conducting intra-EU comparisons means that by nature of the study no more than 28 
countries can be included in the analysis. If we add the fact that in the great majority of ‘real’ 
studies145 the actual number is reduced for problems linked to missing information, the result 
is that most European comparisons would include no more than 20 countries (Bryan and 
Jenkins, 2015). 
Although conducting multilevel analyses using European countries can be theoretically 
attractive, as many researches aim to investigate the ‘country effect’ on individual outcomes, 
according to most findings it engenders serious problems of reliability. To answer the 
questions on how many countries are required for reliable estimates, the literature does not 
agree on the exact number but it agrees on the fact that multilevel analyses of European 
countries are in fact very risky and they are likely to bring fatal errors. To give some of the 
most influential ‘rules of thumb’, the less strict rules indicate a minimum number of about 20-
25 groups for having at least reliable coefficient estimates of fixed effects146. However, many 
authors agree that at least 100 groups should be included in order to have unbiased results. 
Maas and Hox (2005) find that at least 30 groups are needed, but only for fixed effects. The 
simulations conducted by Bryan and Jenkins (2015) suggest that linear models require at least 
25 countries and logit models at least 30 countries. 
Although these rules are not always taken into account – and this is mirrored by the number 
of published articles that do in fact use multilevel analyses for cross-European comparisons147 
– the multilevel logistic regression models that I have tentatively carried out for this research 
are not reported, as they are likely to be unreliable.  
 
                                                        
145 By real studies I mean researches conducted on existing data, rather than on simulations. 
146 While coefficients of fixed effects are usually recognised to be somehow reliable even with reduced numbers 
of groups, for the interaction effects and the covariance parameters to be reliable, more groups are needed 
(Bryan and Jenkins, 2015). 
147 Taking into consideration only two well-known journals – the European Sociological Review and the 
Journal of European Social Policy – Bryan and Jenkins (2015) count as many as 45 articles (published in the 
first one between 2005 and 2012) and 111 articles (published by the second one between 2005 and 2009) that 
have used multilevel analyses using European countries. 
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3.5.2.2 Validation of indicators using SEM 
 
Broadly speaking, the validity of indicators refers to the ability of indicators to measure the 
phenomenon for which they have been constructed. Since the selection of indicators is based 
on theoretical grounds but it is also influenced by external factors (such as the lack of existing 
data), the validation clearly represents an important methodological step in research that 
focuses on the development of indicators. Although an indicator cannot be considered as 
‘wrong’ or ‘false’, it is nevertheless important that an indicator be able to do so. For this, the 
literature sometimes refers to some characteristics that indicators should have, such as 
‘validity’, ‘reliability’, ‘specificity’, ‘sensitivity’, and so on 148  (Panerai, 1998; see also 
Cronbach and Meehl, 1995; Carmines and Zeller, 1979). 
Indicators and indexes can be validated by different means, which – on the methodological 
level – include the correlation with other concepts and indicators that measure similar aspects 
(criterion validity), or the evaluation of how the proposed measure is consistent with other 
measures. On the empirical side, a statistical tool that can be useful to assess whether a series 
of indicators do measure the dimensions that they are supposed to measure is Structural 
Equation Modelling. This approach was tentatively carried out in order to validate the 
indicators used to develop the typologies of the three regimes under study. However, the 
model could not be generated, due to the problem of the limited number of countries included 
in the analysis149. 
 
This chapter provided a detailed overview of the methods and sources used in this research 
and listed the main limitations linked to both available data and to specific statistical 
techniques. Given these problems, and taking into consideration the limits of existing data, the 
analyses conducted in the framework of this research and presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, 
constitute the best possible use of the data and methods for such study. 
                                                        
148 According to the Panerai (1998), validity refers to the overall ability of an indicator to measure what it is 
supposed to measure; reliability refers to whether similar results could be obtained if the same measurement was 
performed by other people in other circumstances; specificity refers to the immunity of the indicators to changes; 
sensitivity refers to the ability of the indicator to detect changes in what it is measuring. 
149 For information about simple size requirements for SEM, refer to Wolf et al. (2013), among others. 
Chapter 4  
Analysis of contemporary paid domestic work in Europe: 
similarities and differences among EU member states 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 presented the state of the art of literature on domestic work, as well as an overview 
of the main features of contemporary paid domestic work in developed countries. It also 
provided an overview of the transformations occurred over time in the domestic sector and of 
the main trends that are visible in most European countries today. However, comparative 
analyses of the domestic sector in different European countries show that common trends 
coexist with significant differences at national level. 
This chapter presents a descriptive analysis of contemporary paid domestic work in Europe. 
The overall objective of the chapter is to highlight similarities and differences between 
European countries. The analysis is based on available institutional data, mainly from the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO), the European Commission and the OECD, as well 
as on descriptive analyses that I have conducted on the EU-Labour Forces Survey data. These 
last analyses are mainly conducted on the data from year 2015, which corresponds to the last 
available data, unless stated otherwise. 
The analysis is divided into three thematic areas: 1) the magnitude of the domestic sector; 2) 
the workforce composition; 3) the working conditions in the domestic sector. The first part 
includes a section on the increase of the domestic sector in recent years and a section on the 
current size of the domestic sector in each European country included in the analysis. The 
second part focuses on the feminisation and the ethnicisation of the domestic sector. The last 
part analyses some aspects that can be used to define the working conditions of domestic 
workers. In particular, three elements are taken into consideration: the income level, the job 
stability (proportion of temporary vs. permanent contracts) and the work on unusual working 
schedules (weekends, evenings and nights). 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
The analysis of contemporary paid domestic work in Europe presented in this chapter is 
organised around thematic areas. Each thematic area first presents some available data from 
institutional sources150, followed by my own analyses, based on the EU-Labour Forces Survey 
data, from Eurostat151. The objective is to provide an overview of the main trends in the 
domestic sector and to highlight the main similarities and differences among EU member 
states. 
All the analyses on the EU-LFS data are based on a statistical definition of paid domestic 
work derived from the International Standard Classification on Occupations 2008 (ISCO-08), 
which is provided by Eurostat at a 3-digit level152. In particular, the domestic sector, as 
defined in this study, includes the ISCO-08 codes 531, 532 and 911 – which correspond to 
childcare, elderly care and housework respectively. All the analyses include the EU member 
states for which data is available. Depending on the issue that is investigated at each time, 
some countries are excluded from the analysis, because of missing information. In particular, 
Bulgaria, Poland, Slovenia and Malta are excluded from all the analyses, as the ISCO code 
provided for these countries does not allow for the identification of domestic workers153. 
Germany and Romania are excluded from the analysis on the ethnicisation of the domestic 
sector, because the variable ‘Country of birth’ is not provided. The details about the 
limitations and problems linked to the statistical definition of domestic work based on the EU-
LFS data are provided in Chapter 3, which deals with methodological issues. 
 
                                                        
150 The main institutional sources used in this chapter are the International Labour organisation, the OECD and 
the European Union. 
151 The EU-Labour Forces Survey data are public data coming from national institutional statistical bodies and 
then harmonised at European level by Eurostat. The data for this study were obtained by Eurostat in May 2015, 
upon request. An update, which included the last release on year 2015, was obtained in February 2016. For 
details about the EU-LFS database, refer to section 3.3.1.  
152 The International Standard Classification on Occupations 2008 (ISCO-08) is a system of classification of 
occupations used in international surveys, which has been elaborated by the ILO. It is the result of a major 
revision of the International Standard Classification on Occupations 1988 (ISCO-88), which was adopted until 
year 2008. The overall structure of the classification is a hierarchical division into Major groups (1 digit), Sub-
major groups (2 digits), Minor groups (3 digits) and Unit groups (4 digits). The data publicly provided by 
Eurostat only provides the classification at 3 digits. For details about the statistical definition of the domestic 
sector, refer to section 3.4.1.3. 
153 The ISCO-08 codes for these countries are only provided at 2 digits. This does not allow for a clear 
identification of domestic workers, as other types of workers are included at the level of Sub-major group. 
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4.2 The magnitude of the domestic sector 
 
In the last decades, the domestic sector has increased significantly in all parts of the world. 
The increase is not only visible in absolute terms, but it is also an increase of domestic 
workers as a share of the total employment, so that domestic work has become in many areas 
of the world an important source of employment (ILO, 2013). However, due to the 
‘invisibility’ of the work and the lack of a commonly agreed statistical definition of domestic 
work, it is difficult to obtain reliable data on the scope of domestic work, and estimates on the 
number of domestic workers worldwide differ greatly (Carls, 2012). According to 
conservative estimates provided by the International Labour Organisation, in 2010 there were 
at least 52 million domestic workers across the world. However, the ILO suggests that the 
extent of domestic work should be much greater and that estimates that take into account 
other elements could be close to 100 million domestic workers worldwide154. In terms of the 
magnitude of the domestic sector compared to the total employment, domestic workers 
represent about the 3.6% of all waged employees in the world. The sector is particularly 
developed in Latin America and Caribbean, in the Middle East and in Asia. However, it is not 
negligible in the other parts of the world and in Europe domestic workers represent the 0.4% 
of all paid employees (ILO, 2013). 
Concerning the increase that has occurred in the last twenty years, the ILO estimated that the 
number of domestic workers worldwide has grown from 33.2 million in 1995 to 52.6 million 
in 2010, which represents an increase of 19 million workers in only 15 years. Although the 
greatest increase in the number of domestic workers in the last decades was registered in 
South America, Middle East and Asia, also Europe has experienced a growth of the domestic 
sector in recent years. According to the ILO, from 1995 to 2010 there has been an increase of 
210000 domestic workers in Western Europe and of 120000 domestic workers in Eastern 
Europe.  
Within Europe, the greatest increase was registered in Spain, France and Italy, where the 
number of domestic workers more than doubled – mainly due to the employment of an 
                                                        
154 For estimates on the extent of the domestic sector, the ILO employs official data, which are by definition 
more conservative, as they tend to undercount the number of domestic workers (because the way national 
questionnaires are formulated might fail in grasping some domestic activities, because of the fact that irregular 
workers – especially undocumented migrants – might be reluctant to reveal themselves, because paid domestic 
work can misleadingly be interpreted as home work, because children – who in some countries do work as 
domestics – are not included in labour surveys, and so on). The case of India is particularly striking as the 
discrepancies between official and non-official estimates vary as much as from 2.5 to 90 million domestic 
workers. 
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increasing number of migrant domestic workers155. Overall, the increase was more marked at 
the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, and a slight decrease has been observed 
around 2008. However, also the other European countries have generally experienced an 
increase of the domestic sector starting from the 1990s. In Germany, for instance, the number 
of domestic workers has increased by three-quarter in the period 1995-2010. According to the 
ILO, the only exceptions are the United Kingdom, which is one of the rare countries where 
the number of domestic workers has decreased over the last decades, and Nordic countries, 
where the number of domestic workers has not changed significantly. 
 
4.2.1 The size of the domestic sector 
 
According to the ILO data (data LABORSTA 2008, ILO 2013), a significant difference exists 
in the extent of the domestic sector between Western and Eastern European countries, both in 
terms of absolute numbers and in terms of the relevance of the domestic sector in the national 
labour market.  
In Western Europe, about 3.7% of total employment takes place in private households. In 
absolute terms, the countries that counted the highest number of domestic workers in 2010 
were Spain, with more than 740000 domestic workers, followed by France (590000 domestic 
workers) and Italy (420000 domestic workers). In terms of what domestic workers represent 
as a share of the total national employment, between 2007 and 2010 the greatest percentages 
were registered in Cyprus (4.4%), Spain (4%) and Portugal (3.4%). However, domestic work 
also represented a significant segment of the total employment in France, Greece and Italy 
(around 2%). Among Western European countries, the countries where domestic work 
represents the smallest percentage of the total employment are Denmark, the Netherlands 
(both 1%), Germany and the UK (both 0.5%). 
Concerning Eastern Europe, the countries that counted the absolute highest numbers of 
domestic workers between 2006 and 2009 were Romania (29000 domestic workers) and 
Poland (11000 domestic workers). However, when domestic work is counted as the share of 
the total employment, all Eastern European countries show a percentage far below the 1%, 
which is a significantly smaller share compared to Western European countries.  
The analysis of the domestic sector as a proportion of the total employment based on the EU-
LFS data for year 2015 shows some dissimilarity, compared to the above-mentioned data. 
                                                        
155 In Spain, from 1995 to 2010, the number of domestic workers increased from 355000 to 747000. In Italy, it 
increased from 200000 in 1995 to 419000 in 2010 (ILO, 2013). 
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Table 15 presents the total number of domestic workers, as well as the proportion of domestic 
workers as a share of the total employed population in each EU country for which data is 
available. 
 
Table 15: Share of domestic workers among all other workers (2015) 
Country Domestic 
workers 
Domestic 
workers (%) 
All other 
workers 
All other 
workers (%) 
AT 5487 6.4 79864 93.6 
BE 3655 9.1 36444 90.9 
CY 1743 10.3 15221 89.7 
CZ 782 4.2 17693 95.8 
DE 9905 4.2 227445 95.8 
DK 5997 10.1 53199 89.9 
EE 581 5.0 11146 95.0 
ES 3858 9.7 35946 90.3 
FI 1156 9.7 10719 90.3 
FR 22446 11.4 175309 88.6 
GR 2717 3.7 70291 96.3 
HR 503 3.7 12977 96.3 
HU 3948 4.1 91823 95.9 
IE 5849 7.4 72999 92.6 
IT 16944 8.3 186075 91.7 
LT 1217 4.5 26128 95.5 
LU 1124 8.3 12448 91.7 
LV 878 5.0 16510 95.0 
NL 3074 7.4 38495 92.6 
PT 6276 8.9 63988 91.1 
RO 3270 3.2 99709 96.8 
SE 18138 11.9 134222 88.1 
SK 2209 5.8 36158 94.2 
UK 3427 9.2 33960 90.8 
Source: EU-LFS 2015 
 
Figure 1 is the graphical representation of the proportion of domestic workers as a share of the 
total employed population in all EU member states for which data is available. 
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Figure 1: Proportion of the domestic sector compared to all other sectors in 24 EU 
member states (2015) 
 
Figure 1: the vertical line is the EU average. The horizontal lines at the end of each bar are the confidence 
intervals. Bulgaria, Slovenia, Malta and Poland are not included, because the information on the occupation 
(ISCO code) is not available. 
Source: EU-LFS 2015 
 
As it emerges from Figure 1, the countries where the domestic sector represents the biggest 
share of the total employment are Sweden, France, Cyprus and Denmark. However, also in 
Finland, the UK, Spain, Belgium, Italy, Portugal and Luxembourg, it is significantly higher 
compared to the European average. On the contrary, the countries where the domestic sector 
is smaller compared to the total employment are Romania, Greece, Croatia, Hungary, 
Denmark, Czech Republic and Lithuania, where it represents less than the 5% of the total 
employment. 
In line with the official statistics from the ILO, the Eastern European countries show the 
lowest share of domestic workers as a percentage of all workers. However, among Western 
countries, only Germany confirms official institutional data, with a small domestic sector, 
while Denmark and the Netherlands present the biggest proportion, as expected. 
If domestic activities are disaggregated into the three main components – housework, 
childcare and elderly care – the situation varies greatly among European countries, with some 
countries where the largest proportion of domestic workers is concentrated in housework 
activities (as it was common in the past) and other countries with a very large share of carers. 
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Figure 2 presents the three components of domestic activities as a share of the domestic sector 
in all the EU countries for which information is available. Annex 1 offers the detailed 
information on the three activities disaggregated (absolute numbers, proportions and graphical 
representation of each component separately). 
 
Figure 2: Share of disaggregated activities in the domestic sector in 24 EU member 
states (2015) 
 
Figure 2: The data displayed include all EU member states, apart from Bulgaria, Slovenia, Malta and Poland, 
for which the information on the occupation (ISCO code) is not available. 
Source: EU-LFS, 2015 
 
As it appears from Figure 2, in the majority of the EU countries the share of housework 
activities is larger than the share of care activities. In particular, Mediterranean countries 
(Cyprus, Greece, but also Italy and Portugal) and Eastern European countries are among those 
with the highest percentage of housework activities among all activities included in the 
domestic sector. This is also the case of some continental countries, such as Germany, 
Belgium and France156. This suggests that housework-related activities are still predominant 
                                                        
156 The large share of housework activities among domestic activities in France and Belgium is also attributable 
to the adoption of the voucher system, which is largely used to hire private live-out cleaners. While in France the 
system has been enlarged so to cover also care work, in Belgium it is strictly directed to housework activities. 
Research conducted on the French and Belgian voucher system have observed that not only the system met the 
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in the domestic sector, as it has always been the case in the past. The relatively small share of 
elderly care in Italy and Spain contradicts the most recent findings, which have identified the 
two countries as those with the highest number of elderly carers. This could be the result of 
the high share of undeclared work in the domestic sector, which is estimated to be particularly 
high in these two Mediterranean countries157. 
However, as it emerges from the graphic, there are countries where the share of care activities 
is larger than housework-related activities. These countries include all Northern countries and 
the islands, but also the Czech Republic and Estonia. In particular, the share of elderly care 
activities is in all countries far larger than the share of childcare activities. This can be due to 
a variety of reasons. First, private paid childcare is everywhere predominantly used on an 
occasional basis and therefore it mostly falls under undeclared work. This is due to the fact 
that public childcare is provided in all countries, albeit at different levels and in different 
forms, and also that it is often grandparents who are involved in the care of children to a 
certain extent. Additionally, individuals involved in sporadic types of childcare work are 
likely to have another occupational and/or educational status and not to define themselves as 
childcare workers at the moment of the interview. Second, elderly care, whose demand has 
known a tremendous increase in the last decades, is a type of activity that, contrary to 
childcare, usually demands long working hours. Therefore, contrary to child carers, elderly 
carers are more likely to perform this job as their primary occupational source. 
In general, the important share of child- and elderly care in all countries confirm the important 
demand for care services everywhere, due to recent demographic trends, changes in family 
models and increased female participation in the labour market, among other factors. 
 
4.2.2 The informal economy 
 
One of the main problems when analysing the labour market with institutional data is that 
data inevitably fails to grasp the informal segments of the labour market. Due to the very high 
level of undeclared work in the domestic sector in many European countries (Farvaque, 2013), 
analysing the scope of domestic work becomes particularly challenging. The high prevalence 
of undeclared work in the domestic sector is due to a variety of reasons. First, it has to do with 
the hidden nature of the work, which is performed within private doors and is thus difficult to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
growing need of families in terms of externalisation of domestic chores, but it also contributed to fostering the 
demand, due to the very affordable prices of vouchers (Gerard, 2013). 
157 The discussion about the role of the informal economy in the domestic sector is detailed in section 3.4.1.2. 
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monitor. Not only the working conditions of domestic workers can be hardly inspected, but 
the employment relationship is often made on informal arrangements. Second, as discussed in 
Chapter 1, the low value attributed to domestic activities, and the blurred dividing lines 
between professional housework and home work, determine resistance to fully recognise 
domestic work as a real job.  
Furthermore, as it has been highlighted by literature, the domestic sector – especially in the 
form of live-in jobs – attracts many undocumented migrants, as it offers a shelter, food and 
accommodation and at the same time it offers a protection from inspections (Ambrosini, 
2011). In some countries, their irregular administrative status is reflected in the irregularity of 
their employment relationship, and this contributes to increasing informal work in the 
domestic sector.  
The measurement of undeclared work is difficult by definition, because of the hidden nature 
of this segment of the labour market. Concerning the measurement of the undeclared work in 
the domestic sector, some efforts have been made by national authorities and more recently at 
European level. In 2007, a special Eurobarometer was launched in order to investigate to what 
extent the population buys goods and services related to undeclared work. According to the 
findings, 11% of the population admitted that they had bought goods and services related to 
the informal economy and among these, 17% had bought domestic services. According to 
national and European reports that give account of the importance of the undeclared work in 
the domestic sector, estimates vary from 15% in Sweden to 70% in Italy and Spain and even 
90-95% in Germany158 (Farvaque, 2013). 
Although estimates vary greatly among the different sources and usually include only a 
limited number of countries, it is interesting to show the extent of the undeclared work in the 
domestic sector for the few countries for which information is available. Figure 3 shows the 
extent of the undeclared work in the domestic sector in eight European countries, based on the 
estimates provided in the DGCIS report 2011 of the French Ministry of Economy and 
Industry. 
 
 
 
                                                        
158 The main sources regarding the undeclared work in the domestic sector are the following: the European 
Commission Staff Working Document on exploiting the employment potential of the personal and household 
services, SWD (2012); “Etude sur les services à la personne dans sept pays européens, DGCIS, French Ministry 
of Economy and Industry (2011); “Creating formal employment relationships in the domestic services sector: 
successful strategies?”, IWAK (2012). 
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Figure 3: Formal and informal domestic workers in 8 EU countries 
 
Figure 3: the dark grey bar corresponds to the number of domestic workers based on the EU-LFS 2015. The 
number of undeclared domestic workers (light grey bar) is calculated based on the estimates of the informal 
economy in the domestic sector provided in the DGCIS report 2011 (French Ministry of Economy and Industry) 
and the EU-LFS 2015. 
Source: EU-LFS 2015 and DGCIS Report 
 
As shown in Figure 3, in Italy and Spain the number of undeclared domestic workers is far 
greater than the number of regular workers. In both countries, the undeclared work in the 
domestic sector is estimated at 70% of the total employment in the sector. However, although 
in the remaining countries the undeclared work is smaller than the regular employment, the 
number of irregular employment in the domestic sector remains significant. In the UK, but 
also in Germany and in the Netherlands, the informal work represents almost half of the total 
employment in the sector (50%, 45% and 40% respectively), a figure that is far above the 
estimates on the shadow economy in the total employment of each country159. 
Figure 4 shows the proportion of the domestic sector compared to the total employment if the 
informal economy were to be added into the picture160. For this, the number of irregular 
domestic workers was calculated based on the estimates of the DGCIS report, while the 
                                                        
159 Official estimates on the informal economy at country level indicate 10.05% in the UK, 13.50% in Germany 
and 9.50% in the Netherlands (Schneider, 2013). 
160 Although the EU-LFS does not exclude informal workers a priori, there are reasons to expect that 
undeclared workers would not be willing to disclose their irregular employment status and thus to participate in 
the survey. This is especially true for irregular migrants, who might fear to be reported to the authorities. 
Therefore, if it is true that considering the domestic workers included in the EU-LFS as only regular workers 
does not correspond to the reality, it is also true that we could expect the majority of irregular workers not be 
grasped by LFS data.  
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number of irregular workers in all other sectors was calculated based on the official estimates 
on country level provided by Schneider (2013). The proportion of the domestic sector was 
then calculated, similarly to the one presented in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 4: Proportion of formal and informal domestic sector compared to all other 
sectors in 8 EU countries 
 
Figure 4: the dark grey bar corresponds to the number of domestic workers based on the EU-LFS 2015. The 
number of undeclared domestic workers (light grey bar) is calculated based on the estimates of the informal 
economy in the domestic sector provided in the DGCIS report 2011 (French Ministry of Economy and Industry) 
and the EU-LFS 2015. 
Source: EU-LFS 2015, DGCIS report, estimates shadow economy by Schneider (2013) 
 
Although this calculation should not be taken as a faithful representation of the reality, 
because the EU-LFS data could also include irregular domestic workers (see footnote 160), 
the graphic offers nevertheless an idea of the extent of the informal economy in the domestic 
sector. In particular, it shows how the relative importance of the domestic sector changes 
compared to the total employment when informal workers are added into the picture. As it is 
visible from the graphic, when the undeclared work is added to the domestic sector, the 
proportion of the sector as a share of the total employment becomes bigger in all countries 
included in the analysis. However, the major changes can be observed for Spain, Italy and the 
UK, where the proportion of the domestic sector increases significantly. 
If we compare Figure 4 and Figure 1, what emerges is that if we were to add the informal 
work in the ‘official’ domestic sector Spain, Italy, the UK and France would be the European 
countries with the highest proportion of domestic workers, compared to the total employment. 
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Although estimates on the scope of the informal domestic sector are not available for the 
majority of EU member states, this exercise proves that, due to the great incidence of 
undeclared work in this specific sector, a cross-European comparison on the magnitude of the 
domestic sector with official data should be interpreted with caution. 
 
4.3 The workforce composition 
 
Literature on domestic work has highlighted that contemporary paid domestic work reveals 
both continuities and important changes in the profile of domestic workers. The main 
continuity regards the feminisation of domestic work, which had already started in the 
nineteenth century. The main changes have to do with the increased ethnicisation of paid 
domestic work: in many European countries, new domestic workers are more and more likely 
to be international migrants, compared to past, where the mobility of domestic workers was 
mainly internal to the country. Another novelty, compared to the past, is represented by the 
marital status, the age and the education of new domestic workers. Today, domestic workers – 
especially female migrants – are more likely to be better educated and often older and with 
dependants, compared to their predecessors161. 
However, although the above-mentioned features do constitute visible trends in Europe, 
significant differences exist among European countries in the workforce composition in the 
domestic sector. This section focuses on the feminisation and the ethnicisation of the 
domestic sector and highlights the main similarities and differences at European level. 
 
4.3.1 The feminisation of the domestic sector 
 
Although men have been a constant presence in domestic services in more ancient times, in 
both Europe and other parts of the world domestic work has known a process of feminisation, 
so that by the late nineteenth century it has become an almost exclusively feminised job (Sarti 
and Scrinzi, 2010). The relatively high number of men in certain European countries is 
usually ascribed to the presence of migrant men, who constitute the majority of the male 
population of domestic workers (Beccalli and Ambrosini 2009; Sarti and Scrinzi, 2010). 
Today, paid domestic work is commonly considered as a typical female job. This is linked to 
the traditional gender division of labour within households, as well as the gendered 
                                                        
161 For details about the changes in domestic workers’ profile, refer to section 1.2.  
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socialisation, which assigns to men the economic tasks and more broadly the public sphere 
and to women the domestic tasks performed in the private sphere (Anderson, 2006; Scrinzi 
2011, Lutz, 2002). The work that was traditionally performed by women in their households 
is still considered as a female responsibility and women in general are seen as the natural 
providers of domestic services. What has changed is that this work is more and more 
externalised to other women, who are now waged workers in the formal (or informal) labour 
market (Lutz, 2011). 
According to the ILO (2013), women account for 83% of all domestic workers worldwide. 
Also, there is virtually no country in the world where men outnumber women in the domestic 
service sector. The shares of women domestic workers range from little more than 60% in the 
Middle East to more than 90% in South America. This means that everywhere domestic work 
represents an important source of employment for women. However, it also means that the 
poor working conditions which are typical of domestic work disproportionally affect women 
virtually in every area of the world162. The situation in Europe is no different. Data from the 
ILO indicate that the domestic sector is highly feminised in all European countries, with 
female domestic workers accounting for more than 90% in Spain, 88% in Italy, 85% in 
France. According to the ILO (2013), the country with the lowest proportion of women in the 
domestic sector is the UK, with about 61% of female domestic workers. 
The analysis of the EU-LFS data generally confirms the overwhelming feminisation of the 
domestic sector in Europe, despite slightly different findings at country level. Table 16 
includes the number and the proportion of male and female domestic workers in the 24 
European countries included in the analysis. Figure 5 shows the degree of feminisation of 
domestic work in the 24 European countries for which information is available. 
As it emerges from the graphic, the feminisation of paid domestic work is a phenomenon that 
concerns all countries with no exception. In all European countries the number of women is 
significantly higher than that of men and ranges from 77.7% in Denmark to 97.8 in Cyprus. 
This is in line with literature and with the institutional sources presented at the beginning of 
the section.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
162 Information on working conditions in the domestic sector is provided in section 1.2.4.  
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Table 16: Male and female domestic workers in 24 EU member states (2015) 
Country  Male domestic 
workers  
Male domestic workers (% 
of total domestic workers)  
Female 
domestic 
workers  
Female domestic workers (% 
of total domestic workers)  
AT  494  9  4993  91  
BE  264  7.2  3391  92.8  
CY  38  2.2  1705  97.8  
CZ  67  8.6  715  91.4  
DE  981  9.9  8924  90.1  
DK  1337  22.3  4660  77.7  
EE  26  4.5  555  95.5  
ES  278  7.2  3580  92.8  
FI  123  10.6  1033  89.4  
FR  2748  12.2  19698  87.8  
GR  277  10.2  2440  89.8  
HR  33  6.6  470  93.4  
HU  405  10.3  3543  89.7  
IE  751  12.8  5098  87.2  
IT  2621  15.5  14323  84.5  
LT  85  7  1132  93  
LU  77  6.9  1047  93.1  
LV  39  4.4  839  95.6  
NL  305  9.9  2769  90.1  
PT  246  3.9  6030  96.1  
RO  317  9.7  2953  90.3  
SE  3399  18.7  14739  81.3  
SK  107  4.8  2102  95.2  
UK  470  13.7  2957  86.3  
 
Figure 5: Proportion of women in the domestic sector in 24 EU member states (2015) 
 
Figure 5: the vertical line is the EU average. The horizontal lines at the end of each bar are the confidence 
intervals. Bulgaria, Slovenia, Malta and Poland are not included, because the information on the occupation 
(ISCO code) is not available. Source: EU-LFS 2015 
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The countries with the more feminised domestic sector are Mediterranean and Eastern 
European countries, where female domestic workers account for more than 90%. Additionally, 
also Luxembourg and Belgium show a feminisation of the domestic sector, which is above the 
European average. The countries with the lowest shares of female work are Northern 
countries (especially Denmark and Sweden, but also Finland, at a lower degree), the UK, 
Ireland and France.  
The only remarkable exception is Italy, which, contrary to the other Mediterranean countries, 
stands out with a relatively high share of men in the sector. However, when sex is cross-
analysed with the country of birth it emerges that almost all men working in the domestic 
sector in Italy are migrants. This is both the remaining of a tradition where employing a live-
in male domestic work was considered a status symbol for wealthier families (Andall, 2000), 
and also the consequence of the particularly poor reputation of such work, where migrants 
represent the biggest share of the workforce. According to recent research, in Italy there has 
been a re-masculinisation of domestic work, but only of migrant men, who choose to 
temporarily work in this sector because of the strong demand (Catanzaro and Colombo, 2009). 
 
4.3.2 The ethnicisation of the domestic sector 
 
In addition to the gender dimension, another emerging feature of paid domestic work is the 
growing ethnicisation of the job (Anderson, 2000, 2006; Lutz, 2010; Anthias and Lazaridis, 
2000; Kofman et al. 2000). In many European countries, domestic work is more and more 
performed by migrant women, who represent the lower social strata that go to fill the gaps of 
labour demand that are not filled by locals. Although migrants were already employed in the 
domestic sector in ancient times, the link between international migration and domestic work 
has become more visible in recent times (Sarti, 2006), at the point that it has been defined a 
global issue that has generated a gendered and racialised division of labour (Andall, 2000; 
Parrenas, 2001; Ehrenreich and Hochschild, 2003; Lutz, 2008).  
According to the ILO, international migrants moving to Europe are often concentrated in the 
lower-skilled segments of the labour market, including domestic services, as they tend to 
encounter barriers in entering other parts of the labour market. Data from the 2004 European 
Community Labour Force Survey shows that among all female migrants those working in the 
domestic sector are the 36% in Spain, the 27.9% in Italy and the 21.1% in France (ILO, 2013). 
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Both in Italy and in Spain, the majority of domestic workers are foreign-born, with Italy 
counting 78.4% of migrant domestic workers in 2008 (ILO, 2013). 
The analysis of the EU-LFS data confirms the general trend towards an ethnicisation of the 
domestic sector in certain European countries, but it also highlights the considerable 
differences that exist among countries. Table 17 shows the number and the proportion of 
migrant and non-migrant domestic workers for the European countries for which information 
is available163. 
 
Table 17: Migrant and non-migrant domestic workers in 22 EU member states (2015) 
Country  Migrant  
domestic  
workers  
Migrant domestic  
workers (% of total 
domestic workers)  
Non-migrant  
domestic  
workers  
Non-migrant domestic 
workers (% of total 
domestic workers)  
AT  1793 32.7 3694 67.3 
BE  1162 31.8 2489 68.1 
CY  1138 65.3 605 34.7 
CZ  34 4.3 748 95.7 
DK  884 14.7 5108 85.2 
EE  88 15.1 493 84.9 
ES  794 20.6 3064 79.4 
FI  90 7.8 1066 92.2 
FR  3814 17 18628 83 
GR  1072 39.5 1643 60.5 
HR  101 20.1 401 79.7 
HU  96 2.4 3852 97.6 
IE  1442 24.7 4407 75.3 
IT  7632 45 9312 55 
LT  112 9.2 1105 90.8 
LU  630 56 340 30.2 
LV  139 15.8 739 84.2 
NL  326 10.6 2729 88.8 
PT  590 9.4 5686 90.6 
SE  4389 24.2 13725 75.7 
SK  27 1.2 2182 98.8 
UK  641 18.7 2786 81.3 
Source: EU-LFS 2015 
The table excludes Germany and Romania, for which information on the country of birth is not provided. 
 
Figure 6 shows the proportion of migrants in the domestic sector in the European countries 
included in the analysis. 
 
                                                        
163 The migrant population is statistically defined using the information on the country of birth. The EU-LFS 
provides information about the country of birth aggregated in the following areas: native of own country; NMS3 
(3 new member states of 2007 and 2013); NMS13 (10 new member states of 2004); EU15; EFTA countries; 
other Europe; North Africa; Other Africa; Near Middle East; East Asia; South East Asia; North America; Central 
America; South America; Australia and Oceania. 
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Figure 6: Proportion of migrants in the domestic sector in 22 EU member states (2015) 
 
Figure 6: The data displayed include all EU member states, excluding Bulgaria, Slovenia, Malta and Poland, for 
which the information on the occupation (ISCO code) is not available and Germany and Romania, for which 
information on the country of birth is not provided. 
Source: EU-LFS 2015 
 
As it emerges from Figure 6, the differences between European countries in terms of 
ethnicisation of the domestic sector are overwhelming. The proportion of migrants among the 
domestic workforce varies from 1.2% in Slovakia to 65.3% in Cyprus. Additionally, given the 
high prevalence of undeclared work in the domestic sector, and given that migrants are likely 
to concentrate in the informal economy, the figure clearly underestimates the presence of 
migrants who work in the domestic sector.  
Cyprus is the country that shows the higher proportion of migrants in the domestic sector, 
together with Luxembourg164 . However, Italy, Greece, Austria and Belgium also have a 
significant high proportion of migrant labour force in the sector, compared to the European 
average. Indeed, many studies have highlighted the fact that Mediterranean countries, as well 
as Germany, Austria and Belgium, have recently experienced an increase of migrant workers 
in domestic services, but for different reasons. In the Mediterranean countries, welfare does 
not adequately support families with public services. This, combined with the low level of 
                                                        
164 The case of Luxembourg is not commented further, as it represents an exception in the European landscape. 
According to the European Observatory of Working Life, in Luxembourg the high percentage of non-nationals is 
remarkable in every sector of the labour market, as the phenomenon of cross-border workers is typical of this 
country. Additionally, the migrant population in Luxembourg is mainly intra-European and is characterised by 
high education levels, which explains their presence in all levels of the labour market. 
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cash allowance, created a strong demand for cheap and flexible labour force and contributed 
to the development of a basin of an often undeclared migrant workforce (Catanzaro and 
Colombo 2009; Ambrosini, 2013). In the case of continental countries, such as France and 
Belgium, welfare traditionally offers a better support in terms of public services, albeit with 
cross-national differences. However, in these countries welfare policies are more and more 
shifting from in-kind services to conditional and/or unconditional cash allowances, leaving 
families ‘free’ to buy these services in the market (Simonazzi, 2009). Germany and Austria 
are somehow in between these two types of countries: their welfare state is traditionally more 
generous than that of Mediterranean countries, but they tend to be familialistic with respect to 
domestic and care work and they adopted a system of unconditional cash allowances to 
families (Simonazzi, 2009). As in the case of Mediterranean countries, families rely more and 
more on migrant women, as they represent a cheaper and more flexible workforce compared 
to local women. 
The countries with the lowest shares of migrants in the domestic sector are Eastern European 
countries. Slovakia, Hungary and Czech Republic all have less than 5% of migrants in the 
domestic workforce. However, also Finland, Portugal and the Netherlands have a small 
concentration of migrants in the sector (7.8%, 9.4% and 10.6% respectively). 
 
4.3.2.1 Countries of origin 
 
The migrant population employed in the domestic sector in each European country differs not 
only in numerical terms, but also in terms of the countries of origin. If Figure 6 shows the 
enormous differences that exist in Europe in the concentration of migrants in the domestic 
workforce, just as many differences are observable when the origins of domestic workers are 
considered in detail.  
To understand these differences, three main factors have to be considered. First, the 
international migration into Europe is not homogeneous and largely depends on the history of 
migration, which differs significantly from country to country. These historical differences 
are also mirrored in the characteristics of the migrant population employed in domestic 
services. Second, given the low reputation and poor working conditions of domestic work, the 
migrants who concentrate in this sector tend to be those that enjoy a lower status and who find 
more barriers to enter the labour market of the host society, be that because of administrative 
procedures, or because of racist and discriminatory issues. In particular, third-country 
nationals, especially those coming from less developed countries, are more likely to work in 
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low-skilled occupations, including domestic work. Third, as literature has pointed out, the 
European enlargements first of 2004 and then of 2007 and 2013 have generated a large flow 
of migration from Eastern European countries. For many of these migrants – especially for 
women – the domestic sector represents the main entry point in the labour market of receiving 
countries (Morokvasic et al., 2007).  
Figure 7 shows the migrant domestic workers in Europe by country of origin, based on data 
from the EU-LFS165.  
 
Figure 7: Migrant domestic workers in Europe by country of birth (region) 
 
Country of birth: 
1 = EU15  
2 = new member states (CY, CZ, EE, HU, LT, LV, MT, PL, SK, SI, BG, RO, HR) 
4 = EFTA countries (Switzerland, Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein)  
5 = other Europe 
6 = North Africa  
7 = other Africa 
8 = Middles East  
9 = South and East Asia 
10 = North America and Oceania  
11 = Central America 
12 = South America  
 
The data displayed include all EU member states, apart from Bulgaria, Slovenia, Malta and Poland, for which 
the information on the occupation (ISCO code) is not available and Germany and Romania, for which 
information on the country of birth is not provided. 
Source: EU-LFS 2015 
                                                        
165 The EU-LFS data only provides the country of origin aggregated in areas. For details, refer to footnote 147.  
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According to the EU-LFS data, the great majority of migrant domestic workers in Europe 
come from Eastern European countries (new accession countries following the 2004, 2007 
and 2013 enlargements and other parts of Europe). The second region of the world from 
which domestic workers emigrate is Africa (codes 6 and 7 in the graphic). At a lower level is 
the presence of domestic workers from South and East Asia, from old European countries and 
from South and Central America (codes 11 and 12 in the graphic). Considerably less 
important is the number of domestic migrants from the Middle East and from richer areas of 
the world (EFTA countries, North America and Oceania).  
Figure 8 shows the cross-country differences in the origin of migrant domestic workers. The 
figure overall confirms that cross-national differences in the origin of domestic workers 
depend, among other factors, on the different history of migration of European countries. In 
general, it can be observed that in countries of old immigration166, such as the UK, Belgium, 
France, the Netherlands and Sweden, a large number of domestic workers come from Africa, 
South America and/or Asia. The prevalence of each area of origin seems to be linked to 
historical legacies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
166 In migration studies, it is common to define ‘countries of immigration’ those countries where the 
immigration is considerably and systematically larger than emigration (positive net migration). The relative term 
‘old’ is adopted with reference to countries where the positive net migration started sometime in the past. The 
term is used for comparison with countries where the surplus of immigration over emigration started in more 
recent times (countries of ‘new’ immigration) (Fassman and Reeger, 2012). In Europe, typical countries of old 
immigration are the UK, France, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden, while 
countries of new immigration are Spain, Portugal, Greece and Italy (Franchino, 2009). 
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Figure 8: Country of birth (by region) of migrant domestic workers in 22 EU member 
states 
 
Country of birth: 
1 = EU15  
2 = new member states (CY, CZ, EE, HU, LT, LV, 
MT, PL, SK, SI, BG, RO, HR) 
4 = EFTA countries (Switzerland, Iceland, Norway, 
Liechtenstein)  
5 = other Europe 
6 = North Africa  
7 = other Africa 
8 = Middles East  
9 = South and East Asia 
10 = North America and Oceania  
11 = Central America 
12 = South America  
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Country of birth: 
1 = EU15  
2 = new member states (CY, CZ, EE, HU, LT, LV, 
MT, PL, SK, SI, BG, RO, HR) 
4 = EFTA countries (Switzerland, Iceland, Norway, 
Liechtenstein)  
5 = other Europe 
6 = North Africa  
7 = other Africa 
8 = Middles East  
9 = South and East Asia 
10 = North America and Oceania  
11 = Central America 
12 = South America 
 
Source: EU-LFS 2015 
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For instance, many migrant domestic workers in the UK come from Africa and Asia. This can 
be due to the fact that for long time migration to the UK was linked to the former British 
Empire and many migrants were coming from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, the Caribbean 
Islands and Africa. Also, immigration to Belgium was for a long time linked to its colonies, 
especially to Congo, but immigration from North Africa and Turkey was also very consistent 
(Van der Bracht et al., 2014). This is reflected in the composition of the domestic workforce, 
where a large share of domestic workers is constituted by North Africans and other Africans 
(codes 6 and 7 in the graphic). The same can be said about France and its colonial links with 
Africa, which is also reflected in the composition of the workforce in the French domestic 
sector. In the Netherlands, the same link is visible between the number of domestic workers 
from Africa and Asia and its history of immigration, which was first characterised by ‘guest 
workers’ programmes with Turkey and Morocco and then by colonial links with Indonesia. 
This might suggest that the old immigration flows in these countries still have an effect on 
new migration flows 167 , and at the same time that these new migrants tend to be 
overrepresented in low-skilled occupations, such as the domestic service sector. 
However, the main novelty is that also in some countries of old immigration a medium to 
large share of domestic workers coming from Eastern European countries can be observed. In 
particular, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, but also Sweden and the UK, show a great 
number of Eastern European domestic workers. The only exceptions are represented by 
France, and to a lower extent by the Netherlands, where the presence of domestic workers 
from Eastern Europe is less pronounced.  
Concerning Mediterranean countries, usually identified as countries of ‘new immigration’168, 
it can be observed that the great majority of domestic workers come from Eastern European 
countries. This is particularly true for Italy and Greece. The situation is somehow different in 
Spain and in Portugal, where the largest share of domestic workers comes from South 
America and from Africa (only in Portugal). Again, as it is the case for countries of old 
immigration, this is mainly due to colonialist links to South America (for both Spain and 
Portugal) and to Africa (for Portugal). 
                                                        
167 The migrant population in Figure 8 is defined based on the country of birth and therefore only includes new 
migrants, who are born in a country other than the country of residence. 
168 If we define immigration countries those with a positive net migration, also the majority of Eastern European 
countries fall under this definition. Additionally, they also have a recent history of immigration and can therefore 
be included in the definition of countries of new immigration (Fassman and Reeger, 2012).  
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Regarding Eastern European countries, which are also countries of new immigration, the 
picture is much more homogeneous, as migrant domestic workers are almost entirely coming 
from other Eastern European countries.  
 
4.3.2.2 Second generations 
 
Finally, it is important to notice that when second generations are added to the analysis, the 
ethnicisation of the sector in some countries might be considerably higher. To check whether 
adding second generations would change the degree of ethnicisation and for which countries, 
I have used the only database provided by Eurostat that includes information on the country 
of birth of mothers and fathers, namely the EU-LFS ad hoc module 2014. Figure 9 reports the 
proportion of migrants, second generations and natives working in the domestic sector in the 
European countries for which data is available169.  
As it emerges from the graphic, the degree of ethnicisation changes considerably when 
second generations of migrants are added to first generations. However, this is more visible 
for some countries, while in other countries second generations in the domestic sector are 
negligible. In particular, in France, Luxemburg and the UK, but also in some Eastern 
European countries, such as Latvia and Estonia, the presence of second-generation migrants 
among the domestic workforce is considerable, so that the degree of ethnicisation becomes 
significantly stronger when first and second-generation migrants are considered 
simultaneously. In other countries, especially Romania, Italy, Spain and Cyprus, the level of 
ethnicisation when second generations are added remains almost unchanged. 
As expected, the differences in the presence of second-generation migrants among European 
countries are strongly linked to their history of immigration, with countries of old 
immigration showing a stronger presence of second generations and countries of new 
immigration showing the least presence of second generations. The exceptions are Estonia 
and Latvia, which both present a strong presence of second generations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
169 Second generations are defined as individuals born in the country of residence, who have at least one of the 
two parents born abroad (variables ‘country of birth of mother’ and ‘country of birth of father’).  
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Figure 9: Proportion of migrants, second generations and natives in the domestic sector 
in 19 EU member states 
 
Figure 9: The data displayed include all EU member states, excluding Bulgaria, Slovenia, Malta and Poland, for 
which the information on the occupation (ISCO code) is not available and Germany, for which information on 
the country of birth and country of birth of mothers and fathers is not provided. 
Source: EU-LFS ad hoc module 2014 
 
 
4.4 The working conditions in the domestic sector 
 
As scholarship has long highlighted, domestic work is characterised by excessively poor 
working conditions. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the low status and low value of the job, 
which are linked to a variety of factors, are reflected in the working conditions, which remain 
persistently low, compared to any other type of employment (Anderson, 2000; Rollins, 1985; 
Parreñas, 2001; Cox, 2006). Public bodies, as well as third sector professionals working in the 
field, have recently started to pay attention and to denounce the inequalities suffered by 
domestic workers. These inequalities are visible not only in the economic exploitation of 
domestic workers in the labour market, but in some cases in their degrading treatment and 
psychological and physical abuse (UNHCR 2011; ILO, 2013). As UNHCR emphasises, in the 
most extreme cases – and especially in the case of the most vulnerable migrant population – 
these abuses can reach conditions similar to slavery and be linked to situations of human 
trafficking (UNHCR, 2011). The invisibility of the job, which is performed in private 
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environments, prevents from a close monitoring of the working conditions and from the 
punishment of situations of abuse and exploitation. 
In the last decades, many attempts have been made in certain European countries in order to 
professionalise domestic services and improve the working conditions of domestic workers. 
The assumption behind any attempt to professionalise the sector is that the status of the job 
would change once the job is carried out on a professional basis (Lutz, 2010). In other words, 
the transformation from unpaid work to market-based employment would engender a 
transformation of the value attributed to the job. In most cases, reforms of the regulations of 
the domestic sector have been intended to reduce undeclared work and at the same time 
decrease unemployment by creating new jobs in the labour market (Kvist, 2012). The main 
instruments that have been adopted include the introduction of voucher systems, tax 
deductions and reduction of social security contributions for hiring domestic workers. 
However, as the findings deriving from monitoring efforts point out, the professionalisation of 
the work has not automatically led to an improvement of working conditions and better job 
quality. Excessive working hours (especially for live-in domestic workers), involuntary part-
time (mainly due to long commuting time), wages far below national standards and/or 
minimum wages, precarious forms of contracts, low benefits associated to the job (holidays, 
transportation, health insurance, etc.), lack of training and professional mobility are just some 
typical features of the working conditions in the domestic sector (Anderson, 2000; Lutz, 
2010; ILO, 2013; UNHCR, 2016).  
 
4.4.1 Income level 
 
One of the main problems linked to the quality of jobs in the domestic sector is the low pay, 
which generally falls far below national standards and/or minimum wages. This is partly due 
to the unwillingness of employers to pay high wages for a job that is still considered a low-
skilled occupation, of no value, and requiring no specific competence (Lutz, 2010). Even in 
the most successful cases of professionalisation of domestic services – namely, the voucher 
systems of France and Belgium – policy and academic findings emphasise that the success of 
the systems is due to the high public financial participation, which makes possible to keep the 
price for the employers (families) competitively low. On the contrary, the failure of the 
voucher system in Austria has been precisely identified in the relatively high price that 
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employers have to pay to hire domestic workers through the voucher system, compared to the 
informal market170.  
Figure 10 shows the distribution of the domestic workers by income deciles in Europe. 
 
Figure 10: Income (deciles) of domestic workers in Europe  
 
Figure 10: Data not available for Bulgaria, Slovenia, Malta and Poland, for which the information on the 
occupation (ISCO code) is not provided and Austria, Czech Republic, Spain, Hungary and Sweden, for which 
information on the income level is not provided. 
Source: EU-LFS 2015 
 
As it clearly emerges from the figure, the income of the domestic workers in Europe 
concentrates in the lower deciles, which suggests that domestic workers are among the 
workers with the lower income among the entire employed population. 
If we compare the distribution of income of domestic workers to that of other low-skilled 
workers, it emerges that in many European countries domestic workers are disproportionately 
concentrated in the lower income deciles, while the other low-skilled workers are better 
distributed in higher income deciles. Figure 11 provides the comparison between the income 
distribution of domestic workers and other low-skilled workers in all EU countries for which 
the information is available.  
 
                                                        
170 Based on the Austrian Dienstleistungsscheck system (voucher system), the hourly price that families have to 
pay is 10.2 euro. Since the informal market rate for hiring domestic workers is about 7 euro per hour, the system 
is not attractive to employers. This explains the very limited use of vouchers by Austrians (IWAK, 2011). 
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Figure 11: Distribution of domestic workers and other low-skilled workers by income 
deciles in 19 EU member states (2015) 
 
Figure 11: Data not available for Bulgaria, Slovenia, Malta and Poland, for which the information on the 
occupation (ISCO code) is not provided and Austria, Czech Republic, Spain, Hungary and Sweden, for which 
information on the income level is not provided. 
Source: EU-LFS 2015 
 
Figure 11 shows that it is only in Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and the UK that the 
income of domestic workers seems to be similar to that of other low-skilled workers171. In all 
                                                        
171 For the definition of ‘other low-skilled workers’ I used the ISCO classification and I included only codes 
>=900, which correspond to ‘Elementary occupations’. 
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the other countries, the income of domestic workers is over-represented in the lowest deciles 
of income.  
 
4.4.2 Temporary work 
 
Another feature that can be used to assess the quality of jobs in the domestic sector is the 
precariousness of the job, in terms of temporary vs. permanent type of contract. Table 18 
shows the proportion of temporary and permanent contracts in the domestic sector and in all 
other sectors of the labour market in 24 European countries, according to the EU-LFS data for 
the year 2015. 
 
Table 18: Proportion of temporary and of permanent jobs in the domestic sector and in 
other sectors in 24 EU member states (2015) 
Country  Temporary work 
domestic sector %  
Permanent work 
domestic sector %  
Temporary work 
other sectors %  
Permanent work 
other sectors %  
AT  6.86 93.14 9.10 90.90 
BE  12.16 87.84 8.79 91.21 
CY  63.28 36.72 11.93 88.07 
CZ  18.47 81.53 10.01 89.99 
DE  15.74 84.26 12.53 87.47 
DK  13.65 86.35 8.84 91.16 
EE  2.27 97.73 3.21 96.79 
ES  27.21 72.79 24.76 75.24 
FI  26.26 73.74 12.80 87.20 
FR  22.88 77.12 15.17 84.83 
GR  26.77 73.23 11.87 88.13 
HR  25.21 74.79 20.03 79.97 
HU  24.88 75.12 14.09 85.91 
IE  11.24 88.76 8.61 91.39 
IT  11.47 88.53 14.42 85.58 
LT  2.53 97.47 1.97 98.03 
LU  9.05 90.95 9.45 90.55 
LV  2.98 97.02 3.43 96.57 
NL  20.09 79.91 19.70 80.30 
PT  22.59 77.41 21.11 78.89 
RO  3.94 96.06 1.31 98.69 
SE  28.00 72.00 14.69 85.31 
SK  17.12 82.88 10.08 89.92 
UK  6.41 93.59 5.31 94.69 
 
Figure 12 presents the proportion of temporary work, as a share of the total employment, in 
the domestic sector. 
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Figure 12: Proportion of temporary work in the domestic sector in 24 EU member states 
(2015) 
 
Figure 12: Data not available for Bulgaria, Slovenia, Malta and Poland, for which the information on the 
occupation (ISCO code) is not provided. 
Source: EU-LFS 2015 
 
As shown in Figure 12, only in Cyprus the share of domestic workers with a temporary work 
is higher than the share of domestic workers with a permanent job. In all the other countries, 
the share of temporary work in the domestic sector represents less than 30%. However, in 
Sweden, Spain, Greece, Finland, Croatia, Hungary, France, Portugal and the Netherlands the 
proportion of temporary work in the domestic sector is higher than the European average. In 
Eastern European countries – Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Romania – the share of 
temporary work in the domestic sector is significantly lower compared to the European 
average. 
Figure 13 presents the comparison between the proportion of temporary work in the domestic 
sector and in all other sectors in the 24 countries included in the analysis. 
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Figure 13: Proportion of temporary work in the domestic sector and in the other sectors 
in 24 EU member states (2015) 
 
Figure 13: Data not available for Bulgaria, Slovenia, Malta and Poland, for which the information on the 
occupation (ISCO code) is not provided. 
Source: EU-LFS 2015 
 
As it emerges from the graphical representation, the share of temporary work in the domestic 
sector is larger than the share of temporary work in all the other sectors in the majority of the 
EU member states included in the analysis. The most significant differences are visible in 
Cyprus, Sweden, Finland, Greece and Hungary. Only in Austria, Estonia, Italy, Luxembourg 
and Latvia the share of temporary work in the domestic sector is lower than in all the other 
sectors, albeit with smaller differences. 
However, it is important to notice that the share of temporary work might be underestimated, 
as the figure does not capture the large share of informal work in the domestic sector172. 
 
4.4.3 Unusual working hours 
 
A last feature that can be used to assess the quality of jobs in the domestic sector and that is 
typical of occupations characterised by poor working conditions, is the fact of working on 
unusual time schedules. This includes working on weekends, on evenings and on night shifts. 
Domestic workers are often required to work on atypical timetables, either to satisfy the needs 
                                                        
172 By definition, informal work is characterised by an informal employment relationship (no formal contract) 
and therefore by a high degree of precariousness. 
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of the employers or because the need – especially for care work – may arise at sudden times. 
For instance, families might require domestic workers to perform certain tasks at specific 
times, such as cleaning or cooking for specific occasions during the weekends, or very early 
in the morning or late in the evening, depending on the working hours of the family members. 
In the case of care work, workers might be needed at specific times because of the very nature 
of the work (children who need to be picked up very early in the morning or late in the 
evenings, depending on the timetable of other family members, or elderly people and other 
dependants whose health conditions require to work at nights and/or on weekends). The fact 
of working on shifts and on unusual working hours adds up to the emotional and physical 
strain of domestic work and contributes to worsening the working conditions of domestic 
workers.  
 
Figure 14: Proportion of shift work in the domestic sector in 24 EU member states 
(2015) 
 
Figure 14: Data not available for Bulgaria, Slovenia, Malta and Poland, for which the information on the 
occupation (ISCO code) is not provided. 
Source: EU-LFS 2015 
 
As presented in Figure 14, in many European countries more than 50% of domestic workers 
work on shifts (evenings, Saturdays, Sundays, nights). The proportion of domestic workers 
working on shifts is especially high in Croatia, Luxembourg, Cyprus, Greece and Sweden, 
with more than 55% of domestic workers whose work is performed in atypical hours. What is 
worth noticing here is that the two countries where the domestic sector is regulated through 
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the system of vouchers (France and Belgium) are the countries with the lowest share of shift 
work. This seems to suggest that the voucher system succeeds in regulating working hours in 
a sector where unusual time shifts are considered the norm. 
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Chapter 5  
 
Measuring care, gender and migration regimes: construction of 
indicators and typologies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Chapter 2, I have discussed the use of typologies to explain social phenomena and 
presented an overview of the main classifications that have been made to measure care, 
gender and migration regimes. In this chapter, I present the analysis that I have conducted on 
the three regimes and the construction of three new typologies. The objective is to measure 
the three regimes under study and to use these indicators and typologies as a tool for 
investigating cross-national variations in the degree of ethnicisation of the domestic sector. 
This chapter is divided into three main sections, each of them presenting the analysis of one 
of the three regimes taken into consideration. Each section includes the following steps: the 
presentation of the theoretical grounds on which each analysis is carried out, the presentation 
of the selection of the indicators, the analyses that have been carried out and their results, and 
finally the typologies deriving from the analyses.   
 
5.1 Measuring the care regime 
 
The objective of this section is to provide a tentative measurement of care regimes. First, the 
analysis presented in this section has the objective of covering the main thematic dimensions 
of care regimes, as they are defined in this study: care for children, care for elderly people and 
incentives for housework activities. While the academic literature has already investigated the 
national approaches with respect to care provisions and the ‘care dimension’ of policies, little 
or no attention has been given to policies specifically addressing housework services so far. 
For a thorough understanding of the impact of care regimes on the structure and functioning 
of the domestic sector, it seems crucial to add a further dimension that includes the incentives 
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for the externalisation of housework activities. Although the two main dimensions that have 
been analysed in the literature – care for children and care for the elderly – are at the core of 
the way welfare states support care responsibilities and therefore are fundamental in 
understanding the development of the domestic sector at national level, a more complete 
analysis should necessarily take into consideration also those policies that directly touch at 
housework services – which are the “non-care” dimension of the domestic sector.  
The assumption is that policies and specific regulations addressing housework activities have 
an effect on outcomes in the domestic sector, as they might influence the choices of families 
in terms of the externalisation of housework services. For instance, the choice to externalise 
both care and cleaning services can be based on the availability or not of certain monetary 
incentives offered by the state, or by the availability of eased procedures to hire formal 
domestic personnel. The availability of such incentives or regulations can in turn influence the 
availability and the composition of the supply side.  
The second objective of this analysis is to take into account both the generosity of policies 
and the degree of de-familialisation of policies, as it has been highlighted by research on care 
regimes. 
The existing literature has highlighted the complex nature of care packages and of the 
different combinations of care policies at country level and the consequent difficulties 
encountered when trying to measure care regimes173. Given the complexity of the task, and in 
order to provide a comprehensive picture of the way European countries can be grouped with 
respect to care policies, I have conducted an analysis meant to derive indicators that can be 
validated statistically and then used in the further analysis that will be presented in Chapter 6.  
 
5.1.1 Construction of indicators and typologies of care regimes 
 
The analysis was carried out in order to classify care regimes and create a typology based on 
two dimensions: 1) the degree of de-familialisation and 2) the generosity of welfare 
provisions with respect to care. The choice is based on the fact that both dimensions are 
crucial in determining households’ choices with respect to care and domestic responsibilities. 
This in turn is of paramount importance for the understanding of care regimes in the light of 
evaluating their impact on the domestic sector. In addition to the two above-mentioned 
dimensions, the measurement of care regimes and the construction of the typologies is meant 
                                                        
173 For a detailed explanation of care policies and the difficulties in measuring care regimes, refer to section 2.2.3. 
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to cover the three domains which are part of my analysis of paid domestic work: childcare, 
elderly care and housework. This is based on the consideration that – although the last domain 
has usually been neglected in the evaluation of care regimes – housework incentives do 
constitute an important public instrument that can have a crucial repercussion on the degree of 
externalisation of domestic services, as well as on the way paid domestic work is regulated 
and conceived. 
First of all, the generosity of care provisions and the extent to which they are allocated by the 
state can represent an incentive to families, as they provide families with the financial support 
to satisfy their care and domestic needs. The level of financial support provided by the state 
for the care of children (parental leaves, availability of public affordable childcare facilities), 
for the care of elderly people (availability of affordable public residential facilities, cash-for-
care incentives to hire external help, social security schemes, etc.) and for housework services 
(financial incentives to externalise housework) has an impact on the degree of externalisation 
of domestic and care activities. When policy instruments are in place, but the level of 
financial support is not sufficient, families might decide not to benefit from the support and 
not to externalise care responsibilities. This is the case, for instance, of paternity and parental 
leaves, which in many European countries are not used by fathers, as the level of 
compensation is too low. Also, when residential facilities for dependent people and childcare 
services are too expensive, families might decide not to use them, especially when the income 
level of one family member – of women in particular – is not sufficient and makes the use of 
external services not worth it. 
However, the degree of generosity of public provisions is not enough to understand care 
regimes, as policies that are part of care regimes can have different outcomes in the degree of 
externalisation of domestic and care tasks, and thus on the outcomes in the domestic sector. 
As highlighted by the literature (see Chapter 2), the measurement of care regimes along the 
spectrum that goes from familialisation to de-familialisation represents a more nuanced 
instrument for the assessment of care regimes. While a high level of generosity of care 
provisions tends to be associated with a higher degree of externalisation of care and domestic 
activities by families, not all policies are intended to offer public alternatives for alleviating 
the care burden from the shoulders of families. While the availability of quality and 
affordable services for the care of children and older people is always considered as a de-
familialising type of policy, other types of state intervention are meant on the contrary to 
encourage families to assume their care responsibilities on their own. This is the case, for 
instance, of long and well-paid maternity leaves, which are known to push mothers to stay 
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home to care for their children, while making it difficult for them to re-enter the labour 
market. 
 
5.1.1.1 Selection of indicators 
 
The indicators were selected so to provide an empirical and valid instrument to measure the 
three domains taken into consideration for the assessment of care regimes: childcare provision, 
elderly care provision and incentives for housework174. Additionally, indicators were selected 
in order to cover both the de-familialisation and the generosity dimension of care regimes.  
Regarding the provision of care, the majority of the indicators were selected from the 
Multilinks database, after crosschecking the information with other public institutional 
databases, such as the OECD database, ILO databases and Eurostat. Only one indicator was 
selected from the OECD Health Statistics database. Regarding housework incentives, the 
selected indicators were derived from the report Developing personal and household services 
in the EU: a focus on housework activities, funded by the European Commission. 
Table 19 provides the full list of indicators used for the analysis, as well as the sources from 
which indicators were selected: 
 
Table 19: Indicators used for the analysis of care regimes 
Area Indicator Source 
Childcare Effective maternity leave (obtained by weighting 
the maternity leave duration in weeks with the 
maternity leave compensation as a percentage of 
earned income) 
Multilinks database 
Effective parental leave (obtained by weighting 
the parental leave duration in weeks with the 
parental leave compensation as a percentage of 
earned income) 
Multilinks database 
Childcare usage for children under 3 years old (% 
of all children under 3) 
Multilinks database 
Full-time childcare usage for children under 3 (% 
of all children under 3) 
Multilinks database 
Child allowance for 1st child (% of average net 
income) 
Multilinks database 
Child allowance for 2nd child (% of average net 
income) 
Multilinks database 
Elderly care Residential care, people living in care institutions 
(% of population 65 years old or more) 
Multilinks database 
                                                        
174 Although the selected indicators and the following construction of indexes has been based on theoretical 
grounds and is meant to provide a scientific valid set of measurements, I am aware of the relativity and the 
normativity of the selection of the indicators.  
 183 
Home-based care recipients (% of population 65 
years old or more) 
Multilinks database 
Minimum social security (% of average net 
income) 
Multilinks database 
Net replacement rate (% of average income) Multilinks database 
Long-term-care expenditure (% of GDP) OECD Health Statistics 2017 
database 
Housework Voucher system (Y/N) EC report 
Reduced VAT for housework services (Y/N) EC report 
Tax deductions for housework services (Y/N) EC report 
Reduced contributions for housework services 
(Y/N) 
EC report 
 
Regarding childcare provision, maternity and parental leaves represent one of the principal 
indicators used in any study on care regimes. Although the duration and level of 
compensation vary significantly, all European countries offer a certain combination of 
maternity and parental leaves. On the contrary, paternity leaves are not available in all 
countries. The choice not to include paternity leaves as such is based on the fact that they are 
less relevant for a comparative analysis, as they are almost identical in the majority of EU 
countries (usually, they consist in 5 to 10 day leaves, paid at 100%, that fathers can take 
immediately after the birth of the child). Additionally, due to their short duration, they cannot 
be considered as contributing to the familialisation or the de-familialisation of care.  
The indicators on overall childcare usage and full-time childcare usage for children aged 0 to 
3 years old have been selected because they mirror the availability of public childcare services 
at national level. Therefore, they constitute a very important source of information about the 
type of public service provision addressing children. The two indicators on child allowances 
have been selected as they provide important information regarding the level of financial 
support offered to families for the care of children. 
Regarding elderly care, the indicators about residential care and home-based care (people 
living in residential homes for the elderly and home-based care recipients) have been selected 
as they mirror the availability of elderly care services provided by the state. Therefore, they 
provide information about the way and the extent to which the state takes in charge care 
responsibilities towards the elderly.  
The indicators about minimum social security schemes and net replacement rates have been 
selected because they provide information about the level of support provided by the state to 
senior citizens. Unfortunately, there is no unique way to provide financial support to elderly 
people and each member state has its own system of social security provision for the elderly. 
Although there might be specific measures addressing the economic needs of elderly people, 
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the most common include the financial benefits in the form of pensions, social security and 
social insurance schemes. Although pension benefits are usually linked to the employment 
history of individuals and to the length of contributions, they nevertheless represent one of the 
most important measures for evaluating elderly care provision, as they are intended to provide 
the financial means to conduct a decent and autonomous life in old age. In this sense, 
information on pensions is useful as it defines the “public responsibility for the financial 
autonomy of the elderly irrespective of their children’s obligations” (Saraceno and Keck, 
2008). Regarding the minimum social security scheme, they are either offered by the state as 
means-tested entitlements for old age or as more or less universalistic social assistance 
schemes. The combination of the two indicators is meant to provide an idea of the level of 
financial support to elderly people. The indicator on the level of long-term care expenditure as 
a percentage of the GDP has been introduced in the analysis as it provides an institutional 
measure on the level of the financial support that the state allocates to the care of senior 
citizens175.  
Concerning housework incentives, the four indicators have been selected as they represent the 
main type of measures offered by governments to facilitate the externalisation of domestic 
tasks. Although the report Developing personal and household services in the EU: a focus on 
housework activities identifies other types of public interventions that can one way or another 
facilitate the process (the overall flexibilisation and the type of structure of the labour market, 
the more or less explicit increase of the labour supply through for example specific 
immigration policies 176 , etc.), the selected indicators are easier to use for international 
comparison, as they all measure one type of financial incentive specific to domestic work. 
Concerning the selection of the indicators, the main limitation of this analysis is represented 
by the lack of information on some policies that can be crucial in defining both the level of 
generosity of care regimes and the level of de-familialisation achieved by such policies. The 
missing indicators that could have been beneficial for the analysis are the availability and the 
level of compensation of child-rearing allowances 177  (in the field of childcare) and the 
                                                        
175 Although LTC expenditure cannot alone capture the whole public expenditure addressing care needs of the 
elderly, as different budget lines can include some aspects of elderly care support (health, social assistance, etc.), 
it nevertheless provides a specific measure that can be used for cross-national comparison. 
176 In this research, the immigration policies that directly or indirectly encourage the increase of the supply side 
(domestic workers) are included in the analysis of migration regimes, in section 5.3.  
177 Child-rearing allowances are specific incentives that exist in some countries intended to provide incentives 
for parents (usually mothers) to stay at home to care for their children, instead of re-entering the labour market. 
These incentives, that clearly belong to the familialisation types of policies, are special benefits, which are not 
part of the maternity or parental leaves, whose objective is to offer mothers the choice between caring for 
children at home or working outside the home. However, although they are meant to substitute paid work in the 
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availability and the level of compensation of cash-for-care allowances178  (in the field of 
elderly care). 
 
Since the analysis is intended to develop two separate indexes – a generosity index and a de-
familialisation index – each indicator was attributed to one or the other dimension, depending 
on the relevance for each dimension. Even if almost all selected indicators could partly be 
used for measuring both dimensions179, a distinction was made between those indicators that 
are more clearly indicating the degree of familialisation vs. defamilialisation, and those that 
are most useful to measure the level of generosity. Although there is no unanimity on which 
policies are intended to familialism and which to de-familialisation, and even less on which 
are the empirical results of these policies with this respect, the choice of the indicators was 
made based on the following considerations. 
In principle, familialisation occurs when care and domestic responsibilities are privately and 
publicly acknowledged as being responsibilities of families, who have to find their own 
solutions to meet their needs, through unpaid family resources and various types of solidarity 
(extended family, friends, neighbours, etc.). On the contrary, de-familialisation occurs when 
families can count on external support in satisfying their care and domestic needs. This can be 
achieved through both the state and the market. However, as Saraceno and Keck underline 
(2010), the type of de-familialisation achieved through the market is different from the one 
achieved through public provision, as the externalisation via the market almost always implies 
                                                                                                                                                                             
labour market, they usually consist in a low level of payment, which is not comparable to an income derived 
from employment in the labour market. 
178 For a thorough analysis of care regimes in terms of familialisation/de-familialistion it would have been 
useful to have indicators on the availability of cash-for-care allowances, on the level of such allowances and on 
the typology (bound to buy care services or unconditional allowances). Unfortunately, no exploitable indicator 
was found on cash-for care allowances across European countries. The Multilinks database – from which the 
majority of indicators on care provision were selected – includes one indicator on the availability of cash-for-
care schemes for the elderly in 2009 (Yes-No response type). However, the indicator could not be used, because 
after cross-checking the information with the most recent data at European level, it appears that in the last few 
years the situation has evolved and that today virtually all EU countries include some sort of cash-for-care 
scheme in their care packages. This makes a Yes-No indicator not exploitable (no difference between countries). 
The MISSOC Comparative Tables Database (available here: 
http://www.missoc.org/INFORMATIONBASE/COMPARATIVETABLES/MISSOCDATABASE/comparative
TableSearch.jsp ) offers a rich set of indicators on social policies, including long term care (LTC) and family 
benefits. However, the information about cash-for-care allowances for elderly people is of difficult interpretation 
and cannot be used for comparative purposes. This is due to the fact that the level of cash allowances is only 
provided for certain countries, while for the majority of countries only a verbal description of the policy and of 
the entitlements is provided, which renders the interpretation and the international comparison arduous.  
Therefore, no indicator on cash-for-care allowances was included in the analysis. 
179 All indicators – which correspond to policies in the field of care – include both a de-familialisation and a 
generosity dimension, which in some cases can be difficult to distinguish. For instance, all indicators that are 
universally used to measure the degree of familialisation vs. de-familialisation necessarily include a generosity 
dimension, as policies can include a different degree of financial support. 
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the intervention of the families. From this point of view, the direct purchase of care and 
domestic services in the market does not change the traditional role of families with respect to 
care and domestic responsibilities, and therefore can hardly be considered as a “real” de-
familialisation.  
Additionally, for a coherent assessment of policies through the familialisation/de-
familialisation approach, the adoption of a gender perspective is necessary (Saraceno and 
Keck, 2008). From a gender perspective, the degree of familialisation can be evaluated 
through the degree of care and domestic responsibilities assigned to women and on the 
contrary the de-familialisation through the degree to which the unpaid labour of women is 
substituted by paid external labour. The combination of a familialisation/de-familialisation 
approach and the gender perspective has been taken as the framework for the distinction 
between the indicators that measure each of the two dimensions of the analysis.   
Table 20 reports the subdivision of indicators that was made prior the analysis, distinguishing 
between the indicators used to construct the generosity index and those used to construct the 
de-familialisation index: 
 
Table 20: Selected indicators for each dimension of the care regime 
De-familialisation index Generosity index 
 Effective maternity leave (obtained by 
weighting the maternity leave duration in 
weeks with the maternity leave 
compensation as a percentage of earned 
income) 
 Childcare usage for children under 3 years 
old (% of all children under 3) 
 Full-time childcare usage for children under 
3 (% of all children under 3) 
 Residential care, people living in care 
institutions (% of population 65 years old or 
more) 
 Home-based care recipients (% of population 
65 years old or more) 
 Housework incentives – derived from: 
 Voucher system (Y/N) 
 Reduced VAT for 
housework services (Y/N) 
 Tax deductions for 
housework services (Y/N) 
 Reduced contributions for 
housework services (Y/N) 
 Effective parental leave (obtained by 
weighting the parental leave duration 
in weeks with the parental leave 
compensation as a percentage of 
earned income) 
 Child allowance for 1st child (% of 
average net income) 
 Child allowance for 2nd child (% of 
average net income) 
 Minimum social security (% of 
average net income) 
 Net replacement rate (% of average 
income) 
 Long-term-care expenditure (% of 
GDP) 
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The indicators used for the de-familialisation index include all housework incentives, public 
services and facilities for childcare and elderly care, and maternity leaves. Concerning 
housework incentives, the choice to use them for the assessment of the degree of de-
familialisation is based on the fact that the availability of such policies is known to have an 
impact on family choices with respect to the externalisation of housework activities, no matter 
the level of generosity of such incentives180. The indicator on housework incentives was 
derived by the sum of the values of fours dichotomous variables (Yes-No response): 1) 
voucher system; 2) reduced VAT; 3) tax deductions; 4) reduced contributions. 
Concerning the indicators on the provision of public childcare and elderly care services 
(childcare usage, people living in residential care homes, home-based care recipients), the 
choice to use them for the measurement of the de-familialisation index is based on the 
literature, which uncontroversially stresses the de-familialising nature of these policies 
(Leitner, 2003; Saraceno, 2010, 2011, refer to Chapter 2)181. 
The choice to include the indicators on child allowances and on social security schemes and 
pensions for elderly people in the generosity index is based on the fact that these incentives 
are aimed to provide a certain degree of financial support to families. Even if a higher 
financial support can contribute to the purchase of external care services, they are not usually 
high enough to determine households’ choices in terms of externalisation of care work. 
Therefore, they seem to be more suitable for the definition of the overall generosity of care 
regimes. A different case is that of cash-for-care allowances for elderly care, which are more 
and more used in all European countries, and which are directly linked to the direct 
purchasing of care services in the market by families. In the case of cash-for-care allowances, 
the debate over their familialising or de-familialising nature is controversial. On the one hand, 
they can be considered as de-familialising policies, as they do encourage families to 
externalise care work by directly purchasing services in the market. On the other hand, they 
re-familialise care responsibilities, because, contrary to public services, they attribute to 
families the full responsibility of care (Simonazzi, 2009). 
                                                        
180 Public incentives for the externalisation of housework services (voucher system, tax deductions, exemption 
from the payment of social contributions, etc.) seem to be powerful instrument in conditioning beneficiaries’ 
choices. Recent academic literature, as well as institutional reports on the monitoring of public policies, 
underline the link between the presence of such incentives and the increased externalisation of domestic services. 
Contrary to old times, when only wealthier households could afford the externalisation of domestic tasks, today 
in many countries, and especially through public incentives, more and more middle-class families decide to 
externalise these services (Lutz, 2011; Gerard, 2013). 
181 The availability of good quality and affordable care facilities constitutes one of the main instruments used by 
welfare states to relieve families from their role of unpaid care providers. Many researches have underlined that 
the higher the availability of such services, the higher the degree of externalisation of care activities (Bettio and 
Plantenga, 2004).  
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The indicator on the total expenditure of the state on long-term care (LTC) was selected, 
because it represents a powerful instrument for measuring the degree of generosity of care 
regimes with regard to elderly care. 
The most seemingly controversial use of indicators for the construction of the two indexes is 
represented by the indicators on maternity and parental leaves182, because the first was used to 
construct the de-familialisation index, while the second was included in the indicators that 
measure the generosity of care regimes. The reason behind the inclusion of maternity and 
parental leaves in two separate dimensions is that while long and generously compensated 
maternity leaves are commonly recognised as familialistic incentives, as they promote the 
care of children within family settings (Saraceno, 2011), parental leaves cannot be considered 
as encouraging the familialisation of care183. If we add to the familialisation/de-familialisation 
approach a gender perspective, the difference between the two policies becomes apparent. 
From a gender point of view, maternity leaves tend to promote the charge of caring 
responsibilities on female members of the family and result in obstacles for women in 
entering or reintegrating the labour market (the so-called ‘child penalty’). Although they are 
not explicitly intended to prevent women from pursuing a professional career, they actually 
create significant obstacles for the reintegration of women in the labour market, especially 
when quality and affordable childcare services are unavailable. On the contrary – and again 
from a gender perspective – parental leaves contribute to the sharing of responsibilities among 
couples and thus weaken the traditional gender division of labour. This in turn seems to have 
opposite outcomes in terms of the reintegration of women in the labour market after the birth 
of a child. Some research has pointed out that when parental leaves are more equally shared 
between men and women, mothers tend to show a stronger attachment to the labour market 
and a dual-earner/dual-carer model tends to be promoted184 (Saraceno, 2011; Leira, 1998). 
Also, countries with the best parental leaves coverage are those with the highest women’s 
participation rates. Therefore, the effective parental leave indicator (obtained by weighting the 
parental leave duration with the parental leave compensation as a percentage of earned 
                                                        
182 As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the indicators on the length and on the level of compensation 
of paternity leaves – which correspond to the few days to which fathers are entitles after the birth of their child – 
were not included in the analysis, as they do not differ consistently among EU member states (in the majority of 
EU countries, fathers are entitled to 5 to 10 paid days of leave) and because they seem to neither encourage a 
more equal sharing of care responsibilities among couples, nor increase the degree of familialisation. 
183 For a detailed explanation about the difference between maternity and parental leaves in terms of their 
familialising power, refer to section 2.2.4.1.  
184 Usually, a distinction is made between parental leaves where men have the option to take time off to care for 
children, and specific “use-it-or-lose-it” quotas for fathers. The latter is commonly considered to be the best 
possible incentive to promote equality among couples and in the labour market, as it reformulates the work-
family issue as a concern of both parents (Leira, 2002). 
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income) is used to measure the generosity of care policies, and not the degree of 
familialisation. 
 
5.1.2.1 Construction of the de-familialisation index 
 
As a first step for the construction of the de-familialisation index, the database was prepared 
so to include all the selected indicators. In order to analyse the indicators in terms of 
familialisation vs. de-familialisation, one variable had to be reversed – ‘effective maternity 
leave’ –, as it goes in the opposite direction in terms of de-familialisation185. The complete 
database, with standardised variables, as well as the correlation matrix are reported in Annex 
2.  
After testing the correlation between the variables, a Principal Component Analysis (PCA)186 
was run on the six items and on the 22 countries for which the data are available187. The 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure verified the sampling adequacy for the analysis: KMO = .56, 
which is above the acceptable limit of .5 (all KMO values for individual items were > .49). 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity, ^2(15) = 67.86483, p < .001 indicated that the correlations 
between the items were sufficiently large for PCA.  
An initial analysis was run to obtain eigenvalues for each component in the data. Two 
components had eigenvalues over Kaiser’s criterion of 1, but the first component alone 
explained 53% of the initial variance. Based on this information, as well as on the scree plot, 
only one component was retained in the final analysis. Information on the PCA is reported in 
Annex 2. Table 21 shows the factor loadings.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
185 While for the other indicators, the higher the value the higher the degree of de-familialisation, regarding the 
variable ‘effective maternity leave’ the opposite is true: the higher the value of the effective maternity leave, the 
higher the degree of familialisation. Therefore, the indicator must be reversed prior the analysis. 
186 Since a Factor Analysis based on a small number of cases (here 22) does not guarantee reliable results (see 
Field A. and al., 2012, ch. 17), a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was used instead. The PCA is a statistical 
technique that calculates linear combinations of k variables on the basis of their reciprocal correlations and 
estimates k principal components. 
187 Since data were missing for certain countries, the final dataset for this and the following analyses includes 22 
countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia and 
the UK. 
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Table 21: Summary of PCA (N = 22) - De-famlialisation 
Item Factor loadings 
Childcare usage under 3 years old .94 
Full-time childcare usage under 3 years old .80 
Residential care elderly .88 
Home-based care elderly .70 
Housework incentives .54 
Effective maternity leave .35 
Eigenvalues 3.20 
% of variance 53 
Cronbach’s alpha .8 
 
Finally, the factor scores were calculated (see Annex 2).  
If we translate the factor scores graphically, we can observe how European countries position 
themselves along the spectrum that goes from familialisation to de-familialisation. 
 
Figure 15: De-familialisation index in 22 EU member states 
 
 
Figure 15 shows that, based on the indicators included in the analysis (maternity leaves, 
childcare and elderly care public services and housework incentives), Nordic countries 
(Denmark, Sweden and Finland), together with France and Belgium, show a higher degree of 
de-familialisation. These countries are characterised by a strong public support to families in 
terms of public services, both for children and for elderly people, which typically encourage 
the de-familialisation of domestic and care tasks. These are the countries with the strongest 
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and longest tradition of welfare state support, also with respect to care, and where the state 
takes in charge the majority of care responsibilities188. In these countries, the state not only 
supports families and alleviate the care burden from the domestic sphere, but it also acts as 
the main care provider (Bode, 2011; Degavre and Nyssens, 2012).  
Looking in detail at each indicator, it appears that Denmark is the country that offers the 
highest level of public services in all areas: childcare facilities (with the highest full-time 
coverage compared to the other European countries), elderly care public services (both in the 
form of residential care and home-based care), and a medium level of support for the 
externalisation of housework. Concerning maternity leaves, Denmark offers quite a long and 
well-paid leave to mothers, which on the contrary tends towards a familialisation of childcare. 
Overall, the care regime of Denmark is strongly pushing towards a de-familialisation of care, 
through a well-developed public provision of services, but at the same time it also supports 
mothers in their caring role after the birth of a child (familialising policy). This can be 
explained by the fact that while the externalisation of the care of elderly people and of 
housework services seems to be more generally accepted, the care of children tends to be at 
least partly familialised in all countries, as parents are considered as the natural providers for 
the overall well-being of children189. Sweden offers the same strong support to families in 
terms of public services to both children and elderly people and a medium support for the 
externalisation of housework services. However, compared to Denmark, it also has a de-
familialising approach to maternity leaves, as it offers a well-paid but very short maternity 
leave. This is the case also of Belgium, with a short and relatively well-paid maternity leave, 
coupled with an important public provision of childcare and elderly care services and a strong 
level of housework incentives. Therefore, in terms of de-familialisation, Sweden and Belgium 
seem to have the most coherent approach, as all the indicators taken into consideration in the 
analysis point at a de-familialising approach. Similar to Belgium, France has put in place 
policies for the externalisation of housework activities and offers a strong support in terms of 
provision of services (more evident for the provision of childcare facilities and residential 
homes for the elderly, and with a slightly less developed system of home-based care for 
                                                        
188 In Esping-Andersen classification of welfare states, these countries correspond to the social-democratic 
group of countries, characterised by a strong and universalistic type of welfare state. For details on welfare 
regimes, refer to section 2.1.2.  
189 As presented in section 2.2.4.1, research has showed that a complete de-familialisation of childcare is not 
only unfeasible, but it is also not sought for. This is valid for all European countries, including those with the 
longest tradition of public childcare services. Indeed, concerning the care of children, psychological, social and 
cultural reasons point at the fact that the care of children will never be exclusively a state responsibility 
(Saraceno, 2008, 2010).  
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elderly people). Compared to Belgium and Sweden, France offers slightly longer and better-
paid maternity leaves, thus supporting to a greater extent the traditional role of women as care 
providers.  
Among the countries with the highest scores on the de-familialisation index, the Netherlands 
represents a peculiar case. While the maternity leave is similar to that of France, the overall 
childcare coverage is extremely high, but only for part-time services. This mirrors the labour 
force behaviour of women, who in this country tend to be concentrated in part-time jobs, 
especially after the birth of a child. Therefore, the relatively good provision of childcare 
services is mitigated by the almost exclusive use of part-time. Concerning the elderly care 
provision, the findings of this analysis confirm that in the Netherlands, just as in the UK, there 
is a strong difference between the provision of childcare and elderly care, the latter being 
extremely well developed (Bettio and Plantenga, 2004). Therefore, the strongest de-
familialisation policy in the Netherlands is the one addressing the care of senior people, which 
is clearly accepted as a state responsibility. 
The countries with the strongest familialistic approach with respect to care are Eastern 
European countries and Mediterranean countries. Concerning the provision of elderly care, all 
Eastern European countries included in the analysis (Estonia, Poland, Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Latvia) offer a low coverage, with a more developed system of home-based care, 
compared to the provision of residential services190. Among Mediterranean countries, Italy 
and Greece show the lowest elderly care provision, both in the form of residential and home-
based care services, although in all Mediterranean countries elderly care provision is 
underdeveloped. Concerning childcare services, among Eastern European countries they are 
well developed in Estonia and in Slovenia, while they are heavily underdeveloped in Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. In the case of Mediterranean countries, the best childcare 
coverage, both part-time and full-time, is offered by Portugal191, while Spain and Italy show a 
medium overall childcare coverage, which is significantly lower in the case of full-time 
coverage. The lowest provisions in the Mediterranean area are that offered by Greece.  
Regarding maternity leaves, the longest leaves are offered by Eastern European countries 
(Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia and Slovakia), followed by Mediterranean countries. 
When the effective maternity leave is taken into consideration (the duration of the leave 
                                                        
190 The only exception is Latvia, where the provision of home-based services for elderly people is lower than 
that of residential services. 
191 Among Mediterranean countries, Portugal represents a unique case, because of its historically high female 
participation rates in the labour market (Bettio et al., 2006). This explains the relatively high coverage in terms 
of childcare services, compared to the other Mediterranean countries. 
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weighted by the level of compensation), the most familialisatic maternity leaves are those 
offered by Estonia, Czech Republic, Poland, Portugal and Hungary. This confirms literature’s 
findings, that point at the overdevelopment of maternity leave policies as a way to strengthen 
the traditional (Catholic) culture that considers mothers as the natural providers of care for 
children. 
Overall, continental countries such as Germany, Luxembourg, Austria and the islands position 
themselves in the average score albeit wide differences exist in the combination of 
familialistic/de-familialistic policies. For instance, while Germany offers medium to low 
public services for both children and the elderly but has a more de-familialistic approach to 
maternity leaves, Austria on the contrary encourages a more familialistic approach through 
long and well-paid maternity leaves, but offers less public services for the care of children. In 
Austria, as it is the case in the Netherlands and the UK, there is quite a different approach 
between the care for children and the care for elderly people, the latter being more developed. 
The UK shows a relatively strong familialism with respect to maternity leaves, but a de-
familialistic approach regarding public care provision. However, as mentioned above, a 
difference exists between elderly care provision, which is traditionally taken in charge by 
public authorities, and the care of children, which is under-developed, especially in terms of 
full-time services.  
Overall, when only the familialisation/de-familialisation approach is taken into account, two 
main considerations can be drawn. First, countries differ considerably with respect to the 
degree of de-familialisation of their care policies, with Northern countries being the most 
striking examples of de-familialisation and Mediterranean countries the strongest promoters 
of familialism. Second, differences exist in the degree of de-familialisation depending on the 
policy area. While policies of de-familialistion seem to be stronger with respect to public 
provision of elderly care, all European countries overall present a stronger degree of 
familialisation in the field of childcare. Only Sweden and Belgium show an overall de-
familialistic approach in all policy areas. However, as literature has shown, in the field of 
childcare provision a full de-familialisation is unlikely to happen and to be sought for 
(Saraceno, 2011). This is confirmed by the fact that, despite consistent differences, maternity 
leaves are part of any welfare state, no matter its de-familialisation intents. 
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5.1.2.2 Construction of the generosity index 
 
As a first step for the construction of the generosity index, the database was prepared so to 
include all the selected indicators. The resulting database, with standardised variables, as well 
as the correlation matrix, is reported in Annex 2.  
After testing the correlation between the variables, a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
was run on the six items and on the 22 countries for which data are available. The usual 
indexes (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin and Cortest Bartlett’s test of sphericity) confirm that a PCA can 
be performed on these data192.  
The first component alone explains the 41% of the initial variance, while two components 
combined explain 69% of the variance. Since only two components had eigenvalues over 
Kaiser’s criterion of 1, the analysis was rerun to extract two components. The full information 
on the PCA is reported in Annex 2, together with the factor loadings of the two components, 
which correspond to the childcare component and the elderly care component. 
 
Table 22: Summary of PCA, oblique rotation (N = 22) - Generosity 
Item Loadings component 1 –  
Childcare 
Loadings component 2 –  
Elderly care 
Effective parental leave .73  
Child allowance 1st child .94  
Child allowance 2nd child .91  
Minimum social security  .87 
Net replacement rate  .45 
LTC expenditure  .71 
Eigenvalues 2.44 1.70 
% of variance 41 69 
alpha .85 .47 
 
The PCA confirms that, in line with the literature, European countries do not necessarily have 
the same behaviour in terms of generosity of policies addressing childcare and elderly care: 
some countries can be very generous in supporting families on their needs for childcare and 
less in supporting elderly care, and vice versa (Bettio and Plantenga, 2004). 
Figure 16 shows the degree of generosity of policies addressing childcare in all European 
countries included in the analysis. 
 
 
                                                        
192 KMO = .6 (all KMO values for individual items were > .47). The Cortest Bartlett’s test of sphericity, 
^2(15) = 52.83297, p < .001, indicated that correlations between items were sufficiently large for PCA.  
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Figure 16: Generosity of childcare policies in 22 EU member states 
 
 
As it emerges from Figure 16, when only the degree of generosity is taken into consideration, 
the countries that better support families in terms of generosity of childcare policies are 
Germany, Denmark, Luxembourg and Sweden, but also Hungary and Slovenia. Therefore, the 
most generous care regimes with respect to childcare are Northern countries, but also two 
among Eastern European countries. Germany and Hungary are the countries that offer better 
coverage, regarding both child allowances and effective parental leaves, with Germany 
offering the best parental leave coverage in Europe. Denmark offers a lower coverage of 
effective parental leaves, but provides high financial support in the form of child allowances.  
The less generous countries in terms of childcare policies are Greece, Spain and Portugal, 
with Italy showing a slightly higher support compared to the other Mediterranean countries, 
thanks to higher child allowances. Among continental countries, France and the Netherlands, 
together with the UK, offer quite poor financial support in the form of child allowances and 
with the exception of France an underdeveloped package of parental leaves. All Eastern 
European countries show a medium level of generosity for childcare, with good effective 
parental leaves and lower child allowances. However, it should be noticed that since the 
packages of parental leaves of Eastern European countries are not formulated as to encourage 
the participation of fathers in caring responsibilities (Saraceno and Keck, 2010), as they do 
not include any specific quotas to be taken by fathers, they tend to be used only by mothers, 
who add them up to their maternity leave. 
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By looking at the generosity of care regimes in meeting childcare needs, what clearly emerges 
is that Mediterranean countries offer the least support, while Northern, continental and 
Eastern European countries offer different degrees of support. In particular, France, the 
Netherlands and the UK show a particularly poor generosity of childcare policies.  
Figure 17 shows the degree of generosity of policies addressing elderly care in all European 
countries included in the analysis. 
 
Figure 17: Generosity of elderly care policies in 22 EU member states 
 
 
The most generous countries among those included in the analysis are Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden and Ireland, while the countries that provide the least financial 
support for elderly care are Eastern European countries, together with Germany and Spain. In 
the latter countries, the care for elderly people seems to be considered as a family 
responsibility and the state only provides a limited support. The public expenditure in long-
term care (LTC) shows that the countries that allocate less financial resources for the care of 
elderly people are Greece, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia and Poland, while Denmark, Belgium 
and Sweden allocate the most conspicuous resources. The most generous minimum social 
security scheme is offered by Denmark, while Germany, Spain and Hungary offer a less 
generous protection. Greece, Hungary and the Netherlands offer the strongest financial 
protection in the form of net replacement rates.  
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Overall, the most generous countries for elderly care are Northern countries, while the less 
generous are Eastern European countries. The behaviour of Mediterranean countries, and of 
Italy and Greece in particular, is peculiar: while they show low LTC expenditure and poor 
social security schemes, they score in the average position compared to all other countries. 
This is due to the fact that Mediterranean countries generally offer relatively generous 
pension schemes for elderly people, combined with limited social security (Jehoel-Gijsbers 
and Vrooman, 2008).  
 
5.1.3 Results 
 
Figure 18 shows the position of EU member states with respect to the generosity of policies 
towards children (x-axis) and towards elderly people (y-axis). 
 
Figure 18: Generosity of care regimes in 22 EU member states 
 
 
Two distinct behaviours are detectable. First, there is a group of countries that behave more or 
less coherently in terms of generosity towards children and the elderly, be that with higher or 
lower degrees of support. In this group of countries, we can identify a cluster of countries 
where both childcare and elderly care are well financed by the state. This group includes 
 198 
Belgium, Ireland, Sweden, Luxembourg, Austria and Denmark. The latter is the country that 
offers the highest level of generosity in all care policies, far higher than any other country of 
the same cluster. Among the same countries, Belgium provides more financial support for 
elderly care, compared to childcare. This is mainly due to its care system, that privileges 
elderly care and childcare services and allowances/pensions, but offers less financial support 
in terms of paternity and maternity leaves. Still among the countries that behave quite 
coherently in terms of generosity, we recognise another group of countries, which on the 
contrary offer less generous support for both elderly people and children. This group includes 
Poland, Latvia, Slovakia, Italy, France, Czech Republic and the UK, whose care regimes are 
characterised by less generous policies on both fields. Spain also shows low generosity of 
care policies, but with a significant difference between childcare and elderly care. While 
childcare policies are among the less generous in Europe, together with Greece, generosity on 
elderly care seems to be slightly higher. 
The second type of behaviour concerning generosity of care regimes is that of countries that 
show a wide difference between the care support for elderly care and for children. While the 
care regimes of Germany, Hungary, Slovenia and Finland are very generous in supporting 
childcare needs, they are consistently less generous for the care of elderly people. On the 
contrary, the Netherlands, Greece and Portugal offer generous support to elderly people, 
while they provide less support for childcare. This is particularly true in the case of Greece, 
whose policies addressing childcare needs are among the less generous in Europe. The 
Netherlands, in line with the findings of the literature, offers a very generous care support for 
senior citizens, but a less generous support for childcare.  
The second group of countries testifies that the degree of support of welfare states is not 
unambiguous and that care policies closely depend on the way care responsibilities are 
understood as family or public responsibilities. In countries such as the Netherlands, but also 
in Mediterranean countries (Greece, Portugal, Spain and partly Italy) the care of elderly 
people seems to be recognised at least partly as a public responsibility, while the care of 
children is almost entirely conceived as a family matter. On the contrary, in countries like 
Germany, Hungary, Slovakia and Finland, the state assumes a large part of childcare 
responsibilities, while the care of senior citizens is not fully acknowledged as a public issue. 
The differentiation between the generosity towards childcare and elderly care also shows that 
a great difference exists in Europe in the level of financial support to care needs. While 
Northern countries, and especially Denmark, offer a strong financial support to families, 
Eastern European and Mediterranean countries generally stand out as countries whose care 
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regime is the less financially supported. Surprisingly, France is part of the group of countries 
that offer the least financial support to care, despite the historical strength of its system of 
social provision. This can be partly due to the selection of the indicators, which might have 
excluded those fields where the care regime of France is stronger, but it could also be traced 
back to the fact that France has recently experienced a weakening of the traditional generosity 
of its welfare state. However, the case of France and the development of its care regime 
deserve further future investigations. 
 
As a final step in the analysis of care regimes in Europe, the two dimensions – de-
familialisation and generosity of care regimes – were combined together, in order to offer a 
multifaceted analysis. A synthetic index for generosity was obtained by calculating the 
average between the generosity towards childcare and elderly care. The reduction of the two 
generosity indexes to a synthetic measure is meant to facilitate the visual representation of the 
two main dimensions employed as a framework for this analysis. Although this oversimplifies 
the issue of the generosity of care regimes, as it reduces it to a single measure that does not 
differentiate between elderly care and childcare, it is nevertheless useful for an analysis that 
takes into consideration two different approaches to care.  
Figure 19 shows the position of EU member states with respect to the de-familialisation index 
(x-axis) and the generosity index (y-axis). 
A few interesting findings emerge from the combination of the two dimensions. First of all, 
Figure 19 clearly shows that only in a minority of European countries care regimes can be 
said to decidedly pursue the de-familialisation. Indeed, the great majority of care regimes 
concentrate in the first and fourth quadrant of the plot, which refers to familialisation. Second, 
among care regimes characterised by average or strong degrees of familialisation, a great 
difference exists in terms of generosity, with countries (mainly continental countries and the 
islands) providing a more generous support, and countries (mainly Eastern European and 
Mediterranean countries) providing a weaker financial support. Another element that can be 
derived from the graphical representation of the two dimensions is that, although France 
shows a relatively poor degree of generosity overall, no care regime seems to act in favour of 
de-familialisation of care responsibilities without providing a certain support in terms of 
generosity. In other words, findings seem to suggest that de-familialisation policies always 
imply a certain amount of state support, also from the economic point of view, while 
familialisation can be achieved either with public financial support or without a substantial 
financial support scheme. 
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Figure 19: Care regimes in 22 EU member states 
 
 
 
5.1.4 A typology of care regimes 
 
Based on the de-familialisation and on the generosity indexes, a cluster analysis 193  was 
conducted in order to identify cluster of countries that behave similarly with respect to the 
two dimensions. Different types of cluster techniques were used to find the most robust 
typology, including a first agglomerative hierarchical clustering that shows the main 
clustering path based on the two indicators, and subsequently two partitional cluster 
analyses194. Annex 3 reports the dissimilarity matrix, the dendrogram of the hierarchical 
clustering and the results of the PAM cluster analysis.  
Figure 20 shows the graphical representation of the PAM cluster analysis, based on the 
generosity and the familialisation indexes. 
 
 
                                                        
193 For more details on cluster analysis, refer to section 3.1.1. 
194 After an explorative hierarchical clustering, a k-means cluster analysis and a Partitioning Around Medoids 
(PAM) cluster analysis were conducted. Although the results were almost identical, only the PAM – which 
offers the best results and is commonly considered as a more robust technique – is reported. 
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Figure 20: Typology of care regimes - PAM cluster analysis 
 
 
According to the cluster analysis, three clusters of countries can be identified195. A first 
cluster – which I name de-familialisation – includes Denmark, Sweden, Belgium, the 
Netherlands and France. This cluster includes all countries that are characterised by a high 
degree of de-familialisation, with a medium to high degree of generosity of care regimes. 
Although the care regime of Denmark is both the most generous and the one showing the 
highest degree of de-familialisation, all countries have in common care regimes that provide 
both public alternatives to family care and a certain degree of financial support. In these 
countries, the state takes in charge care responsibilities and the family is not regarded as the 
only care provider. In these care regimes, the unpaid work usually performed by women is 
partially substituted by paid external labour, be that domestic and cleaning work or care work. 
Domestic and care needs can be satisfied through public support, without the mediation of 
family resources or the solidarity of the extended family and networks (Leira et al., 2005; 
Bettio and Plantenga, 2004).  
Looking specifically at care policies addressing childcare, this high degree of de-
familialisation is usually achieved through relatively short but well-paid maternity leaves and 
                                                        
195 The clustering techniques used for this analysis could justify the subdivision of countries in 3 or 4 clusters. 
However, all solutions with 4 clusters identified Denmark as a cluster on its own, due to the wide distance 
existing between this country and all other EU countries (Denmark is the European countries that shows far the 
highest scores on both indicators). However, the solution with 3 clusters was chosen, as Denmark can be 
grouped in with Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands and France, which all show high degrees of de-
familialisation, albeit with lower scores compared to Denmark. 
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generous parental leaves, coupled with the availability of childcare facilities. Concerning 
elderly care, de-familialisation is achieved through generous elderly care policies, mainly in 
the form of public services (both residential homes and home-based care services). 
Additionally, if we consider policies providing incentives for the externalisation of housework 
activities, we see that the de-familialisation cluster includes the two countries – Belgium and 
France – that have introduced a voucher system for housework services196 and that offer 
families strong incentives for externalising cleaning activities. However, also the other 
countries offer certain incentives for housework services, mainly in the form of tax deductions, 
reduction of the VAT and of contributions for housework services. 
A second cluster – which I name familialisation with state support – includes Hungary, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, Germany, the UK, Austria, Finland, Slovenia, Italy and Portugal. 
Although the care regimes of this cluster differ significantly in the way care policies are 
combined, they are characterised by a low level of de-familialisation coupled with a medium-
to-high level of generosity. In these countries, the role of families as care providers is not 
questioned, but the state supports families in meeting their care and domestic responsibilities. 
This is usually achieved through monetary transfers, rather than public services.  
Looking specifically at care policies addressing childcare, this cluster of countries is 
characterised by relatively long and well-paid maternity leaves and high child allowances, but 
medium to low provision of public childcare facilities. Regarding elderly care, the provision 
of public services for elderly people is quite poor (very poor in the case of Italy and Portugal) 
and the family needs towards the elderly are met mainly through financial transfers (pensions 
and social security)197. Generally, these countries do not offer specific incentives for the 
externalisation of housework, apart from tax deductions (Germany, Finland, Italy and 
Luxembourg). Overall, this cluster refers to care regimes where domestic and care 
responsibilities are acknowledged as family responsibilities, but where the state provides a 
certain degree of (mainly monetary) support to families. In these countries, the care burden of 
families is not questioned, but only partly alleviated by public aid (Letablier and Jönsson, 
2005).  
                                                        
196 While both voucher systems cover housework activities, the French system allows the use of vouchers for 
both domestic and care services. In Belgium, the voucher system includes only housework (cleaning, ironing, 
preparing meals, buying groceries) and all other forms of work are strictly forbidden. There is currently a debate 
in Belgium on whether the voucher system should be open to care activities, but no action has been taken into 
this direction so far. 
197 Concerning elderly care, this cluster of countries is characterised by the extensive use of cash-for-care 
allowances, rather than public services. Unfortunately, no such indicator (on the availability and the level of cash 
benefits) could be included in the analysis. Therefore, this instrument will not be commented further. 
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As anticipated, among the countries that belong to this cluster wide differences exist, 
especially in the level of support provided by the state. The care regimes of Italy and Portugal 
are those that show the lowest degree of generosity and in the case of Italy also a low degree 
of de-familialisation, comparable to countries that belong to the third cluster. Looking 
specifically at the indicators included in the analysis, it becomes apparent that although Italy 
and Portugal share the same levels of scores and therefore are more similar to countries of the 
third cluster, their care regime is more generous with regards to policies addressing elderly 
care, mainly through relatively high pension schemes.  
Finally, the third cluster – which I name familialisation without state support – includes the 
majority of Eastern European countries (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Latvia, Estonia) 
and two Mediterranean countries (Greece and Spain). In these countries, the care regime is 
characterised by a very low public support for domestic and care activities. Families are 
largely recognised as the only care providers and the state provides neither adequate 
alternatives in the form of public services (childcare and elderly care facilities), nor a 
sufficient financial support to families to meet their caring needs. These care regimes 
implicitly and explicitly encourage the mediation of family resources and family solidarity, 
which goes in parallel with the scarce public care provision (Leire et al., 2005).  
Looking specifically at the indicators included in the analysis, this type of familialism without 
state support is achieved through very long and relatively well-paid maternity leaves, 
relatively poor parental leaves and very low child allowances. Both childcare facilities and 
public services for elderly people are underdeveloped, especially in Eastern European 
countries and in Greece, and social security schemes and pensions are among the lowest in 
Europe (with the exception of Greece, which offers high pension schemes). No specific public 
incentives exist for the externalisation of domestic activities, apart from a system of reduced 
contributions for housework services in Spain.  
As emphasised by the literature, the extremely low level of de-familialisation of care policies 
shows that the care regime in these countries is based on very traditional views about the role 
of families – and especially female family members – as care providers (Letablier and 
Jönsson, 2005; Gerhard et al., 2005). Care responsibilities are generally considered a family 
responsibility, and families have to choose either to sacrifice the paid work of one family 
member, or to mobilise family resources (extended family, neighbours and other networks), 
when available. When unpaid external help is unavailable and all family members are not able 
to provide unpaid care work, families have to buy domestic and care services in the market, 
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but a certain degree of financial burden remains on families, since public financial help is 
usually insufficient (Bettio et al., 2006; Catanzaro and Colombo, 2009; Ambrosini, 2011).  
 
5.2 Measuring the gender regime 
 
For the purpose of this analysis, the gender regime is conceptualised as the combination of 
two separate dimensions: 1) the gender equality and 2) the gender contract 198 . The first 
dimension measures the outcomes of all types of policies that directly or indirectly have an 
impact on the different attainments of men and women, as well as policies specifically 
addressing the equality between men and women. This dimension includes indicators that 
measure different aspects of gender equality outcomes, such as employment status, economic 
situation, educational attainments, access to power, access to health and to other services, and 
so on. The second dimension – which is more difficult to measure – is what literature has 
often referred to as the ‘gender contract’. This dimension includes the general perception of 
gender roles in society and within the family and of what is considered to be the ideal sharing 
of work and family responsibilities between men and women. It also includes general views 
about what is considered to be ‘good care’ (for children, for the elderly and for other 
dependent people) and who is responsible for the general everyday well-being of the family 
(tasks related to house maintenance, cleaning, etc.). For the first dimension an existing index 
– the Gender Equality Index 2015 – was used, while for the second dimension an index 
measuring the gender contract was constructed. 
The two dimensions have been kept separate throughout the analysis, based on the assumption 
that outcomes in terms of gender equality do not necessarily coincide with gender 
expectations, gender social norms and the institutional and individual perception of gender 
roles. Although there are reasons to expect that a positive correlation exists between the two 
dimensions, incoherence between gender equality outcomes and gender expectations could 
not be excluded.  
In this section, a tentative measurement of the gender regime is presented, that takes into 
consideration the two above-mentioned dimensions of the gender regime. In the last section of 
the chapter, the construction of a typology of gender regimes based on the gender equality and 
the gender contract indexes is presented. 
                                                        
198 For details about the conceptualisation of gender regimes and about the difference between gender equality 
and the gender contract, refer to Chapter 2, section 2.3.  
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5.2.1 Construction of indicators and typologies of gender regimes 
 
Due to the complexity of the concept of gender regimes, a full understanding of the gender 
regime in place in a given country should take into consideration both gender equality in a 
broader sense and the overall perception of gender roles and individuals’ attitudes about the 
gender division of labour199. Therefore, the construction of the indicators to measure the 
gender regime and the subsequent development of a typology of gender regimes in Europe is 
based on the theoretical definition of gender regimes as the combination of two separate 
dimensions: the dimension that measures gender equality outcomes and the dimension 
assessing cross-country differences in terms of the gender contract200.  
For the first dimension, the Gender Equality Index 2015 (GEI) was used. For the second 
dimension, a new indicator was constructed, based on selected indicators from two European 
publicly available datasets: the ad hoc module on ‘family work and well-being’ of the 
European Social Survey 2004 201  and the Special Eurobarometer 428/2014 on ‘gender 
equality’. 
The first dimension, which corresponds to the more ‘objective’ dimension of gender regimes, 
includes the attainments achieved in each country in relation to gender equality. Given the 
multifaceted and cross-cutting nature of the concept of gender equality, this dimension covers 
different domains, such as educational attainments, employment situation, political 
representation and participation, gender segregation, access to health and other services, and 
so on. The first dimension, for which rich institutional data is available, is easier to measure, 
as outcomes in terms of gender equality can be taken as instruments to assess the level of 
gender equality attainments at country level.  
The second dimension, which corresponds to the more ‘subjective’ dimension of gender 
regimes, includes what literature has often referred to as the ‘gender contract’. The 
introduction of this dimension in the definition of gender regimes intends to bring a 
                                                        
199 The first dimension of the gender regime, as it is defined in this study, includes gender equality in a broad 
sense. This can be assessed either through the analysis of policies that directly or indirectly influence the degree 
of gender equality, or through the analysis of gender equality outcomes. For this analysis of gender regimes, it 
was chosen to use gender equality outcomes, rather than policies, as the assessment of the actual attainments 
seems more accurate than the evaluation of how gender equality is formally included into policies. 
200 For more information about the theorisation of the gender contract, refer to section 2.3.2. 
201 Although a more recent ESS ad-hoc module on family wellbeing exists (Round 5, 2010), it does not include 
all European countries (in particular, data is not available for Italy and Luxembourg). Therefore, after verifying 
the consistency of the responses by country from 2004 to 2010, I have decided to use the 2004 version. 
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measurement of the overall gender culture, which includes, among other things, the general 
perception of the role of men and women in society and within the family, the most suitable 
combination of sharing of responsibilities among sexes and the accepted combination of 
sharing of domestic and care responsibilities among the family, the state and the market. 
Although the majority of quantitative measurements that focus on gender-related issues are 
based only on the first dimension, I argue that the introduction of the second dimension is 
necessary for a deeper understanding of the impact of gender regimes on the domestic sector 
in Europe. Although it could be presumed that a strong correlation between the two 
dimensions exists, I posit that they should be kept separate, because they do not measure the 
same aspect of the gender regime and therefore they can potentially not coincide. For instance, 
a more traditional view about gender roles in the family can coexist with low gender gaps in 
the labour market and/or in educational attainments. On the contrary, a more progressive 
gender contract and a more equal sharing of responsibilities within couples could exist in 
contexts where gender equality outcomes are still relatively poor. 
For the first dimension, European countries are ranged according to the Gender Equality 
Index 2015, from countries that have achieved higher outcomes in terms of gender equality to 
countries where gender inequalities in all fields are still prevalent.  
For the second dimension, the aim is to range countries based on the type of gender contract 
that is dominant in a given place. Countries with lower scores in this dimension are countries 
where family and care responsibilities tend to be considered tasks to be performed within 
families, namely by women. On the contrary, countries with higher scores are countries where 
the division of labour between men and women is more equal and where at least part of 
family and care activities tend to be considered as a state responsibility. The idea is to 
position European countries in a scale that corresponds to the informal gender contract, where 
the lowest denotes more patriarchal approaches to care and family responsibilities, and the 
highest describes more progressive approaches.  
The lowest extreme of the scale is a country where the overall perception of the gendered 
division of labour is that all activities related to the well-being of the family should be 
performed by the family, and by women in particular. In these countries, ideally women 
would not participate in the paid labour market and stay home to perform cleaning and care 
tasks for the sake of the family, while only men pursue a professional career. In these 
countries, childcare services, residential services for the elderly and the use of paid cleaning 
services are regarded as inappropriate and/or unacceptable.  
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On the contrary, the highest extreme of the scale is ideally a country where the traditional 
gendered division of labour is weaker, where a full-time job for women is not seen as 
detrimental for the sake of the family and where the use of paid external services (childcare 
facilities, residential services for the elderly and cleaning services) is considered as acceptable 
and appropriate. In these countries, people expect the state to support them in their family 
responsibilities and external public services are welcome. 
 
5.2.2 Selection of indicators 
 
As anticipated, for the first dimension an existing index – the Gender Equality Index 2015 – 
was used. This index, elaborated by the European Union, measures the national attainments in 
terms of gender equality, assigning to each member state an overall score, based on the 
outcomes in six sub-dimensions: work, money, knowledge, time, power and health. The index 
used in this analysis is the overall composite index, which includes the above-mentioned sub-
dimensions and excludes the two additional satellite domains measured by the GEI (gender-
based violence and intersecting inequalities)202.  
For the second dimension, a new indicator was constructed, based on two European publicly 
available datasets, namely the ad hoc module on ‘family work and well-being’ of the 
European Social Survey 2004 203  and the Special Eurobarometer 428/2014 on ‘gender 
equality’. Several indicators were selected, based on relevance, to reflect and assess the 
second dimension that defines the gender contract. All selected variables measure the 
respondents’ opinions in each European country with respect to specific statements about 
gender roles and the sharing of house and childcare responsibilities204. 
                                                        
202 For details about the Gender Equality Index, refer to section 3.3.3 of the methodology.  
203 Although a more recent ESS ad-hoc module on family wellbeing exists (Round 5, 2010), it does not include 
all European countries (in particular, data is not available for Italy and Luxembourg). Therefore, after verifying 
the consistency of the responses by country from 2004 to 2010, I have decided to use the 2004 version. For 
details about the two Rounds, refer to section 3.3.3. 
204 No indicator was found that assesses the respondents’ opinions about caring responsibilities of elderly people 
and dependant people, other than children. A few European surveys exist which focus on the ageing of the 
population and the availability of welfare services with respect to elderly care, but none aims specifically at 
evaluating individual opinions about caring responsibilities of elderly people. It is important to notice that the 
omission of opinions about the care responsibilities towards the elderly might represent a bias in the 
measurement of the gender contract, as the care for children and the care for other dependant people might be 
conceived and judged differently in different contexts. For instance, while the care for children is everywhere at 
least partially considered a family responsibility, this is not the case of elderly care, which in some countries is 
more accepted as being a state responsibility. For examples and existing literature highlighting this issue, refer to 
section 2.2.4.2. 
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Specifically, two variables were selected from the European Social Survey, round 2 (2004), 
where respondents were asked to evaluate the following statements, ranking from 1 to 5, 
where 1 is ‘strongly agree’ and 5 ‘strongly disagree’:  
1) Women should be prepared to cut down on paid work for sake of family;  
2) Men should have more right to job than women when jobs are scarce.  
Another five variables were selected from the Eurobarometer survey, where respondents were 
asked to evaluate the following statements, ranking from 1 to 4, where 1 is ‘strongly agree’ 
and 4 ‘strongly disagree’:  
1) All in all family life suffers when the mother has a full-time job;  
2) Women are less willing than men to make a career for themselves;  
3) Men should work more in childcare sectors, such as day nurseries;  
4) Overall men are less competent than women to perform household tasks;  
5) A father must put his career ahead of looking after his young child.  
Table 23 provides the list of the seven items selected for the measurement of the second 
dimension, as well as the source. 
 
Table 23: Indicators used for the analysis of gender regimes 
Dimension Indicator Source 
Gender 
equality 
Gender Equality Index Gender Equality Index – 
European Commission 
Gender 
contract 
Women should be prepared to cut down on paid 
work for the sake of family (1 = strongly agree, 5 
= strongly disagree) 
European Social Survey 
(2/2004) 
Men should have more right to job than women 
when jobs are scarce (1 = strongly agree, 5 = 
strongly disagree) 
European Social Survey 
(2/2004) 
All in all family life suffers when the mother has 
a full-time job (1 = strongly agree, 4 = strongly 
disagree) 
Special Eurobarometer 
428/2004 
Women are less willing than men to make a 
career for themselves (1 = strongly agree, 4 = 
strongly disagree) 
Special Eurobarometer 
428/2004 
Men should work more in childcare sectors, such 
as day nurseries (1 = strongly agree, 4 = strongly 
disagree) 
Special Eurobarometer 
428/2004 
Overall men are less competent than women to 
perform household tasks (1 = strongly agree, 4 = 
strongly disagree) 
Special Eurobarometer 
428/2004 
A father must put his career ahead of looking 
after his young child (1 = strongly agree, 4 = 
strongly disagree) 
Special Eurobarometer 
428/2004 
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5.2.2.1 First dimension: the gender equality index 
 
Based on the Gender Equality Index, countries are ranked in terms of the outcomes in six sub-
domains of gender equality: work (participation in the labour market, level of segregation in 
the labour market and the quality of work), money (financial resources and overall economic 
situation), knowledge (educational attainment, segregation in education and the lifelong 
learning), time (time devoted to economic activities, time devoted to care activities and time 
devoted to social activities) and power (economic, social and political power). 
Figure 21 shows the position of European countries based on the GEI 2015, ranking from the 
higher to the lower scores. 
 
Figure 21: Gender Equality Index 2015 - overall scores EU-28 
 
 
As shown by the graphical representation, the countries that position themselves above the 
European average are Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Finland, Denmark), continental 
countries (the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg), the islands (the UK 
and Ireland), plus Slovenia and Spain. On the contrary, the countries that score very poorly 
compared to the European average score are Eastern European countries (Romania, Slovakia, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic) and Mediterranean 
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countries (Portugal, Greece and Italy). Countries like Austria, Estonia, Malta and Latvia show 
average scores, which are closer to the EU average and those of other continental countries.  
What clearly emerges from the graphic is that Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands 
represent a definite group of countries, characterised by scores far above all the other 
European countries. These countries are far the most progressive countries in terms of gender 
equality outcomes. The difference among all the other EU countries is smaller, as they 
position themselves along a continuum from continental (higher scores) to Mediterranean and 
Eastern European countries (lower scores). Therefore, the overall attainments in terms of 
gender equality seem to be quite defined by geographical areas, with Northern and continental 
regions being more progressive and with better gender equality outcomes, and Southern and 
Eastern regions being less developed with respect to gender equality achievements. The only 
exceptions to the rule are Spain and Slovenia, which present relatively higher scores, 
compared to the EU average and compared to Mediterranean and Eastern countries. 
 
5.2.2.2 Second dimension: the gender contract index 
 
The selected indicators were first treated, in order to differentiate between more or less 
traditional views about gender roles and sharing of responsibilities between men and women, 
which correspond to a more or less traditional type of gender contract. Since all selected 
indicators were ordinal variables, ranking responses from 1 to 4 or from 1 to 5, the proportion 
of the responses that show the less traditional gender contract were calculated for each item 
and for each country by summing up the percentages of ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ responses, 
or ‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’, in the case of reversed questions, and then by 
calculating the proportion compared to the whole set of responses205. The detailed responses 
for each variable, as well as the percentages of ‘agreement’ or ‘disagreement’ (depending on 
the wording of the statement), are reported in Annex 4.  
The indicators were then merged into a single dataset, which includes seven indicators and 
where the values indicate the proportion of the more progressive views about gender roles 
                                                        
205 The total percentage of the most progressive responses in terms of gender contract was calculated as follow. 
The sum of ‘strongly disagree’ and ‘disagree’ was calculated for Variable 1 (Women should be prepared to cut 
down on paid work for sake of family), Variable 2 (Men should have more right to job than women when jobs 
are scarce), Variable 3 (All in all family life suffers when the mother has a full-time job), Variable 4 (Women are 
less willing than men to make a career for themselves), Variable 6 (Overall men are less competent than women 
to perform household tasks) and Variable 7 (A father must put his career ahead of looking after his young child). 
The sum of ‘strongly agree’ and ‘agree’ was calculated for Variable 5 (Men should work more in childcare 
sectors, such as day nurseries). The proportion of total disagreement or total agreement was then calculated with 
respect to the full set of responses.   
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(gender contract) compared to the totality of responses. Countries for which the information 
was missing in either of the two datasets (ESS and Eurobarometer) had to be removed. The 
final dataset, presented in Table 24, includes seven variables and 21 countries: Austria, 
Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, the UK, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, 
Slovenia, Slovakia. 
 
Table 24: Final dataset for the second dimension (the gender contract) 
Country VAR1 
Women 
should cut 
down on 
paid work 
for the 
sake of 
family 
VAR2 
Men 
should 
have more 
right to job 
when jobs 
are scarce 
VAR3 
Family life 
suffers 
when the 
mother 
works full-
time 
VAR4 
Women 
are less 
willing 
than men 
to make a 
career 
VAR5 
Men 
should 
work more 
in the 
childcare 
sector 
VAR6 
Men are 
less 
competent 
than 
women in 
household 
tasks 
VAR7 
A father 
must put 
his career 
ahead of 
looking 
after 
children 
AT 25 50 25 51 61 40 56 
BE 44 54 41 68 51 64 73 
CZ 20 38 38 58 30 48 61 
DE 26 54 38 63 63 46 69 
DK 62 84 65 67 85 77 84 
EE 17 43 36 69 43 59 73 
ES 25 56 26 79 75 40 56 
FI 49 71 70 80 77 62 71 
FR 29 57 46 84 63 67 82 
GR 31 31 25 69 44 45 68 
HU 23 29 22 55 43 28 48 
IE 32 57 42 64 56 44 61 
IT 35 33 26 60 53 27 52 
LU 20 57 29 76 71 63 78 
NL 46 65 53 65 36 78 79 
PL 21 39 28 53 42 38 50 
PT 14 40 20 65 67 42 74 
SE 51 78 66 79 85 69 93 
SI 31 58 38 67 57 51 72 
SK 31 48 39 56 31 46 47 
UK 26 52 49 77 57 60 70 
 
Table 24: the values in the table indicate the percentage of the most ‘progressive’ views about gender roles as a 
share of total responses. This proportion was calculated by summing up the responses ‘strongly disagree’ and 
‘disagree’ for variables 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7 and the responses ‘strongly agree’ and ‘agree’ for variable 5. The 
proportion was then calculated based on the total responses. 
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A Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was run on the seven items and the 21 countries for 
which data are available206. The first component extracted by the PCA explains the 66% of 
the initial variance, while the second component explains 14%207. The eigenvalues, together 
with the result of the scree plot, justify the retention of only one component. This means that 
all selected indicators refer to one single component, which alone defines the gender contract. 
The full information on the PCA is reported in Annex 4. Table 25 shows the factor loadings 
of the PCA with the extraction of one component. Finally, the scores were calculated for the 
component.  
 
Table 25: Summary of PCA, without rotation (N = 21) - Gender contract 
Item Loadings 1 component – 
gender contract 
VAR 1 - Women should be prepared to cut 
down on paid work for sake of family 
.76 
VAR 2 - Men should have more right to 
job than women when jobs are scarce 
.93 
VAR 3 - All in all family life suffers when 
the mother has a full-time job 
.88 
VAR 4 - Women are less willing than men 
to make a career for themselves 
.71 
VAR 5 - Men should work more in 
childcare sectors, such as day nurseries 
.67 
VAR 6 - Overall men are less competent 
than women to perform household tasks 
.87 
VAR 7 - A father must put his career ahead 
of looking after his young child 
.85 
Eigenvalues 4.64 
% of variance 66 
Cronbach’s alpha .89 
 
Table 26 reports the scores of both the Gender Equality Index and the Gender contract index. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
206 The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure verified the sampling adequacy for the analysis: KMO = .65, which is 
above the acceptable limit of .5 (all KMO values for individual items were > .47). The Cortest Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity, ^2(21) = 123, p < .001, indicated that correlations between items were sufficiently large for PCA. 
207 The eigenvalue of the second component is below 1, which according to Kaiser’s criterion (Field et al., 
2012) means that it should not be retained. For details about the analysis, refer to Annex 4. 
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Table 26: Scores of the Gender Equality Index and the Gender contract index 
Country Gender equality 
index 
Gender contract 
index 
AT 50.2 -0.83 
BE 58.2 0.42 
CZ 43.8 -0.88 
DE 55.3 -0.11 
DK 70.9 1.97 
EE 49.8 -0.27 
ES 53.6 -0.16 
FI 72.7 1.45 
FR 55.7 0.86 
GR 38.3 -0.63 
HU 41.6 -1.54 
IE 56.5 -0.13 
IT 41.1 -1.07 
LU 55.2 0.35 
NL 68.5 0.83 
PL 43.7 -1.25 
PT 37.9 -0.62 
SE 74.2 2.00 
SI 57.3 0.12 
SK 36.5 -0.84 
UK 58 0.36 
 
5.2.3 Results 
 
Since the analysis of the second dimension resulted in one single index for the definition of 
the gender contract, the two final indexes – addressing respectively gender equality outcomes 
and the gender contract – were plotted against each other, in order to show how European 
countries for which data are available behave in relation to the two combined dimensions 
(Figure 22). 
What clearly emerges from the plot is that – as mentioned in section 5.2 – a positive 
correlation between the two dimensions exists, which means that countries that score high on 
the gender equality index and that have better gender equality outcomes also tend to be more 
progressive in their opinions about the roles of women and men and the division of family and 
work responsibilities. The result is that countries group themselves along a line that goes from 
the bottom left quadrant of the graph to the upper right one. 
 
 
 
 
 214 
Figure 22: Gender regimes in Europe 
 
 
Countries at the lowest extreme are those whose overall perception of the gender division of 
labour entails that all activities related to the well-being of the family should be performed by 
the family, and by women in particular. In these countries women tend not to participate in 
the paid labour market, especially when they have children aged 0 to 3 years old, and only 
men pursue a professional career without interruptions. In these countries, childcare services 
and the use of paid cleaning services are regarded as somehow inappropriate and/or 
unacceptable. On the contrary, at the highest extreme there are countries where the traditional 
gendered division of labour is weaker, where a full-time job for women is not seen as 
detrimental for the family and where the use of paid external services (childcare facilities and 
cleaning services) is considered as acceptable and appropriate. In these countries, people 
expect the state to support them in their family responsibilities and external public services 
are welcome. 
The graphical representation already shows that countries can be grouped into three main 
clusters, which present a significant distance between each other. What is remarkable is that 
while Scandinavian countries emerge as having far the highest scores in both dimensions, all 
the other European countries position themselves at a considerable distance from the Northern 
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model. This seems to suggest that both gender equality and general attitudes about the gender 
division of labour are most progressive in the Scandinavian area, while the rest of Europe 
stands far behind. Among countries with the lowest scores, Hungary, Poland, Italy, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Austria show the most traditional views about gender roles, with the 
lowest scores on the gender contract index, irrespectively of the scores in terms of gender 
equality. All these countries have in common a very traditional gender contract, compared to 
the other European countries, while gender equality outcomes differ between them, with 
Slovakia at the lower extreme of the gender equality index and Austria with relatively higher 
scores. It should be noticed that these are all countries with a strong traditional Catholic 
background, which could partly explain the very traditional attitudes about the family 
ideology and the role of men and women inside and outside the family. 
 
5.2.4 A typology of gender regimes 
 
Based on the gender equality and the gender contract indexes, a cluster analysis was 
conducted in order to identify cluster of countries that behave similarly with respect to the 
two dimensions. As in the case of care regimes, different types of cluster techniques were 
used to find the most robust typology, including a first agglomerative hierarchical clustering 
that shows the main clustering path based on the two indicators, and subsequently two 
partitional cluster analysis. Due to the very definite dissimilarity matrix, where three clusters 
of countries can clearly be identified, all clustering techniques employed in this section 
provided identical results208. Annex 5 reports the dissimilarity matrix, the dendrogram of the 
hierarchical clustering and the results of the k-means and the PAM cluster analysis.  
Figure 23 shows the graphical representation of the typologies of gender regimes resulting 
from the cluster analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
208 The only difference is represented by Austria and Estonia, which lie at the border of two clusters: the 
hierarchical cluster analysis includes both countries in the third cluster, while the partitional cluster analysis 
include Austria in the third cluster and Estonia in the second (see the explanation later in the text). 
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Figure 23: Typologies of gender regimes in Europe 
 
 
According to the cluster analysis, three clusters of countries can be identified: 1) Denmark, 
Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands; 2) Belgium, Germany, Estonia, Spain, France, the UK, 
Ireland, Luxembourg and Slovenia; 3) Austria, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Italy, 
Poland, Portugal and Slovakia. The clusters resulting from this analysis of the gender regime 
only partly overlap with existing typologies of European countries.  
The first cluster – which I label modern gender contract209 – includes three Scandinavian 
countries (Denmark, Sweden and Finland) and the Netherlands, and clearly stands out as a 
block of countries where gender equality attainments are higher and opinions regarding 
gender roles are the most ‘progressive’. These are countries that in Esping-Andersen’s 
classification correspond to the social-democratic welfare model. This cluster of countries is 
also coherent with the majority of the classifications developed by feminist theories (see 
Chapter 2). The only exception is the Netherlands, whose presence in this cluster is in 
contradiction with the majority of welfare classifications, which usually group this country 
together with other continental countries. Moreover, compared to the Scandinavian countries, 
not only the Netherlands shows considerably lower scores, but it also presents a mixed pattern, 
                                                        
209 The labels for each cluster emphasise the gender contract, because it is considered the most innovative 
element of this analysis of gender regimes. 
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as it seems to behave better in terms of gender equality outcomes, but to have more 
conservative views about gender roles.  
The second cluster – which I label gender contract in transition – presents similar average 
scores on both dimensions and is positioned in the middle of the plot. Overall, this cluster is 
more heterogeneous, as it includes countries that in the majority of welfare classifications 
belong to different groups. According to Esping-Andersen’s classification, this group includes 
both liberal (UK, Ireland) and corporatist-conservative (Belgium, Germany, France) welfare 
countries. According to the classification of Letablier, neo-liberal (islands), maternalist 
(continental countries) and family ties countries (Spain) are all present in this group. The 
country that presents the most surprising behaviour is Spain, as the majority of classifications 
associate it to other Mediterranean countries (Simonazzi, 2009).  
Finally, the third cluster – which I label traditional gender contract – includes both 
Mediterranean and Eastern European countries. These countries score poorly on both 
dimensions and are positioned at the bottom left of the quadrant. This cluster seems to 
contradict Esping-Andersen’s typology, which does not differentiate between continental and 
Mediterranean countries. Indeed, it seems that quite a pronounced difference exists – at least 
in terms of gender equality – between continental countries on one side, and Mediterranean 
and East European countries on the other.  
 
5.3 Measuring the migration regime 
 
Although one of the objectives of the European Union is to create a common immigration 
policy, the division of competences between the EU and member states remains problematic, 
as member states are unwilling to lose their competence in the field of migration, for political, 
historical and economic reasons (European Parliament, 2011). Since the Tampere summit in 
1999 and more and more since the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the EU 
has made efforts to harmonise policies on migration and to expand a common European legal 
migration framework, mainly through the adoption of Directives on border control, legal 
migration, irregular migration, visa and the Common European Asylum System. However, 
immigration policies – especially those related to the integration of migrants in the host 
societies – still remain a competence of member states210. The result is that host societies have 
                                                        
210 The competences of the European Union in the field of migration include: 1) regular migration: the EU can 
establish the conditions governing entry and legal residence in a member state, including for family reunification, 
for third-country nationals. However, the member states maintain the right to determine the volumes of 
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admitted and incorporated migrants in very different ways, depending on historical, 
demographic, economic and social characteristics of each country (Rodriguez-Garcia, 2010) 
and great differences exist between countries in terms of migration regimes. 
Systematic comparative research on migration regimes has gained momentum in the last 
decade (Helbling et al., 2013). However, the measurement and classification of migration 
regimes is still problematic for a variety of factors. First of all, migration regimes include two 
different dimensions that are usually treated separately: the immigration/admission regime 
and the integration regime. The first covers the entry and admission criteria of migrants and 
includes visas, entry and work permits, border control and the overall system of laws and 
regulations intended to manage the admission of migrants in the national territory. The second 
covers the situation of the migrant population once settled in the receiving country. It includes 
issues such as access to the labour market, access to health services, access to education, 
political participation, participation in cultural and leisure activities, access to social benefits 
and services, participation in trade unions, and so on. So far, the attempts to provide 
comprehensive quantitative tools to compare countries in terms of both admission and 
integration criteria have been scarce and the two dimensions are still analysed separately. A 
comprehensive database covering both dimensions and able to provide a quantitative 
assessment of immigration policies is still needed. 
Among the databases that cover one or the other dimension, those that have been developed to 
cover integration regimes are generally the most suitable for quantitative international 
comparisons. Conversely, the few attempts to construct measurement instruments that cover 
immigration policies are of difficult use for international comparison, either because they are 
often intended to track changes in immigration restrictiveness in single countries, or because 
they include a limited number of countries211. 
Another issue when comparing migration regimes is that existing classifications and 
measurement tools usually focus on either output policies or outcomes. In particular, while 
                                                                                                                                                                             
admission; 2) integration: the EU can provide incentives for measures of integration in the member states. 
However, there is no legal provision for the harmonisation of national laws and regulations. 3) combating 
irregular migration: the EU provides incentives for the reduction of irregular migration, in the respect of human 
rights principles; 4) readmission agreements: the EU can conclude agreements with third countries for 
readmission purposes (“Fact sheet on the European Union – Immigration policy”, online). As stated in official 
documents of the European Parliament, “The Union’s competence in connection with migration does not affect 
the competence of the Member States in connection with the integration of third-country nationals residing 
legally in their territories, the determination of volumes of third-country nationals admitted in order to seek work 
or the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security, The exercise of Union competence 
must take Members States’ social security interests into account” (European Parliament, 2011). 
211 For details regarding the existing classifications and databases on both immigration and integration systems, 
refer to section 2.4.3.  
 219 
the introduction of outcome indicators (such as the number of migrants in the labour market, 
the effective use of health and social services by migrants, the number of expulsions from the 
territory, family reunification, etc.) would be beneficial for measuring migration regimes, 
some of the most powerful tools developed to classify migration systems are only based on 
the evaluation of policy outputs and a database integrating both output policy and outcomes is 
lacking (Boucher and Gest, 2015). 
Due to the lack of existing indices to measure both immigration and integration systems and 
for the purpose of an evaluation of the impact of migration regimes on the domestic sector, 
the measurement and classification of migration regimes in this study was carried out as to 
include three elements. The first element is the overall environment regarding immigration in 
a given country, which includes integration policies, such as access and integration in the 
labour market, access to services, education, long-term residence and naturalisation, but also 
some policies that can help assessing the immigration/admission dimension212.  
The second element, which could be included in the immigration/admission policy framework, 
is the type of immigration. This element includes two indicators that assess the reasons for 
migration and the provenance of migrants. Specifically, one indicator measures the number of 
residence permits issued by reason and covers the immigration of third-country nationals. 
Another indicator measures the provenance of intra-European migrants, which is particularly 
important for a study on domestic work. This indicator is meant to measure differences in 
intra-European migration, which are not captured by indicators on residence permits, as they 
comprise only third-country nationals. 
The third element that has been included in the measurement of migration regimes is the 
extent of the informal economy in a given country, which is known to influence the presence 
of low-skilled migrants, including domestic workers. Following literature on domestic work 
and migration, the informal economy, together with some policy measures such as 
regularisation programmes, act as pull factors for the presence of (mainly irregular) migrants 
in some sectors of the labour market, including domestic services213. The inclusion of this 
                                                        
212 For information about the distinction between integration and immigration policy frameworks, refer to 
section 2.4.3. 
213 Although regularisation programmes have been identified as having an effect on the arrival of domestic 
workers, no indicators on regularisation programmes was included in the analysis. This choice was based on the 
following reasons: 1) regularisation programmes act as pull factors for low-skilled migrants only when they are 
intended to provide legal status to irregular migrants who already live and work in a certain country (MPI, 2011). 
This is not the case in every European countries. While regularisation programmes were initially introduced in 
the migration regimes of Northern European states, such as France, UK and the Netherlands, in the last two 
decades they have become the prerogative of Southern countries. However, regularisation programmes are now 
used differently depending on the state, with Northern countries using them almost exclusively for humanitarian 
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indicator is based on the findings of recent studies, which have identified a link between a 
pre-existing underground economy and the inflow of migrants in certain sectors of the labour 
market, especially in low-skilled jobs (Bettio et al., 2006; Ambrosini, 2010; UNHCR, 2011; 
Finotelli and Sciortino, 2009). The presence of a large and easily accessible underground 
economy allows irregular migrants to remain on the territory, while waiting for regularisation 
opportunities, and at the same time creates expectations for potential migrants, who might be 
encouraged by easily accessible jobs in the receiving country. 
In addition to the three above-mentioned elements, the selected indicators cover both policy 
outputs and outcomes. The detailed explanation on the selection of the indicators is presented 
in the following section. 
 
5.3.1 Construction of indicators and typologies of migration regimes 
 
Female migrants represent in some European countries the large majority of the workforce in 
the domestic sector, so that it has been highlighted as one of the most significant trends in 
recent developments of paid domestic work. However, a great variation exists among 
European countries with respect to the proportion of migrants in the domestic sector, which 
deserves a thorough analysis in order to understand such differences. The construction of a 
typology of the migration regime for the purpose of a study on paid domestic work is based 
on theoretical considerations about the direct and indirect impact that migration regimes 
might have on the presence of migrant domestic workers in the domestic sector, on the size of 
the sector and on working conditions. In addition, the pre-existence of a large informal 
economy in a given country has been identified as a pull factor that encourages the constant 
renewal of migration flows that go to fill labour market shortages. Domestic services 
represent one of the main sectors of the labour market where newly arrived migrants – both in 
a regular and irregular situation – are likely to find a job.   
For the integration regime, the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) was selected, as it 
represents the most comprehensive existing index on migration/integration policies. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
reasons and Mediterranean countries using them to regularise migrant workers (MPI, 2011). 2) an indicator 
measuring the number of regularisation programmes launched over time can be a source of confusion with 
respect to the beneficiaries. For instance, domestic workers from Eastern European migrants, who are known to 
have largely benefitted from regularisation programmes in Southern Europe, were the main beneficiaries of these 
policy measures, but only prior the accession of their countries into the European Union. To assess when these 
migrants have passed from irregular status to a regular situation can be arduous, both because the accession of 
Eastern countries came at different moments (2004, 2007 and 2013), and also because some old European 
countries have put in place restrictions for nationals of new accession countries, which vary from country to 
country.  
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Regarding the extent of the informal economy, the number of residence permits issued by 
reasons and the provenance of intra-European migrants, different sources have been combined, 
in order to derive accurate indicators. The list of the sources used for the classification of 
migration regimes is provided below. 
 
5.3.2 Selection of indicators 
 
Drawing both from the literature on migration regimes and that on domestic work, the 
indicators were selected with the purpose to cover the following aspects:  
1) integration policies; 
2) immigration/admission policies, which have an impact on the arrival of both third-
country nationals and European nationals; 
3) the size of the informal economy. 
The overall score of MIPEX 2015, which includes eight policy areas and sub-indicators, was 
selected and included in the analysis to cover the dimension of integration policies. Although 
the MIPEX predominantly covers aspects linked to integration regimes (access to education 
and to health services, political participation, anti-discrimination issues, and so on), it 
nevertheless covers a variety of policies that can be useful in assessing also immigration 
policy frameworks, because it includes policies that are somehow related to the entry, 
residence and work permits of migrants. As Carrera observes with regard to the nexus 
between immigration and integration, the social inclusion of migrants is closely related to the 
immigration policy framework and “policies on admission are therefore paradoxically 
converging with those of social inclusion” 214(2006, p. 13). In particular, I argue that the 
indicators regarding eligibility and conditions for family reunion and permanent residence, as 
well as policies regulating the access to the labour market, are particularly suitable for 
investigating both integration and immigration regimes.  
In addition to the immigration/admission policies already included in the MIPEX, the analysis 
includes two outcome indicators that assess the presence of both third-country nationals and 
European nationals. The first indicator measures the presence of third-country nationals who 
obtained a first residence permit issued for employment reasons. This indicator is useful for 
                                                        
214 Carrera takes as an example integration programmes, which in addition to their principal objective of 
favouring the integration of migrants in the host society, can be also used as policy tools to refrain migration. 
Therefore, integration programmes can be used to evaluate the degree of openness or restrictiveness of a country 
with respect to the arrival of new migrants.  
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two reasons. First, it allows assessing the size of the migrant population from third countries 
who arrived for work reasons and who are thus active in the labour market of the host society, 
this being particularly useful for the purpose of investigating the presence of migrant workers. 
Second, it allows assessing the type of migration, as the reasons for issuing first residence 
permits are a good indicator of the history of migration in a given country. For instance, 
countries of old immigration are more likely to issue residence permits for family 
reunification, compared to countries of new immigration, because of the size of second and 
third generations already in the country. On the contrary, countries of new immigration are 
more likely to issue permits for economic and work reasons, because their migrant population 
mainly includes newly arrived migrants. 
The indicator on the presence of intra-European migrants was included in the analysis, 
because it covers the migrant population that do not require residence and work permits, in 
that part of the European Union. In particular, the indicator provides the proportion of 
European migrants coming from new accession countries compared to the total intra-
European migrant population. The choice to include this indicator is based on two 
considerations. First, intra-European migration is often excluded from analysis on migration 
regimes, as the mobility of Europeans within the EU cannot be captured by immigration 
policies that regulate the admission of foreign people215. Second, a great difference exists in 
the workforce composition of the domestic sector, between EU nationals coming from old 
European countries and nationals of Eastern European countries, the latter being the great 
majority of domestic workers.  
In addition to these two indicators, one specific indicator estimating the size of the informal 
economy in 2015 has been included in the analysis. This is based on theoretical assumptions 
and follows the findings of scholarship on domestic work, which has highlighted the 
importance of a large pre-existing informal economy as a pull factor for migration inflows 
that go to fill labour shortages in certain sectors of the labour market. 
Table 27 provides a schematic overview of the selected indicators, the dimensions covered by 
the indicators and the sources. 
 
 
 
                                                        
215 Although a few European countries had put in place restrictions in the admission of nationals from new 
accession countries, these measures were temporary and all nationals of the EU28 are currently granted access 
and residence in any European country. 
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Table 27: Indicators for the measurement of migration regimes 
Dimension Indicator Source 
Integration 
regimes 
Overall score MIPEX 2015 (synthetic indicator, 
covering 8 policy areas) 
Migrant Integration Policy 
Index 2015 (MIPEX) – 
Migration Policy Group + 
national experts 
Immigration 
regimes 
Overall score MIPEX 2015 (synthetic indicator, 
covering 8 policy areas) 
Migrant Integration Policy 
Index 2015 (MIPEX) – 
Migration Policy Group + 
national experts 
Number of first residence permits issued for 
employment reasons (% of all first residence 
permits) 
Residence permits statistics 
(Eurostat) 
Number of migrants from new accession 
countries (% of all intra-European migrants – age 
20-64)  
2016 Annual Report on intra-
EU Labour Mobility (European 
Commission) 
Informal 
economy 
Estimates informal economy 2015 (% GDP) Schneider, 2015 
      
5.3.2.1 Indicator on integration and immigration policies – MIPEX 2015  
 
European countries differ significantly in the way they promote or discourage the admission 
of foreign people and their integration in the host society. Each migration regime derives from 
the combination of different policies, which can be more generous on certain aspects and 
more restrictive on other aspects, with respect to both the admission and the integration of 
migrants. The overall score of the MIPEX is a synthetic indicator that includes eight policy 
areas and sub-areas. It provides the general scores of all migration policies combined, which 
range from access to education, health and other services, to access to permanent residence 
and nationality. Although the MIPEX has been developed with the goal of measuring the 
policies on the integration of migrants, this index can be useful to generally evaluate and 
compare EU countries with respect to their overall approach to immigration and the presence 
of migrants in the host society. 
Figure 24 shows the overall scores of the MIPEX 2015 in all EU member states. 
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Figure 24: MIPEX 2015 - overall scores EU-28 
 
 
As it emerges from the graphical representation, when taking into account all policy areas 
included in the MIPEX, the countries that show the lowest score compared to all EU countries 
are Eastern European countries, plus Cyprus and Greece. Conversely, the countries that show 
the most developed migration policy system in terms of integration are Sweden, Portugal, 
Finland and Belgium. Continental countries, such as Germany, the Netherlands, France and 
Luxembourg, the islands (the UK and Ireland) and Italy and Spain have similar scores, all 
above the EU average.  
If we compare the MIPEX overall scores with the size of the immigrant population in each 
European country (see Figure 25), we observe that there is no apparent correlation between 
the two. This suggests that a more open and favourable integration policy system does not 
seem to stimulate larger immigration flows, compared to a more restrictive system in terms of 
access and integration. For instance, although the overall MIPEX scores of Portugal and 
Finland are among the highest in Europe, their foreign-born population is quite small, 
compared to other countries, such as Latvia, which on the contrary score low on the MIPEX 
index and has a large foreign-born population. This contradicts popular views that associate 
less restrictive migration and integration policies with massive inflows of migrants. In the 
same way, countries whose migration regimes are based on restrictive policies and an 
environment more hostile to the integration of migrants in the host society do not necessarily 
refrain immigration.  
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Figure 25: Foreign-born population and MIPEX in 22 EU member states 
 
 
Source: Data on the foreign-born population are extracted from Eurostat Statistical Books, 2011. Migrants in 
Europe. A statistical portrait of the first and second generation. Data not available for Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Cyprus and Hungary. 
 
If instead of the overall MIPEX index only the overall score of the policy area on the labour 
market is taken into account, which includes information on the access of migrants to the 
labour market and the possibility for migrants to find a job in the formal economy, a few 
differences are observable, compared to the overall score on integration. 
Figure 26 shows the ranking of EU member states according to the scores of the policy area 
“labour market mobility” of the MIPEX.  
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Figure 26: MIPEX 2015 - Scores on labour market mobility (EU-28) 
 
 
While Sweden and Portugal present the highest scores and Eastern European countries the 
lowest scores also on labour market mobility, other countries behave slightly differently. 
Belgium, which shows an overall policy framework that is very favourable to the overall 
integration of migrants, offers fewer opportunities of access and integration in the labour 
market, compared to other countries. The same is true for the UK, France, Luxembourg and 
Ireland, whose policy framework on the access and integration of migrants in the labour 
market are below the EU average, although the overall score on integration suggests that other 
integration policies are more favourable to the integration of the migrant population. On the 
contrary, Estonia seems to offer better opportunities to migrants in the labour market, despite 
the overall unfavourable integration environment. 
 
5.3.2.2 Indicator on the informal economy 
 
This indicator provides the estimate of the shadow economy as a percentage of the national 
GDP. The measurement of the informal economy is complex, as it is meant to capture 
economic activities that are not part of the official sources, and per definition it can never be 
completely reliable. However, estimates on the informal economy can be a useful indicator in 
order to provide a picture of the overall situation in Europe. 
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Figure 27 shows the extent of the shadow economy in the European countries included in the 
analysis, which are ranked from the largest to the smaller: 
 
Figure 27: Estimates on shadow economy in Europe 
 
Sources: Schneider (2013). Countries are ranked from those showing the largest segment of the shadow 
economy as a percentage of the national GDP to those showing the smallest share. The horizontal line 
represents the European average. 
 
The graphical representation of the estimates of the informal economy in Europe clearly 
shows that, apart from Slovakia and the Czech Republic, all Eastern European and 
Mediterranean countries present a proportion of the informal economy which is higher than 
the European average. Among these countries, it is Eastern European countries that have the 
highest informal economy, as a percentage of the national GDP. Overall, two clear patterns 
are observable: an increase of the shadow economy from West to East, which is from old to 
new European countries, and an increase in the shadow economy from North to South, with 
Mediterranean countries showing highest estimates, compared to Nordic countries. 
 
5.3.2.3 Indicator on first residence permits issued for employment reasons 
 
This indicator measures the presence of third-country nationals who have obtained a first 
residence permit for employment reasons, compared to all third-country nationals present in 
the territory on a legal basis. Data are extracted from official Eurostat sources and include 
information for the year 2015 and for all countries included in the analysis. The indicator was 
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obtained by calculating the proportion of first residence permits issued for employment 
reasons, compared to all other reasons, which include family reunification, education and 
other reasons. 
Figure 28 shows the proportion of employment-related residence permits in the countries 
included in the analysis. 
 
Figure 28: First residence permits issued for employment reasons (% of all residence 
permits) in 22 European countries 
 
 
As expected, the countries that show the highest number of first residence permits issued for 
employment reasons are Eastern European countries, which are among countries of new 
immigration. On the contrary, countries of old immigration, such as the UK, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Germany, France, Austria, Denmark and Sweden show a considerably lower 
percentage of permits issued for employment reasons. This is partly due to their older 
immigration history and the presence of older generations of migrants, which is likely to 
require a higher number of permits issued for family reasons. Also, since these countries are 
among those showing the highest scores in the indicator measuring integration, they are 
expected to be more open to admit foreigners on a humanitarian basis. 
Mediterranean countries constitute an exception, because despite their recent immigration 
history, the number of residence permits issued for employment reasons is significantly low. 
Italy and Greece are among the countries where permits based on employment reasons are the 
smallest percentage, and where the majority of the residence permits are granted for reasons 
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of family reunion. At least two elements could explain this finding. First, the large informal 
economy of these countries absorbs a large segment of the foreign population, which is more 
likely to be found in irregular employment situations and thus not grasped by data on legal 
residence permits. However, a large informal economy is also a characteristic of Eastern 
European countries, which on the contrary issue the majority of residence permits for 
employment reasons. The second explanation regards the origin of the foreign population, 
which greatly differs depending on the receiving country. Contrary to countries of old 
immigration, Mediterranean countries host mainly migrants from Eastern European countries, 
who have a regular status and therefore do not require residence permits216. 
 
5.3.2.4 Indicator on migrants from new EU accession countries 
 
This indicator measures the proportion of migrants coming from new EU accession countries 
among the total intra-European foreign population, in each European country included in the 
analysis217. Data refer to the year 2015 and are extracted from the European Commission 
report 2016 Annual Report on intra-EU Labour Mobility. Contrary to the indicator on 
residence permits, this indicator covers the migrant population that does not require residence 
and work permits, in that it is part of the European Union. The inclusion of this indicator in 
the analysis of migration regimes is especially important due to the high presence of Eastern 
European migrants working in the domestic sector in certain European countries.   
The variable was derived by calculating the proportion of the number of migrants from new 
accession countries compared to the total intra-European population. Figure 29 shows the 
proportion of migrants from the new EU accession countries as a share of the total intra-
European migrant population for the year 2015. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
216 According to Eurostat data, the main countries of birth of migrants in countries of old immigration (Belgium, 
Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, for instance) include Turkey and Morocco, for which a residence permit is 
required. On the contrary, the main country of birth of migrants in Italy is Romania, whose nationals constitute 
the 17% of the total foreign population (Eurostat Statistics in focus, 31/2012). 
217 New accession countries include: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Malta (EU enlargement 2004), Romania, Bulgaria (EU enlargement 2007) and Croatia (EU 
enlargement 2013). 
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Figure 29: Migrants from new EU accession countries as a share of the total intra-
European migration in 22 EU member states (2015) 
 
 
 
In line with literature on domestic work, Figure 29 shows that Italy, Greece and to a lesser 
extent Ireland and Spain, are the countries with the highest concentration of migrants from 
new accession countries. Eastern European countries also show very high shares of migrants 
from new accession countries, which is more understandable due to their geographical 
proximity. On the contrary, Northern and continental countries, which correspond to countries 
of old immigration, show a smaller presence of migrants coming from new EU accession 
countries. This confirms that the country of origin of the foreign population in each European 
country is strongly related to the type of immigration, the age of immigration and historical 
legacies of each nation-state. 
 
5.3.3 A typology of migration regimes 
 
Based on the four indicators selected to measure migration regimes – the MIPEX, the extent 
of the informal economy, the first residence permits issued for employment reasons and the 
migrants from new EU accession countries – a cluster analysis was conducted in order to 
identify clusters of countries that behave similarly with respect to the selected dimensions. 
The explorative analysis to identify the right number of clusters suggested the possibility of 
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dividing countries into 3, 5 or even 6 groups. Different types of clustering techniques were 
used to find the most robust typology, including hierarchical, k-means and Partition Around 
Medoids (PAM) cluster analyses with 3 and 5 cluster solutions 218 . The k-means cluster 
analysis with the extraction of 5 clusters is the one presented here. Annex 6 reports the 
dissimilarity matrix, the dendrogram of the hierarchical cluster analysis and the results of the 
k-means analysis with 5 clusters.  
Figure 30 shows the graphical representation of the k-means cluster analysis with a 5 clusters 
solution, based on the four indicators. 
 
Figure 30: Typology of migration regimes - k-means cluster analysis 
 
Figure 30 shows the result of the cluster analysis. Although only two dimensions are visible in the figure, the 
countries are positioned in the space based on the four dimensions used in the analysis. 
 
The resulting typology includes five separate clusters of countries. Since a cluster including 
only one item cannot be treated as a real cluster, I consider Poland as an outlier, the result 
being a typology of four clusters.  
In terms of similarity with other European countries with respect to its migration regime, 
Poland possesses features that are as distant as possible from any other country and can for no 
reason be associated with other countries. Looking in detail at the Polish model of migration, 
it can be noticed that it is characterised by a very low score in terms of integration system 
                                                        
218 The option of dividing countries into 6 clusters was excluded, due to the limited number of countries 
included in the analysis.  
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(MIPEX) and a very large share of informal economy, similar to the other Eastern European 
countries. Moreover, Poland is unique in the European landscape, because of the high number 
of first residence permits issues for employment reasons, which corresponds to more than the 
double of the European average, and no immigration from new accession countries. This is 
due to the fact that Poland is mainly an emigration country and the immigration into the 
country is mainly based on employment of migrants coming from extra-EU countries, such as 
Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, Russia and Georgia (Grot, 2013).  
Therefore, if we exclude Poland, which represents a peculiar case in the European landscape 
with respect to its migration regime, the four clusters derived from the analysis are the 
following219: 
1) Finland, Belgium, Portugal and Sweden. 
2) Ireland, Austria, Germany, the UK, Denmark, France, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg 
3) Greece, Italy and Spain 
4) Latvia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Estonia 
The first cluster – which I label old immigration and high integration – includes countries that 
are characterised by a very high level of integration in the domains included in the MIPEX 
index. Additionally, these countries show the lowest percentage of migrants coming from new 
accession countries and a medium level of informal economy. Concerning the percentage of 
permits issued for employment reasons, these countries present a medium to low levels, 
which is in line with their old history of immigration220. 
The second cluster – which I name old immigration and medium integration – includes other 
countries of old immigration (Austria, Germany, the UK, Denmark, France, the Netherlands 
and Luxembourg) and Ireland221. These countries are characterised by medium to high scores 
in terms of integration of migrants and a small segment of shadow economy. Also, in line 
with their immigration history, which is longer than all the other European countries, the 
share of residence permits issued for employment reasons is small. In these countries, 
characterised by large stocks of second and third generations, the majority of the residence 
                                                        
219 For a matter of interpretation of the clusters, I reorder the clusters. Therefore, the number of the clusters does 
not coincide with that showed in Figure 30.  
220 As mentioned earlier in the text, old immigration countries have a higher concentration of second and third 
generations of migrants, compared to new immigration countries. Therefore, a high number of residence permits 
is issued for reasons other than employment, such as family reunification. 
221 Contrary to the other countries included in this cluster, Ireland shares some characteristics with 
Mediterranean countries such as Italy and Spain, as during the 1960s and 1970s it was predominantly an 
emigration country. It is only recently, starting from the 1990s, that these countries have moved to being 
immigration countries (Eurostat, 2011). 
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permits are issues for family reunification reasons. Regarding the presence of migrants 
coming from new accession countries, in these countries it is smaller than in Eastern 
European and Mediterranean countries, despite the fact that an increase in the arrival of 
Eastern European migrants has been detected as a new trend also in these countries (Eurostat, 
2011). In particular, Ireland, the UK and Austria already count a significant presence of 
migrants from new member states222. 
The third cluster – which I name new immigration and medium integration – includes three 
Mediterranean countries – Italy, Greece and Spain. These countries share common features 
with respect to the four indicators used for the analysis, albeit with greater differences 
compared to other clusters. The main common feature is a very high level of informal 
economy, just below that of Eastern European countries. Regarding the overall integration 
system, Italy and Spain share similar scores, while Greece is positioned below the European 
average. Additionally, the proportion of residence permits issued for employment reasons is 
low, with the exception of Spain, where the proportion of residence permits for work is 
comparable with that of countries belonging to the third cluster. Regarding the presence of 
migrants from new EU member states, Italy and Greece show the highest proportion 
compared to all other European countries. However, this is also a common feature of Spain, 
albeit to a lesser extent. 
The fourth cluster – which I name new immigration and low integration – includes all the 
Eastern European countries, apart from Poland. These countries share the same features in all 
four indicators and constitute a very distinctive cluster. In particular, they are characterised by 
a large informal economy and low scores in terms of integration of migrants. The only 
exception is Estonia, which shows a more open integration system. Also, as it is typical of 
countries of new immigration, they present a high proportion of first residence permits issued 
for employment reasons, compared to all other types of permits. Finally, mainly due to the 
geographical proximity, they host a large share of migrants coming from new accession 
countries. 
 
 
  
                                                        
222 While after each EU enlargement many countries had put in place temporary restrictions in the access of 
migrants from new member states, Ireland and the UK immediately allowed nationals of new EU countries to 
live and work in their country. This resulted in the reception of quite large shares of migrants from new member 
states (Eurostat, 2011). 
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Chapter 6  
 
Measuring the impact of care, gender and migration typologies on 
migrant domestic work 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter presents the last set of analyses conducted in the framework of this research. In 
the first part, I recall the objectives of the research and based on them I formulate the specific 
hypotheses. The second part presents some descriptive analyses, similar to those presented in 
Chapter 4, where I aggregate the information on the main features of the domestic sector at 
the level of the typologies of the three regimes (instead of at the level of single countries). The 
third part of the chapter introduces the final analysis and the reasons for the choice of 
multinomial logistic regression analysis, instead of other types of inferential analysis 
(multilevel analysis and ‘aggregated analysis’). The fourth part shows the last analyses and 
includes the description of the analyses, the comparison between the different models that 
were carried out and the interpretation of the results. In the last part of the chapter I interpret 
the results in the light of the hypotheses presented at the beginning of the chapter. 
 
6.1 Objectives and hypotheses 
 
Before presenting the last set of analyses carried out in the framework of this research, it is 
necessary to return to the objectives of the study and to present the hypotheses that have been 
formulated in relation to the objectives. As stated in the introduction of the dissertation, the 
main objective of the research is to empirically test the theory that identifies care, gender and 
migration regimes as having an impact on migrant domestic work. 
The specific objectives are the following: 
1) To investigate whether and to what extent the three regimes have an impact on the 
share of migrants in the domestic workforce; 
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2) To investigate whether and to what extent the three typologies can be a useful tool to 
explain the cross-national variation in the main features of paid domestic work, and in 
the degree of ethnicisation in particular. 
The first set of analyses – that is, the descriptive analyses presented in Chapter 4 – provided a 
description of the main features of contemporary paid domestic work in Europe and 
highlighted the main differences between European countries. As it emerges from the 
analyses, significant cross-country differences exist, especially with respect to the share of 
migrants in the domestic services workforce. Other differences, albeit less significant, include 
the size of the domestic sector as a share of total employment, the degree of feminisation of 
the domestic workforce and the three aspects used to investigate working conditions: the 
income level in the domestic sector compared to other low-skilled occupations, the share of 
temporary work vs. permanent work in the domestic sector and the prevalence of unusual 
working hours in the domestic sector (evening, night and weekend shifts).  
The second set of analyses, presented in Chapter 5, allowed to create a typology of care 
regimes, a typology of gender regimes and a typology of migration regimes, based on a series 
of indicators and/or synthetic indexes specifically elaborated for the purpose of this study. 
The construction of synthetic indexes, where relevant, and of the three typologies was carried 
out in order to use these indicators and typologies to study a social phenomenon, namely the 
migrant domestic work.  
In this third step of the analysis – and in order to answer to the main research questions – I 
combine the indicators and the typologies of the three regimes with the EU-LFS data. This 
allows me to investigate whether the three regimes have an effect on the actual outcomes of 
individuals in the labour market (in the domestic sector) and to measure the intensity of this 
effect. 
 
Hypotheses 
Based on the objectives of the research, and based on the literature, the following hypotheses 
have been formulated: 
1) The three regimes – the care, the gender and the migration regimes – do have an effect 
on the main features of paid domestic work and in particular on the concentration of 
migrants in the domestic sector. Specifically, they have an effect: 
 on the proportion of migrant domestic workers, compared to native domestic 
workers 
 237 
 on the proportion of migrant domestic workers, compared to migrants working in 
another sector 
 
2) The three regimes have the highest explanatory power when they are taken into 
consideration simultaneously 
3) The typologies of the three regimes are a better tool, compared to countries, to explain 
the main features of paid domestic work and in particular the degree of ethnicisation 
of the sector  
4) The specific effects of the three regimes are expected to be the following: 
4a. The effect of the gender regime on the concentration of migrants is expected to be 
the following: 
- Cluster 3 of the gender regime (Traditional gender contract) is expected to 
have a positive effect on the degree of ethnicisation of the domestic sector, 
while Cluster 1 (Modern gender contract) is expected to have a negative effect 
on the degree of ethnicisation. This means that countries that belong to Cluster 
3 are expected to have a higher concentration of migrants in the domestic 
sector, compared to Clusters 2 and 1 (Gender contract in transition and Modern 
gender contract). On the contrary, countries that belong to Cluster 1 are 
expected to have a more balanced workforce composition between migrants 
and natives. Countries that belong to Cluster 2 are expected to have a medium 
degree of ethnicisation (between Cluster 3 and 1).  
This is based on the fact that where housework and care work are seen as a 
responsibility of families, and of women in particular (as in Cluster 3: Traditional 
gender contract), domestic work is associated with a work of no value and the 
professionalisation of the work is difficult to achieve. This reinforces stereotypes 
about the low reputation and the unskilled nature of the job, which in turn leads to 
the concentration in this sector of the weakest segment of the workforce, namely 
migrants. Conversely, in contexts where the gender division of labour is weaker 
and domestic and care activities are not entirely seen as a family responsibility, 
domestic work is supposed to be more professionalised and to enjoy a better 
reputation. Thus, in Cluster 1 the workforce in the domestic sector is expected to 
be more balanced, both in terms of feminisation and of ethnicisation. 
4b. The effect of the care regime on the concentration of migrants is expected to be the 
following: 
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- Cluster 1 of the care regime (De-familialisation) is expected to have a negative 
effect on the concentration of migrants in the domestic sector. Clusters 2 and 3 
(Familialisation with and without state support) are expected to have a positive 
effect on the degree of ethnicisation. In other words, countries that belong to 
Cluster 1 of the care regime are expected to have a lower proportion of 
migrants in the domestic sector, compared to countries that belong to Cluster 2 
and Cluster 3. In particular, the positive effect of Cluster 3 on the concentration 
of migrants in the domestic sector is expected to be stronger than that of 
Cluster 2. 
This is based on the fact that in countries characterised by policies that push to the 
familialisation of care and domestic tasks, families tend to find their own solutions 
to cover their needs for care and domestic services. Especially when the state does 
not guarantee adequate support either in the form of public services or in the form 
of monetary transfers (Cluster 3), families have to rely on the cheapest available 
option in the labour market, which is represented by migrants. 
4c. The effect of the migration regime on the concentration of migrants is expected to 
be the following: 
- Cluster 4 (New immigration and low integration) and Cluster 3 (New 
immigration and medium integration) are expected to have a positive effect on 
the concentration of migrants in the domestic sector. Cluster 2 (Old 
immigration and medium integration) and Cluster 1 (Old immigration and high 
integration) are expected to have a negative effect on the concentration of 
migrants in the domestic sector. In other words, countries that belong to 
Clusters 4 and 3 are expected to show the highest degree of ethnicisation in the 
domestic sector, compared to Clusters 1 and 2.  
This is based on the fact that Clusters 4 (New immigration and low integration) 
and 3 (New immigration and medium integration) are characterised by a large 
informal economy, combined with low scores in the integration index. These are 
both features that suggest that migrants are more likely to be concentrated in the 
lower-skilled and less reputed segments of the labour market, which include the 
domestic sector. First, the informal economy has been proved to attract domestic 
workers (see Chapter 2); second, when migrants are less integrated in the host 
society, they are more likely to concentrate in poorly paid jobs, such as domestic 
services. On the contrary, countries that belong to Cluster 2 (Old immigration and 
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medium integration) and Cluster 1 (Old immigration and high integration) are 
expected to have a lower concentration of migrants in the domestic sector. First, in 
countries of old immigration, migrants are generally expected to be more 
integrated in the host society, which is confirmed by their higher score in the 
integration index; second, in countries characterised by less restrictive migration 
policies, migrants are supposed to integrate better and faster in other sectors of the 
labour market. 
 
6.2 Bivariate descriptive analysis using the typologies 
 
Before presenting the results of the inferential analyses carried out to conclude this study, it 
can be interesting to use descriptive bivariate analyses to show how the features of 
contemporary domestic work change based on the three typologies developed in this study. 
This can be useful in order to show the behaviour of each cluster within each typology with 
regard to the main feature of the domestic sector and thus to preliminary assess Hypothesis 1 
(The three regimes – the care, the gender and the migration regimes – do have an effect on the 
main features of paid domestic work and in particular on the concentration of migrants in the 
domestic sector) and Hypothesis 3 (The typologies of the three regimes are a better tool, 
compared to countries, to explain the main features of paid domestic work and in particular 
the degree of ethnicisation of the sector).  
For these analyses, instead of aggregating the information on the domestic sector at country 
level (as presented in Chapter 4), I aggregate the information based on the clusters of each 
typology. To do so, I use the EU-LFS microdata, which I aggregate based on the clusters of 
the three typologies. For each feature of the domestic sector that is taken into consideration, a 
separate analysis on each regime typology is presented. Annex 7 reports the data based on 
which all the figures of this section have been created. Annex 8 reports all the tests that have 
been carried out to test the differences between the clusters of each typology for each feature. 
 
6.2.1 Magnitude of the domestic sector 
 
Care regime 
Figure 31 shows the proportion of domestic workers compared to all other workers for the 
three clusters of the typology of care regimes, based on the EU-LFS 2015. 
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Figure 31: Proportion of domestic workers in the 3 clusters of care regimes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Care typology: 
 
1 = De-familialisation 
2 = Familialisation with 
state support 
3 = Familialisation 
without state support 
 
The difference in the proportion of domestic workers compared to all other workers in the 
three groups of the care regime is statistically significant. As it is clear from the figure, the 
proportion of domestic workers is considerably higher in Cluster 1 of the care regime, which 
corresponds to ‘De-familialisation’. This can be explained by the fact that countries 
characterised by a stronger de-familialisation of policies tend to promote the externalisation of 
domestic and care tasks, while in countries characterised by familialisatic policies, care and 
domestic services are considered the responsibility of families.  
However, literature has highlighted that the lack of public services and/or state support does 
not mean that domestic services are not externalised, as families do have increasing care and 
domestic needs that cannot bear on their own. This would suggest that in countries with 
familialising policies (Clusters 2 and 3) the share of the domestic sector should be just as 
important. The explanation for a relatively lower share of domestic workers compared to all 
other workers in Clusters 2 and 3 of the care regime can be attributed to the large share of 
informal work in the domestic sector223. 
 
 
 
                                                        
223 As stated in section 4.2.3 and section 3.4.1.2, although the EU-LFS data does not exclude a priori irregular 
workers, there are reasons to believe that irregular workers, especially when they also have an irregular 
migration status, are less likely to be captured by official surveys, compared to regular workers. 
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Gender regime 
Figure 32 shows the proportion of domestic workers compared to all other workers for the 
three clusters of the typology of gender regimes, based on the EU-LFS 2015. 
 
Figure 32: Proportion of domestic workers in the 3 clusters of gender regimes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gender typology: 
 
1 = Modern gender 
contract 
2 = Gender contract 
in transition 
3 = Traditional 
gender contract 
 
The difference in the proportion of domestic workers compared to all other workers in the 
three groups of the gender regime is statistically significant. Although the difference between 
the first cluster and the other two clusters is less flagrant than in the case of care regimes, 
Cluster 1 of gender regimes (Modern gender contract) emerges as the one with the higher 
share of domestic workers, compared to all workers. This is in line with the literature and with 
theoretical considerations regarding the gender contract. In countries of Cluster 1 (Modern 
gender contract) the externalisation of domestic and care services is expected to be more 
accepted – which justifies the importance of the domestic sector as a share of the full labour 
market. In countries characterised by more traditional views about gender roles (Clusters 2 
and 3), families – and women in particular – are expected to assume the majority of care and 
domestic tasks and the externalisation of domestic work is less accepted. 
 
Migration regime 
Figure 33 shows the proportion of domestic workers compared to all other workers for the 
four clusters of the typology of migration regimes, based on the EU-LFS 2015. 
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Figure 33: Proportion of domestic workers in the 4 clusters of migration regimes 
 
 
 
 
 
Migration typology: 
 
1 = Old immigration 
and high integration  
2 = Old immigration 
and medium 
integration 
3 = New 
immigration and 
medium integration 
4 = New 
immigration and 
low integration 
 
While there is almost no difference between Cluster 2 (Old immigration and medium 
integration) and Cluster 3 (New immigration and medium integration), countries that belong 
to Cluster 1 (Old immigration and high integration) have a considerably larger domestic 
sector, compared to all other sectors, while countries of cluster 4 (New immigration and low 
integration) have considerably fewer domestic workers compared to all workers in their 
labour market. Again, as mentioned above, this difference can be due to the prevalence, in 
countries of Cluster 4, of a large informal economy, which would hide the presence of many 
domestic workers.  
Overall, as stated in section 4.2.3 and section 3.4.1.2, there are reasons to believe that due to 
the high prevalence of informal work in the domestic sector, the analysis of the magnitude of 
the domestic sector with the EU-LFS data is likely to be very imprecise and results should be 
taken with caution. 
 
6.2.2 Proportion of women the domestic sector 
 
Care regime 
Figure 34 shows the proportion of women in the domestic sector for the three clusters of the 
typology of care regimes, based on the EU-LFS 2015. 
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Figure 34: Proportion of women in the domestic sector in the 3 clusters of care regimes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Care typology: 
 
1 = De-
familialisation 
2 = Familialisation 
with state support 
3 = Familialisation 
without state 
support 
 
The difference in the proportion of women in the domestic sector in the three clusters of the 
care regime is statistically significant. In particular, countries belonging to Cluster 3 
(Familialisation without state support) have a significantly higher share of women in the 
domestic sector, while countries that belong to Cluster 1 (De-familialisation) have a lower 
share of women in the domestic workforce. In line with literature, this seems to confirm that 
the familialistic nature of the care regime is reflected not only in the family (the family, and 
women in particular, are seen as the main providers of care), but also in the domestic sector. 
In other words, in countries characterised by familialism women are more likely to be those 
performing domestic and care tasks, either within their families, or in the labour market.  
 
Gender regime 
Figure 35 shows the proportion of women in the domestic sector for the three clusters of the 
typology of gender regimes, based on the EU-LFS 2015. 
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Figure 35: Proportion of women in the domestic sector in the 3 clusters of gender 
regimes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gender typology: 
 
1 = Modern gender 
contract 
2 = Gender contract 
in transition 
3 = Traditional 
gender contract 
 
 
While Cluster 2 (Gender contract in transition) and 3 (Traditional gender contract) of the 
typology of gender regimes show a similar (high) proportion of women in the domestic sector, 
Cluster 1 (Modern gender contract) is the only one that shows a relatively higher proportion 
of men in the domestic sector. This is understandable, due to the fact that, in countries with a 
more equal gender contract and a higher degree of gender equality in all aspects, gender 
stereotypes that assign domestic tasks to women are expected to be weaker. In other words, 
gender equality in both public and domestic sphere is reflected in a better gender balance also 
in the domestic sector, which is generally confirmed by data. 
However, it is worth noting that even in countries characterised by a modern gender contract, 
the proportion of women in the domestic sector remains disproportionally high, compared to 
that of men. 
 
Migration regime 
Figure 36 shows the proportion of women in the domestic sector for the four clusters of the 
typology of migration regimes, based on the EU-LFS 2015. 
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Figure 36: Proportion of women in the domestic sector in the 4 clusters of migration 
regimes 
 
 
 
 
 
Migration typology: 
 
1 = Old immigration and 
high integration  
2 = Old immigration and 
medium integration 
3 = New immigration 
and medium integration 
4 = New immigration 
and low integration 
 
The cluster with the highest share of women in the domestic sector is Cluster 4 (New 
immigration and low integration). This can be explained by the fact that Eastern European 
countries are also countries with strong familialistic policies, as well as low scores in gender 
equality and a traditional type of gender contract. However, Mediterranean countries, which 
share the same features of familialism and traditional gender contract and which are part of 
Cluster 3 of the migration regime (New immigration and medium integration) present a lower 
concentration of women in the domestic sector, similar to that of Cluster 1 (Old immigration 
and high integration). This can be explained by the fact that in some Mediterranean countries, 
such as Italy, there has been a recent resurgence of male domestic work, where migrants 
constitute the strongest supply (see section 4.3.1). 
 
6.2.3 Proportion of migrants in the domestic sector 
 
Care regime 
Figure 37 shows the proportion of migrants in the domestic sector for the three clusters of the 
typology of care regimes, based on the EU-LFS 2015. 
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Figure 37: Proportion of migrants in the domestic sector in the 3 clusters of care regimes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Care typology: 
 
1 = De-familialisation 
2 = Familialisation 
with state support 
3 = Familialisation 
without state support 
 
While Clusters 3 (Familialisation without state support) and 1 (De-familialisation) of the care 
regime have similar shares of migrants in the domestic sector, Cluster 2 (Familialisation with 
state support) shows a considerably higher concentration of migrants in the domestic sector. 
This contradicts the Hypothesis 4b, which highlights the link between a lack of state support 
and the concentration of migrants in the domestic sector. According to the hypothesis, Cluster 
1 is expected to have a significantly smaller concentration of migrants in the domestic sector, 
while Cluster 3 is expected to show the strongest ethnicisation. Indeed, theory suggests that 
the lack of support by the state (here Cluster 3), both in terms of financial transfers or public 
services, would encourage families to rely more and more on migrants, who offer the cheapest 
available workforce.  
On the contrary, it is Cluster 2 that shows a considerably higher concentration of migrants in 
the sector, compared to the other clusters. This can be partially due to the fact that some 
Mediterranean countries, such as Italy and Portugal, which are usually pointed as countries 
with the least state support, are instead part of Cluster 2 (Familialisation with state support) in 
this typology224.  
                                                        
224 While the majority of European comparisons of care regimes had concentrated only on old European 
countries, in the typology developed in this study also Eastern European countries are taken into consideration, 
where possible. This obviously changes the perspective of the comparison. For instance, if it is true that Italy and 
Portugal do have a generally weak state support for care needs, compared to Northern countries, it is also true 
that when compared to Eastern European countries they do offer a higher support, especially with regards to 
elderly care. 
 247 
Finally, it is interesting to notice that countries that belong to Cluster 1 (De-familialisation) 
have a similar degree of ethnicisation in the domestic sector as in Cluster 3. This seems to 
suggest that it is not only a weak support by the state in terms of care that influences the 
ethnicisation of the sector. A detailed analysis on the proportion of migrants in the domestic 
workforce is provided in section 6.4. 
 
Gender regime 
Figure 38 shows the proportion of migrants in the domestic sector for the three clusters of the 
typology of gender regimes, based on the EU-LFS 2015. 
 
Figure 38: Proportion of migrants in the domestic sector in the 3 clusters of gender 
regimes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gender typology: 
 
1 = Modern gender 
contract 
2 = Gender contract 
in transition 
3 = Traditional 
gender contract 
 
 
Cluster 3 of gender regimes (Traditional gender contract) presents the highest concentration 
of migrants in the domestic sector among the three clusters. On the contrary, Cluster 2 
(Gender contract in transition) and Cluster 1 (Modern gender contract) have a considerably 
lower share of migrants in the domestic sector. This overall confirms Hypothesis 4a and 
seems to confirm that in countries characterised by a traditional gender contract and low 
levels of gender equality, domestic work enjoys a bad reputation and poor working conditions, 
which in turn explains the concentration in this sector of the weakest segments of the labour 
market.  
However, while a weaker ethnicisation of the domestic sector could be expected in countries 
characterised by a modern gender contract and better gender equality – as gender equality in 
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all fields is expected to be also reflected in the workforce composition of the domestic sector 
– the great difference between Cluster 2 and Cluster 3 is more puzzling and deserves further 
investigation. 
 
Migration regime 
Figure 39 shows the proportion of migrants in the domestic sector for the four clusters of the 
typology of migration regimes, based on the EU-LFS 2015. 
 
Figure 39: Proportion of migrants in the domestic sector in the 4 clusters of migration 
regimes 
 
 
 
Migration typology: 
 
1 = Old immigration 
and high integration  
2 = Old immigration 
and medium 
integration 
3 = New 
immigration and 
medium integration 
4 = New 
immigration and 
low integration 
 
 
Overall, the Hypothesis 4c is not confirmed by this analysis. Cluster 3 of the migration 
regimes (New immigration and medium integration) shows a disproportionately higher share 
of migrants in the domestic sector, which corresponds to almost double the European average. 
Conversely, Cluster 4 (New immigration and low integration) is the group with the lowest 
share of migrants in the domestic workforce. Clusters 1 (Old immigration and high 
integration) and 2 (Old immigration and medium integration) present similar levels of 
ethnicisation, which fall in between the other clusters. In this respect, it should be reminded 
that this analysis includes only first-generation migrants and that countries that belong to 
Cluster 2 and Cluster 1 are likely to have a higher degree of ethnicisation if also second and 
third generations are taken into account. Nevertheless, countries of new immigration and low 
integration are clearly those where the ethnicisation of the domestic sector is more evident. 
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6.2.4 Working conditions: income 
 
Care regime 
Table 28 compares the income of domestic workers to that of other low-skilled workers in 
each cluster of the typology of care regimes, based on the EU-LFS 2015225.  
 
Table 28: Distribution of domestic workers and other low-skilled workers by income 
(deciles) in the 3 clusters of care regimes (percentages) (EU-LFS 2015) 
 Care 1 - De-familialisation Care 2 - Familialisation with 
state support 
Care 3 - Familialisation 
without state support 
 Domestic 
sector 
Other sectors Domestic 
sector 
Other sectors Domestic 
sector 
Other sectors 
 % Cum. % % Cum. % % Cum. % % Cum. % % Cum. % % Cum. % 
1 25.4 25.4 10.3 10.3 34.7 34.7 7.9 7.9 32.0 32.0 8.6 8.6 
2 20.2 45.6 8.9 19.2 21.3 56.0 8.7 16.5 24.1 56.1 8.9 17.5 
3 17.6 63.2 8.6 27.8 17.6 73.6 9.6 26.1 15.1 71.2 10.7 28.1 
4 13.4 76.7 8.7 36.6 10.3 83.9 9.5 35.6 9.2 80.4 11.0 39.1 
5 9.8 86.4 9.1 45.7 7.7 91.6 10.6 46.2 8.6 89.0 12.2 51.3 
6 6.2 92.6 9.7 55.3 4.3 95.8 10.5 56.6 5.1 94.1 11.9 63.2 
7 3.8 96.4 11.0 66.3 2.3 98.1 10.3 66.9 1.5 95.6 7.5 70.7 
8 2.0 98.5 10.9 77.2 1.2 99.3 11.3 78.2 2.3 97.9 12.2 82.9 
9 1.0 99.5 10.8 88.0 0.5 99.9 10.9 89.2 1.3 99.2 8.1 91.0 
10 0.5 100 12.0 100 0.1 100 10.8 100 0.8 100 9 100 
 
In all three clusters the median income of domestic and other low-skilled workers is clearly 
lower than that of workers in other sectors: in the first cluster (De-familialisation), the median 
income is found in the third percentile, while in other sectors it is the sixth one; in the second 
and third clusters (respectively Familialisation with and without state support), the median 
income is found in the second decile, while for workers in other sectors it is in the sixth and 
fifth decile respectively, the differences being statistically significant226.   
 
 
 
                                                        
225 The definition of ‘other low-skilled workers’ is based on the ISCO classification and includes only codes 
>=900, which correspond to ‘Elementary occupations’. Although two of the three ISCO codes used to define 
domestic workers are part of the Major Group 5, I chose to compare domestic workers only with ‘very low-
skilled’ workers. This should avoid comparing the income of domestic workers with occupations that are 
generally thought to be more prestigious.  
226 The Mann-Whitney test was used to check whether the median values differ between domestic workers and 
workers in other sectors within each cluster. The results are the following: Cluster 1: z = 98.7, p = 0.00; Cluster 
2: z = 199.5, p = 0.00; Cluster 3: z = 59.9, p = 0.00. 
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Gender regime 
Table 29 compares the income of domestic workers to that of other low-skilled workers in 
each cluster of the typology of gender regimes, based on the EU-LFS 2015.  
 
Table 29: Distribution of domestic workers and other low-skilled workers by income 
(deciles) in the 3 clusters of gender regimes (percentages) (EU-LFS 2015) 
 Gender 1 - Modern gender 
contract 
Gender 2 - Gender contract in 
transition 
Gender 3 - Traditional gender 
contract 
 Domestic 
sector 
Other sectors Domestic 
sector 
Other sectors Domestic 
sector 
Other sectors 
 % Cum. % % Cum. % % Cum. % % Cum. % % Cum. % % Cum. % 
1 17.2 17.2 12.0 12.0 34.5 34.5 8.2 8.2 35.2 35.2 7.5 7.5 
2 19.4 36.6 9.2 21.2 23.7 58.2 8.9 17.1 19.8 55.0 8.3 15.8 
3 21.4 58.0 8.3 29.6 15.5 73.7 9.5 26.6 17.7 72.7 9.9 25.7 
4 16.3 74.3 8.2 37.8 10.2 83.8 9.9 36.5 9.9 82.5 9.4 35.0 
5 11.4 85.7 9.3 47.1 7.1 90.9 10.2 46.7 8.3 90.8 11.3 46.3 
6 6.7 92.3 9.9 57.0 4.2 95.1 10.3 56.9 4.7 95.6 10.9 57.2 
7 4.0 96.3 10.0 67.0 2.7 97.8 11.0 67.9 2.1 97.7 9.1 66.3 
8 2.0 98.3 10.6 77.6 1.4 99.2 10.6 78.5 1.4 99.1 12.5 78.8 
9 1.1 99.4 11.0 88.7 0.6 99.7 10.5 89.0 0.7 99.8 10.5 89.4 
10 0.6 100 11.3 100 0.3 100 11.0 100 0.2 100 10.6 100 
 
A similar picture emerges from the inspection of Table 29, showing the relationship between 
income of domestic workers and the gender regime typology. In this case too, the median 
income of domestic workers is much lower than that of other low-skilled workers. While in 
countries that belong to Cluster 2 (Gender contract in transition) and Cluster 3 (Traditional 
gender contract) the mean income of domestic workers is in the second decile, and that of 
low-skilled workers is found in the sixth decile, the situation in Cluster 1 (Modern gender 
contract) is slightly better (or less bad), since the median income of domestic workers falls in 
the third decile, thus reducing the gap between them and other low-skilled workers227. 
 
 
Migration regime 
Table 30 compares the income of domestic workers to that of other low-skilled workers in 
each cluster of the typology of migration regimes, based on the EU-LFS 2015. 
 
 
                                                        
227 The results of the Mann-Whitney test for the gender regime typology are the following: Cluster &: z = 65.9, 
p = 0.00; Cluster 2: z = 150.5, p = 0.00; Cluster 3: z = 162.4, p = 0.00. 
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Table 30: Distribution of domestic workers and other low-skilled workers by income 
(deciles) in the 4 clusters of migration regimes (percentages) (EU-LFS 2015) 
 Migration 1 –  
Old immigration and 
high integration 
Migration 2 –  
Old immigration and 
medium integration 
Migration 3 –  
New immigration and 
medium integration 
Migration 4 –  
New immigration and 
low integration 
 Domestic 
sector 
Other 
sectors 
Domestic 
sector 
Other 
sectors 
Domestic 
sector 
Other 
sectors 
Domestic 
sector 
Other 
sectors 
 % Cum
. % 
% Cum
. % 
% Cum
. % 
% Cum
. % 
% Cum
. % 
% Cum
. % 
% Cum
. % 
% Cum
. % 
1 36
.9 
36.9 7.
3 
7.3 28
.4 
28.4 9.
2 
9.2 34
.2 
34.2 7.
4 
7.4 34
.3 
34.3 8.
7 
8.7 
2 19
.0 
55.9 8.
4 
15.7 21
.8 
50.2 9.
1 
18.4 21
.0 
55.2 8.
2 
15.6 28
.4 
62.7 7.
8 
16.5 
3 18
.0 
73.9 9.
7 
25.4 17
.1 
67.3 9.
1 
27.5 17
.6 
72.7 9.
7 
25.2 17
.4 
80.1 12
.0 
28.4 
4 10
.0 
84.0 9.
3 
34.7 12
.7 
80.0 9.
6 
37.1 9.
4 
82.1 8.
7 
33.9 8.
3 
88.5 13
.8 
42.2 
5 8.
1 
92.0 10
.1 
44.8 8.
8 
88.9 10
.0 
47.1 8.
2 
90.3 11
.1 
45.0 4.
0 
92.5 13
.7 
55.9 
6 5.
0 
97.0 10
.4 
55.2 5.
1 
94.0 10
.2 
57.2 4.
6 
94.9 10
.8 
55.8 2.
2 
94.7 12
.2 
68.2 
7 1.
9 
98.9 11
.1 
66.2 3.
3 
97.3 10
.7 
67.9 2.
3 
97.2 8.
7 
64.5 0.
9 
95.6 9.
6 
77.8 
8 0.
8 
99.7 11
.1 
77.3 1.
6 
98.9 10
.5 
78.4 1.
8 
98.9 13
.6 
78.0 1.
7 
97.3 8.
1 
85.9 
9 0.
2 
99.9 10
.6 
87.9 0.
8 
99.6 10
.7 
89.2 0.
8 
99.8 10
.9 
89.0 1.
7 
99.0 7.
0 
93.0 
1
0 
0.
1 
100 12
.1 
100 0.
4 
100 10
.8 
100 0.
2 
100 11
.0 
100 1.
0 
100 7.
0 
100 
 
As shown in Table 30, the difference of the median income between domestic workers and 
other low-skilled workers persists if we consider the migration regime typology. In all clusters, 
the median income of domestic workers is found in the second decile, while that of other low-
skilled workers is in the sixth decile228. 
 
6.2.5 Working conditions: shift work 
 
Care regime 
Figure 40 shows the proportion of domestic workers doing shift work for the three clusters of 
the typology of care regimes, based on the EU-LFS 2015. 
 
 
                                                        
228 The results of the Mann-Whitney test for the migration regimes typology are the following: Cluster 1: z = 
105.9, p = 0.00; Cluster 2: z = 144.5, p = 0.00; Cluster 3: z = 139.5, p = 0.00; Cluster 4: z = 44.1, p = 0.00. 
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Figure 40: Proportion of domestic workers doing shift work in the 3 clusters of care 
regimes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Care typology: 
 
1 = De-
familialisation 
2 = Familialisation 
with state support 
3 = Familialisation 
without state 
support 
 
The difference in the proportion of shift work in the domestic sector in the three clusters of 
care regimes is statistically significant. The cluster where the proportion of shift work in the 
domestic sector is lower is Cluster 1 (De-familialisation), while the cluster where it is higher 
is Cluster 3 (Familialisation without state support). This finding is not surprising, given that in 
countries where domestic and care work have a longer history of externalisation, the domestic 
sector is more likely to be ‘professionalised’, that is to also have more standard working 
conditions compared to the rest of the labour market. On the contrary, where familialisation is 
stronger, domestic work is more likely to be attributed low value, in accordance to the general 
view of domestic work as unpaid work. 
 
Gender regime 
Figure 41 shows the proportion of domestic workers doing shift work for the three clusters of 
the typology of gender regimes, based on the EU-LFS 2015. 
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Figure 41: Proportion of domestic workers doing shift work in the 3 clusters of gender 
regimes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gender typology: 
 
1 = Modern gender 
contract 
2 = Gender contract 
in transition 
3 = Traditional 
gender contract 
 
When the proportion of shift work in the domestic sector is analysed using the typology of 
gender regimes, the findings are unexpected. While Cluster 1 of gender regimes (Modern 
gender contract) seems to offer better working conditions to domestic workers in terms of 
income, it is not the case with respect to unusual working hours. Indeed, Cluster 1 is the group 
where the proportion of shift work in the domestic sector is higher. This seems to indicate 
either that domestic work demands specific working timetables (which corresponds to the 
reality, but then the difference between the clusters should not be so important), or that a more 
progressive gender contract does not necessarily translate into better regulation and better 
working conditions in the domestic sector. 
The group of countries where the proportion of shift work is smaller is Cluster 2 (Gender 
contract in transition). 
 
Migration regime 
Figure 42 shows the proportion of domestic workers doing shift work for the four clusters of 
the typology of migration regimes, based on the EU-LFS 2015. 
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Figure 42: Proportion of domestic workers doing shift work in the 4 clusters of 
migration regimes 
 
 
 
Migration typology: 
 
1 = Old immigration 
and high integration  
2 = Old immigration 
and medium 
integration 
3 = New 
immigration and 
medium integration 
4 = New 
immigration and 
low integration 
 
The clusters that present the higher proportion of shift work in the domestic sector are Cluster 
1 (Old immigration and high integration) and Cluster 3 (New immigration and medium 
integration). While this is not surprising for Cluster 3, as new immigration countries are 
characterised by a large informal economy and thus a more unregulated labour market, this is 
more surprising for Cluster 1, where the labour market, including the domestic sector, is 
expected to be more regulated, thus offering better working conditions to all workers. Overall, 
Cluster 2 (Old immigration and medium integration) is the one offering the most regulated 
domestic sector, at least regarding the working shifts. 
 
 
6.2.6 Working conditions: temporary work 
 
Care regime 
Figure 43 shows the proportion of temporary work in the domestic sector for the three clusters 
of the typology of care regimes, based on the EU-LFS 2015. 
The clusters of the care regime where the proportion of temporary work in the domestic sector 
is higher are Cluster 1 (De-familialisation) and Cluster 3 (Familialisation without state 
support). Cluster 2 (Familialisation with state support) has the lowest share of temporary work 
in the domestic sector. The high share of temporary work in Cluster 1 is the least expected 
finding, especially if we consider that France and Belgium are part of this cluster. In fact, the 
voucher system that covers domestic work in Belgium and domestic and care work in France 
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is one of the examples of the most regulated systems of domestic work in Europe. We could 
then expect that the type of contract offered to domestic workers in these countries should be 
mostly a permanent contract, rather than a temporary contract. 
 
Figure 43: Proportion of temporary work in the domestic sector in 
the 3 clusters of care regimes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Care typology: 
 
1 = De-familialisation 
2 = Familialisation with 
state support 
3 = Familialisation 
without state support 
 
The high share of temporary work in Cluster 3 is less surprising, given that in countries where 
the care regime is characterised by a weaker state support are those where the domestic sector 
is likely to be less regulated. 
 
Gender regime 
Figure 44 shows the proportion of temporary work in the domestic sector for the three clusters 
of the typology of gender regimes, based on the EU-LFS 2015. 
The cluster of the gender regime where the share of temporary work in the domestic sector is 
higher is Cluster 2 (Gender contract in transition), while the cluster where the proportion of 
temporary work is lower is Cluster 3 (Traditional gender contract). The latter is the most 
unexpected finding, as in countries with a strongly familialistic culture and more traditional 
views about gender equality and gender roles domestic work is strongly associated to the 
unpaid work of women and thus to work of no value. In these countries, the domestic sector is 
expected to be poorly regulated and contracts offered to domestic workers to be mostly of a 
temporary kind. 
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Figure 44: proportion of temporary work in the domestic sector in the 3 clusters of 
gender regimes 
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Migration regime 
Figure 45 shows the proportion of temporary work in the domestic sector for the four clusters 
of the typology of migration regimes, based on the EU-LFS 2015. 
 
 
Figure 45: Proportion of temporary work in the domestic sector in the 4 clusters of 
migration regimes 
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and medium 
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low integration 
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The clusters of the migration regime with the highest share of temporary work in the domestic 
sector are Cluster 1 (Old immigration and high integration) and Cluster 4 (New immigration 
and low integration), while the countries with the least share of temporary work are Clusters 2 
(Old immigration and medium integration) and Cluster 3 (New immigration and medium 
integration). Since both Clusters 3 and 4 share some features, such as a large informal 
economy and presumably a less regulated labour market, we would rather expect them to 
have both a high share of temporary work. This is not the case for Cluster 3, where the 
proportion of temporary work in the domestic sector is the lowest among the groups of 
migration regimes. 
Overall, concerning the working conditions in the domestic sector, these analyses seem to 
suggest that while the highest levels of income in the domestic sector are offered by countries 
that belong to Cluster 1 of the gender regime (Modern gender contract) and Cluster 1 of the 
care regime (De-familialisation), these clusters do not offer the best working conditions in 
terms of temporary work and unusual working hours. On the contrary, the countries that offer 
better working conditions in terms of temporary work are those belonging to Cluster 3 of 
migration regimes (New immigration and medium integration), Cluster 3 of gender regimes 
(Traditional gender contract) and Cluster 2 of care regimes (Familialisation with state 
support). Countries that offer better working conditions in terms of shift work are those 
belonging to Cluster 2 of migration regimes (Old immigration and medium integration), 
Cluster 2 of gender regimes (Gender contract in transition) and Cluster 1 of care regimes (De-
familialisation). 
 
6.3 Three types of inferential analyses 
 
As anticipated in section 6.1, for the last set of analyses presented in this chapter I combine 
data on individual outcomes in the labour market with the data on the three regimes under 
study. From a statistical point of view, combining data on individuals with information 
aggregated at a higher level (the level of the group)229 is a situation that needs to be addressed 
with specific tools. This is based on the assumption that the group individuals belong to might 
influence their characteristics. In other words, individual outcomes of individuals belonging 
                                                        
229 In this case, the individual level is the EU-LFS data, while the group level is represented by the different 
clusters of each typology (or the indicators used for each regime). 
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to a certain group might be more similar to each other, compared to individual outcomes of 
individuals belonging to another group.  
When using statistical methods, the effect that the group has on the individual level must be 
taken into account, to overcome the risk of correlated observations. Indeed, the fact that 
individuals belong to the same group and thus might share a series of characteristics of this 
group means that they are not completely independent. The independence of observations 
being one of the main assumptions of most statistical analyses, the problem of dependence 
has to be addressed with specific solutions. 
According to Twisk (2006), there are three main ways to address this situation: i) the 
multilevel analysis; ii) the ‘aggregated analysis’; and iii) the ‘disaggregated analysis’.  
All three methods have been explored for this last step of the research, but only the results of 
the third type are reported. Below is a brief description of each solution, with a brief 
discussion over the suitability of each technique for this specific research. 
 
Multilevel analysis 
The ideal solution to the problem of correlated observations is represented by multilevel 
analysis, which is specifically designed to acknowledge the presence of a hierarchical 
structure in the data (different levels of groups/clusters). It is a type of analysis that has 
revealed very useful in various fields, such as research on education, where pupils are nested 
within classes and schools, or medical research, where patients are nested within hospitals or 
doctors, and so on. It is also used for longitudinal studies, where the correlation of the 
observations on the same individuals is solved by nesting data within individual subjects (Hox, 
1998). 
In all these situations, multilevel analysis allows to measure the variability in the outcome that 
is attributable to the groups. The idea is that in a situation of nested (or hierarchical) data, the 
variability within groups is small, because individuals belonging to the same group are more 
likely to have similar characteristics or behaviours, and variability among groups, thus the 
effect of the group, is large. 
Although the multilevel analysis represents the most powerful statistical tool to analyse 
hierarchical data, it cannot be applied to all situations, as it demands a series of assumptions 
to be met. In particular, it demands that both the number of individuals in each group and the 
number of groups (level 2 of the analysis) be large for results to be reliable (see section 
3.5.2.1). 
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The results of the multilevel logistic regression models that have been tentatively carried out 
for this research are not presented here, for two main reasons: 
1- the total number of groups (the clusters of the typologies developed for the three 
regimes) is 11, which is far below the minimum acceptable sample size. This 
jeopardises the reliability of both coefficient estimates and of the explained variance. 
2- The explained variance, which is the total variance explained by the level 2 (groups) is 
very low (less than 5%). This does not justify the use of a multilevel analysis230. 
 
Aggregated method 
Similar to multilevel analysis, the aggregated method acknowledges the hierarchical structure 
of the data and the dependency of the observations. However, instead of constructing models 
that include both levels of data, it consists in analysing the group observations, instead of the 
individual observations. To do so, some sort of average or any other useful information 
(proportion, mean, etc.) must be calculated for each group. Then, this information (aggregated 
at group level) is used as the outcome variable in standard regression analyses. 
Although the aggregated method could be an interesting alternative to the more sophisticated 
multilevel analysis, it has to meet the assumptions of standard regressions. The linear 
regression models that I have tentatively carried out following this method are not presented 
here, because they are likely to be unreliable, due to the very small number of observations231. 
 
Disaggregated method 
Contrary to the multilevel analysis and the aggregated method, the disaggregated method does 
not acknowledge the correlation between observations, thus the nested structure of the data. 
This means that data is treated only at the individual level and the information on groups is 
included in the analysis in one single level. Although this clearly represents a limitation, as it 
violates the assumption of independence of observations, this is the only type of analysis that 
was made possible by the data in my possess. The next section presents the results of the 
multinomial logistic regression models that have been carried out. 
                                                        
230 The multilevel analysis is useful because data is supposed to be clustered in groups. When the variance is 
very low, it means that the contribution of groups (level 2) in explaining the variance is small. In other words, 
including the second level does not significantly contribute to explaining the variance. 
231 A series of linear regression models were carried out, where the outcome variables were for each regression 
the proportion of women in the domestic sector, the proportion of migrants, the domestic sector as a share of the 
total employment, and so on; the predictors were the groups derived from the three typologies. Although some 
significant regression coefficient resulted from the models, the results are not reported as the limited number of 
observations (the clusters of the three typologies) does not guarantee reliability. 
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6.4 Multinomial logistic regression models 
 
Several multinomial logistic regression models were estimated to investigate the effect that 
the three regimes under study have on the probability to be a migrant domestic worker in 
Europe. In order to do so, a new dummy variable was created in the EU-LFS database 2015, 
which was derived from the variables ‘ISCO08’ (occupation) and ‘Country of birth’. The new 
dummy variable has three categories: 1) migrant domestic worker; 2) native domestic worker; 
3) migrant working in another sector. This variable was used as the dependent variable 
(outcome) in all the analyses, so to investigate the effect of other variables and of the three 
regimes under study on the probability to be a migrant domestic worker, compared to a native 
domestic worker, and the probability to be a migrant domestic worker, compared to a migrant 
working in another sector. A fourth category is logically possible, and also present in the data, 
namely that of native workers in other sectors. However, the contrast between this additional 
category and that of migrant domestic workers would be out of the scope of testing the 
aforementioned hypotheses, since it would entail neither the condition of being a migrant, nor 
that of working in the domestic sector. 
The database was prepared so to include only employed individuals aged more than 16 years 
old and less than 80 years old, and so to exclude all missing cases on the variables included in 
the analysis232. The valid sample includes 219353 individual observations. In addition to the 
variables provided by the EU-LFS, new variables were created addressing the different 
clusters of each typology (care, gender and migration regimes) and each indicator used for the 
creation of the typologies. 
As for the analytical strategy adopted, in a first step a set of nested multinomial regressions 
was carried out, including only the control variables provided by the EU-LFS database. 
Starting from a simple model that includes just one control variable (gender), each model 
progressively adds up one control variable at a time, with the last model including all control 
variables: gender, age, higher educational attainment and marital status. All of these variables 
were previously prepared in order to adapt them to the regression analysis233. Having checked 
                                                        
232 Since the dummy dependent variable includes only three categories out of the four logically possible, all 
other workers – namely, natives working in any other sector of the labour market – are excluded from the valid 
sample. 
233 The variable ‘Sex’ was re-levelled, so to use ‘male’ as the reference category in the regressions. The variable 
‘Highest educational attainment’ was recoded, so to eliminate the categories that present few or no occurrences. 
The resulting variable is categorical and includes three categories: 1= ‘low education’ (no education and primary 
education), 2= ‘medium education’ (secondary education and similar) and 3= ‘high education’ (higher secondary 
education, university and PhD). The category ‘low education’ was used as the reference in the regressions. 
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that the fit of the model improves from the most basic model to the model that includes all the 
above-mentioned independent variables234, this last model was used as the base model (Model 
0) to which compare the further models that were carried out.  
The second step consists of multinomial regression models that include the information on the 
three regimes under study, targeted at testing the hypotheses presented in section 6.1. Thirteen 
models were estimated, whose description is reported in Table 31. 
 
Table 31: Analytical strategy 
Name Variables 
MODEL 0 Gender, Age, Education level, Marital status 
MODEL 1 Model 0 + Country 
MODEL 2 Model 0 + Care typology 
MODEL 3 Model 0 + Gender typology 
MODEL 4 Model 0 + Migration typology 
MODEL 5 Model 0 + Care typology + Gender Typology + Migration Typology 
MODEL 6 Model 0 + Interaction Care X Gender typology 
MODEL 7 Model 0 + Interaction Care X Migration typology 
MODEL 8 Model 0 + Interaction Gender X Migration typology 
MODEL 9 Model 0 + Interaction Care X Gender typology + Migration typology 
MODEL 10 Model 0 + Interaction Care X Migration typology + Gender typology 
MODEL 11 Model 0 + Interaction Gender X Migration typology + Care typology 
MODEL 12 Model 0 + Interaction all 3 typologies 
 
6.4.1 Comparison between models 
 
Table 32 provides the information on the fit of the 12 models that were estimated, plus the 
base model (Model 0). The fit parameters included in the table are the AIC and the BIC. The 
models are ordered according to the increasing value of the BIC, which corresponds to a 
ranking from the best to the worst fit235. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Concerning the variable ‘marital status’, the category ‘married’ was used as the reference, against the categories 
‘single’ and ‘separated’. 
234 The AIC constantly decreased from the most basic model to the last model (AIC = 365000 for the model that 
includes only gender, to AIC = 331000 for the model that includes gender, age, education and marital status). 
The Log-likelihood ratio test was significant in each subsequent model, showing that each further model was 
better than the previous one in predicting the outcome variable.  
235 Both AIC and BIC are measures of fit that decrease as the fit of the model increase. 
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Table 32: Fit measures of 13 multinomial regression models 
 
 Obs Lsq df BIC AIC 
MODEL 1 (country) 219353 106261.0 46 314000.5 313506.2 
MODEL 12 (three-way interaction) 219353 104342.0 38 315821.2 315409.2 
MODEL 11 (genderXmigration, care) 219353 103611.5 34 316502.4 316131.7 
MODEL 10 (careXmigration, gender) 219353 102809.5 30 317255.2 316925.7 
MODEL 8 (genderXmigration) 219353 102669.5 30 317395.2 317065.7 
MODEL 7 (careXmigration) 219353 101147.7 26 318867.8 318579.5 
MODEL 9 (careXgender, migration) 219353 100322.3 30 319742.4 319412.8 
MODEL 5 (all typologies) 219353 99781.6 26 320233.9 319945.5 
MODEL 4 (migration typology) 219353 95724.8 18 324192.3 323986.3 
MODEL 6 (careXgender) 219353 93110.5 24 326880.5 326612.7 
MODEL 3 (gender typology) 219353 91914.7 16 327977.8 327792.4 
MODEL 2 (care typology) 219353 91822.3 16 328070.2 327884.8 
MODEL 0 (base) 219353 88637.6 12 331205.8 331061.6 
 
 
As it emerges from the table, all models show a considerable improvement compared to the 
base model, which means that they all better predict the outcome variable than the latter. 
Annex 9 reports the coefficients, standard errors, and odds ratio of the 13 models listed in 
Table 32. 
The best fitting model is Model 1 (which includes the individual country variable), according 
to either of the fit indices (BIC, AIC or L2).  Based on this result, we should conclude that the 
best way to predict whether a worker is a migrant working in the domestic sector is to 
consider the country she or he lives in; in other words, in Europe it is the country level that 
better accounts for the differences in the share of migrant workers in the domestic sector, 
hence pointing at cross-country differences in the welfare provisions, in the migration 
regulatory policies, and so on. 
As sensible as this result is, it adds little to our understanding of the phenomenon under study: 
the cross-country differences as for the processes and mechanisms that influence the 
concentration of migrant workers in the domestic sector are obvious and well know, as the 
literature review in Chapter 2 shows. What would be more fruitful is to know whether these 
differences can be summarised by any set of typologies, and in particular those that were 
devised in Chapter 5, as alternatives to the already-existing ones described in Chapter 2. 
Indeed, since the aim here is to generalise (to the level of the three regimes), the idea is not to 
interpret variation at the level of each country, but rather to find a conceptual tool that allows 
both to generalise and at the same time to show a sufficiently strong explanatory power. In 
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this view, Model 1 would be best considered as a new baseline (thus substituting Model 0) for 
comparing the models without countries and with the care, gender and migration typologies.  
Model 12 (including interactions among the three regimes) shows the best fit, after Model 1 
(BIC difference=1820; L2 change=1919.0 with 4 degrees of freedom). In order to grasp the 
meaning of this result, two issues should be considered. On the one hand, this model tends to 
bring approximately the same level of information as Model 1, since the interaction between 
the three typologies gives 14 valid combinations (see the frequencies of the interactions at the 
end of Annex 9) against the 18 countries; therefore, it could be concluded that the two models 
show a rather close fit because Model 12 almost reproduces Model 1. On the other hand, and 
most interestingly, the fact that Model 12 is second only to Model 1 in terms of goodness of 
fit means that, should we use the three typologies in interaction between them, rather than the 
countries, we would come to explain the ethnicisation of the domestic sector about as well.  
This represents a key finding for this study that is worth some discussion. Indeed, countries 
can be thought just as conventional proxy indicators for a host of factors: systems of welfare, 
migration, gender equality but also, and broadly speaking, culture, historical events, political 
arrangements and orientation, economic facts, support for different types of policies, and 
many other aspects of their lives that go unmentioned or unspecified. On the contrary, the 
clusters formed by the typologies developed in this study have a clear and evident meaning, as 
they group the European countries based on just three dimensions, that are clearly singled out 
both on the theoretical and the empirical level. The fact that these clusters do explain the 
variability shown by the data almost as well as the countries means that they constitute a 
useful and well-designed tool to understand the phenomena under study.  
In other words, if it is true that statistically speaking going from 18 to 14 countries is a small 
improvement, what matters is that these 14 new groups are not arbitrary labels attached to the 
countries (as the names of the countries are), but they are the result of a careful representation 
of a three-dimensional discrete space. Indeed, the categories are not arbitrarily assigned, but 
are the result of processing (PCA) and clustering of the data. The fact that this novel regime-
based coding is nearly as effective as country labels in predicting both the ethnicisation of 
domestic work and the ‘domesticisation’ of migrant workers is a solid validation of the whole 
process followed in this study, including the typologies identified in Chapter 5. 
A second relevant consideration concerning Model 12 is that in this model the typologies are 
interacted with one another, so that the effect of either of them depends on that of the others. 
This goes exactly in the direction postulated by the theory of the three regimes, as Hypothesis 
2 states: not only the three regimes do have an impact on migrant domestic work (thus 
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confirming Hypothesis 1), but their impact is greater when they are taken into consideration 
in mutual interdependence, rather than individually (as in Model 5), as Hypothesis 2 claims. 
Furthermore, and confirming the soundness of the previous finding, models from 6 to 11, 
including even only one two-way interaction, show a better fit than Model 5, in which the 
three typologies are considered independently from one another. Once more, this means that it 
is the interplay between the three regimes that matters for understanding the distribution of 
migrant workers over the sectors of activity, and in particular in the domestic sector.  
As interesting as it is, Model 12 – as anticipated – is comparable to Model 1 because the 
number of valid combinations given by the three-way interaction (14 in total) is close to the 
number of countries included in the analysis. Hence, looking at models that show a slightly 
worse fit, but are more parsimonious than Model 12, can bring more light in the 
understanding of the phenomenon under study. 
Among those including any two-way interaction, Model 11 features the interaction between 
the gender and the migration typologies, plus the care typology, and shows the next best fit 
after Model 12, with a difference from the latter in terms of BIC values of 681 and a L2 
change of 730.5 with 4 degrees of freedom236. Hence, were we to choose only one interaction 
of the possible three among the typologies, we should give preference to that between the 
gender and the migration typology. This result is in line with the characteristics of 
contemporary domestic work, as described in Chapter 1, the feminisation and ethnicisation of 
the sector being its two paramount features; and also with the descriptive analyses conducted 
in Chapter 4. 
The next best fitting model is Model 10, which includes the interaction between the care and 
the migration typology, plus the gender typology, with a difference in fit from Model 12 of 
753 points of BIC and a L2 change of 802 with 4 degrees of freedom. Rather surprisingly, the 
still next best fitting model is not Model 9 (which includes the interaction between the care 
and gender typology, plus the migration clusters) but Model 8, which includes the interaction 
between the gender and migration typologies, but excludes the care typology altogether. 
When we compare this to Model 11 (including instead the latter), we find that the difference 
between the two is significant (BIC (9)-(12)=893, L2 change=942, df=4), pointing at the fact 
that the care typology is relevant for predicting the probability of being a migrant domestic 
worker; nonetheless, it proves to be the weakest among the three, since the models that 
                                                        
236 It is to be noted that two cells of the interaction between the gender and the migration typologies are empty, 
namely the combination modern gender contract / new immigration and medium integration, and the 
combination modern gender contract / new immigration and low integration (see the frequencies of the 
interactions at the end of Annex 10).  
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include its interaction with any of the other two show a comparatively worse fit (Model 6, 7 
and 9); in the same vein, Model 2 (that includes only the care typology) fits worse than Model 
3 (including only the gender typology) and especially worse than Model 4 (including only the 
migration typology).  
In sum, the examination of the fit indices shown in Table 32 points at the following 
conclusions. First, and not unexpectedly, the probability of being a migrant domestic worker 
is better accounted for when we consider the differences between countries. Second, the 
interplay between the three regimes is able to rival (albeit from a distance, statistically 
speaking) with the country level in this task (hence confirming Hypothesis 1), and gives a 
much better insight than considering the typologies independently from one another (thus 
confirming Hypothesis 2). Third, the interplay between the migration and the gender 
typologies is particularly relevant, while the care typology plays a lesser role in the shaping of 
the ethnic distribution of the domestic sector.  
Given the limited interest that Model 1 has for the present study, and considering that Model 
12 is close to the latter in terms of parsimony, my attention now turns to Model 11, whose 
parameters will be commented in the following section. 
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6.4.2 Model 11: interaction between gender and migration, plus care 
 
Table 33 shows the coefficients, the odds ratio and the confidence intervals of the odds ratio 
of each independent variable of Model 11237 . The table is divided into two blocks that 
correspond to the categories of the dependent variable (native domestic workers and migrants 
working in another sector) being compared to the reference category (migrant domestic 
workers).  
 
Table 33: MODEL 11 
 
  95% CI for odds ratio 
B Lower Odds ratio Upper 
Native domestic workers vs. migrant domestic workers 
Intercept 2.60    
Female 0.07  1.03 1.08 1.12 
Age 0.02  1.01 1.02 1.02 
Medium education 0.25  1.25 1.29 1.33 
High education -0.71 0.47 0.49 0.51 
Separated/widow -0.16 0.82 0.85 0.89 
Single 0.66 1.87 1.94 2.01 
Care 1 – De-familialisation 0.13  1.08 1.14 1.21 
Care 3 – Familialisation without support 0.40  1.39 1.50 1.62 
Gender 1 x Migration 1 (Modern gender contract 
x Old immigration & high integration) 
-2.58  0.06 0.07 0.09 
Gender 2 x Migration 1 (Gender contract in 
transition x Old immigration & high integration) 
-2.95  0.04 0.05 0.06 
Gender 3 x Migration 1 (Traditional gender 
contract x Old immigration & high integration) 
-1.29  0.23 0.27 0.33 
Gender 1 x Migration 2 (Modern gender contract 
x Old immigration & medium integration) 
-1.74  0.15 0.17 0.21 
Gender 2 x Migration 2 (Gender contract in 
transition x Old immigration & medium 
integration) 
-2.27 0.09 0.10 0.12 
Gender 3 x Migration 2 (Traditional gender 
contract x Old immigration & medium 
integration) 
-2.87  0.05 0.06 0.07 
Gender 2 x Migration 3 (Gender contract in 
transition x New immigration & medium 
-2.60  0.06 0.07 0.09 
                                                        
237 The category ‘migrant domestic worker’ of the dependent variable was chosen as the reference category, in 
order to compare the other two categories against this one – which corresponds to the focus of the analysis. The 
reference categories of the control and independent variables are the following: male, low education, married, 
Care 2 (Familialisation with state support). As for the interactions between gender and migration typologies, the 
reference is the combination Gender 3 and Migration 4 (Traditional gender contract / New immigration and low 
integration). Two cells of the interaction do not have any occurrence, namely Gender 1 x Migration 3 (Modern 
gender contract / New immigration and medium integration) and Gender 1 x Migration 4 (Modern gender 
contract / New immigration and low integration). Hence, the interaction between gender and migration presents 
nine combinations. 
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integration) 
Gender 3  x Migration 3 (Traditional gender 
contract x New immigration & medium 
integration) 
-3.44  0.03 0.03 0.04 
Gender 2 x Migration 4 (Gender contract in 
transition x New immigration & low integration) 
-2.34 0.07 0.10 0.13 
Migrants in other sectors vs. migrant domestic workers 
Intercept 4.17     
Female -2.44  0.08 0.09 0.09 
Age -0.01  0.99 0.99 0.99 
Medium education 0.44  1.50 1.55 1.61 
High education 1.66  5.05 5.28 5.52 
Separated/widow -0.33  0.69 0.72 0.75 
Single -0.05  0.92 0.95 0.99 
Care 1 – De-familialisation -0.38 0.64 0.68 0.72 
Care 3 – Familialisation without support 0.61  1.71 1.85 1.99 
Gender 1 x Migration 1 (Modern gender contract 
x Old immigration & high integration) 
-1.25  0.24 0.29 0.34 
Gender 2 x Migration 1 (Gender contract in 
transition x Old immigration & high integration) 
-0.75  0.39 0.47 0.57 
Gender 3 x Migration 1 (Traditional gender 
contract x Old immigration & high integration) 
0.03  
(n.s.) 
0.86 1.04 1.25 
Gender 1 x Migration 2 (Modern gender contract 
x Old immigration & medium integration) 
-0.69  0.41 0.50 0.61 
Gender 2 x Migration 2 (Gender contract in 
transition x Old immigration & medium 
integration) 
-0.79  0.38 0.45 0.54 
Gender 3 x Migration 2 (Traditional gender 
contract x Old immigration & medium 
integration) 
-0.73 0.40 0.48 0.57 
Gender 2 x Migration 3 (Gender contract in 
transition x New immigration & medium 
integration) 
-1.91  0.12 0.15 0.18 
Gender 3 x Migration 3 (Traditional gender 
contract x New immigration & medium 
integration) 
-1.67  0.16 0.19 0.22 
Gender 2 x Migration 4 (Gender contract in 
transition x New immigration & low integration) 
-0.77  0.35 0.46 0.61 
All coefficients are significant at 95%, apart from those indicated with (n.s.) 
 
As it emerges from Table 33, all coefficients are significant, apart from the interaction 
between Gender 3 and Migration 1 (Traditional gender contract x Old immigration and high 
integration). However, there are important differences in the magnitude of the effects.  
Figure 46 shows the graphical representation of the predicted probabilities of all the variables 
included in the model. 
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Figure 46: Predicted probabilities of Model 11 
 
 
Figure 46: The predicted probabilities are shown in a scale from 0 to 1. All effects between 0 and 0.50 refer to 
negative effects, while from 0.50 to 1 refer to positive effects. Effects closer to 0 and to 1 are stronger, while 
effects closer to 0.50 are weaker. The figure is divided into the two categories of the dependent variable, which 
are tested against the reference category ‘migrant domestic worker’. 
 
6.4.2.1 The effect of the three regimes 
 
Before discussing the interpretation of the results, it is important to mention that at this stage 
of the analysis the clusters of each typology, as well as the interactions between the clusters of 
the typologies, will be considered without any reference to the countries that belong to such 
clusters. This means that the number of countries and the countries that are actually part of 
each cluster and each interaction are not taken into account. The reason behind this choice is 
based on the theoretical framework of this study: because the ultimate goal of the research is 
to evaluate whether the three typologies can be used as a tool for investigating a social 
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phenomenon, from a theoretical point of view the membership of each country to one or 
another cluster is of no importance. Following the logic of the theory that is at the basis of this 
study, the clusters of each regime are defined by a series of features that refer to each of the 
three regimes and are expected to be constant over at least a certain amount of time. On the 
contrary, the membership of each country to a particular cluster is expected to be volatile, in 
that possible transformations at country level might entail the transition from one to another 
cluster. 
 
The care regime 
Let’s first consider the effect of the care regime. A care regime characterised by 
familialisation without state support (Cluster 3), instead of familialisation with state support 
(Cluster 2), has a positive effect on the probability of being either a native worker in the 
domestic sector, or a migrant working in another sector, as compared to that of being a 
migrant domestic worker (respectively, with an odds ratio of 1.50 and 1.85). In other words, 
the probability to be a migrant domestic worker is higher in countries where the care regime is 
characterised by familialisation with state support. This confirms the preliminary descriptive 
analysis presented at the beginning of this chapter. 
In the case of countries in which the state fosters a de-familialisation of care activities 
(Cluster 1), as compared to the reference category, the direction of the effect is different 
according to which contrast is considered: if we compare native and migrant workers in the 
domestic sector, a de-familialised care regime increases the probability to be native domestic 
workers against that of being migrant workers (odds ratio=1.14), while the opposite is true 
when we compare migrants working in other sectors to migrants in the domestic sector (odds 
ratio=0.68). Otherwise said, in this type of care regime, it is more likely to find natives rather 
than migrants in the domestic sector. However, a migrant worker is more likely to have a job 
in the domestic sector, rather than in others.  
Figure 47 and Figure 48 provide a graphical representation that helps understanding the 
intensity of the effects.  
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Figure 47: Predicted probabilities of Care 1 (De-familialisation) 
 
 
 
Figure 48: Predicted probabilities of Care 3 (Familialisation without state support) 
 
Figure 47 and 48: The predicted probabilities are shown in a scale from 0 to 1. All effects between 0 and 0.50 
refer to negative effects, while from 0.50 to 1 refer to positive effects. Effects closer to 0 and to 1 are stronger, 
while effects closer to 0.50 are weaker. ‘Care 2’ (Familialisation with state support) is the reference category 
for the typology of Care. 
 
Although both Clusters 1 and 3 have a significant effect in predicting the outcomes (see Table 
33), their effect is quite small. In particular, the effects of care regimes of both Clusters 1 and 
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3 on the probability to have native domestic workers rather than migrants are low (the 
predicted probabilities are located close to the value 0.50 in the figures). The effects of 
Clusters 1 and 3 on the probability to have migrants in other sectors rather than migrant 
domestic workers are stronger. As mentioned above, in Cluster 1 (De-familialisation) the 
probability to have migrant domestic workers rather than migrants in other sectors is higher, 
contrary to Cluster 3 (Familialisation without state support). 
 
Interaction of Gender and Migration regimes 
Let’s now turn our attention to the interaction between gender and migration regimes. Still 
referring to Table 33, we can notice that the values of the odds ratios are all below 1, meaning 
that the probability to have migrant domestic workers, rather than native domestic workers or 
migrants in other sectors is everywhere higher compared to the interaction Gender 3 x 
Migration 4 (Traditional gender contract x New immigration and low integration), which is 
the reference category for the interactions238. However, as graphically visible in Figures 49-57, 
the intensity of the effect varies greatly among the different interactions. 
Looking specifically at each interaction, what emerges is that the interaction between Gender 
3 (Traditional gender contract) and Migration 3 (New immigration and medium integration) is 
the one with the strongest effect on the probability to have native domestic workers compared 
to migrants.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
238 The only exception to this picture is the interaction between Gender 3 (Traditional gender contract) and 
Migration 1 (Old immigration and high integration), which is not significant. 
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Figure 49: Predicted probabilities of Gender 3 (Traditional gender contract) X 
Migration 3 (New immigration and medium integration) 
 
Figure 49: The predicted probabilities are shown in a scale from 0 to 1. All effects between 0 and 0.50 refer to 
negative effects, while from 0.50 to 1 refer to positive effects. Effects closer to 0 and to 1 are stronger, while 
effects closer to 0.50 are weaker. ‘Gender 3 x Migration 4’ (Traditional gender contract / New immigration and 
low integration) is the reference category for the interactions Gender X Migration. 
 
As shown in Figure 49, in this interaction the probability to have migrant domestic workers 
rather than native domestic workers is extremely high. However, also the probability that 
migrants work in the domestic sector, rather than in another sector is quite important. This 
suggests that in countries that belong to this combination of gender and migration regimes – 
traditional gender contract and new immigration/medium integration countries – the 
ethnicisation of the domestic sector is particularly pronounced, more than in any other 
combination. 
However, it is not only in countries of new immigration and characterised by a traditional 
gender contract that the concentration of migrants in the domestic sector is high. If we 
consider, for instance, the combination Gender 3 x Migration 2 (Traditional gender contract / 
Old immigration and medium integration), it emerges that this combination has a similar 
strong effect on the probability to have migrant domestic workers, rather than native domestic 
workers. This suggests that the ethnicisation of the domestic sector is strong in countries 
characterised by a traditional gender contract, whether they have old or new immigration 
regimes. 
Figure 50 shows the predicted probabilities of the interaction Gender 3 x Migration 2. 
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Figure 50: Predicted probabilities of Gender 3 x Migration 2 (Traditional gender 
contract / Old immigration and medium integration) 
 
Figure 50: ‘Gender 3 x Migration 4’ (Traditional gender contract / New immigration and low integration) is the 
reference category for the interactions Gender X Migration. 
 
As shown in Figure 50, the effect of this interaction on the probability to have migrants 
working in another sector, rather than migrant domestic workers, is significant, albeit 
considerably weaker compared to its effect on the probability to have migrant domestic 
workers vs. native domestic workers. Also, the effect is weaker, compared to the effect of the 
interaction Gender 3 x Migration 3. This suggests that while in both interactions – Gender 3 x 
Migration 3 and Gender 3 x Migration 2 – the ethnicisation of the domestic sector is very 
pronounced, in the first interaction there is also a high probability that migrants are 
concentrated in the domestic sector, which is not so strong in the second interaction. 
Concerning the combination Gender 3 x Migration 1 (Traditional gender contract / Old 
immigration and high integration), the effect on the probability of having native domestic 
workers against migrant domestic workers is again statistically significant. This means that 
also in this combination between gender and migration regimes the probability to have 
migrant domestic workers, rather than natives, is higher, compared to the reference group 
(Traditional gender contract / New immigration and low integration). This suggests that also 
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in contexts characterised by less restrictive migration regimes, the ethnicisation of the 
domestic sector is important239. 
Figure 51 shows the predicted probabilities of the interaction Gender 3 x Migration 1. 
 
Figure 51: Predicted probabilities of Gender 3 x Migration 1 (Traditional gender 
contract / Old immigration and high integration) 
 
Figure 51: ‘Gender 3 x Migration 4’ (Traditional gender contract / New immigration and low integration) is the 
reference category for the interactions Gender X Migration. 
 
Concerning the interactions between Gender 2 (Gender contract in transition) and all the 
clusters of migration regimes, the effect on the concentration of migrants in the domestic 
sector is similar. Figures 52, 53, 54 and 55 show the predicted probabilities of these 
interactions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
239 The probability to have migrants working in another sector vs. Migrant domestic workers (blue point in 
Figure 50) is not commented, because the coefficient of the effect is not statistically significant (refer to Table 
33). 
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Figure 52: Predicted probabilities of Gender 2 x Migration 1 (Gender contract in 
transition / Old immigration and high integration) 
 
Figure 52: ‘Gender 3 x Migration 4’ (Traditional gender contract / New immigration and low integration) is the 
reference category for the interactions Gender X Migration. 
 
Figure 53: Predicted probabilities of Gender 2 x Migration 2 (Gender contract in 
transition / Old immigration and medium integration) 
 
Figure 53: ‘Gender 3 x Migration 4’ (Traditional gender contract / New immigration and low integration) is the 
reference category for the interactions Gender X Migration. 
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Figure 54: Predicted probabilities of Gender 2 x Migration 3 (Gender contract in 
transition / New immigration and medium integration) 
 
Figure 54: ‘Gender 3 x Migration 4’ (Traditional gender contract / New immigration and low integration) is the 
reference category for the interactions Gender X Migration. 
 
Figure 55: Predicted probabilities of Gender 2 x Migration 4 (Gender contract in 
transition / New immigration and low integration) 
 
Figure 55: ‘Gender 3 x Migration 4’ (Traditional gender contract / New immigration and low integration) is the 
reference category for the interactions Gender X Migration. 
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As emerges from the above figures, the probability to have migrant domestic workers, rather 
than native domestic workers is strong in all interactions between Gender 2 (Gender contract 
in transition) and the four clusters of migration regimes, and even stronger for the interaction 
between gender contract in transition and less restrictive migration systems. Regarding the 
probability that migrants work as domestic workers rather than being employed in other 
sectors, the effect of the fours interactions has the same directions, but the intensity of the 
effect varies considerably. In particular, it is in the interaction Gender 2 x Migration 3 
(Gender contract in transition / New immigration and medium integration) that the effect is 
stronger, and in the interaction Gender 2 x Migration 1 (Gender contract in transition / Old 
immigration and high integration) that the effect is weaker. This means that migrants are more 
likely to be found in the domestic sector, rather than in other sectors in the first interaction. 
Concerning the interactions between Cluster 1 of gender regimes and the clusters of migration 
regimes, only two combinations exist: Gender 1 x Migration 2 (Modern gender contract / Old 
immigration and medium integration) and Gender 1 x Migration 1 (Modern gender contract / 
Old immigration and high integration).  
Figures 56 and 57 report the predicted probabilities of these two interactions. 
 
Figure 56: Predicted probabilities of Gender 1 x Migration 1 (Modern gender contract / 
Old immigration and high integration) 
 
Figure 56: ‘Gender 3 x Migration 4’ (Traditional gender contract / New immigration and low integration) is the 
reference category for the interactions Gender X Migration. 
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Figure 57: Predicted probabilities of Gender 1 x Migration 2 (Modern gender contract / 
Old immigration and medium integration) 
 
Figure 57: ‘Gender 3 x Migration 4’ (Traditional gender contract / New immigration and low integration) is the 
reference category for the interactions Gender X Migration. 
 
As visible from the comparison between the two figures, both the probability to have migrant 
domestic workers rather than native domestic workers and the probability to have migrants in 
the domestic sector rather than in other sectors are higher for the interaction Gender 1 x 
Migration 1 (Modern gender contract / Old immigration and high integration). 
Overall, what emerges from the analysis of the effect of the interactions between gender and 
migration regimes is that the lowest ethnicisation of the domestic sector is found in the 
interaction between Cluster 3 of gender regimes (Traditional gender contract) and Cluster 4 of 
migration regimes (New immigration and low integration), while the higher ethnicisation is 
found in the interaction between Cluster 3 of gender regimes (Traditional gender contract) 
and Cluster 3 of migration regimes (New immigration and medium integration). However, the 
probability to have migrant domestic workers, rather than native domestic workers is also 
high in the interactions Gender 2 x Migration 1 (Gender contract in transition / Old 
immigration and high integration), Gender 2 x Migration 3 (Gender contract in transition / 
New immigration and medium integration) and Gender 3 x Migration 2 (Traditional gender 
contract / Old immigration and medium integration). On the contrary, the probability is 
weaker in the interactions Gender 1 x Migration 2 (Modern gender contract / Old immigration 
and medium integration), Gender 2 x Migration 2 (Gender contract in transition / Old 
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immigration and medium integration), Gender 2 x Migration 4 (Gender contract in transition / 
New immigration and low integration) and Gender 3 x Migration 1 (Traditional gender 
contract / Old immigration and high integration). 
Concerning the probability of being a migrant working in another sector, compared to being a 
migrant domestic worker, the findings suggest that migrants are more likely to work in the 
domestic sector in contexts characterised by the interactions Gender 2 x Migration 3 (Gender 
contract in transition / New immigration and medium integration) and Gender 3 x Migration 3 
(Traditional gender contract / New immigration and medium integration). In other words, in 
new immigration countries with a medium level of integration of migrants, be they 
characterised by a traditional gender contract or a gender contract in transition, there is a high 
probability to have migrant domestic workers, compared to migrants in other sectors. The 
situation is the opposite – namely, a higher probability to have migrants in other sectors rather 
than migrant domestic workers – in all the other combinations of gender and migration 
regimes. 
 
6.5 Testing the hypotheses 
 
Based on these results and on the hypotheses defined in section 6.1, we can state the 
following. 
Hypothesis 1 (the three regimes – the care, the gender and the migration regimes – do have an 
effect on the concentration of migrants in the domestic sector) is confirmed. All the 
multinomial regression models that include the three regimes (the indicators or the typologies) 
confirm that the three regimes under study do have a statistically significant effect on migrant 
domestic work. In particular, they show that the three regimes have an effect on both the 
proportion of migrant domestic workers, compared to native domestic workers, and on the 
proportion of migrant domestic workers, compared to migrants working in another sector. 
Hypothesis 2 (the three regimes have a highest explanatory power when they are taken into 
consideration simultaneously) is confirmed by the analysis. If we compare the models that 
include the typologies of the three regimes, what emerges is that the models where the three 
regimes are taken into consideration in their interactions have better parameters of fit. In 
particular, the model that includes the interaction between gender and migration regimes, plus 
the care regime considered as a separate factor (fixed effect), seems to have the strongest 
explanatory power. Overall, this finding is in line with the theory of scholar Helma Lutz, who 
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suggested that it is the intersection of the three regimes that explains the phenomenon of 
migrant domestic work in Europe. 
Hypothesis 3 (the typologies of the three regimes are a better tool, compared to countries, to 
explain the degree of ethnicisation of the sector) can be generally confirmed. Although the 
multinomial regression model that includes the countries (Model 1) has the best parameters of 
fit, compared to all models, as it brings more detailed information, this model goes against the 
principle of parsimony. On the contrary, the typologies of the three regimes do bring a certain 
level of generalisation (which is one of the goals of using the three regimes as tools for 
investigating the phenomenon of migrant domestic work), while maintaining a strong 
explanatory power. 
Concerning the specific effects of the three regimes on migrant domestic work (Hypothesis 4), 
the results point at the following considerations.  
Hypothesis 4a, on gender regimes, is only partially confirmed. Cluster 3 of the gender regime 
(Traditional gender contract) has a positive effect on the ethnicisation of the domestic sector, 
but only when it is combined with the Clusters 2 and 3 of migration regimes, which 
correspond to old and new immigration countries with a medium level of integration. On the 
contrary, when the traditional gender contract is combined with the Cluster 1 (Old 
immigration and high integration) and Cluster 4 (New immigration and low integration) its 
effect on the ethnicisation of the domestic sector is weaker. In particular, in contexts 
characterised by a traditional gender contract and low levels of integration, the probability to 
have native domestic workers, rather than migrants, is very high. The Cluster 1 of gender 
regimes (Modern gender contract) shows a low degree of ethnicisation of the domestic sector 
– as predicted – only when it is combined with the Cluster 2 of migration regimes (Old 
immigration and medium integration). However, what is interesting to notice is that there is 
no clear pattern suggesting a higher ethnicisation of the domestic sector in the passage from 
Cluster 1 to Cluster 3 of gender regimes. In particular, both Clusters 2 and 3 of gender 
regimes can have either a low or a high degree of ethnicisation, depending on the type of 
migration regime they belong to. 
Hypothesis 4b, on care regimes, is not confirmed by the analysis. According to the findings, 
both Cluster 1 (De-familialisation) and Cluster 3 (Familialisation without state support) 
increase the probability of having native domestic workers, compared to migrant domestic 
workers, compared to Cluster 2 (Familialisation with state support). In other words, the 
cluster of care regimes with the highest probability to have migrants in the domestic sector is 
Cluster 2 (Familialisation with state support), followed by Cluster 1 (De-familialisation).  
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This contradicts the main findings of literature, where the care regimes characterised by a 
weak public support (here Cluster 3) are generally thought to favour the concentration of 
migrants in the domestic sector.  
Hypothesis 4c, on migration regimes, is only partially confirmed by the findings. According 
to the hypothesis, both Clusters 3 and 4 were expected to show the highest ethnicisation of the 
domestic sector. However, the findings show that only Cluster 3 (New immigration and 
medium integration) significantly increases the probability of having migrant domestic 
workers, compared to native domestic workers. Cluster 3 has a positive effect on the 
ethnicisation of the domestic sector in all cases, which is when it is combined to a traditional 
gender contract, or to a gender contract in transition. On the contrary, Cluster 4 (New 
immigration and low integration) is the cluster that has the least probability of having migrant 
domestic workers, rather than natives. This is always true, irrespectively of the cluster of 
gender regimes they belong to.  
Concerning Clusters 1 (Old immigration and high integration) and 2 (Old immigration and 
medium integration), which were expected to have the least concentration of migrants in the 
domestic sector, the results are only partially confirmed. Concerning Cluster 1 (Old 
immigration and high integration), it increases the probabilities to have migrant domestic 
workers when it is combined with a gender contract in transition (Cluster 2 of gender 
regimes). However, it decreases the probabilities to have migrant domestic workers, rather 
than natives, when it is combined with a traditional gender contract. Concerning Cluster 2 
(Old immigration and medium integration), it decreases the probability to have migrant 
domestic workers, rather than native domestic workers, when it is combined with a modern 
gender contract and a gender contract in transition. On the contrary, Cluster 2 increases the 
probability to have migrant domestic workers when it is combined with a traditional gender 
contract. 
Overall, the hypotheses formulated in order to test the theory of the three regimes are 
generally confirmed. However, while the effect of the three regimes – especially when they 
are taken into consideration simultaneously – on migrant domestic work is confirmed by the 
analysis, the direction and the intensity of the effect do not confirm the predictions in all cases. 
The most innovative finding concerns the effect of care regimes on migrant domestic work. 
While the findings of the literature suggest that countries characterised by a weak state 
support have a stronger ethnicisation of the domestic sector, the analysis presented here 
suggests that the ‘familialisation without state support’ decreases the ethnicisation of the 
sector. Instead, it is in countries belonging to Clusters 1 (De-familialisation) and Cluster 2 
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(Familialisation with state support) that the probability to have migrants in the domestic 
sector is higher. 
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Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this research, I have investigated the impact of the care, gender and migration regimes on 
migrant domestic work in Europe. Based on the findings of the literature on paid domestic 
work – which includes both housework and care work – it emerges that important common 
trends exist in Europe with respect to the main characteristics of the job. Among the most 
visible trends are the general increase of the sector, also due to the growing demand for care 
workers, the intensification of the feminisation and the growing ethnicisation of the sector. 
However, while differences exist in Europe with respect to all features of paid domestic work, 
including its regulation and the employment conditions, it is its ethnicisation that shows the 
greatest variations among European countries. While in some countries migrants have become 
the incontestable protagonists of this segment of the labour market, in other countries the 
proportion of migrant domestic workers remains at considerably lower levels.  
In order to understand the reasons not only of the increased concentration of migrants in the 
paid domestic sector, but also of the significant differences between European countries, I 
have analysed three macro factors – the care, gender and migration regimes – which are 
known to have an impact on this phenomenon. In particular, the analyses conducted in this 
research draw from the theory elaborated by Helma Lutz, according to whom, in order to 
understand the phenomenon of migrant domestic work, the three regimes have to be taken 
into consideration simultaneously.  
While part of the literature on domestic work has already given insights on the importance of 
these three macro factors on the domestic sector in Europe, the effects on these factors – taken 
individually or in combination – have not been empirically tested so far.  This research aimed 
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to test this theory, while at the same time overcoming some of the main limitations of the 
literature that has developed around these themes, which can be summarised as follows.  
First of all, while a vast corpus of studies exists on the three regimes (especially on care and 
migration, while less attention has been traditionally paid to the gender regime), they have 
often been studied separately and very seldom in their interaction. Although other structural 
factors, as well as individual choices, can surely account for playing a role in the growing 
ethnicisation of the domestic sector, and in other features of contemporary domestic work, a 
thorough analysis of the interaction between these three factors is necessary and can already 
shed light on the phenomenon.  
Additionally, most literature on domestic work, but also on care, gender and migration 
regimes, tends to be confined to the theoretical level and/or to be carried out through 
qualitative methods of investigation. While this is understandable, due to the complexity of 
measuring concepts such as gender norms, preferences about care responsibilities and so on, it 
can nevertheless present some risks. These risks include issues of generalisation, especially in 
the case of multi-country comparisons, which can in turn prevent the use of these concepts as 
a basis for future studies and/or policy assessment.  
In this research, which was carried out in three main steps, I have tried to overcome the 
above-mentioned limits, by i) taking into consideration the three regimes both separately and 
simultaneously, and ii) empirically testing this theory for the first time. 
The overall objectives of the research were the following: 
 To investigate whether and to what extent the three regimes have an impact on the 
main features of paid domestic work, and in the degree of ethnicisation in particular. 
 To investigate whether the three regimes – in the form of typologies – can be a useful 
tool to explain the cross-national variation in the concentration of migrants in the 
domestic sector. 
The following sections summarise the three sets of analyses that I have used to test the theory 
and focus on what can be considered the main contributions of this research. 
 
First analysis: the features of contemporary paid domestic work 
The first step was a descriptive analysis of contemporary paid domestic work in Europe. The 
objective of this first set of analyses was to confirm (or contradict) the findings of the 
literature and to highlight the similarities and differences that exist between European 
countries. Also, by highlighting how widely European countries differ in the size of the 
migrant population in the domestic sector, the objective was to underline the need for a 
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thorough understanding of such differences and set the framework of the second and third set 
of analyses.  
This analysis focused on three elements, which were used to provide an overall description of 
the domestic sector: 1) The magnitude of the domestic sector, with a focus on the increase of 
the domestic sector over time and the analysis of the relative size of the domestic sector as a 
share of the total employment; 2) the workforce composition, with a focus on the 
concentration of women (feminisation) and the concentration of migrants (ethnicisation) of 
the domestic sector; and 3) some elements that can be used to define the working conditions 
in the domestic sector: the income level, the job stability (type of contract) and the unusual 
working hours (working on shifts, at night or at weekends).   
The analyses were conducted using the EU-Labour Forces Survey data from 2015, which 
represent the most reliable and comprehensive source for a European comparison in the field 
of labour market participation. Despite the limitations of the data, which are highlighted in 
Chapter 3, this analysis proved to be relevant, as it allowed both to confirm some findings 
already attained by the literature and by the institutional sources, but also to reveal some 
unexpected findings.  
The findings that mostly confirm the existing literature are the relative numerical importance 
of the domestic sector – and in particular of care activities – in the formal labour market in 
Europe, the incontestable feminisation of the domestic sector, as well as the poor working 
conditions that characterise this work, compared to similar types of work. 
Concerning the size of the domestic sector, it is in Northern countries – and to a lesser extent 
in Central and Southern European countries – that domestic work represents the biggest share 
of the total employment. A net difference exists between Eastern European countries and the 
rest of Europe, with the former showing the smallest domestic sector. With this respect, it is 
important to notice that due to the high prevalence of undeclared work in the domestic sector, 
the analysis conducted on official institutional data (in this case, the EU-LFS database) can 
only partly grasp the extent of the phenomenon.  
The analysis presented in section 4.2.2, which is based on the official available estimates on 
the irregular work in the domestic sector, is particularly interesting as it shows how the 
relative size of the domestic sector would change if we were to add the undeclared work. 
Unfortunately, not only estimates change greatly depending on the source, but they exist only 
on a reduced number of European countries. This stimulates two reflections. The first is that, 
due to the great incidence of undeclared work in the domestic sector, a full understanding of 
the scope of contemporary paid domestic work is possible only when irregular work is 
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accounted for. This leads to the second reflection, on the importance of the availability of 
reliable estimates on irregular work in Europe. The constant update of harmonised methods of 
calculation of estimates of the shadow economy should be coupled with the development of 
estimates disaggregated by professional and/or economic sector, which are currently 
unavailable.  
Concerning the feminisation of the domestic sector, the analysis based on the EU-LFS 2015 
data confirms that despite the slight cross-national differences, domestic work – also in the 
formal labour market – is in the great majority performed by women. In all European 
countries, the number of women in the domestic sector is higher than that of men and ranges 
from 77.7% in Denmark to 97.8% in Cyprus. Not surprisingly, and in line with previous 
studies, the countries with the lowest shares of women in domestic activities are those 
characterised by less traditional gender regimes and more egalitarian labour and welfare 
systems (Northern countries), while the most feminised domestic sectors are those of 
Mediterranean and Eastern European countries, which are associated with less egalitarian 
systems. The only remarkable exception is Italy, where the share of women in the domestic 
sector is similar to that of Northern countries. However, as already highlighted by the 
literature, this does not indicate a better repartition of domestic activities between men and 
women, but rather that more and more migrant men choose to temporarily enter this sector 
due to the strong demand.  
Concerning the working conditions (income level, job stability and unusual working hours), 
the analyses confirm that domestic work is everywhere characterised by weaker labour 
standards, compared to similar occupations. The most surprising finding is that, apart from the 
income level, the poor quality of the jobs in the sector is not a prerogative of countries 
characterised by less regulated labour markets, high incidence of informal economy, or a 
weaker support by the welfare state. While the income of domestic workers in Northern 
countries (Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands, but also the UK) is similar or equal to that 
of other low-skilled workers, job instability and unusual working hours seem to be features 
common to all domestic sectors in Europe, including countries that enjoy the best welfare 
protection – such as the Scandinavian countries – and countries where this sector of the labour 
market is more regulated – such as France and Belgium, where a system of vouchers is in 
place. 
Regarding the ethnicisation of the domestic sector, the analysis based on the EU-LFS data 
confirms that the situation in Europe is uneven. Indeed, the most striking element that 
emerges from the analysis of contemporary paid domestic work in Europe is the considerable 
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difference between European countries in the concentration of migrants in the domestic sector, 
which varies from less than 2% in some Eastern European countries, to more than 65% in 
Cyprus and almost 50% in Italy and other Mediterranean countries. This finding, as extreme 
as it is, confirms the need for a deeper investigation to uncover the reasons that determine 
such differences.   
With this respect, it should be pointed out that the degree of ethnicisation of the domestic 
sector changes considerably depending on the definition of the migrant population. In 
particular, when second and/or third generations are added to first generation migrants, the 
ethnicisation of domestic workers is even more visible in certain countries. For instance, in 
countries of old immigration, such as France, Luxembourg and the UK (but also in some 
Eastern European countries, such as Latvia and Estonia), the presence of second generation 
migrants is considerable, while in Mediterranean countries the domestic sector is almost 
entirely populated by new migrants. The comparison between the degree of ethnicisation of 
the European countries for which data are available show that the national history of 
migration (namely, the age of the migration) can only partially explain the differences. 
Unfortunately, due to national restrictions, information on second generations – which is data 
allowing for identifying old immigration (i.e. country of birth of mother and father, etc.) – is 
not always disclosed, which prevents from making cross-national comparisons.  
 
Second analysis: typologies of care, gender and migration regimes 
The second step of this research was a thorough analysis of the care, gender and migration 
regimes. For this step, and with the purpose of investigating the impact of the three regimes 
on migrant domestic work, three typologies – each of them corresponding to one of the three 
regimes – were constructed. These three typologies were developed with the purpose of 
finding a valid empirical tool allowing for an empirical testing of the theory of the three 
regimes. In this sense, the three typologies are intended as instruments whose goal is twofold. 
First, they aim to operationalise each regime and classify countries according to the indicators 
that are selected to define these regimes. Second, they are used as instruments to test the 
impact of such regimes on migrant domestic work.  
Concerning the care regime, the typology was created based on two dimensions, which are 
deemed to be crucial for the definition of care regimes: the ‘de-familialisation’ and the 
generosity of care regimes. For each dimension, one composite index was calculated, based 
on selected indicators from different international databases. If we take into consideration 
only the de-familialisation index, two main findings emerge. First, countries differ 
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considerably with respect to the degree of de-familialisation of their care regimes, the 
Northern countries being the greatest supporters of de-familialisation and Mediterranean 
countries promoting more familialistic policies. Second, great differences exist in the degree 
of de-familialisation depending on the policy area. While policies of de-familialisation are 
more common with respect to elderly care, all European countries show a certain degree of 
familialisation in the field of childcare. This confirms that, in line with the literature, a full de-
familialisation of childcare is unlikely to be promoted. The only exceptions are Sweden and 
Belgium, which overall show a de-familialistic approach in both policy areas. 
If we take into consideration only the generosity index, two main behaviours are visible in 
Europe. First, there is a group of countries that behave more or less coherently in terms of 
generosity towards children and the elderly. In Belgium, Ireland, Sweden, Luxembourg, 
Austria and Denmark both childcare and elderly care are well supported by the state, while in 
Eastern European countries, France, Italy and the UK, the state offers a less generous support 
for both children and seniors. Then, there is a group of countries that show a different level of 
generosity, depending on the field (childcare vs. elderly care). While the care regimes of 
Germany, Hungary, Slovenia, and Finland are very generous in supporting childcare, they are 
considerably less generous for the care of elderly people. The opposite behaviour is that of the 
Netherlands, Greece and Portugal, which offer better support to the care of elderly people and 
little support for childcare. This finding confirms that the financial support of welfare states is 
not unambiguous and that care policies strongly depend on which care responsibilities are 
considered a family or a public matter.  
The typology that derives from the analysis of care regimes – which is the result of a cluster 
analysis based on the two indexes – suggests the existence of three main clusters of countries 
that behave similarly with respect to care regimes. The first cluster, which I have called ‘De-
familialisation’, includes Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, France and Belgium; the second 
cluster, which I have called ‘Familialisation with state support’, includes mainly continental 
countries and the islands, but also Italy and Portugal; and the third cluster, which I have called 
‘Familialisation without state support’, includes the remaining Mediterranean countries and 
Eastern European countries. 
A few interesting findings emerge from the construction of this typology. First, only a 
minority of countries (Denmark, Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands and France) show a de-
familialistic approach in their care regime and these countries (Cluster 1) stand at a 
considerable distance from all the remaining European countries. Second, all the care regimes 
characterised by a de-familialistic approach provide a high level of generosity. This suggests 
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that, while familialisation is either pursued with or without the economic support of the state, 
de-familialisation always implies a certain amount of state support. Finally, the most 
unexpected finding in terms of clustering of countries is that Italy and Portugal, which are 
usually considered to be characterised by a weak state support, are instead found to be more 
similar to the countries characterised by a familistic approach supported by the state. 
 
Concerning the gender regime, the typology was developed based on two dimensions: the 
gender equality and the ‘gender contract’. While for the first dimension an existing synthetic 
index (the Gender Equality Index) was employed, for the second dimension I created a 
‘gender contract index’, based on selected indicators from different sources. The typology of 
gender regimes derived from this analysis indicates the existence of three main clusters of 
countries: the first cluster, which I have called ‘Modern gender contract’, includes 
Scandinavian countries, plus the Netherlands; the second cluster, which I have called ‘Gender 
contract in transition’, includes continental countries and the islands, plus Spain and Estonia; 
and the third cluster, which I have called ‘Traditional gender contract’, includes 
Mediterranean countries and Eastern European countries, plus Austria.  
What strongly emerges from the analysis of gender regimes is that, contrary to care and 
migration regimes, the classification of countries follows a coherent pattern and that a high 
level of gender equality outcomes in the different fields which are accounted for (employment, 
power, economic situation, education and so on) is always associated with less traditional 
views about gender roles and the gender division of labour. This means that countries clearly 
group themselves together in a scale that goes from low levels of gender equality and a 
traditional gender contract, to countries characterised by high levels of gender equality in all 
fields and a more equal vision of gender roles. 
 
Concerning the migration regimes, the typology was developed so to cover both integration 
and immigration systems, but also some elements that can specifically influence the arrival 
and the concentration of migrants in the domestic sector. For the overall integration system, I 
have used an existing synthetic indicator (the Migrant Integration Policy Index), while for the 
other dimensions I have selected three indicators, from different sources. The choice of the 
three indicators was based on theoretical grounds and included the elements that are deemed 
to have an impact on the arrival of domestic workers in Europe: the existence of a large 
informal economy, the number of residence permits issued for employment reasons and the 
number of Eastern European migrants among intra-European ones.  
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The resulting typology indicates the existence of four main clusters of countries, if we 
exclude the case of Poland, which constitutes a unique case in Europe with respect to its 
migration regime. The first cluster – labelled ‘Old immigration and high integration’ – 
includes Scandinavian countries, Belgium and Portugal. This cluster corresponds to the least 
restrictive migration regime and is characterised by a high level of integration, a low presence 
of migrants from Eastern European countries and a medium level of informal economy. The 
second cluster – labelled ‘Old immigration and medium integration’ – includes mainly old 
immigration countries and is characterised by medium levels of integration, a low presence of 
migrants from new accession countries and a small informal economy. The third cluster – 
labelled ‘New immigration and medium integration’ – includes three Mediterranean countries, 
which share a similar large informal economy, a high percentage of migrants from new 
accession countries and a medium level of integration. The fourth cluster – labelled ‘New 
immigration and low integration’ – includes Eastern European countries, which are 
characterised by a very large informal economy, low levels of integration and a very high 
percentage of residence permits issued for employment reasons. 
 
A few interesting points emerge from the construction of the three typologies.  
First, the three typologies are found to group countries in a clear and meaningful way, and 
therefore maintain a strong link with the theory. The identification of a behaviour which is 
coherent with the theory with respect to the three regimes under study can be used as a 
construct validation of the three typologies (Carmines and Zeller, 1979). Indeed, although the 
choice of the indicators used for the analysis of each regime was based on theory, it could not 
be taken for granted that the results of the analyses be coherent with such theory. 
Second, while in some cases the three typologies closely recall existing and well-known 
typologies developed by the literature, in other cases they move away from existing 
classifications. This is the case, for instance, of the typology of care regimes, where Italy and 
Portugal are found to have a closer similarity to continental countries (familialisation with 
state support) than to the other Mediterranean countries (included in the cluster of 
familialisation without state support). Similarly, in the typology of gender regimes, Spain 
moves away from Eastern and Mediterranean countries and scores considerably higher in 
terms of gender equality and perception of the gender contract.  
This can be due to at least three reasons. First, countries may be grouped together differently 
from other classifications because of the indicators used to build each typology (the rationale 
for their choice and their possible limitations have been illustrated in Chapter 5). Second, 
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since the three regimes under study can evolve over time, recent changes occurred at national 
level can justify a different behaviour compared to previous classifications (when possible, 
the data used for the construction of these typologies are the most recent available data). Third, 
the choice of the countries included in the analysis can contribute to a different clustering of 
countries, compared to existing classifications.   
Indeed, the inclusion in this analysis of (some) eastern European countries, which are 
generally excluded from cross-European comparisons, certainly contributes to redefining 
European typologies with respect to the three regimes under study and represents one of the 
most innovative contributions of this research. While Northern countries seem to remain a 
more or less stable cluster in all typologies, the inclusion of Eastern European countries 
brings about a reshuffling of the other European countries: in some cases, as in the typology 
of migration regimes, Eastern countries embody a distinct cluster, distant from the other 
configurations; in other cases, as in the typology of care and gender regimes, they mingle with 
other countries. Overall, they are nevertheless found to be more similar to Mediterranean 
countries, under many respects. 
 
Third analysis: testing the impact of the three regimes on migrant domestic work 
The last step of the research was the empirical test of the theory of the three regimes. For this 
step, I have conducted multivariate analyses (using multilevel logistic regression models), 
which allowed me to investigate the impact of the three regimes on migrant domestic work in 
Europe. The main findings can be summarised as follows. 
First of all, according to the analyses and based on the available data, the three regimes under 
study are found to have an impact on migrant domestic work. The comparison between the 
different models presented in Chapter 6 shows not only that the impact of the three regimes is 
statistically significant, but that the three typologies used to measure the three regimes are 
powerful instruments for investigating migrant domestic work – almost at the level of 
countries. 
This represents a key finding for this study that is worth some discussion. While countries can 
be thought just as conventional proxy indicators for a series of factors (welfare, migration, 
gender equality but also historical events, political orientation, economic activities, labour 
market regulations and so on), the clusters of the typologies developed in this study have a 
clear and evident meaning, as they group the European countries based on just three 
dimensions, that are clearly singled out both on the theoretical and the empirical level. In 
other words, the typologies derived from the analyses are not arbitrary labels attached to the 
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countries, but they are the result of a careful representation in a three-dimensional discrete 
space. The fact that these clusters do explain the variability shown by the data almost as well 
as the countries means that they constitute a useful and well-designed tool to understand the 
phenomena under study. This constitutes a solid validation of the whole process followed in 
this study. 
A second important finding that can be derived from the analyses is that the three typologies – 
which correspond to the three regimes – are more powerful at predicting the outcome (in this 
case the probability to have migrant domestic workers, instead of native domestic workers 
and instead of migrants in other sectors) when their interactions are taken into consideration. 
Although also the models that tested the three typologies separately do have a significant 
effect on the outcome, the ‘best’ models – namely, those that have the best measures of fit – 
are those that include the interactions between the regimes. This goes exactly in the direction 
postulated by the theory of the three regimes: not only the three regimes do have an impact on 
migrant domestic work, but their impact is greater when they are taken into consideration in 
mutual interdependence, rather than individually, so that the effect of either of them depends 
on that of the others. This means that it is the interplay between the three regimes that matters 
for understanding the distribution of migrant workers over the sectors of activity, and in 
particular in the domestic sector. 
A third important finding is that the interplay between the migration and the gender regimes 
proves to be particularly relevant, while the care regime plays a lesser role in the shaping of 
the ethnic distribution of the domestic sector. Indeed, the model that emerges as the best 
empirical test – because of its generalisation power and because of its explanatory power – is 
the model that analyses the interaction between gender and migration regimes, plus the care 
regime considered as a separate factor.  
Concerning the effects of the three regimes on migrant domestic work the results point at 
different considerations. If we look at the interaction between the gender and the migration 
regime, the hypotheses that were formulated (see section 6.1) are only partially confirmed. 
Regarding gender regimes, no clear pattern suggests a higher ethnicisation of the domestic 
sector in the passage from Cluster 1 to Cluster 3 of gender regimes (that is from a modern to a 
traditional gender contract). For instance, both Clusters 2 and 3 of gender regimes can have 
either a low or a high degree of ethnicisation, depending on the type of migration regime they 
belong to. Regarding migration regimes, contrary to the hypothesis that Clusters 3 and 4 
would show the highest ethnicisation of the domestic sector, the findings show that only 
Cluster 3 (New immigration and medium integration) significantly increases the probability 
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of having migrant domestic workers, compared to native domestic workers. Indeed, Cluster 3 
has a positive effect on the ethnicisation of the domestic sector in all combinations with the 
gender regimes. On the contrary, Cluster 4 (New immigration and low integration) is the 
cluster that has the least probability of having migrant domestic workers, rather than natives. 
This is always true, irrespectively of the cluster of gender regimes they belong to. This 
suggests that it is not the distinction between old or new immigration countries that makes the 
difference in the ethnicisation of the domestic sector. The findings clearly suggest that new 
immigration countries characterised by low levels of integration are those more likely to have 
a high concentration of migrants in the domestic sector. 
The most innovative finding concerns the effect of care regimes on migrant domestic work. If 
we look at the effects of the care regime, taken as a separate factor, what strongly emerges 
from the analysis is that the cluster of care regimes with the highest ethnicisation of the 
domestic sector is Cluster 2 (Familialisation with state support), followed by Cluster 1 (De-
familialisation). While the findings of the literature suggest that countries characterised by a 
weak state support have a stronger ethnicisation of the domestic sector, the analysis presented 
here suggests that the ‘familialisation without state support’ decreases the ethnicisation of the 
sector. Instead, it is in countries belonging to Clusters 1 (De-familialisation) and Cluster 2 
(Familialisation with state support) that the probability to have migrants in the domestic 
sector is higher. 
To conclude, if we closely look at the effects of the three regimes on migrant domestic work, 
three elements seem to point at the peculiarity of care regimes. First, the analyses confirm the 
importance of taking into consideration the three regimes simultaneously. However, if we 
look at the ‘best’ model, the care regime proves to have a stronger effect if taken as a separate 
factor, rather than in combination. Second, although statistically significant, the effect of the 
care regime is weaker, compared to that of the gender and migration regimes. Third, the 
specific effects of the care regime are those that more than any other move away from the 
expected hypotheses. I believe that the distinct behaviour of the care regimes in this context is 
also due to the complexity of this regime and that supplementary in-depth analyses are 
necessary to shed light to these findings. 
 
Future work 
In the light of the findings of this research and the work presented in this dissertation, I would 
like to draw the attention on two issues, which can be interesting in the perspective of future 
research and policy assessment. 
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The first has to do with the indicators used to build the three regimes that have been measured. 
As highlighted in Chapter 3 on methodology, one of the main limitations of the construction 
of the three typologies was the lack of available harmonised data on specific indicators that, 
based on theory, should be part of the definition of each regime. This was the case, to mention 
one example for each regime, of an indicator that should assess the level of cash-for-care 
benefits for the elderly (care regime), an indicator assessing citizen’s opinions about who is 
responsible for the care of elderly people (gender regime), or an indicator clearly assessing 
the number of regularisation programmes and the purpose of each of them (migration regime). 
Although the three typologies derived from the analyses can be reasonably considered a solid 
representation of each regime, the availability of data harmonised for all 28 European 
countries is of paramount importance for conducting comparative studies and the lack of such 
data (especially for certain European countries) should be taken seriously into consideration 
and be part of the European Union agenda in the future. Also, the EU should promote clear 
and uncontroversial guidelines for the collection and the use of data in each European country 
and abolish the restrictions that are in place in certain EU countries.  
The second, and most important, issue regards the irregular work in the domestic sector. The 
test of the impact of the three typologies that correspond to the three regimes has been 
conducted on the available data (the EU-LFS 2015), which are ambiguously meant to include 
both formal and informal workers, but which presumably grasp only the formal segments of 
the labour market. The results of the analyses show that indeed the three typologies do have 
an impact on the ethnicisation of the domestic sector, especially in their interplay, but only of 
the formal domestic sector. Now, the fact that the strongest effects on the ethnicisation of 
domestic work is that of the interactions that present the strongest probability to have a large 
segment of irregular work (i.e. Traditional gender contract x New immigration and medium 
integration), at the point to become almost proxies of the irregular work, or that some findings 
seem to be counterintuitive (i.e. stronger ethnicisation of the Familialisation with state support 
care regimes), cannot be underestimated. Indeed, this seems to suggest that the portion of 
domestic work falling into the informal economy is crucial and that the inclusion of irregular 
domestic workers would bring useful insights to the interpretation of these results.  
Therefore, I believe the next necessary step of this research would be to test the same 
typologies on data that include unambiguously formal and informal domestic work, which 
inevitably calls for a well-designed and reliable collection of data on irregular workers. 
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ANNEX 1 
 
Table 1: Disaggregated activities in the domestic sector in 24 EU member states (2015) 
 
Country Housework  Housework (%) Childcare Childcare (%)  Elderly care Elderly care (%) 
AT  3071  0.560  513  0.093  1903  0.347  
BE  2256  0.617  575  0.157  824  0.225  
CY  1500  0.861  148  0.085  95  0.055  
CZ  380  0.486  60  0.077  342  0.437  
DE  7051  0.712  776  0.078  2078  0.210  
DK  1541  0.257  1974  0.329  2482  0.414  
EE  286  0.492  107  0.184  188  0.324  
ES  2370  0.614  283  0.073  1205  0.312  
FI  316  0.273  271  0.234  569  0.492  
FR  13785  0.614  4718  0.210  3943  0.176  
GR  2254  0.830  172  0.063  291  0.107  
HR  360  0.716  20  0.040  123  0.245  
HU  2398  0.607  1004  0.254  546  0.138  
IE  1381  0.236  1625  0.278  2843  0.486  
IT  10002  0.590  440  0.026  6502  0.384  
LT  775  0.637  190  0.156  252  0.207  
LU  700  0.623  217  0.193  207  0.184  
LV  413  0.470  194  0.221  271  0.309  
NL  1039  0.338  692  0.225  1343  0.437  
PT  3667  0.584  815  0.130  1794  0.286  
RO  2014  0.616  174  0.053  1082  0.331  
SE  2542  0.140  3068  0.169  12528  0.691  
SK  933  0.422  202  0.091  1074  0.486  
UK  787  0.230  1061  0.310  1579  0.461  
 
 
Figure 1: Share of housework activities among domestic activities in 24 EU member 
states (2015) 
 
Source: EU-LFS 2015 
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Figure 2: Share of childcare activities among domestic activities in 24 EU member states 
(2015) 
 
Source: EU-LFS 2015 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Share of elderly care activities among domestic activities in 24 EU member 
states (2015) 
 
Source: EU-LFS 2015 
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ANNEX 2 
 
Construction of the de-familialisation index 
 
  
Correlation matrix: 
 
 Effective 
maternity leave 
Childcare usage 
under 3 years 
old 
Full-time 
childcare usage 
under 3 years 
old 
Residential care 
elderly 
Home-based 
care elderly 
Housework 
incentives 
Effective 
maternity leave 
1.00 0.36 0.22 0.25 -0.11 0.21 
Childcare usage 
under 3 years 
old 
0.36 1.00 0.80 0.76 0.56 0.43 
Full-time 
childcare usage 
under 3 years 
old 
0.22 0.80 1.00 0.47 0.50 0.29 
Residential care 
elderly 
0.25 0.76 0.47 1.00 0.70 0.49 
Home-based 
care elderly 
-0.11 0.56 0.50 0.70 1.00 0.08 
Housework 
incentives 
0.21 0.43 0.29 0.49 0.08 1.00 
 
 
Principal Component Analysis: 
 
Exploratory analysis (as many factors as variables): 
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Scree plot: 
 
 
  
 
PCA with extraction of 1 component (without rotation): 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 312 
Reliability analysis – Cronbach’s alpha: 
 
 
 
 
Scores of the De-familialisation index 
 
Country Scores 
AT -0.204434914 
BE 0.692274915 
CZ -1.140456688 
DE 0.001231388 
DK 2.864707217 
EE -0.428150835 
ES -0.063314878 
FI 0.166964985 
FR 1.189952016 
GR -1.086399018 
HU -0.896541446 
IE -0.396101984 
IT -0.429561369 
LV -0.832096912 
LU 0.096992639 
NL 0.930814849 
PL -1.395832071 
PT 0.195270941 
SE 1.658189194 
SK -0.837505389 
SI -0.096505004 
UK 0.010502366 
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Construction of the generosity index 
 
 
Correlation matrix: 
 
 Effective 
parental leave 
Child allowance  
1st child 
Child allowance 
2nd child 
Minimum social 
security 
Net 
replacement 
rate 
LTC expenditure 
Effective 
parental leave 
1.00 0.55 0.49 -0.31 -0.37 -0.03 
Child allowance  
1st child 
0.55 1.00 0.91 0.00 -0.11 0.28 
Child allowance 
2nd child 
0.49 0.91 1.00 0.02 -0.02 0.26 
Minimum social 
security 
-0.31 0.00 0.02 1.00 0.24 0.50 
Net 
replacement 
rate 
-0.37 -0.11 -0.02 0.24 1.00 -0.06 
LTC expenditure -0.03 0.28 0.26 0.50 -0.06 1.00 
 
 
Principal Component Analysis: 
 
Exploratory analysis (as many factors as variables): 
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Scree plot: 
 
 
 
PCA with extraction of 3 components (without rotation): 
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PCA with extraction of 2 components (oblique rotation): 
 
 
 
 
 
Reliability analysis – Cronbach’s alpha (1st component): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 316 
Reliability analysis – Cronbach’s alpha (2nd component): 
 
 
 
Scores of the generosity components 
Country Component 1 –  
Childcare 
Component 2 –  
Elderly care 
AT 0.1759207 0.70546799 
BE 0.2504526 1.35802168 
CZ -0.1499288 -0.43025324 
DE 2.0326994 -1.56503296 
DK 1.1587283 1.68298402 
EE -0.1898703 -2.29892017 
ES -1.7263397 -0.38966254 
FI 0.2653403 -0.41325725 
FR -0.6710803 -0.24190155 
GR -1.7536941 0.19399179 
HU 1.9093109 -0.65304198 
IE 0.3782104 1.21310260 
IT -0.2628085 -0.01951952 
LV -0.5828633 -0.85025428 
LU 0.6759859 0.68180849 
NL -0.4983220 1.60943616 
PL -0.9598748 -0.68207226 
PT -1.1559234 0.29770403 
SE 0.6625488 0.79612981 
SK -0.3021318 -0.71093417 
SI 1.0160124 -0.33874342 
UK -0.2723726 0.05494676 
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ANNEX 3 
 
Cluster analyses – Care regimes 
 
 
Dissimilarity matrix:
 318 
 
 
 AT BE CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GR HU IE IT LV LU NL PL PT SE SK SI UK 
BE 0.96760
11 
                                                                                                 
CZ 1.18751
17 
2.13458
64 
                                                                                      
DE 0.29170
22 
0.89604
79 
1.25616
41 
                                                                            
DK 3.22185
51 
2.25824
74 
4.35530
46 
3.09976
08 
                                                                
EE 1.69987
52 
2.33500
50 
1.19083
00 
1.53932
73 
4.23632
85 
                                                      
ES 1.50532
49 
2.00968
84 
1.32284
56 
1.29344
59 
3.83641
07 
0.40969
26 
                                           
FI 0.63466
95 
1.02331
72 
1.32516
59 
0.34957
60 
3.08419
91 
1.31304
42 
1.01062
79 
                                 
FR 1.65808
82 
1.35540
32 
2.33634
19 
1.37462
87 
2.51579
75 
1.79973
61 
1.39014
12 
1.09216
92 
                      
GR 1.50585
26 
2.38180
95 
0.49273
44 
1.48677
37 
4.52264
89 
0.80566
24 
1.06022
10 
1.43847
34 
2.29920
33 
             
HU 0.71703
92 
1.59854
61 
0.95006
98 
0.98054
55 
3.84387
81 
1.93022
21 
1.88077
64 
1.27435
49 
2.35156
70 
1.42072
8 
            
IE 0.40340
35 
1.08841
07 
1.31640
10 
0.68812
73 
3.32020
35 
2.04030
35 
1.88329
33 
1.03598
97 
2.02075
25 
1.72009
72 
0.52773
41                                                                       
           
IT 0.62389
19 
1.46707
19 
0.72632
73 
0.57114
39 
3.64583
50 
1.10323
21 
0.98728
25 
0.60030
02 
1.64992
57 
0.91616
43 
0.89993
92 
0.93741
78                                                             
          
LV 1.31650
84 
2.15326
03 
0.52627
04 
1.26399
41 
4.27023
46 
0.66466
81 
0.84119
48 
1.18788
04 
2.03870
48 
0.26206
01 
1.34623
66 
1.57381
28 
0.70222
08                                                   
         
LU 0.38418
64 
0.60833
47 
1.57169
30 
0.45524
96 
2.86544
01 
1.99369
74 
1.74428
04 
0.75610
04 
1.57596
52 
1.87839
36 
0.99483
01 
0.50672
98 
0.97455
61 
1.67645
60                                         
        
NL 1.14104
58 
0.34459
12 
2.23724
98 
0.98368
27 
2.11865
10 
2.25535
28 
1.89522
14 
0.98982
65 
1.04469
77 
2.41918
72 
1.82879
70 
1.34846
43 
1.52841
22 
2.17396
80 
0.84289
52                               
       
PL 1.73529
05 
2.64603
49 
0.58911
19 
1.75054
38 
4.81435
31 
1.05626
37 
1.35343
42 
1.73215
65 
2.61134
58 
0.31215
36 
1.53271
17 
1.90077
69 
1.18144
83 
0.57332
34 
2.11616
11 
2.70335
39                     
      
PT 0.95724
80 
1.32972
08 
1.34294
25 
0.69075
66 
3.24780
91 
1.02632
61 
0.67997
87 
0.35627
74 
0.99505
79 
1.32879
55 
1.51980
90 
1.36006
40 
0.68798
85 
1.06682
32 
1.11235
69 
1.22906
20 
1.63864
76           
     
SE 1.88485
66 
0.96881
37 
2.97853
27 
1.72946
10 
1.39064
06 
2.87201
02 
2.48156
44 
1.69382
32 
1.27492
72 
3.13215
90 
2.55673
45 
2.05536
13 
2.26196
34 
2.87960
87 
1.56201
12 
0.74784
60 
3.42498
41 
1.86604
77 
    
SK 1.13930
59 
2.01453
37 
0.37232
60 
1.11875
89 
4.17387
20 
0.84380
79 
0.95051
99 
1.09365
51 
2.02807
49 
0.36966
32 
1.13620
22 
1.37496
71 
0.54764
30 
0.21009
54 
1.50948
05 
2.06276
31 
0.64078
20 
1.03567
43 
2.78493
66                     
   
SI 0.14854
32 
0.91594
74 
1.21865
95 
0.14330
29 
3.15277
36 
1.61739
67 
1.39702
99 
0.48954
00 
1.51234
79 
1.49361
99 
0.85080
46 
0.54646
82 
0.58406
60 
1.28628
47 
0.39143
33 
1.04997
21 
1.74153
43 
0.82131
86 
1.79766
57 
1.12400
61           
  
UK 0.58995
46 
1.13942
60 
1.16516
30 
0.34267
16 
3.23821
97 
1.21745
26 
0.95215
39 
0.16027
61 
1.22965
48 
1.28593
12 
1.16861
99 
0.99157
00 
0.44125
86 
1.03896
59 
0.79234
48 
1.13500
21 
1.57641
74 
0.36985
61 
1.84856
79 
0.93668
46 
0.45996
77 
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Agglomerative hierarchical cluster analysis: 
 
 
 
 
Explorative analysis of best cluster solutions: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 320 
K-means cluster analysis – 4 clusters solution: 
 
 
 
 
PAM 3 clusters solution: 
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ANNEX 4 
 
Gender contract index 
 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
 
Correlation matrix: 
 
 VAR1 VAR2 VAR3 VAR4 VAR5 VAR6 VAR7 
VAR1 1.00 0.74 0.79 0.27 0.40 0.59 0.46 
VAR2 0.74 1.00 0.84 0.52 0.68 0.77 0.68 
VAR3 0.79 0.84 1.00 0.48 0.40 0.78 0.61 
VAR4 0.27 0.52 0.48 1.00 0.59 0.58 0.67 
VAR5 0.40 0.68 0.40 0.59 1.00 0.32 0.54 
VAR6 0.59 0.77 0.78 0.58 0.32 1.00 0.84 
VAR7 0.46 0.68 0.61 0.67 0.54 0.84 1.00 
 
Exploratory analysis (as many factors as variables): 
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Scree plot : 
 
 
 
 
PCA with extraction of 1 component (without rotation): 
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Reliability analysis – Cronbach’s alpha 
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ANNEX 5 
 
Cluster analyses – Gender regimes 
 
 
Dissimilarity matrix: 
 325 
 
 
      AT    BE    CZ    DE    DK    EE    ES    FI    FR    GR    HU    IE    IT    LU    NL    PL PT SE SI SK 
BE 1.427                                                                                                         
CZ 0.555 1.797                                                                                                   
DE 0.844 0.585 1.256                                                                                            
DK 3.326 1.904 3.691 2.482                                                                                      
EE 0.561 1.001 0.799 0.502 2.892                                                                               
ES 0.730 0.703 1.109 0.156 2.607 0.346                                                                        
FI 2.996 1.622 3.413 2.166 0.549 2.622 2.306                                                                 
FR 1.755 0.492 2.019 0.970 1.723 1.240 1.038 1.583                                                          
GR 1.049 2.013 0.538 1.558 3.835 1.056 1.402 3.626 2.115                                                   
HU 1.029 2.429 0.691 1.858 4.333 1.455 1.726 4.021 2.693 0.959                                            
IE 0.886 0.569 1.327 0.106 2.446 0.596 0.253 2.111 0.994 1.650 1.910                                      
IT 0.822 2.096 0.301 1.557 3.986 1.096 1.410 3.714 2.304 0.503 0.476 1.627                               
LU 1.263 0.267 1.580 0.467 2.111 0.782 0.537 1.865 0.505 1.761 2.233 0.502 1.875                        
NL 2.292 0.980 2.733 1.477 1.165 1.954 1.625 0.719 1.107 2.989 3.320 1.413 3.034 1.243                  
PL 0.702 2.087 0.373 1.519 3.991 1.113 1.385 3.684 2.351 0.780 0.343 1.574 0.290 1.890 2.986           
PT 1.084 2.040 0.571 1.589 3.857 1.087 1.433 3.652 2.136 0.035 0.974 1.681 0.525 1.788 3.017 0.805     
SE 3.508 2.100 3.896 2.667 0.286 3.098 2.800 0.565 1.963 4.065 4.525 2.623 4.194 2.322 1.270 4.184 4.088    
SI 1.137 0.301 1.540 0.293 2.189 0.761 0.431 1.875 0.746 1.808 2.151 0.268 1.841 0.293 1.195 1.811 1.837 2.374   
SK 1.185 2.258 0.633 1.781 4.093 1.283 1.626 3.876 2.374 0.263 0.830 1.868 0.459 2.011 3.230 0.747 0.248 4.321 2.041  
UK 1.372 0.056 1.747 0.529 1.958 0.952 0.650 1.670 0.534 1.971 2.376 0.513 2.046 0.242 1.019 2.034 1.998 2.152 0.245 2.214 
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Agglomerative hierarchical cluster analysis: 
 
 
 
 
 
Explorative analysis of best cluster solutions: 
 
 
 
 
 
K-means cluster analysis – 3 clusters solution: 
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PAM cluster analysis – 3 clusters solution: 
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ANNEX 6 
 
Cluster analyses – Migration regimes 
 
 
Dissimilarity matrix: 
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     AT   BE   CZ   DE   DK   EE   ES   FI   FR   GR   HU   IE   IT   LU   LV   NL   PL   PT   SE SI SK 
BE 2.46                                                                                                          
CZ 2.35 3.52                                                                                                     
DE 1.19 1.37 2.64                                                                                               
DK 1.55 1.44 2.46 1.04                                                                                         
EE 3.62 3.14 2.51 3.25 2.86                                                                                   
ES 2.17 1.77 1.92 1.50 1.34 1.98                                                                             
FI 2.06 1.64 2.56 1.30 1.04 3.16 1.30                                                                       
FR 1.95 1.39 3.46 1.53 1.36 3.33 2.29 2.24                                                                  
GR 2.67 3.14 2.25 2.55 2.93 2.31 2.10 3.19 3.22                                                            
HU 2.61 2.67 1.81 2.37 2.23 1.15 1.40 2.62 2.71 1.35                                                      
IE 0.85 2.28 1.65 1.14 1.18 2.93 1.45 1.58 2.06 2.30 1.98                                                 
IT 2.69 2.95 2.00 2.30 2.71 2.67 1.62 2.45 3.50 1.52 1.90 2.13                                           
LU 2.40 2.02 3.62 2.15 1.41 3.73 2.65 2.14 1.35 4.12 3.32 2.38 4.11                                     
LV 3.40 3.89 2.10 3.50 3.28 1.51 2.60 3.75 3.66 1.90 1.28 2.84 2.78 4.18                               
NL 1.68 1.53 3.10 1.28 0.74 3.52 2.05 1.44 1.14 3.51 2.90 1.66 3.35 0.91 3.90                         
PL 5.50 4.82 4.68 5.26 4.35 3.25 4.32 4.79 4.63 5.37 4.04 4.93 5.61 4.20 4.01 4.65                   
PT 3.07 1.18 3.49 2.01 1.72 3.04 1.68 1.37 2.34 3.56 2.86 2.63 2.98 2.38 4.07 2.00 4.47              
SE 2.80 1.08 3.85 1.73 1.74 3.84 2.19 1.40 2.14 3.88 3.41 2.62 3.29 2.20 4.65 1.69 5.25 1.03        
SI 3.89 3.95 2.04 3.75 3.21 1.44 2.42 3.34 4.07 3.01 1.92 3.09 2.97 4.09 1.83 3.89 3.18 3.59 4.38   
SK 2.38 3.51 1.17 2.80 2.32 2.35 2.21 2.82 3.08 2.63 1.81 1.80 2.87 3.11 1.83 2.86 3.91 3.60 3.98 1.97  
UK 1.01 2.12 2.04 1.06 0.91 3.25 1.58 1.17 1.99 2.85 2.43 0.63 2.47 2.03 3.36 1.27 4.95 2.36 2.23 3.35 2.16 
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Explorative analysis of best cluster solutions: 
 
 
 
 
 
Dendrogram hierarchical cluster analysis: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 331 
K-means cluster analysis – 3 clusters solution: 
 
 
 
 
 
K-means cluster analysis – 5 clusters solution: 
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ANNEX 7 
 
 
Table 1: Domestic workers and all other workers in the 3 clusters of care regimes (EU-
LFS, 2015) 
  Care 
typology 
Domestic 
workers 
 Domestic 
workers (%) 
Lower CI Upper CI  Other 
workers 
  Other 
workers (%) 
1 53310 10.86 10.77 10.94 437669 89.14 
2 54116 6.49 6.44 6.55 779321 93.51 
3 10147 5.59 5.49 5.70 171234 94.41 
 
 
Table 2: Domestic workers and all other workers in the 3 clusters of gender regimes 
(EU-LFS, 2015) 
  Gender 
typology 
Domestic 
workers 
 Domestic 
workers (%) 
Lower CI Upper CI  Other 
workers 
   Other 
workers (%) 
1 28365 10.70 10.59 10.82 236635 89.30 
2 50845 7.74 7.68 7.81 605697 92.26 
3 38363 6.57 6.50 6.63 545892 93.43 
 
 
Table 3: Domestic workers and all other workers in the 4 clusters of migration regimes 
(EU-LFS 2015) 
Migration 
typology 
Domestic 
workers 
Domestic 
workers (%) 
Lower CI Upper CI Other 
workers 
Other 
workers (%) 
1 29225 10.64 10.53 10.76 245373 89.36 
2 57309 7.63 7.57 7.69 693719 92.37 
3 23519 7.45 7.56 7.54 292312 92.55 
4 7520 4.58 4.48 4.68 156820 95.42 
 
 
Table 4: Proportion of women in the domestic setor in the 3 clusters of care regime (EU-
LFS 2015) 
Care 
typology 
Men Men  
(%) 
Women Women (%) Lower CI Upper CI 
1 8053 15.11 45257 84.89 84.59 85.20 
2 6168 11.40 47948 88.60 88.33 88.87 
3 755 7.44 9392 92.56 92.03 93.06 
 
 
Table 5: Proportion of women in the domestic sector in the 3 clusters of gender regimes 
(EU-LFS 2015) 
 
Gender 
typology 
Men Men 
(%) 
Women Women (%) Lower CI Upper CI 
1 5164 18.20 23201 81.79 81.34 82.24 
2 5595 11.00 45250 88.99 88.72 89.27 
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3 4217 10.99 34146 89.01 88.69 89.32 
 
 
Table 6: Proportion of women in the domestic sector in the 4 clusters of migration 
regimes (EU-LFS 2015) 
 
Migration 
typology 
Men Men 
(%) 
Women Women 
(%) 
Lower CI Upper CI 
1 4032 13.80 25193 86.20 85.80 86.60 
2 7163 12.50 50146 87.50 87.23 87.77 
3 3176 13.50 20343 86.50 86.05 86.93 
4 605 8.04 6915 91.95 91.32 92.56 
 
 
Table 7: Proportion of migrants in the domestic sector in the 3 clusters of care regimes 
(EU-LFS 2015) 
Care 
typology 
Migrant Migrant (%) Lower CI Upper CI Native Native 
(%) 
1 10575 19.86 19.50 20.18 42679 80.14 
2 12914 29.31 28.79 29.64 31143 70.69 
3 2015 19.86 19.09 20.65 8130 80.14 
 
 
Table 8: Proportion of migrants in the domestic sector in the 3 clusters of gender 
regimes (EU-LFS 2015) 
Gender 
typology 
Migrants Migrants 
(%) 
lwr.ci upr.ci Natives Natives 
(%) 
1 5689 20.09 19.59 20.53 22628 79.91 
2 8571 21.02 20.54 21.33 32207 78.98 
3 11244 29.31 28.85 29.77 27117 70.69 
 
 
Table 9: Proportion of migrants in the domestic sector in the 4 clusters of migration 
regimes (EU-LFS 2015) 
Migration 
typology 
Migrants Migrants 
(%) 
Lower CI Upper CI Natives Natives (%) 
1 6231 21.34 20.85 21.79 22966 78.66 
2 9530 20.18 19.74 20.47 37692 79.82 
3 9498 40.39 39.76 41.01 14019 59.61 
4 245 3.26 2.87 3.68 7275 96.74 
 
 
Table 10: Proportion of domestic workers doing shift work in the 3 clusters of care 
regimes (EU-LFS 2015) 
Care 
typology 
Shift work Normal 
hours 
Shift work 
(%) 
Lower CI Upper CI Normal 
hours (%) 
1 22925 30095 43.24 43.13 43.97 56.76 
2 27513 26179 51.24 51.20 52.05 48.76 
3 5583 4353 56.19 56.13 58.07 43.81 
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Table 11: Proportion of domestic workers doing shift work in the 3 clusters of gender 
regimes (EU-LFS 2015) 
Gender 
typology 
Shift work Shift work 
(%) 
Lower CI Upper CI Normal 
hours 
Normal 
hours (%) 
1 17896 63.12 62.57 63.69 10458 36.89 
2 17976 36.00 36.73 37.57 31958 64.00 
3 20149 52.53 52.03 53.03 18211 47.47 
 
 
Table 12: Proportion of domestic workers doing shift work in the 4 clusters of migration 
regimes (EU-LFS 2015) 
Migration 
typology 
Shift work Shift work 
(%) 
Lower CI Upper CI Normal 
hours 
Normal 
hours (%) 
1 16479 56.41 55.86 57.00 12733 43.59 
2 22922 40.49 40.82 41.62 33686 59.51 
3 13213 56.68 56.43 57.70 10098 43.32 
4 3407 45.32 44.22 46.50 4110 54.68 
 
 
Table 13: Temporary and permanent work in the domestic sector in the 3 clusters of 
care regimes (EU-LFS 2015) 
Care 
typology 
Temporary 
work 
Temporary 
work (%) 
Lower CI Upper CI Permanent 
work 
Permanent 
work (%) 
1 11937 22.72 22.36 23.08 40603 77.28 
2 7295 14.04 13.74 14.34 44658 85.96 
3 2140 23.05 22.20 23.92 7144 76.95 
 
 
Table 14: Temporary and permanent work in the domstic sector in the 3 clusters of 
gender regimes (EU-LFS 2015) 
Gender 
typology 
Temporary 
work 
Temporary 
work (%) 
Lower CI Upper CI Permanent 
work 
Permanent 
work (%) 
1 6664 24.09 23.59 24.60 20994 75.91 
2 9017 18.22 17.88 18.56 40469 81.78 
3 5691 15.53 15.16 15.91 30942 84.46 
 
 
Table 15: Temporary and permanent work in the domestic sector in the 4 clusters of 
migration regimes (EU-LFS 2015) 
Migration 
typology 
Temporary 
work 
Temporary 
work (%) 
Lower CI Upper CI Permanent 
work 
Permanent 
work (%) 
1 7137 24.81 24.31 25.31 21632 75.19 
2 9254 16.67 16.36 16.98 46253 83.33 
3 3582 15.82 15.34 16.30 19066 84.18 
4 1399 20.41 19.46 21.39 5454 79.59 
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ANNEX 8 
 
 
Log-linear models (the number of the tables refers to the tables of Annex 7) 
 
 
Table 1 
 
 
Care 
typology 
% 
Standardized 
residuals 
Domestic 
workers 
N 
Domestic 
workers 
Other 
workers 
Cluster 1  10,9 53310 77,5 -26,6 
Cluster 2 6,5 54116 -43,9 17,9 
Cluster 3 5,6 10147 -33,9 10,4 
Total 7,8 117573     
L2 =  9.184,0 df = 2   
 
 
Table 2 
 
 
Gender 
typology 
% 
Standardized 
residuals 
Domestic 
workers 
N 
Domestic 
workers 
Other 
workers 
Cluster 1  10,7 28365 53,7 -17,0 
Cluster 2 7,7 50845 -1,9 0,7 
Cluster 3 6,6 38363 -34,5 12,3 
Total 7,8 117573     
L2 =  4.112,9 df = 2   
 
 
Table 3 
 
 
Migration 
typology 
% 
Standardized 
residuals 
Domestic 
workers 
N 
Domestic 
workers 
Other 
workers 
Cluster 1  10,6 29225 53,5 -17,0 
Cluster 2 7,6 57309 -5,6 2,2 
Cluster 3 7,4 23519 -7,3 2,4 
Cluster 4 4,6 7520 -47,1 14,4 
Total 8,2 110053     
L2 =  5.639,1 df = 3   
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Table 4  
 
 
Care 
typology 
% 
Standardized 
residuals 
Women N Men Women 
Cluster 1  84,9 45257 15,8 -7,5 
Cluster 2 88,6 47948 -9,0 4,3 
Cluster 3 92,6 9392 -15,0 5,9 
Total 87,3 102597     
L2 =  641,4 df = 2   
 
 
 
Table 5 
 
 
Gender 
typology 
% 
Standardized 
residuals 
Women N Men Women 
Cluster 1  81,8 23201 26,2 -11,1 
Cluster 2 89,0 45250 -11,3 5,3 
Cluster 3 89,0 34146 -9,8 4,3 
Total 87,3 102597     
L2 =  938,9 df = 2   
 
 
 
Table 6 
 
 
Migration 
typology 
% 
Standardized 
residuals 
Women N Men Women 
Cluster 1  86,2 25193 5,2 -2,2 
Cluster 2 87,5 50146 -1,7 0,8 
Cluster 3 86,5 20343 3,3 -1,4 
Cluster 4 92,0 6915 -11,4 4,5 
Total 86,9 95682     
L2 =  212,4 df = 3   
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Table 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 
 
 
Gender 
typology 
% 
Standardized 
residuals 
Migrant N Migrant Native 
Cluster 1  20,1 5689 -13,0 7,9 
Cluster 2 21,0 8571 -11,8 7,4 
Cluster 3 29,3 11244 23,4 -14,7 
Total 23,7 25504     
L2 =  1.014,3 df = 2   
 
 
 
Table 9 
 
 
Migration 
typology 
% 
Standardized 
residuals 
Migrant N Migrant Native 
Cluster 1  21,3 6231 -8,7 5,3 
Cluster 2 20,2 9530 -16,7 10,8 
Cluster 3 40,4 9498 53,8 -32,0 
Cluster 4 3,3 245 -36,8 20,9 
Total 25,3 25259     
L2 =  6.114,5 df = 3   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Care 
typology 
% Standardized 
residuals 
Migrant N Migrant Native 
Cluster 1  19,9 10575 -19,5 13,0 
Cluster 2 29,3 12914 25,3 -16,2 
Cluster 3 19,9 2015 -8,1 4,6 
Total 23,7 25504     
L2 =  1.269,1 df = 2   
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Table 10 
 
 
 
Care 
typology 
% 
Standardized 
residuals 
Doing 
shifts 
N 
Doing 
shifts 
Normal 
hours 
Cluster 1  43,2 22925 -18,0 17,5 
Cluster 2 51,2 27513 12,2 -11,9 
Cluster 3 56,2 5583 12,0 -11,5 
Total 48,0 56021     
L2 =  976,5 df = 2   
 
 
 
Table 11 
 
 
Gender 
typology 
% 
Standardized 
residuals 
Doing 
shifts 
N 
Doing 
shifts 
Normal 
hours 
Cluster 1  63,1 17896 39,0 -37,7 
Cluster 2 36,0 17976 -43,5 42,3 
Cluster 3 52,5 20149 13,9 -13,4 
Total 48,0 56021     
L2 =  5.858,2 df = 2   
 
 
 
Table 12 
 
 
Migration 
typology 
% 
Standardized 
residuals 
Doing 
shifts 
N 
Doing 
shifts 
Normal 
hours 
Cluster 1  56,4 16479 22,1 -21,3 
Cluster 2 40,5 22922 -29,5 28,8 
Cluster 3 56,7 13213 20,1 -19,4 
Cluster 4 45,3 3407 -3,4 3,3 
Total 48,2 52614     
L2 =  2.842,4 df = 3   
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Table 13 
 
 
 
Care 
typology 
% Standardized residuals 
Temporary 
work 
N 
Temporary 
work 
Permanent 
work 
Cluster 1  22,7 11937 21,8 -12,7 
Cluster 2 14,0 7295 -26,1 15,1 
Cluster 3 23,1 2140 9,6 -4,7 
Total 18,8 21372     
L2 =  1.436,1 df = 2   
 
 
Table 14 
 
 
Gender 
typology 
% Standardized residuals 
Temporary 
work 
N 
Temporary 
work 
Permanent 
work 
Cluster 1  24,1 6664 20,9 -10,9 
Cluster 2 18,2 9017 -3,0 1,7 
Cluster 3 15,5 5691 -14,8 8,0 
Total 18,8 21372     
L2 =  755,2 df = 2   
 
 
 
Table 15 
 
 
Migration 
typology 
% Standardized residuals 
Temporary 
work 
N 
Temporary 
work 
Permanent 
work 
Cluster 1  24,8 7137 24,2 -12,7 
Cluster 2 16,7 9254 -12,0 7,1 
Cluster 3 15,8 3582 -10,5 5,4 
Cluster 4 20,4 1399 3,1 -1,5 
Total 18,7 19973     
L2 =  951,8 df = 3   
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ANNEX 9 
 
 
Multinomial logistic regression models 
 
 
MODEL 0 – base model 
 
MODEL 0 
  95% CI for odds ratio 
B (SE) Lower Odds ratio Upper 
Native domestic workers vs. migrant domestic workers 
Intercept -0.05 (0.04)    
Female 0.17 (0.02) 1.13 1.18 1.23 
Age 0.02 (0.00) 1.02 1.02 1.02 
Medium 
education 
0.36 (0.02) 1.38 1.43 1.47 
High education -0.55 (0.02) 0.55 0.57 0.60 
Separated/widow -0.15 (0.02) 0.82 0.86 0.89 
Single 0.69 (0.02) 1.91 1.99 2.06 
Migrants in other sectors vs. migrant domestic workers 
Intercept 2.94 (0.04)    
Female -2.35 (0.02) 0.09 0.09 0.10 
Age -0.01 (0.00) 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Medium 
education 
0.46 (0.02) 1.52 1.58 1.64 
High education 1.72 (0.02) 5.38 5.61 5.85 
Separated/widow -0.34 (0.02) 0.68 0.71 0.74 
Single -0.10 (0.02) 0.87 0.90 0.94 
All coefficients are significant at 95%, apart from those indicated with (n.s.) 
 
MODEL 1 – countries 
 
MODEL 1 
  95% CI for odds ratio 
B (SE) Lower Odds ratio Upper 
Native domestic workers vs. migrant domestic workers 
Intercept -0.24 (0.05)    
Female 0.07 (0.02) 1.03 1.07 1.12 
Age 0.02 (0.00) 1.01 1.02 1.02 
Medium 
education 
0.24 (0.02) 1.23 1.27 1.31 
High education -0.72 (0.02) 0.46 0.49 0.51 
Separated/widow -0.16 (0.02) 0.81 0.85 0.89 
Single 0.66 (0.02) 1.85 1.93 2.00 
Belgium 0.06 (0.05) (n.s.) 0.97 1.06 1.16 
Czech Republic 2.33 (0.18) 7.22 10.24 14.51 
Denmark 1.19 (0.05) 2.98 3.28 3.62 
Estonia 0.95 (0.12) 2.03 2.57 3.26 
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Spain 0.67 (0.05) 1.78 1.96 2.16 
Finland 1.81 (0.12) 4.82 6.09 7.71 
France 0.80 (0.03) 2.07 2.22 2.37 
Greece -0.25 (0.05) 0.71 0.78 0.86 
Hungary 2.96 (0.11) 15.69 19.35 23.88 
Ireland 0.57 (0.04) 1.62 1.77 1.93 
Italy -0.55 (0.03) 0.54 0.58 0.61 
Luxembourg -1.18 (0.08) 0.26 0.31 0.36 
Netherlands 1.42 (0.07) 3.65 4.15 4.73 
Portugal 1.58 (0.05) 4.38 4.85 5.38 
Sweden 0.36 (0.03) 1.34 1.43 1.53 
Slovakia 3.62 (0.20) 25.40 37.29 34.62 
UK 0.82 (0.05) 2.04 2.26 2.51 
Migrants in other sectors vs. migrant domestic workers 
Intercept 3.45 (0.05)    
Female -2.45 (0.02) 0.08 0.09 0.09 
Age -0.01 (0.00) 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Medium 
education 
0.45 (0.02) 1.51 1.57 1.62 
High education 1.68 (0.02) 5.15 5.38 5.63 
Separated/widow -0.32 (0.02) 0.69 0.72 0.76 
Single -0.04 (0.02) 0.92 0.96 1.00 
Belgium -0.40 (0.04) 0.61 0.67 0.73 
Czech Republic 0.93 (0.18) 1.77 2.54 3.64 
Denmark -0.65 (0.05) 0.47 0.52 0.58 
Estonia 0.57 (0.12) 1.40 1.77 2.23 
Spain -0.57 (0.05) 0.51 0.56 0.62 
Finland -0.26 (0.13) 0.60 0.77 1.00 
France -0.44 (0.03) 0.60 0.64 0.69 
Greece -0.24 (0.05) 0.72 0.79 0.86 
Hungary 1.06 (0.11) 2.31 2.87 3.57 
Ireland -0.12 (0.04) 0.81 0.89 0.96 
Italy -0.96 (0.03) 0.36 0.38 0.41 
Luxembourg 0.13 (0.06) 1.01 1.14 1.28 
Netherlands 0.21 (0.07) 1.07 1.23 1.40 
Portugal 0.77 (0.05) 1.94 2.15 2.39 
Sweden -0.90 (0.03) 0.38 0.40 0.43 
Slovakia 0.43 (0.21) 1.02 1.54 2.31 
UK -0.16 (0.05) 0.77 0.85 0.94 
All coefficients are significant at 95%, apart from those indicated with (n.s.) 
 
  
 
 
MODEL 2 (care typology) 
 
MODEL 2 
  95% CI for odds ratio 
B (SE) Lower Odds ratio Upper 
Native domestic workers vs. migrant domestic workers 
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Intercept -0.22 (0.04)    
Female 0.18 (0.02) 1.14 1.19 1.24 
Age 0.02 (0.00) 1.02 1.02 1.02 
Medium 
education 
0.32 (0.02) 1.333 1.38 1.42 
High education -0.59 (0.02) 0.53 0.55 0.58 
Separated/widow -0.15 (0.02) 0.83 0.86 0.90 
Single 0.64 (0.02) 1.83 1.90 1.98 
Care 1 – De-
familialisation 
0.44(0.01) 1.51 1.55 1.60 
Care 3 – 
Familialisation 
with support 
0.49(0.03) 1.55 1.63 1.72 
Migrants in other sectors vs. migrant domestic workers 
Intercept 2.98 (0.04)    
Female -2.36 (0.02) 0.09 0.09 0.10 
Age -0.01 (0.00) 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Medium 
education 
0.47 (0.02) 1.54 1.60 1.65 
High education 1.75 (0.02) 5.50 5.74 5.99 
Separated/widow -0.34 (0.02) 0.68 0.71 0.74 
Single -0.08 (0.02) 0.89 0.93 0.96 
Care 1 – De-
familialisation 
-0.21(0.02) 0.78 0.81 0.83 
Care 3 – 
Familialisation 
with support 
0.15(0.03) 1.10 1.16 1.22 
All coefficients are significant at 95%, apart from those indicated with (n.s.) 
 
 
MODEL 3 (gender typology) 
 
MODEL 3 
  95% CI for odds ratio 
B (SE) Lower Odds ratio Upper 
Native domestic workers vs. migrant domestic workers 
Intercept 0.23 (0.04)    
Female 0.18 (0.02) 1.15 1.20 1.25 
Age 0.02 (0.00) 1.02 1.02 1.02 
Medium 
education 
0.30 (0.02) 1.30 1.34 1.38 
High education -0.68 (0.02) 0.48 0.51 0.53 
Separated/widow -0.14 (0.02) 0.83 0.87 0.90 
Single 0.62 (0.02) 1.79 1.86 1.93 
Gender 1 – 
Modern gender 
contract 
0.01(0.02) (n.s.) 0.97 1.01 1.05 
Gender 3 – 
Traditional gender 
contract 
-0.47(0.02) 0.60 0.62 0.64 
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Migrants in other sectors vs. migrant domestic workers 
Intercept 3.11 (0.04)    
Female -2.36 (0.02) 0.09 0.09 0.10 
Age -0.01 (0.00) 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Medium 
education 
0.47 (0.02) 1.55 1.60 1.66 
High education 1.75 (0.02) 5.49 5.74 5.99 
Separated/widow -0.33 (0.02) 0.69 0.72 0.75 
Single -0.09 (0.02) 0.88 0.91 0.95 
Gender 1 – 
Modern gender 
contract 
-0.46(0.02) 0.61 0.63 0.66 
Gender 3 – 
Traditional gender 
contract 
-0.13(0.02) 0.85 0.88 0.91 
All coefficients are significant at 95%, apart from those indicated with (n.s.) 
 
 
MODEL 4 (migration typology) 
 
MODEL 4 
  95% CI for odds ratio 
B (SE) Lower Odds ratio Upper 
Native domestic workers vs. migrant domestic workers 
Intercept 2.43 (0.08)    
Female 0.11 (0.02) 1.06 1.11 1.16 
Age 0.02 (0.00) 1.01 1.02 1.02 
Medium 
education 
0.16 (0.02) 1.14 1.17 1.21 
High education -0.79 (0.02) 0.43 0.45 0.47 
Separated/widow -0.17 (0.02) 0.81 0.84 0.88 
Single 0.66 (0.02) 1.86 1.93 2.00 
Migration 1 – Less 
restrictive 
-2.10 (0.07) 0.11 0.12 0.14 
Migration 2 – Old 
immigration 
-1.96(0.07) 0.12 0.14 0.16 
Migration 3 – New 
immigration 
-3.01 (0.07) 0.04 0.05 0.06 
Migrants in other sectors vs. migrant domestic workers 
Intercept 4.38 (0.08)    
Female -2.38 (0.02) 0.09 0.09 0.10 
Age -0.01 (0.00) 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Medium 
education 
0.36 (0.02) 1.38 1.43 1.48 
High education 1.59 (0.02) 4.68 4.89 5.11 
Separated/widow -0.33 (0.02) 0.68 0.71 0.75 
Single -0.12 (0.02) 0.85 0.89 0.92 
Migration 1 – Less 
restrictive 
-1.37(0.07) 0.22 0.25 0.29 
Migration 2 – Old -1.09 (0.07) 0.29 0.34 0.38 
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immigration 
Migration 3 – New 
immigration 
-1.69 (0.07) 0.16 0.18 0.21 
All coefficients are significant at 95%, apart from those indicated with (n.s.) 
 
 
MODEL 5 (three typologies) 
 
MODEL 5 
  95% CI for odds ratio 
B (SE) Lower Odds ratio Upper 
Native domestic workers vs. migrant domestic workers 
Intercept 2.17 (0.08)    
Female 0.10 (0.02) 1.06 1.10 1.15 
Age 0.02 (0.00) 1.01 1.02 1.02 
Medium 
education 
0.15 (0.02) 1.13 1.17 1.21 
High education -0.81 (0.02) 0.42 0.44 0.47 
Separated/widow -0.16 (0.02) 0.82 0.85 0.89 
Single 0.66 (0.02) 1.86 1.93 2.00 
Care 1 – De-
familialisation 
-0.02 (0.03) (n.s.) 0.93 0.98 1.03 
Care 3 – 
Familialisation 
with support 
0.68 (0.03) 1.84 1.97 2.10 
Gender 1 – 
Modern gender 
contract 
0.11 (0.02) 1.06 1.11 1.17 
Gender 3 – 
Traditional gender 
contract 
-0.03 (0.03) (n.s.) 0.92 0.97 1.03 
Migration 1 – Less 
restrictive 
-1.89 (0.07) 0.13 0.15 0.17 
Migration 2 – Old 
immigration 
-1.72(0.07) 0.16 0.18 0.20 
Migration 3 – New 
immigration 
-2.91 (0.07) 0.04 0.05 0.06 
Migrants in other sectors vs. migrant domestic workers 
Intercept 3.80 (0.09)    
Female -2.43 (0.02) 0.09 0.09 0.10 
Age -0.01 (0.00) 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Medium 
education 
0.41 (0.02) 1.46 1.51 1.57 
High education 1.64 (0.02) 4.92 5.14 5.38 
Separated/widow -0.32 (0.02) 0.69 0.72 0.75 
Single -0.06 (0.02) 0.91 0.94 0.98 
Care 1 – De-
familialisation 
-0.40 (0.03) 0.64 0.67 0.71 
Care 3 – 
Familialisation 
0.70 (0.03) 1.89 2.02 2.16 
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with support 
Gender 1 – 
Modern gender 
contract 
-0.30 (0.03) 0.70 0.74 0.78 
Gender 3 – 
Traditional gender 
contract 
0.27 (0.03) 1.23 1.30 1.38 
Migration 1 – Less 
restrictive 
-0.42 (0.07) 0.57 0.65 0.75 
Migration 2 – Old 
immigration 
-0.36 (0.07) 0.60 0.70 0.80 
Migration 3 – New 
immigration 
-1.57 (0.07) 0.18 0.21 0.24 
All coefficients are significant at 95%, apart from those indicated with (n.s.) 
 
 
MODEL 6 (interaction Care X Gender) 
 
MODEL 6 
  95% CI for odds ratio 
B (SE) Lower Odds ratio Upper 
Native domestic workers vs. migrant domestic workers 
Intercept 0.28 (0.05)    
Female 0.18 (0.02) 1.14 1.19 1.24 
Age 0.02 (0.00) 1.02 1.02 1.02 
Medium 
education 
0.28 (0.02) 1.29 1.33 1.37 
High education -0.66 (0.02) 0.49 0.51 0.54 
Separated/widow -0.14 (0.02) 0.83 0.87 0.90 
Single 0.63 (0.02) 1.81 1.88 1.95 
Care 2 x Gender 2 -0.19 (0.04) 0.76 0.82 0.89 
Care 1 x Gender 2 0.00 (0.04) (n.s.) 0.93 1.00 1.08 
Care 3 x Gender 2 0.03 (0.05) (n.s.) 0.93 1.03 1.14 
Care 2 x Gender 1 1.13 (0.12) 2.44 3.09 3.92 
Care 1 x Gender 1 -0.06 (0.04) 0.87 0.94 1.01 
Care 2 x Gender 3 -0.59(0.03) 0.52 0.55 0.59 
Migrants in other sectors vs. migrant domestic workers 
Intercept 3.24 (0.05)    
Female -2.36 (0.02) 0.09 0.09 0.10 
Age -0.01 (0.00) 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Medium 
education 
0.45 (0.02) 1.52 1.57 1.62 
High education 1.71 (0.02) 5.27 5.51 5.76 
Separated/widow -0.33 (0.02) 0.69 0.72 0.75 
Single -0.08 (0.02) 0.89 0.92 0.96 
Care 2 x Gender 2 0.05 (0.04) (n.s.) 0.97 1.05 1.14 
Care 1 x Gender 2 -0.27 (0.04) 0.70 0.76 0.82 
Care 3 x Gender 2 -0.22 (0.05) 0.72 0.80 0.89 
Care 2 x Gender 1 -0.11 (0.13) (n.s.) 0.69 0.89 1.15 
Care 1 x Gender 1 -0.62 (0.04) 0.50 0.54 0.58 
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Care 2 x Gender 3 -0.32 (0.04) 0.67 0.72 0.78 
All coefficients are significant at 95%, apart from those indicated with (n.s.) 
 
 
MODEL 7 (interaction Care X Migration) 
 
MODEL 7 
  95% CI for odds ratio 
B (SE) Lower Odds ratio Upper 
Native domestic workers vs. migrant domestic workers 
Intercept 0.00 (0.05)    
Female 0.106(0.02) 1.02 1.07 1.11 
Age 0.02 (0.00) 1.01 1.02 1.02 
Medium 
education 
0.27 (0.02) 1.26 1.31 1.35 
High education -0.65 (0.02) 0.50 0.52 0.55 
Separated/widow -0.16 (0.02) 0.81 0.85 0.88 
Single 0.68 (0.02) 1.90 1.98 2.05 
Care 2 x Migration 
4 
2.72 (0.11) 12.26 15.12 18.65 
Care 3 x Migration 
4 
2.11 (0.09) 6.95 8.27 9.83 
Care 2 x Migration 
1 
1.37 (0.05) 3.58 3.94 4.34 
Care 1 x Migration 
1 
0.05 (0.03) (n.s.) 0.98 1.05 1.12 
Care 2 x Migration 
2 
0.04 (0.03) (n.s.) 0.97 1.04 1.11 
Care 1 x Migration 
2 
0.66(0.03) 1.82 1.94 2.07 
Care 2 x Migration 
3 
-0.79 (0.03) 0.42 0.45 0.48 
Migrants in other sectors vs. migrant domestic workers 
Intercept 3.07 (0.05)    
Female -2.44 (0.02) 0.08 0.09 0.09 
Age -0.01 (0.00) 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Medium 
education 
0.43 (0.02) 1.48 1.53 1.59 
High education 1.64 (0.02) 4.94 5.17 5.40 
Separated/widow -0.33 (0.02) 0.69 0.72 0.75 
Single -0.06 (0.02) 0.91 0.94 0.98 
Care 2 x Migration 
4 
1.43 (0.11) 3.38 4.20 5.21 
Care 3 x Migration 
4 
1.07 (0.09) 2.44 2.92 3.49 
Care 2 x Migration 
1 
1.03 (0.05) 2.52 2.79 3.08 
Care 1 x Migration 
1 
-0.41 (0.03) 0.62 0.66 0.71 
Care 2 x Migration 0.31 (0.04) 1.28 1.36 1.46 
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2 
Care 1 x Migration 
2 
-0.05 (0.03) (n.s.) 0.89 0.95 1.02 
Care 2 x Migration 
3 
-0.59 (0.03) 0.52 0.55 0.59 
All coefficients are significant at 95%, apart from those indicated with (n.s.) 
 
 
 
MODEL 8 (interaction Gender X Migration) 
 
MODEL 8 
  95% CI for odds ratio 
B (SE) Lower Odds ratio Upper 
Native domestic workers vs. migrant domestic workers 
Intercept 0.77 (0.04)    
Female 0.07 (0.02) 1.03 1.08 1.13 
Age 0.02 (0.00) 1.01 1.02 1.02 
Medium 
education 
0.24 (0.02) 1.24 1.28 1.32 
High education -0.74 (0.02) 0.46 0.48 0.50 
Separated/widow -0.16 (0.02) 0.81 0.85 0.88 
Single 0.65 (0.02) 1.85 1.92 2.00 
Gender 2 x 
Migration 4 
1.45 (0.12) 3.38 4.26 5.37 
Gender 3 x 
Migration 4 
3.52 (0.08) 28.81 33.85 39.77 
Gender 2 x 
Migration 1 
0.57 (0.04) 1.63 1.76 1.90 
Gender 1 x 
Migration 1 
0.92 (0.02) 2.41 2.52 2.64 
Gender 3 x 
Migration 1 
2.09 (0.04) 7.38 8.07 8.83 
Gender 2 x 
Migration 2 
1.21(0.02) 3.33 3.35 3.49 
Gender 1 x 
Migration 2 
1.77 (0.04) 5.49 5.89 6.33 
Gender 3 x 
Migration 2 
0.51 (0.03) 1.56 1.66 1.77 
Gender 2 x 
Migration 3 
1.18 (0.04) 3.00 3.26 3.55 
Migrants in other sectors vs. migrant domestic workers 
Intercept 2.66 (0.04)    
Female -2.44 (0.02) 0.08 0.09 0.09 
Age -0.01 (0.00) 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Medium 
education 
0.45 (0.02) 1.51 1.57 1.62 
High education 1.70 (0.02) 5.24 5.48 5.73 
Separated/widow -0.33 (0.02) 0.68 0.72 0.75 
Single -0.07 (0.02) 0.90 0.93 0.97 
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Gender 2 x 
Migration 4 
1.41 (0.12) 3.27 4.10 5.15 
Gender 3 x 
Migration 4 
1.79 (0.08) 5.05 5.97 7.06 
Gender 2 x 
Migration 1 
0.43 (0.04) 1.43 1.54 1.66 
Gender 1 x 
Migration 1 
-0.05 (0.02) 0.91 0.95 1.00 
Gender 3 x 
Migration 1 
1.60 (0.05) 4.54 4.98 5.46 
Gender 2 x 
Migration 2 
0.56 (0.02) 1.68 1.75 1.83 
Gender 1 x 
Migration 2 
0.48 (0.04) 0.51 1.62 0.75 
Gender 3 x 
Migration 2 
0.83 (0.03) 2.17 2.31 2.45 
Gender 2 x 
Migration 3 
0.26 (0.05) 1.19 1.30 1.42 
All coefficients are significant at 95%, apart from those indicated with (n.s.) 
 
 
 
MODEL 9 (interaction Care X Gender, Migration) 
 
 
MODEL 9 
  95% CI for odds ratio 
B (SE) Lower Odds ratio Upper 
Native domestic workers vs. migrant domestic workers 
Intercept 2.67 (0.08)    
Female 0.09 (0.02) 1.05 1.10 1.14 
Age 0.02 (0.00) 1.01 1.02 1.02 
Medium 
education 
0.16 (0.02) 1.14 1.17 1.21 
High education -0.78 (0.02) 0.43 0.46 0.48 
Separated/widow -0.16 (0.02) 0.82 0.85 0.88 
Single 0.66 (0.02) 1.86 1.93 2.00 
Migration 1 – Less 
restrictive 
-1.88 (0.07) 0.13 0.15 0.17 
Migration 2 – Old 
immigration 
-1.64 (0.07) 0.17 0.19 0.22 
Migration 3 – New 
immigration 
-2.95 (0.07) 0.05 0.05 0.06 
Care 2 x Gender 2 -0.75 (0.05) 0.43 0.47 0.52 
Care 1 x Gender 2 -0.53 (0.05) 0.53 0.59 0.65 
Care 3 x Gender 2 0.45(0.05) 1.42 1.57 1.75 
Care 2 x Gender 1 0.82 (0.13) 1.78 2.28 2.92 
Care 1 x Gender 1 -0.46 (0.05) 0.57 0.63 0.69 
Care 2 x Gender 3 -0.47 (0.04) 0.58 0.63 0.68 
Migrants in other sectors vs. migrant domestic workers 
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Intercept 4.68 (0.08)    
Female -2.44 (0.02) 0.08 0.09 0.09 
Age -0.01 (0.00) 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Medium 
education 
0.42 (0.02) 1.47 1.52 1.57 
High education 1.65 (0.02) 4.97 5.19 5.43 
Separated/widow -0.33 (0.02) 0.69 0.72 0.75 
Single -0.06 (0.02) 0.91 0.94 0.98 
Migration 1 – Less 
restrictive 
-0.41 (0.07) 0.58 0.67 0.77 
Migration 2 – Old 
immigration 
-0.32 (0.07) 0.63 0.73 0.84 
Migration 3 – New 
immigration 
-1.60 (0.07) 0.18 0.20 0.23 
Care 2 x Gender 2 -0.99 (0.05) 0.34 0.37 0.41 
Care 1 x Gender 2 -1.31 (0.05) 0.24 0.27 0.30 
Care 3 x Gender 2 -0.03 (0.05) (n.s.) 0.87 0.97 1.08 
Care 2 x Gender 1 -1.06 (0.13) 0.27 0.35 0.45 
Care 1 x Gender 1 -1.60 (0.05) 0.18 0.20 0.22 
Care 2 x Gender 3 -0.59 (0.04) 0.52 0.56 0.60 
All coefficients are significant at 95%, apart from those indicated with (n.s.) 
 
 
 
MODEL 10 (interaction Care X Migration, Gender) 
 
MODEL 10 
  95% CI for odds ratio 
B (SE) Lower Odds ratio Upper 
Native domestic workers vs. migrant domestic workers 
Intercept 0.22 (0.05)    
Female 0.07 (0.02) 1.03 1.08 1.12 
Age 0.02 (0.00) 1.01 1.02 1.02 
Medium 
education 
0.25 (0.02) 1.24 1.28 1.32 
High education -0.71 (0.02) 0.47 0.49 0.52 
Separated/widow -0.16 (0.02) 0.81 0.85 0.88 
Single 0.66 (0.02) 1.87 1.94 2.01 
Gender 1 – 
Modern gender 
contract 
0.33 (0.03) 1.32 1.39 1.46 
Gender 3 – 
Traditional gender 
contract 
-0.43 (0.03) 0.61 0.65 0.69 
Care 2 x migration 
4 
2.94 (0.11) 15.27 18.88 23.33 
Care 3 x migration 
4 
2.23 (0.09) 7.85 9.35 11.13 
Care 2 x migration 
1 
1.53 (0.05) 4.09 4.51 4.99 
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Care 1 x migration 
1 
-0.42 (0.04) 0.61 0.66 0.71 
Care 2 x migration 
2 
0.01 (0.03) (n.s.) 0.94 1.01 1.07 
Care 1 x migration 
2 
0.37 (0.04) 1.35 1.45 1.55 
Care 2 x migration 
3 
-0.57 (0.03) 0.52 0.56 0.60 
Migrants in other sectors vs. migrant domestic workers 
Intercept 3.02 (0.05)    
Female -2.44 (0.02) 0.08 0.09 0.09 
Age -0.01 (0.00) 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Medium 
education 
0.44 (0.02) 1.50 1.55 1.60 
High education 1.67 (0.02) 5.07 5.30 5.54 
Separated/widow -0.32 (0.02) 0.69 0.72 0.75 
Single -0.05 (0.02) 0.91 0.95 0.98 
Gender 1 – 
Modern gender 
contract 
-0.22 (0.03) 0.76 0.80 0.85 
Gender 3 – 
Traditional gender 
contract 
0.11 (0.03) 1.05 1.12 1.18 
Care 2 x migration 
4 
1.38 (0.11) 3.21 3.99 4.97 
Care 3 x migration 
4 
1.09 (0.09) 2.48 2.97 3.56 
Care 2 x migration 
1 
1.03 (0.05) 2.52 2.79 3.09 
Care 1 x migration 
1 
-0.18 (0.04) 0.77 0.84 0.91 
Care 2 x migration 
2 
0.34 (0.03) 1.31 1.40 1.50 
Care 1 x migration 
2 
0.08 (0.04) 1.01 1.08 1.16 
Care 2 x migration 
3 
-0.63 (0.03) 0.49 0.53 0.57 
All coefficients are significant at 95%, apart from those indicated with (n.s.) 
 
 
 
MODEL 11 (interaction Gender X Migration, Care) 
 
 
MODEL 11 
  95% CI for odds ratio 
B (SE) Lower Odds ratio Upper 
Native domestic workers vs. migrant domestic workers 
Intercept 2.60 (0.09)    
Female 0.07 (0.02) 1.03 1.08 1.12 
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Age 0.02 (0.00) 1.01 1.02 1.02 
Medium 
education 
0.25 (0.02) 1.25 1.29 1.33 
High education -0.71 (0.02) 0.47 0.49 0.51 
Separated/widow -0.16 (0.02) 0.82 0.85 0.89 
Single 0.66 (0.02) 1.87 1.94 2.01 
Care 1 – De-
familialisation 
0.13 (0.03) 1.08 1.14 1.21 
Care 3 – 
Familialisation 
without support 
0.40 (0.04) 1.39 1.50 1.62 
Gender 1 x 
migration 1 
-2.58 (0.09) 0.06 0.07 0.09 
Gender 2 x 
migration 1 
-2.95 (0.09) 0.04 0.05 0.06 
Gender 3 x 
migration 1 
-1.29 (0.09) 0.23 0.27 0.33 
Gender 1 x 
migration 2 
-1.74 (0.09) 0.15 0.17 0.21 
Gender 2 x 
migration 2 
-2.27 (0.08) 0.09 0.10 0.12 
Gender 3 x 
migration 2 
-2.87 (0.09) 0.05 0.06 0.07 
Gender 2 x 
migration 3 
-2.60 (0.05) 0.06 0.07 0.09 
Gender 3 x 
migration 3 
-3.44 (0.08) 0.03 0.03 0.04 
Gender 2 x 
migration 4 
-2.34 (0.14) 0.07 0.10 0.13 
Migrants in other sectors vs. migrant domestic workers 
Intercept 4.17 (0.09)    
Female -2.44 (0.02) 0.08 0.09 0.09 
Age -0.01 (0.00) 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Medium 
education 
0.44 (0.02) 1.50 1.55 1.61 
High education 1.66 (0.02) 5.05 5.28 5.52 
Separated/widow -0.33 (0.02) 0.69 0.72 0.75 
Single -0.05 (0.02) 0.92 0.95 0.99 
Care 1 – De-
familialisation 
-0.38 (0.03) 0.64 0.68 0.72 
Care 3 – 
Familialisation 
without support 
0.61 (0.04) 1.71 1.85 1.99 
Gender 1 x 
migration 1 
-1.25 (0.09) 0.24 0.29 0.34 
Gender 2 x 
migration 1 
-0.75 (0.10) 0.39 0.47 0.57 
Gender 3 x 
migration 1 
0.03 (0.10) (n.s.) 0.86 1.04 1.25 
Gender 1 x -0.69 (0.10) 0.41 0.50 0.61 
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migration 2 
Gender 2 x 
migration 2 
-0.79 (0.09) 0.38 0.45 0.54 
Gender 3 x 
migration 2 
-0.73 (0.09) 0.40 0.48 0.57 
Gender 2 x 
migration 3 
-1.91 (0.10) 0.12 0.15 0.18 
Gender 3 x 
migration 3 
-1.67 (0.08) 0.16 0.19 0.22 
Gender 2 x 
migration 4 
-0.77 (0.14) 0.35 0.46 0.61 
All coefficients are significant at 95%, apart from those indicated with (n.s.) 
 
 
 
MODEL 12 (interaction Care X Gender X Migration) 
 
 
MODEL 12 
  95% CI for odds ratio 
B (SE) Lower Odds ratio Upper 
Native domestic workers vs. migrant domestic workers 
Intercept -0.50 (0.05)    
Female 0.07 (0.02) 1.02 1.07 1.12 
Age 0.02 (0.00) 1.01 1.02 1.02 
Medium 
education 
0.25 (0.02) 1.24 1.28 1.33 
High education -0.70 (0.02) 0.47 0.50 0.52 
Separated/widow -0.16 (0.02) 0.82 0.85 0.89 
Single 0.66 (0.02) 1.87 1.94 2.02 
Care 3 x Gender 2 
x Migration 4 
1.18 (0.12) 2.57 3.28 4.17 
Care 2 x Gender 3 
x Migration 4 
3.21 (0.11) 19.92 24.76 30.76 
Care 3 x Gender 3 
x Migration 4 
3.34 (0.14) 21.57 28.14 36.70 
Care 1 x Gender 2 
x Migration 1 
0.30 (0.05) 1.22 1.36 1.51 
Care 2 x Gender 1 
x Migration 1 
2.05 (0.12) 6.10 7.77 9.89 
Care 1 x Gender 1 
x Migration 1 
0.60 (0.04) 1.68 1.83 1.99 
Care 2 x Gender 3 
x Migration 1 
1.83 (0.06) 5.56 6.24 7.00 
Care 2 x Gender 2 
x Migration 2 
0.73 (0.05) 1.89 2.07 2.27 
Care 1 x Gender 2 
x Migration 2 
1.04 (0.04) 2.60 2.84 3.09 
Care 1 x Gender 1 
x Migration 2 
1.51 (0.05) 4.08 4.52 5.00 
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Care 2 x Gender 3 
x Migration 2 
0.25 (0.05) 1.16 1.28 1.41 
Care 3 x Gender 2 
x Migration 3 
0.92 (0.06) 2.25 2.51 2.81 
Care 2 x Gender 3 
x Migration 3 
-0.30 (0.04) 0.68 0.74 0.80 
Migrants in other sectors vs. migrant domestic workers 
Intercept 3.20 (0.05)    
Female -2.44 (0.02) 0.08 0.09 0.09 
Age -0.01 (0.00) 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Medium 
education 
0.44 (0.02) 1.50 1.55 1.61 
High education 1.67 (0.02) 5.08 5.31 5.56 
Separated/widow -0.33 (0.02) 0.69 0.72 0.75 
Single -0.05 (0.02) 0.92 0.95 0.99 
Care 3 x Gender 2 
x Migration 4 
0.81 (0.12) 1.77 2.25 2.85 
Care 2 x Gender 3 
x Migration 4 
1.30 (0.11) 2.94 3.67 4.58 
Care 3 x Gender 3 
x Migration 4 
1.001 (0.14) 2.08 2.74 3.61 
Care 1 x Gender 2 
x Migration 1 
-0.16 (0.05) 0.77 0.85 0.94 
Care 2 x Gender 1 
x Migration 1 
-0.01 (0.13) (n.s.) 0.76 0.99 1.28 
Care 1 x Gender 1 
x Migration 1 
-0.66 (0.04) 0.48 0.52 0.56 
Care 2 x Gender 3 
x Migration 1 
1.01 (0.06) 2.44 2.73 3.06 
Care 2 x Gender 2 
x Migration 2 
0.15 (0.04) 1.06 1.60 1.26 
Care 1 x Gender 2 
x Migration 2 
-0.20 (0.04) 0.75 0.82 0.89 
Care 1 x Gender 1 
x Migration 2 
-0.10 (0.05) 1.81 0.90 1.00 
Care 2 x Gender 3 
x Migration 2 
0.24 (0.05) 1.16 1.27 1.39 
Care 3 x Gender 2 
x Migration 3 
-0.33 (0.06) 0.64 0.72 0.80 
Care 2 x Gender 3 
x Migration 3 
-0.72 (0.04) 0.45 0.49 0.53 
All coefficients are significant at 95%, apart from those indicated with (n.s.) 
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Comparison between 4 models: 
 
 MODEL 0 MODEL 1 MODEL 5 MODEL 11 
 B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) 
Native domestic workers vs. migrant domestic workers 
Intercept -0.05 (0.04) -0.24 (0.05) 2.17 (0.08) 2.60 (0.09) 
Female 0.17 (0.02) 0.07 (0.02) 0.10 (0.02) 0.07 (0.02) 
Age 0.02 (0.00) 0.02 (0.00) 0.02 (0.00) 0.02 (0.00) 
Medium education 0.36 (0.02) 0.24 (0.02) 0.15 (0.02) 0.25 (0.02) 
High education -0.55 (0.02) -0.72 (0.02) -0.81 (0.02) -0.71 (0.02) 
Separated/widow -0.15 (0.02) -0.16 (0.02) -0.16 (0.02) -0.16 (0.02) 
Single 0.69 (0.02) 0.66 (0.02) 0.66 (0.02) 0.66 (0.02) 
Belgium  0.06 (0.05) (n.s.)   
Czech Republic  2.33 (0.18)   
Denmark  1.19 (0.05)   
Estonia  0.95 (0.12)   
Spain  0.67 (0.05)   
Finland  1.81 (0.12)   
France  0.80 (0.03)   
Greece  -0.25 (0.05)   
Hungary  2.96 (0.11)   
Ireland  0.57 (0.04)   
Italy  -0.55 (0.03)   
Luxembourg  -1.18 (0.08)   
Netherlands  1.42 (0.07)   
Portugal  1.58 (0.05)   
Sweden  0.36 (0.03)   
Slovakia  3.62 (0.20)   
UK  0.82 (0.05)   
Care 1   -0.02 (0.03) (n.s.)  
Care 3   0.68 (0.03)  
Gender 1   0.11 (0.02)  
Gender 3   -0.03 (0.03) (n.s.)  
Migration 1   -1.89 (0.07)  
Migration 2   -1.72(0.07)  
Migration 3   -2.91 (0.07)  
Care 1 – De-
familialisation 
   0.13 (0.03) 
Care 3 – 
Familialisation 
without support 
   0.40 (0.04) 
Gender 1 x  
Migration 1 
   -2.58 (0.09) 
Gender 2 x  
Migration 1 
   -2.95 (0.09) 
Gender 3 x  
Migration 1 
   -1.29 (0.09) 
Gender 1 x  
Migration 2 
   -1.74 (0.09) 
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Gender 2 x  
Migration 2 
   -2.27 (0.08) 
Gender 3 x  
Migration 2 
   -2.87 (0.09) 
Gender 2 x  
Migration 3 
   -2.60 (0.05) 
Gender 3 x  
Migration 3 
   -3.44 (0.08) 
Gender 2 x  
Migration 4 
   -2.34 (0.14) 
Migrants in other sectors vs. migrant domestic workers 
Intercept 2.94 (0.04) 3.45 (0.05) 3.80 (0.09) 4.17 (0.09) 
Female -2.35 (0.02) -2.45 (0.02) -2.43 (0.02) -2.44 (0.02) 
Age -0.01 (0.00) -0.01 (0.00) -0.01 (0.00) -0.01 (0.00) 
Medium education 0.46 (0.02) 0.45 (0.02) 0.41 (0.02) 0.44 (0.02) 
High education 1.72 (0.02) 1.68 (0.02) 1.64 (0.02) 1.66 (0.02) 
Separated/widow -0.34 (0.02) -0.32 (0.02) -0.32 (0.02) -0.33 (0.02) 
Single -0.10 (0.02) -0.04 (0.02) -0.06 (0.02) -0.05 (0.02) 
Belgium  -0.40 (0.04)   
Czech Republic  0.93 (0.18)   
Denmark  -0.65 (0.05)   
Estonia  0.57 (0.12)   
Spain  -0.57 (0.05)   
Finland  -0.26 (0.13)   
France  -0.44 (0.03)   
Greece  -0.24 (0.05)   
Hungary  1.06 (0.11)   
Ireland  -0.12 (0.04)   
Italy  -0.96 (0.03)   
Luxembourg  0.13 (0.06)   
Netherlands  0.21 (0.07)   
Portugal  0.77 (0.05)   
Sweden  -0.90 (0.03)   
Slovakia  0.43 (0.21)   
UK  -0.16 (0.05)   
Care 1   -0.40 (0.03)  
Care 3   0.70 (0.03)  
Gender 1   -0.30 (0.03)  
Gender 3   0.27 (0.03)  
Migration 1   -0.42 (0.07)  
Migration 2   -0.36 (0.07)  
Migration 3   -1.57 (0.07)  
Care 1 – De-
familialisation 
   -0.38 (0.03) 
Care 3 – 
Familialisation 
without support 
   0.61 (0.04) 
Gender 1 x  
Migration 1 
   -1.25 (0.09) 
Gender 2 x     -0.75 (0.10) 
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Migration 1 
Gender 3 x  
Migration 1 
   0.03 (0.10) (n.s.) 
Gender 1 x  
Migration 2 
   -0.69 (0.10) 
Gender 2 x  
Migration 2 
   -0.79 (0.09) 
Gender 3 x  
Migration 2 
   -0.73 (0.09) 
Gender 2 x  
Migration 3 
   -1.91 (0.10) 
Gender 3 x  
Migration 3 
   -1.67 (0.08) 
Gender 2 x  
Migration 4 
   -0.77 (0.14) 
All coefficients are significant at 95%, apart from those indicated with (n.s.) 
 
 
 
Frequencies of interactions (Care x Gender, Care x Migration, Gender x Migration): 
 
 
 
-> tabulation of interaction   
 
 group(care | 
     gender | 
 migration) |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      1 1 1 |    151,791       12.10       12.10 
      1 1 2 |     96,846        7.72       19.82 
      1 2 1 |     40,058        3.19       23.01 
      1 2 2 |    197,223       15.72       38.73 
      2 1 1 |     11,835        0.94       39.67 
      2 2 2 |    122,121        9.73       49.41 
      2 3 1 |     69,813        5.56       54.97 
      2 3 2 |     85,247        6.79       61.76 
      2 3 3 |    202,719       16.16       77.92 
      2 3 4 |     95,771        7.63       85.55 
      3 2 3 |     39,798        3.17       88.73 
      3 2 4 |     11,727        0.93       89.66 
      3 3 3 |     72,904        5.81       95.47 
      3 3 4 |     56,808        4.53      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |  1,254,661      100.00 
 
-> tabulation of careXgender   
 
 group(care | 
    gender) |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
        1 1 |    248,637       19.82       19.82 
        1 2 |    237,281       18.91       38.73 
        2 1 |     11,835        0.94       39.67 
        2 2 |    122,121        9.73       49.41 
        2 3 |    453,550       36.15       85.55 
        3 2 |     51,525        4.11       89.66 
        3 3 |    129,712       10.34      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |  1,254,661      100.00 
 
 357 
-> tabulation of careXmigration   
 
 group(care | 
 migration) |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
        1 1 |    191,849       15.29       15.29 
        1 2 |    294,069       23.44       38.73 
        2 1 |     81,648        6.51       45.24 
        2 2 |    207,368       16.53       61.76 
        2 3 |    202,719       16.16       77.92 
        2 4 |     95,771        7.63       85.55 
        3 3 |    112,702        8.98       94.54 
        3 4 |     68,535        5.46      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |  1,254,661      100.00 
 
-> tabulation of genderXmigration   
 
group(gende | 
          r | 
 migration) |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
        1 1 |    163,626       13.04       13.04 
        1 2 |     96,846        7.72       20.76 
        2 1 |     40,058        3.19       23.95 
        2 2 |    319,344       25.45       49.41 
        2 3 |     39,798        3.17       52.58 
        2 4 |     11,727        0.93       53.51 
        3 1 |     69,813        5.56       59.08 
        3 2 |     85,247        6.79       65.87 
        3 3 |    275,623       21.97       87.84 
        3 4 |    152,579       12.16      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |  1,254,661      100.00 
 
 
 
